

Introduction

Born into an illustrious naval family, Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin furthered the family reputation for service to country. His grandfather, the first Henry C., is considered by many as the father of naval aviation, having established an air station at Pensacola, being the first to be catapulted off a ship, and being the first American aviator ever to take on live fire. His father, Lloyd, would have a notable career of his own as a "blackshoe," retiring as a Vice Admiral. As will be seen in the narrative, Mustin's father served as one of several life-long mentors. A detailed discussion of this family is contained in the final transcript.

Graduating the Naval Academy in 1955, Mustin received orders to a Pacific Fleet destroyer followed by a tour as C.O. on a Mayport-based mine hunter and quickly honed his seamanship skills that prepared him to for a remarkable and varied career in the Navy during the Cold War.

There are several areas of note in this oral history. First and foremost, Mustin was a naval warrior who helped bring on line new weapon systems and developed tactics and training methods for their employment. As a Lieutenant, he assisted creating early AAW doctrine; as a Vice Admiral he developed components of the Maritime Strategy. He had a hand in training evolutions such as Damage Control Olympics, NavTag, Surface Training Week, and pierside workups.

During the Vietnam War, Mustin had a Pug Henry "Winds of War" experience, witnessing the conflict from Saigon, the Mekong Delta, as an aide to CinCPac, and as C.O. of USS Henry B. Wilson.

Because of his service in OPNAV during Admiral Zumwalt's tenure as CNO, Mustin provides valuable insights about this controversial leader within the context of challenges faced during the early 1970s.

Finally Mustin's narrative provides excellent examples of leadership. He gives examples of others such as Captain Pete Smith and Admiral Ike Kidd who he sought to emulate. His tenure as Commander Destroyer Squadron TWELVE is a classic "12 o'clock High" story. Throughout, there is an emphasis of providing junior personnel the opportunity to develop seamanship and warfighting skills.

The Naval Historical Foundation appreciates Vice Admiral Mustin's participation in the interview process and his follow-on work to review the transcripts. Thanks also go to John Maloney who performed all of the transcription work and was timely and accurate.

David F. Winkler, Ph.D.
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Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, USN, (Ret.)

Henry C. Mustin was born in Bremerton, Washington on 31 August 1933, the son, grandson, and great-grandson of distinguished naval officers. (The Guided Missile Destroyer DDG 89 has been named for the Mustin family.) He graduated from Coronado High School, Coronado, California, in 1950 and attended the University of Virginia for one year prior to entering the U.S. Naval Academy. He was graduated and commissioned an Ensign 3 June 1955. He retired 1 January 1989.

Vice Admiral Mustin, a destroyerman, served at sea in the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets in USS Duncan (DDR 874); as Commanding Officer USS Bunting (MHC 45); as a plankowner in both USS Lawrence (DDG 4) and USS Conyngham (DDG 17); as Commanding Officer USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG 7); as Commander, Destroyer Squadron 12, homeported in Athens, Greece; as Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 2; and as Commander, U.S. Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic (225 ships and 2100 aircraft over 45 million square miles from the Arctic Ocean to the Equator.)

He served ashore in Vietnam with the Delta River Patrol Group; as Flag Lieutenant to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific; as Executive Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe; as Director, Surface Combat Systems Division in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations; as Deputy Commander Naval Surface Force, Atlantic Fleet; as Naval Inspector General; and as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations). He was responsible for the development of requirements and fleet introduction of the Tomahawk missile, the Standard missile (SM 2), LAMPS helicopters, and the Ticonderoga-class AEGIS cruisers. He was instrumental in defining the initial requirements for the Arleigh Burke class destroyers.

Vice Admiral Mustin directed all U.S. Navy arms control planning, including the START negotiations with the Soviet Union. He led high level U.S. interagency delegations to Moscow, London, Paris, Lisbon, Oslo, and Seoul. He also served as the Senior U.S. Military Representative to the United Nations.

His decorations include two Distinguished Service Medals, three Legion of Merit, three Bronze Stars with Combat "V," Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with Gold Star and Combat "V," Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V," Navy Achievement Medal, Combat Action Ribbon, Presidential Unit Citation, two Navy Unit Commendations, three Meritorious Unit Commendations, many campaign and services medals, and numerous foreign decorations and awards, including the Vietnamese Medal of Honor and Gallantry Cross and Palm.

He was married to the former Lucy Holcomb of Alexandria, Virginia. They have three sons, a daughter, and nine grandchildren. He passed away on 11 April 2016.

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8 January 2001

WINKLER: Today is January 8, 2001. This is Dave Winkler, of the Naval Historical Foundation, with Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, United States Navy, Retired. This is going to be the first of a series of interviews to talk about his career in the United States Navy.

You're not the first Mustin to serve in the Navy. As an introduction, could you talk a little bit about the line of Mustins that preceded you?

MUSTIN: Yes. Well there's more than Mustins. The interesting thing about my family is that the ties are on both my father's and mother's side. My father's side goes back to the War of 1812. Commodore Arthur Sinclair was his great-great-grandfather. And then there were a series of Arthur Sinclairs, one of whom commanded the Lelia in the Confederate Navy. Arthur Sinclair, his son, and my great great uncle served with Semmes in the Alabama. Then down from that side, my grandfather was the first to attend the Naval Academy, class of 1896. I'm named for him, Henry C. Mustin. He was Naval Aviator Number 11, and he started Pensacola. Great sea stories about that. My father is Naval Academy class of 1932. I'm the class of '55, my brother, Tom, is the class of 62, and my youngest son, John, is the class of '90.

On my mother's side, my great-grandfather, Thomas Benton Howard, was the Class of 1876. We have a picture of the Captains of the battleships in the Great White Fleet. Captain Howard is among them, as is my great great uncle, Captain Bowyer. Admiral Howard was CinCPacFlt at the Battle of Veracruz. My grandfather was in command of the aviation detachment that fought at the Battle of Veracruz, which was the first time that any U.S. aviator of any service was fired at by ground fire. My great-uncle, George Barnett, was the Commandant of the Marine Corps at that time. One of the fun things about that is that when I was ComSecondFlt the Fleet Marine gave me a history of amphibious operations in the Navy, and one of the operations discussed was the Veracruz battle. The only one of those three ancestors, Admiral Howard, Captain Mustin, and General Barnett, who was mentioned was General Barnett, the Marine. So the Marine histories are sometimes lacking in full fleshing out. My mother's father, James Proctor Morton, fought with Dewey at the Battle of Manila Bay and was Superintendent of the Postgraduate School at one time. My mother's brother, Tom Morton, is the class of '33, who retired as a rear admiral, and whose son, John, is now working on this family history.

So we're intertwined all the way back to the War of 1812, and maybe beyond, but that's as far as we've...

WINKLER: Has anybody ever laid this all out on paper?

MUSTIN: Yes, my sister has, and my brother also. We've spent a lot of time in the archives piecing this all together. An awful lot of world and naval history has transpired during this period, and various key world players are part of our family history. My

grandmother, for example, Corinne Mustin, is the first cousin of the Duchess of Windsor. When my grandfather Henry Mustin died, the pioneer aviator, she remarried George Murray, who was the captain of the Enterprise at the Battle of Midway, and who was a great friend of Chester Nimitz. We have a picture of the surrender on board USS Missouri signed by Admiral Nimitz to Admiral Murray. Admiral Murray took the surrender in the Marianas from the Japanese. So people like that sort of walked in and out of the family history, the tapestry, as the years rolled by.

WINKLER: How did your father and your mother come to know each other?

MUSTIN: Annapolis is my mother's hometown. The Lord Calvert Inn, which is right on State Circle, was our family home. So my mother lived there when my dad was a midshipman, and they met because their families knew each other. She was sixteen when they were married in 1932.

WINKLER: That's not uncommon for that time period. They married younger then. That would be kind of scandalous today. How many siblings came out of that marriage?

MUSTIN: Myself; my sister, who will be one of the sponsors of the new destroyer Mustin, along with my wife; and my brother, Tom, who's Naval Academy Class of '62.

WINKLER: The destroyer Mustin is named for...

MUSTIN: It's named for my grandfather, my father, myself, and my brother; for the family. There has been a Mustin in the Navy in every generation for over a hundred years.

WINKLER: Because it's a family, I guess you can be included. Because traditionally, of course—until they started naming the aircraft carriers after living politicians—the tradition is you had to be dead. Of course, your father and your...

MUSTIN: Or Arleigh Burke.

WINKLER: Arleigh Burke, yes, that would be an exception.

MUSTIN: But that's right. When I wrote the letter to the Secretary asking that he consider naming a second destroyer Mustin—the first one was named for my grandfather—my dad was still alive. But by the time the decision was made, he had died.

WINKLER: The other thing is, they also name have ships after previous ships. The first Mustin, I assume, served in World War II?

MUSTIN: World War II, among the top three destroyers in terms of battle stars with 13. As a matter of fact, the Mustin was the destroyer that went alongside during the battle of

Guadalcanal at the Santa Cruz Islands just before the Hornet sank. Those two ships have an old timer's association that gets together every year.

WINKLER: Yes, okay. Now, as the son of a Naval officer, I assume that you grew up in different locations.

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. I was born in Bremerton, Washington, because my dad was assigned to the USS Augusta, which left Bremerton shortly after I was born in 1933, and went to become the flagship of the Asiatic Fleet. My dad's first two skippers were Admiral Richardson and Admiral Nimitz, and they both became lifelong friends of his. I lived with them over there, but I can't remember anything about Tsingtao, Shanghai, and the whole Asiatic Fleet scene. From the home movies I've seen it was a different world and a very different navy.

WINKLER: At the time, what was his position on the ship?

MUSTIN: He was an Assistant Gunnery Officer. He was a brand new ensign. There were eight or nine ensigns from his class assigned to the ship; I think five or six of them became flag officers. But his entire life was influenced by his association particularly with Admiral Nimitz, because Admiral Richardson left shortly after he got there.

WINKLER: After the Augusta then, where did...

MUSTIN: We came back to Annapolis, which was my mother's home. He went up to Bath Iron Works, where the destroyer Lamson was under construction. We stayed in Annapolis. I can't really remember a lot of that.

We then moved to Coronado in 1938 and that's where I have my earliest memories, when I was five. We returned from Coronado in '39 so that my dad could attend Postgraduate School, which was then at Annapolis. So when the war started he was at the Postgraduate School. Went to the Pacific, and we stayed in Annapolis during the war. I remember that period clearly.

WINKLER: During the war your father was assigned to...

MUSTIN: Predominantly to cruisers and battleships in the Pacific. He served in the Atlanta, which was sunk in the Battle of Guadalcanal, and he survived the sinking. He was the Assistant Gunnery Officer, and he's featured in Ballard's book about the lost ships of Guadalcanal. He stayed ashore with the Marines for almost three months when the battle was really hanging in the balance, and then came back to the States.

Ballard found the Atlanta, and my dad said that when the order was given to abandon ship—which he didn't agree with—he went down to his stateroom, which was dark, of course. It was in the night. He said he reached in and grabbed a 45 and a couple of other things, because he knew he was going ashore with the Marines. He said he reached his hand in the bulkhead and if he'd gone another six inches he would have

grabbed his father's sword, which was hanging on a sword peg on the bulkhead. We've often thought that—the Atlanta is not too deep—my brother and I considered when we were younger going out there and diving on the Atlanta and seeing if we could find my grandfather's sword. We gave that up.

WINKLER: Marine life probably would have gotten to it.

MUSTIN: It was very difficult to get phone communications during the war. It took a while for us to find out that he was alive, because things were so frantic on the island. But we did; we were notified that the survivors were there.

Then when he came back he arrived in San Francisco, and he could get a flight across the States faster than he could get a phone call through to the family. So we were all sitting there one night and the front door opened, and there's a guy with a sea bag on his shoulder. He said, "Do I live here?" It was my dad coming back from the Battle of Guadalcanal. He was back to build and commission the cruiser Miami, which went back out right away. We went up to Philadelphia while that was finished, and then he went back to the Pacific in the Miami and went to Admiral Willis A. Lee's staff.

Admiral Lee was sent back to Norfolk right around the time the war ended. They had been actively involved in the planning for the invasion of Japan. When the bomb was dropped, that was of course cancelled. In the meantime there had been a lot of complaints in the fleet that new stuff that was being pushed out by the guys in OpNav wasn't working. So the CNO wanted to establish the Operational Development Force, which is now OpTevFor. Admiral Lee was selected to start up that operation and he brought my dad with him to Norfolk. So we moved to Norfolk.

Then moved up to the Washington area in '48 when he went to the Bureau of Ordnance, and I went to St. Stephen's School here. In the flailings of the moves, often my dad was gone. In Norfolk they had a split-year scheme of education, so that you were in 7 Low and 7 High, or 6 Low and 6 High. My mother didn't understand what that was, so when we went to go to the school down there, public school, the guy said to my mother, "Well, is your son in 7 Low or 7 High?"

She said, "Of course, he's in 7 High." So I skipped half a grade. We were there for six months. Then we moved up here, and they didn't have split years. In the meantime it was the second half of the year now. So I went to St. Stephen's, and my mother was adamant that I wasn't going to repeat 7th grade, so I ended up going into the last half of the 8th grade at St. Stephen's. So I ended up skipping two half-years, and ended up skipping a year out of that business. Which meant that when I graduated ultimately from Coronado High School in California, I was too young to go to the Naval Academy, so I had to go to college for a year. I went to the University of Virginia.

In answer to your basic question: yes, we moved around a lot.

WINKLER: As far as a role model is concerned, you probably looked up a lot to your father?

MUSTIN: Absolutely.

WINKLER: Was there anybody else? Probably your mother was very influential...

MUSTIN: Yes.

WINKLER: ...character because she spent a lot of time...

MUSTIN: I really was influenced, as a group, by my father's associates. I thought the people that were around the house with him were really cool. And they were, of course, the outstanding people from the Naval Academy, because he had been an all-American athlete as well as a top performer in academics and leadership. But also the people that were friends of my step-grandfather, Admiral Murray. So my parents would have cocktail parties and Admiral Halsey would be there. This was in the late forties and early fifties, and the events of the war were fresh in these guys' minds. They would be talking over what now are the famous battles of World War II, and they'd be saying, well, so and so was a nervous Nellie and a son of a bitch, and abandoned his ship too early. They talked the way we do, about guys that are the giants of history. All of that stuff had a great influence on me.

Admiral Mitscher was often at these parties. I used to cut Admiral Mitscher's grass and wash his car.

WINKLER: So there really wasn't much of a chance that you were going to go to West Point.

MUSTIN: No, I hadn't really thought of that.

WINKLER: As far as applying to the Naval Academy—you mentioned you went to the University of Virginia. To get to the University of Virginia, they have high academic standards, so you obviously, despite having skipped a grade, were adept academically?

MUSTIN: Yes.

WINKLER: Did you also participate in sports?

MUSTIN: At St. Stephen's, I won the cup as the outstanding athlete. I was captain of the football and baseball teams, and won the cup for the outstanding basketball player. At Coronado High, I played football and I was the captain of the swimming team. And I was on the swimming team at Virginia. Then when I went to the Naval Academy, at the time they had a program called SecNav appointments. I had competed for a Presidential appointment, which was sons of military officers. But the SecNav appointments were

essentially for athletes. So the determination was made by the Naval Academy bureaucracy that they would put me in the SecNav appointment category, in order to free up a slot on the Presidential appointments for a guy who not an athlete. So I went in that way.

WINKLER: When you're arriving there, I guess you're eighteen years old?

MUSTIN: No, I was seventeen.

WINKLER: Okay. Unlike quite a few folks whose first day at Annapolis is as a plebe, you must have been very well briefed, as far as what you could expect as a plebe.

MUSTIN: Yes, I was. And I wasn't really a very good midshipman, because I thought a lot of it was kind of mickey-mouse. I was really torn while I was at the Naval Academy, and this is a common theme among a lot of guys that are Navy juniors. I had enormous respect for the institution and the history and the traditions of the Service, and the professional subjects that I was taught. And I had at the same time a very keen appreciation of how much of the stuff that went on in the Naval Academy had nothing to do with the Navy, and was just mickey-mouse Naval Academy stuff. So I had that same contradiction that Johnny McCain and others have had. When I went on cruise, I was always in the highest aptitude marks in leadership, but when we came back to the Academy I just didn't like a lot of that unrealistic stuff.

One of the things that concerned me then, and when I was a senior officer I was glad to see some action taking care of it, was the prohibition on drinking. It meant that a lot of guys who graduated from the Academy were put in this free-wheeling society and they didn't know how to handle themselves with alcohol. You had a lot of guys get in socially embarrassing, and in some cases serious problems when they graduated, because as junior officers they didn't know how to handle themselves in normal cocktail party situations. They do better at that now, but at that time they didn't.

There were a lot of other artificialities and abnormalities at the Naval Academy that I just didn't like, and therefore I didn't do very well. Looking back on the Naval Academy, it's a series of pros and cons. The pros vastly outweigh the cons. And the fact that I didn't fit into that round peg quite as nicely as other guys is my fault, not the fault of the Academy. It does a pretty damn good job of turning out naval officers, and needs no apologies whatsoever.

WINKLER: One thing that's unique about that period is that you're in a post-war period. The Naval Academy after the war, I think, is different. Quite a few of your classmates may have had some experience...

MUSTIN: Yes. Well, there was a conflux. It was interesting there, because the senior officers on duty there were all, for the most part, veterans of the war. Most of the instructors were officers. So that at the time, the Naval Academy was not accredited. Our

electronics prof was a lieutenant (jg) out of the Class of '50. He was about a chapter ahead of us in the electronics book, which was about three-quarters of an inch thick, because electronics wasn't a big subject. It meant that the academics, which were lock-step—everybody took the same thing except for language—were pretty rigidly divided between professional and non-professional, and the people who had come in, many did have prior service, and many came in just to avoid going to Korea. Which was not unlike what had happened in both service academies in World War II. The rules at the time permitted you to resign from the Naval Academy up to the start of your junior year, your second-class year. So a lot of these guys came in from the Marine Corps and the Army and the Navy, etc., and then immediately resigned or failed academically on purpose. They didn't get drafted because they had prior service. So a large number of the people who were in there were glorified draft dodgers. When the Korean War ended, a number of people just dropped out instantly from the Academy, or got married or deliberately bilged out or things like that. It was a kind of a melting pot. The whole central idea that the officer corps of the Navy came from the Naval Academy had changed forever with the start of World War II. As I said, when my dad went to the Augusta there were nine new ensigns; they were all his classmates, because that was the only source for officers, except for mustangs, guys who had worked their way up. But at the end of World War II, the OCS and the ROTC were created by Admiral Holloway, among others, so the Naval Academy was therefore changing from the sole source of officers to just another source of officers. There was a lot of acrimony among the various sources, which there still is to some degree today. The recent Congressional action demanding that Academy grads get Reserve commissions is an example.

To get ahead a little bit, when I went to my first ship the Gunnery Officer was a mustang, a lieutenant, who had twenty years in, had been a gunner's mate. The first day that I was there he said, "Kid, I'm Lieutenant Wright, and you can call me Lieutenant Wright." He said, "Do you know the difference between an OCS graduate and an ROTC graduate and a Naval Academy graduate?"

I said, "No, Sir."

He said, "Well, an OCS graduate is probably a mustang, so he's an officer trying to learn how to be a gentleman. An ROTC graduate is a gentleman trying to learn how to be an officer. A Naval Academy graduate is both." Then he laughed like hell. And there was a lot of that.

WINKLER: While you're at the Naval Academy, you mentioned you had some athleticism in your younger days, I imagine that continued on through?

MUSTIN: Well, yes. I wasn't big enough or fast enough to play varsity football there. When I was there, Navy won the Sugar Bowl. It was ranked in the top five, and George Welsh was the quarterback. When we went out for plebe football, there were 800 guys out there. It became pretty apparent to me that I wasn't good enough to play in that league. So I was on the swimming team for a couple of years. Then I never got really good enough to compete at the varsity level, so I stayed at the intramural level in

swimming, and played a lot of intramural sports. Which everybody does there. The average guy at the Naval Academy, then and now, is a pretty damn good athlete. A high percentage of them were captains of high school athletic teams. It's hard to realize now, looking at how they play football and how they do, that Navy was in the top five in the country. It was really great to be there with all those guys. There was this enormous intramural athletic program, which there still is, and they're all fully involved with that.

WINKLER: During that plebe year, did you beat Army?

MUSTIN: Yes. But that was the year of the cheating scandal at West Point. Coach Blaik's son and virtually the whole football team were kicked out. So not only did we beat them, we beat them something like 42 to 7. Which meant that we all got to carry on. We beat them three times during my four years.

WINKLER: Where did you do your cruises?

MUSTIN: I did my youngster cruise in a destroyer, and my first-class cruise in the Missouri, battleship.

WINKLER: Deployed stateside?

MUSTIN: No, in those days they formed a training squadron. The squadron went to northern Europe. We didn't go into the Med because there were still occupation forces in the Med. So both cruises went to northern Europe. The first one, we went up to Norway, and the second one, we went up to France, Cherbourg and Brest and places like that.

WINKLER: This was after the Korean War, of course.

MUSTIN: Youngster cruise in 52 was during the war. Yes. First-class cruise was the summer of '54. As a matter of fact, on that cruise I was a big wheel in the midshipman organization. I was the engineer officer. It was the only time that the four Iowa-class battleships operated together—Iowa, New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Missouri. It was quite something to see them.

WINKLER: Gunnery exercises?

MUSTIN: Yes. There was a famous picture taken of them all leaving Hampton Roads, forming up in a line abreast. A guy took that picture from a helicopter. It was a wonderful picture.

WINKLER: One of the things you mentioned is the fact that you have these officers on the ship, all with World War II experience. During these cruises was there anything that influenced you to say—because all your shipmates are going aviation—that surface navy is the way to go?

(END OF SIDE A, TAPE I)

MUSTIN: For the first time, when I went to go into the Naval Academy from the University, it became apparent that my eyes were going bad. So I had to go to a then famous guy over in Washington, Dr. Silver. His claim to fame was that he would have you look at a lot of colored lights and rotating things, and he would make your eyes good enough that you could pass the entrance exam. I think really what he did was teach you how to read the blurs. Anyway, by the skin of my teeth I passed the entrance exam for the Naval Academy, the second time. The first time I failed it. I was walking out next to a guy who said, “Well, that was a piece of cake. But I don’t intend to come here. I just wanted to show my old man that I could have if I’d wanted to.” Anyway, I passed the second time.

My youngster year at the Naval Academy I started wearing glasses. There were no waivers for either submarines or aviation at the time. So I never really considered... Had a lot of fun flying the N3N’s around, but I knew I had no way physically to get into those two unions. So I concentrated on not having to go to the Supply Corps. That was my big concern, was how am I going to keep my eyes good enough to get an unrestricted line commission?

WINKLER: At this time your father—what is he doing?

MUSTIN: He was a brand new early-selected captain when I went in. So he was a captain on duty in the Bureau of Ordnance. Then he was assigned as a captain of a destroyer tender, and then as a destroyer squadron commander on the West Coast. He was the captain of the destroyer tender when I reported to USS Duncan (DDR 874), my first ship.

WINKLER: We’ll return to that very shortly. As far as classmates at Annapolis, any recollections of some of your classmates who may have gone on to careers of distinction?

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. A lot of my classmates had really distinguished careers. Monroe Hatch became a four-star general in the Air Force, because there was no Air Force Academy. He was the vice chief of staff of the Air Force. Powell Carter became CinCLantFlt. Phil Monahan became a distinguished Marine general. John Weaver and Hugh Webster became admirals. Scot McCauley. I think we had seventeen flag and general officers out of the class, a really distinguished bunch of guys. I have a list of all of them somewhere, but I think seventeen is a good number.

WINKLER: As far as classmates who may have had an influence on you, maybe upper-classmen who may have been a good role model for you...

MUSTIN: Jim Sagerholm was a guy out of the class of ’52 who became an admiral, who I thought was a superb guy. I always thought Jim should have been the CNO. He became a vice admiral, but he did not become the CNO, I think because he had a little feud with Rickover. Another one of my classmates who made a lot of distinction, of course, was

Robin Pirie, who's now the UnderSecNav. He was a Rhodes scholar, great lacrosse player. Jim Sagerholm, I'd say. Bill Leftwich, who was in the class of '53, I thought was a magnificent guy. John Drew, not a classmate but our battalion officer, who was a commander at the time. The guys who were commanders were out of the class of '42, because they had gone to war, and in the war a hump was created because there was no attrition. If you stayed alive you were promoted, and you were promoted fast. My dad was a lieutenant when the war started, and he was a commander when it ended. Anyway, John Drew was the class of '42, and when he came to the Naval Academy in 1953, he was a commander. The guys out of '45, who were plebes when the class of '42 were first-classmen, were lieutenants. So the difference of three years meant the difference between a full commander and a lieutenant, and the lieutenants had no prospects for promotion. In the meantime, over the next couple of years, they took all these humped guys and went back and retroactively put in all the attrition factors in the selection board, so that all of a sudden a majority of the commanders were being passed over for captain to accommodate for missing attrition.

Anyway, you had these guys who had been at the Naval Academy together and they were separated by two full grades in the officer structure of the instructors. The senior guys were combat veterans, and they had a whole different sense of what was important than the junior guys, who had never made it into the war. So the senior guys wanted you to be leaders and do well in athletics and pay attention to yourself, and the junior guys tended to concentrate on the mickey-mouse stuff. So as a consequence, most of us really looked up to the senior guys, and didn't like the junior officers. John Drew was the battalion commander; he was as close to John Wayne as you can get. Dave Bagley, who later became CinCUSNavEur, was one of the guys there. The commandant was Captain R. T. S. Keith, who became a vice admiral. The superintendents were older guys. Harry Hill was one of them. These guys were so far above us they were beyond consideration; they were from a different world. So they had no real influence on us any more than God or Jesus Christ did, in terms of day to day living. C. Turner Joy was one of them.

It's hard to be really influenced by any one person when you're at the Academy, because you're so busy all the time. But I was influenced by the environment, and guys like John Drew and my classmates that I was associated with. It's common with every organization that the best guys tend to stay together, and then there's a bunch of other guys. I'm not an elitist, but that's just a fact of life. It's that way at Harvard or Princeton or the Naval Academy. I was lucky to be part of a group of guys who were the elite, and they're the guys that have been friends of mine ever since. Guys who were really world-class athletes and the leaders of the brigade were friends, and have stayed friends through the years.

WINKLER: As far as selection of ships, early on you determined that you were going to have a career as a—they didn't call them surface warfare officers back then.

MUSTIN: No. Oh, no. They called them destroyer sailors.

WINKLER: How did that process go?

MUSTIN: It was very different then, than it is now. Then you went and drew your service selection preference out of a hat. It was a lottery. So if you wanted to be in one of the ships or homeports where there were a too many candidates, you could have been out of luck. Also, many of my class went into the Air Force. I drew a number out of the hat that was high enough, luckily for me, to let me pick a San Diego-based destroyer by name, because I wanted to live in Coronado and I wanted to be in a modern destroyer, which this was, a Gearing-class destroyer, a DDR. And so I picked that, and off we went.

WINKLER: Were we dating at the Naval Academy?

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. Lucy and I started dating my junior year. When I graduated I went to WestPac right away. When I came back from WestPac I came back here—she was living here—and we were married.

WINKLER: “Here” is in Washington?

MUSTIN: Alexandria.

WINKLER: How did you run into Lucy?

MUSTIN: She went to school with my sister, so I knew her well. She’s a lot younger than I am. When I was a junior in college, she was a junior in high school. One Christmas, the Christmas of ’53, I was between girl friends. Her brother was a great athlete and a good friend of mine. He and I played on the basketball team at St. Stephen’s. He got tickets to the Globetrotters, who were in town. He said, “I’ll tell you what. If you can’t get a date, I’ll take your sister and you take mine.”

I said, “Are we going to take these two high school girls out on a date?”

He said, “Sure. What the hell.” So we went to the Globetrotters game, and that’s the last date I ever had with anybody else.

WINKLER: Okay. You mentioned you went right out to WestPac. You’re in a DDR, a Gearing-class destroyer. You know, when you say Gearing-class destroyer—when I came to the fleet they were retiring those things. But that was the top of the line.

MUSTIN: Yes. This was before the FRAM program and the DDR's were the cream of the destroyer crop. As a matter of fact, my first ship had an overhaul in the shipyard at Mare Island, where Lucy and I lived in a Quonset hut for our first home. One of the things we did during that shipyard period was take off the 40-millimeter mounts, because it was determined that the new 3-inch round with the VT fuse was good enough for anti-air defense. So we did that during that overhaul. And just before I left we had our second

overhaul, both of which were at Mare Island. The captain came into the wardroom one morning—Pete Smith, who was a wonderful, great influence on me. His face was white. And he said, “I’ve just come from a meeting with the Admiral, who informed me that this overhaul of this ship is going to cost a million dollars. The Admiral had said, not only had he never heard of a million-dollar overhaul, but he didn’t intend to ever hear of another one again. And how had I possibly let my ship get into such disrepair that it would take a million dollars to put it back on the line?” So that’s the scale...

WINKLER: Back then they were building ships for a million dollars.

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. Now, a million dollars wouldn’t get you past the arrival conference.

WINKLER: How was it that so much money was expended on the overhaul?

MUSTIN: A lot of it was ShipAlts, and OrdAlts like removing the 44 mm, and upgrades to the radar and the CIC, and the radios and communication. They had not done much to these ships, because the Korean War was going on and everybody had been on the line essentially since the end of World War II. So they were falling apart. The engineering plants were in really sad shape. It’s lucky that they were, as Herman Wouk said in “The Caine Mutiny,” designed by geniuses to be run by idiots. Because the engineering practices in World War II, you know, they’d be sitting at anchor and somebody would say “Air raid,” and they’d ram in four burners and get underway, when all the instruction books told you had to slowly go to certain temperatures to warm up the lines and everything. They didn’t pay any attention to that stuff. So they had been run, and run hard. In a couple of months in World War II, as in Vietnam, you’d put five or ten years worth of peacetime firing allowance on the guns. The gun mounts—the liners were all out of the barrels and stuff. So these ships were in bad shape. Probably many of them would have been laid up if it had not been for the Korean War.

WINKLER: They probably pulled quite a few out from being laid up for the Korean War.

MUSTIN: They did.

WINKLER: You mentioned you made a WestPac; where to?

MUSTIN: I made three WestPac cruises in the Duncan, so we really covered the waterfront. We went from Korea on down to Australia; crossed the equator. It was very different, the whole modus was different. Everything was lock-step. You deployed for seven months door-to-door, and you came home for six months door-to-door. The reason for the seven and six, instead of six and six, was so that you didn’t always have Christmas overseas. But that’s what you did. It didn’t matter what was going on in the world or anything else. And you deployed as a unit. A destroyer division, which was four destroyers, deployed together.

When you came back, you had a thirty-day rest and recreation period, and then you started operating, and you operated Monday through Friday. If you were going out for a gunnery shoot, it didn't matter whether it was foggy or rainy, or anything, you went out there and steamed around in little circles, and came back in Friday and tied up to a buoy in San Diego Bay, because the destroyer piers could only accommodate a couple of ships, and most of them were in availability status. So we all swung to buoys out there. You couldn't get away with that kind of routine now, with family life.

My first cruise, when I went aboard I was the fifth officer in the engineering department, and by the time we got to Japan, three weeks later, I was the second officer, because all the guys' obligated service for the Korean War had ended. So we went from twenty-two officers down to eleven, which meant that we were standing horrendous watch schedules, port and starboard. When we came back to the States you had the duty every third day, and that was it. So if you'd go to sea Monday and come in Friday, you'd have the duty either Friday, Saturday, or Sunday, and then back to sea again. Really it was a tough time, for morale and everything else.

WINKLER: The only good news there is that you get yourself qualified real quick.

MUSTIN: Oh, boy. Well, we had the kinds of operating experience that guys spend six or seven years in the Navy before they get now, and even then they don't approach us. In WestPac we'd steam around in a thirty-ship destroyer screen, with three or four carriers inside and a battleship, and maybe two or three cruisers, a large formation steaming, which was a holdover from World War II. So we were really expert at maneuvering boards and close-in station-keeping and rapid refueling at sea, and all those things which are considered almost lost arts now. We would go alongside to fuel at sixty to eighty feet, and you could throw the lines over. Now, if they're closer than two hundred feet it's rare. Over my career I've often reflected on how do we keep basic skills like piloting up for these guys who don't go to sea very often because they're all off playing some computer game in school ashore. That doesn't help you much when the tide's running against you and you put the ship on the mud flats. That happens a lot, particularly in the submarine force, because they don't get enough practice piloting, and don't understand it. In a submarine, most of it is under water, so you're really affected current.

In the 60's, I was CinCPac's aide, Admiral Sharp, was one of the great influences on me. Of course his component commanders were all four-star officers, the Army Pacific guy, and the Air Force. He'd have a CinC's meeting once a week, and at least three times when we were there—you could look out of his office and see the entrance past Ford Island and the channel to sea—at least three times there's a submarine sitting on the mud waiting for the tide to come in so they could get to sea. Every time either CinCUSArPac or CinCPacAF would say, "Now, Oley, what's that ship doing out there?" And they'd laugh like hell--but Admiral Sharp didn't.

He'd take me aside and whisper, "We've got to get these guys to stay off the mud."

WINKLER: You mentioned a little bit about the skipper. He probably was the first skipper you had.

MUSTIN: The first skipper I had was a guy out of the class of '38, who was a submariner, named Ed Conrad, who was a magnificent ship handler, really great. The problem was that he didn't like to let other officers handle the ship. He became a good friend. He left at the end of the first cruise.

The second captain, Pete Smith, was a surface officer. He was a veteran of the war. His philosophy was that he was there to train the officers to be commanding officers. When I left the ship, I thought that I was a better ship handler than he was. And I, over the years, have reflected that that's what he wanted me to think. Because we made all the routine landings, and we'd make all the two-bell landings and the crash-back approaches alongside. The only time he ever handled was when it was really tough. And so we'd go and say, "Well, Captain, my last landing I made three bells; how many did you make?"

He'd say, "Nine," and he'd kind of snicker. Well, he had done it under really difficult conditions. He trained people to want to be commanding officers, and he made it fun. So that at a time when many of the officers were getting out, a lot of them stayed in from that wardroom. Two of them became admirals, myself and a guy named Jim Toole, who's over in Washington, runs a bookstore.

WINKLER: Yes, in fact I met him two weeks ago. He was at the Foundation.

MUSTIN: Yes. He and I were together in Vietnam, too, and then again down in Norfolk. He's another guy you could talk to. We had a lot of sea stories together.

WINKLER: Everybody, I think, I've talked to remembers reporting aboard for the first time, their first ship. What were your impressions?

MUSTIN: Well, I reported aboard the night before we were going to deploy to WestPac. We'd had a hell of a party. I'd gone to Coronado High and I'd graduated from Coronado High, so I knew a lot of people in town. Some of my classmates and best friends had reported to other ships in this destroyer division. So we had this enormous party, that literally ended up hours before we were going to get underway. We went out and reported for duty and went to the bridge. They told the exec and the exec said the captain wants the new officers to go to the bridge, so up we go. And I'm really hung over, and nervous about this. As we get underway, the OOD says to the captain, "Hey, there's a sailboat and two power craft, and they're circling the ship, and causing us trouble."

I went out to the wing of the bridge, and here's this gang of guys and girls in bikinis that I'd been partying with the night before, saying, "See you in six months, Hank." So, this was a source of great embarrassment to me. I was hoping the captain didn't hear who they were talking to, but he did.

It was a great experience to report aboard the day of deployment. Because I missed all the pre-deployment inspections, which are a real pain in the butt.

WINKLER: That's one of the things which, talking to a lot of folks, deploying you leave all the mail and the post office. And unfortunately today with the internet and connectivity...

MUSTIN: You can't get away from it.

WINKLER: You can't get away from it. You can't leave the pier anymore and get away from it.

MUSTIN: It's a whole different environment and experience. It was interesting in those days, because, again, the Korean War was just over, and World War II wasn't that far removed, so everywhere we went we were rich. And in Japan you could buy a Martin guitar for eight dollars. We'd go in the O-Club; we'd get a bottle of whiskey to take it out in town and drink it in the bars out in town—a bottle of Beefeaters would cost eighty-five cents. That kind of stuff. So we all had tons of money, and I was richer when I was an ensign in WestPac than I've ever been in my life. A steak dinner was a dollar and a half. It's isn't that way anymore. Everybody went over and we all got uniforms and civvies tailor-made in Hong Kong. I still have a couple of sport coats I got for eight bucks in Hong Kong. It was quite an experience to go to WestPac. Those of us who'd gone to the Naval Academy didn't have any wardrobes. So my classmate and great friend, Hugh Webster, and I went to Hong Kong with the express purpose of getting our civilian wardrobes, which we did. The problem is, we all went to PG school four years later and all our clothes were exactly the same age, so they all wore out at the same time. We had to wear civvies to class, so one day we were in there and we were pretty spiffy, and the next day the elbows were coming out of our clothes and the collars were fraying on our shirts.

WINKLER: Talk about the enlisted. You said you were initially in engineering, so you're dealing with the "snipes." I guess they usually say a chief is there to train an ensign. Did you have a chief training you?

MUSTIN: Yes, I did. I had a guy who I owe a lot to, and who really influenced my views of what a chief ought to be. This guy's name was Blazewski. He was older than my father, and he had a row of hash marks that were running up his arm. He had over thirty-two years in then. He really looked out for me, particularly when all these other officers got out.

One day the captain—the second captain, whom I really liked, Pete Smith—went down in the forward fire room unannounced, just walking around. He said to Chief Ski, "Ski, I've just come from the after fire room, and I noticed that the casing pressure"—you had to have air between the inner casing and the outer casing in order to keep the fire contained in the boiler—"noticed that the casing pressure is always lower in the forward fire room than it is in the after fire room. Why is that?"

Ski took off his hat and scratched his head and said, “Jeez, I don’t know, Captain. You’ll have to ask Mr. Mustin that stuff. He knows all that stuff.”

The captain left, and Ski came right back. I was sitting in my stateroom reading a magazine. He said, “The captain came down today and he asked this question. He’ll probably ask you again, tonight. The answer is that, when we’re at high speed, as we were, there’s a pressure drop across the bridge, and that means that the casing pressure area in the forward fire room is lower than the after fire room. So you don’t need as much casing pressure.”

I said, “Thanks, Ski.”

I went up to supper and the skipper said, “Hey, Hank, I was down in the forward fire room today, and noticed that the casing pressure was a lot lower. Why do you suppose that is?”

I said, “Well, I’ve thought about that, Skipper,” and I told him about the pressure drop across the bridge.

He says, “Jesus, that makes sense.” Well, it took me five or ten years and a lot of time in engineering to realize that that wasn’t true at all. What happened was, we had a lot of boiler casing leaks in the forward fire room and they couldn’t get the air pressure up, and he didn’t want the captain and me dicking around with his schedule about how he was going to fix them and when he was going to do it.

So when I used to talk to the chiefs over the years—I’d always spent a lot of time with the chiefs—I’d tell them that sea story. There’s a guy who knew how to be a chief. He was looking out and training a junior officer, and he was also making sure that nobody messed around with the things he had planned for his troops.

(END OF SIDE B, TAPE I)

WINKLER: Today is still January 8, 2001. This is Tape II, Side A; again continuing with Vice Admiral Mustin. We were talking about how most were draftees during this time period.

MUSTIN: Yes, and many of them, particularly in engineering, were not the cream of the crop. When I reported, the first captain—I’d gone to see him—he said, “What department do you want to be in?”

I said, “I want to be in the gunnery department.”

And he said, “Well, I’ll tell you what. I’ve got three ensigns. One of them is from Purdue, and I thought: Boilermaker—I’ll make this guy an engineer. And he turned out to be a forestry major. The second one came from Princeton and I thought, jeez they’ve got

one of the finest engineering colleges in the country; and this guy's a history major. And then I've got you. I know what you took at the Naval Academy, because I took the same course." And he had—identical, practically, although he was class of '38. So he said, "So you're going to be an engineer." That's how I got in the engineering department.

But they were mostly draftees. The chiefs really held this whole thing together. Because you had this gang, all of a sudden losing all of the officers with very junior replacements, like me. And this sort of half-mutinous gang of draftees and other guys who couldn't wait to get out. It was a difficult time, and the chiefs made it all work.

On the way over one night, when I was the JO—and we used to steam in very close formation—the OOD said to me on the mid-watch, this was after about a week on board, "Okay, kid, you've got it," and he climbed up in the captain's chair and went to sleep. Jesus; this guy was the Officer of the Deck, he was a lieutenant (jg). So I'm standing out there trying to figure out what to do all of a sudden, at one o'clock in the morning. And the bridge watch had a game that they played that I was unaware of. What the helmsman did was, you had the wheel held in place by a large brass screw. And the bridge on a Gearing-class destroyer is smaller than this room that we're sitting in. You could run from the helmsman's station outside, around and back by the signalman's station and back into the pilot house, and in doing that you covered a distance of maybe fifty feet. Well, unbeknownst to me, these guys had a game they played where the helmsman would unscrew the nut that held the wheel in place, and then he would take the wheel and run out the starboard side of the wing of the bridge, and run around and run back in on the port side, and the game was to see if he could get the helm screwed back on and ready to answer orders before the OOD tried to maneuver the ship. I didn't know any of this. So I'm standing there and I'd turn around and say to the helmsman, "Come left to 275." When I turn around there's no helmsman and no helm. I'm looking back there and this guy comes storming in and screws the thing back. What the hell was that? Well, the OOD was asleep. That was sort of typical of the kind of stuff you had to put up with.

WINKLER: Do you recall the first time you brought the destroyer alongside for a replenishment?

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. I do indeed. It was under Captain Pete Smith. The first captain had a policy that he had what was called a sea-detail OOD. It was always the same guy. Pete Smith's policy was, and mine became that forever, that whoever had the watch performed whatever function had to be performed. So you spread the wealth around. Well, it just so happened that we had a major replenishment scheduled on my watch, which was the 8 to 12 in the morning, which required us to go alongside four ships—an oiler, and then an AKS, and then a couple of other ships—to pick up ammunition and oil and vegetables and trade some spare parts. He said to me, "Okay, you're ready. Take it alongside." And on my first try, I got to make four approaches at sea. Boy, I was on cloud nine when I got off the bridge. It was wonderful.

And then in that same period we had a night replenishment. So I'm up there. Now I'm all charged up, because I'd made four approaches in my career; I'm a veteran, an old salt. I'm ready to go alongside, and the captain said, "I'm taking the conn."

I said, "But, Captain!"

He said, "Well, you know, I've never been alongside at sea at night, so I thought I'd like to do it at least once before I turn it over to you guys." Well, I was humiliated, and I was sulking. He took it alongside. And from then on, he let us do it.

Pete Smith made that tour a wonderful experience. There are captains, and I've watched them over my career, who just micro-manage the shiphandling business, so that essentially all you're doing is parroting their orders to the helm and the engines. But he never did that. He didn't say anything unless he thought you were really in trouble, and then he made sure that you knew what you were doing, to the extent that you weren't going to get into trouble. So, being a student at the feet of Pete Smith was a great experience for me, and gave me some elements of leadership style that I found to be very useful for the rest of my career.

WINKLER: The other key person is the XO. The XO and CO have different roles. Sometimes they do a good guy-bad guy routine.

MUSTIN: Yes. The first XO was a guy who was an ex-aviator who had been grounded in World War II when a piece of a prop had been hit by enemy fire and had hit him in the eye. It didn't blind him, but it blurred his vision so that he couldn't fly any more. He was a really nice guy, but he just didn't do anything. He spent the whole day in his cabin. He just didn't ever do anything.

The second XO was an ex-yeoman in the Navy, a mustang lieutenant commander, who knew absolutely everything there was to know about Navy administration. He was a stickler for all that stuff. He was a real pain in the butt. But he also was a guy who had a really low moral standard. In every port that we went into on WestPac, he'd disappear, and he'd be shackled up with some Philippine gal, or Japanese, or Korean. And he'd bring them to the ship. You'd have the duty and all of a sudden the exec would be aboard for dinner, and have this Japanese hooker with him. It was really embarrassing.

So neither of those XO's was what I would call a role model, for that reason. The first XO, the captain really, essentially, was both the CO and XO. And the second guy was a good enough XO in terms of administering the ship so that the captain could concentrate on training the officers and line functions, which he did. So in that respect he was a good XO, but in terms of being an example for young men, he was unsat.

WINKLER: How was your department head?

MUSTIN: My first department head, of course, left. Three weeks after I got aboard he bailed out. That left two of us in the department. He was a reserve officer, who really

didn't know very much about anything. And he left about half way through our time back in San Diego. So our next deployment, I was just about to make jg and I was the chief engineer, having been the fifth officer sixteen months before. So I really didn't have a lot of association with a department head, because I became him by default.

WINKLER: How many people did you have in engineering?

MUSTIN: There were two officers, and about eighty-five or ninety enlisted. The organization was a lot different then. The damage controlmen and the damage control assistant and everybody were all in the engineering department. On the new destroyers they've got them in the deck department, so they've changed the organization. The organizations on the Arleigh Burke are really different.

WINKLER: During this time period, what is your father doing?

MUSTIN: He was Captain of a tender, then a DesRon commander, and then he became the chief of staff of CruDesPac. He was the chief of staff on my third deployment, when I was also the chief engineer. Movies were a big thing. On my second deployment, my dad was the captain of a tender. The tender was in Subic Bay; we were in Korea. We had these old projectors that were just falling apart. They showed the movies reel by reel, and the projectors finally reached a stage where you couldn't repair them any more. Movies were our main battery. So the captain said to me when we were in Sasebo, "Your father's the captain of the Piedmont."

"Yes, sir."

"He's down there in Subic."

"Yes, sir."

"I want you to get on the next plane and go down there and get us a goddam movie projector that works!" So I went off on this odyssey to get this projector, and came back with a movie projector. I was in hog heaven then. Of course, I was the golden boy with the skipper.

WINKLER: That's a good excuse to go visit. "Dad, I'm here to get a projector."

MUSTIN: When the ship went down to Subic, Admiral Radford was CinCPac, and he wanted to make Subic Bay a fallback to Japan because we weren't sure how long we were going to be in Japan. That's how Cubi Point got built up. It was just being built up at the time. It didn't have all the stuff it had during the Vietnam War. So we used to go to the old O-Club at Main Navy, and we'd anchor out. The first time we got there, the first cruise, we anchored out, went in, and it was the Marine Corps birthday. My classmate Phil Monahan, who went into the Marines, had been the captain of the football team. We all met at the O-Club. They had these big one-rpm fans in the ceiling and we used to try to pop the champagne corks into them—eighty-five cent champagne. So we all got all

sloshed up because it was the Marine Corps birthday. Then we went back to the landing. It was between boats, and the ship was, like, from here to across the street. It was about 12:30 or so at night. So I just said, hell, I'm going to swim out there. So I swam out. I came up and the OOD was a little puzzled to see this. The rest of the guys came out by the officer's motor launch. The next night I had the duty, and we were watching the movie back on the fantail. We used to train Mount 53 ninety degrees and watch movies on it. All these sailors had thrown these big lengths of chain over the side with steaks on large hooks and all of a sudden I heard this big rattling around. Then another, and on each side of the fantail they pulled up about a nine-foot shark. So that ended the swimming. The Lord looks out for fools and drunks.

WINKLER: I went diving once in Subic Bay. Now you have me thinking.

That's one tradition, when I was twenty years ago on board ship, of course—I was on an unrep ship—when you're checking...the movie officer, let's see what films you've got. Unfortunately, that's one of the things that has gone away with today's Navy. You can tune in on CNN; they've got Home Box Office. I think we've lost something there.

MUSTIN: Well, yes. It was a lot different. Things were done that were fun, that everybody thought were fun. The senior chief would be up there going over the movie list, asking if they've got so-and-so. That was a big deal.

WINKLER: Whereas now everybody can go...

MUSTIN: Sure, you check out a bunch of videos before you go. And seeing a movie isn't as big a deal now as it was then. Everybody stopped everything. Have a matinee on Sunday, wow.

WINKLER: That doesn't impress folks now. Now everybody's doing video games. Because you're a DDR, I guess part of it was early warning radar?

MUSTIN: We had what was one of the earliest of the so-called three-dimensional radars. It was an SPS-8. And when I was the weapons officer of the Lawrence, it was SPS-39, in '62. So from '55 to '63, it had gone from -8 to -39. But we could never get the thing to work. So we never really had height information. And nobody really gave a damn about it, because we weren't trying to track missiles. We were trying to track airplanes. And most of the airplanes at the time were not the low radar signature jets. They were AD's, and things like that. They were prop planes and they had a huge radar signature because of the prop.

There was one DDR per destroyer division. There were two divisions in a squadron. Each squadron had one DDR, one which was a long hull destroyer, then there was a straight stick, long hull. Then there were two Fletcher's, 445's. They had considerably less range than we did. We had fourteen feet in the middle, of extra fuel capacity. And we had twin rudders and they had a single rudder. Which meant that we

could do a lot of things, particularly in high tide, high current situations, that they couldn't do, which we never let them forget.

Down in Australia one time, we were tied up in a nest. One of my friends, a guy named Stump Donnelly was in the next ship. It was not in our division. And so we both had the duty, and about three o'clock in the morning we're out there and I'm talking to Stump, leaning on the railing, nested. All of a sudden I looked at him and he was going down. I said, "Stump, I think your ship is sinking."

He said, "No."

I said, "Well, why am I looking down at you?" So he went down to check the forward fire room which was steaming, and what had happened was the check man—one of these draftees—the guy had left his post and they had low water in the boiler. The fires were still going. So the economizer, which was where the water went in, melted down to the floor of the boiler, and through the floor of the boiler, and through the skin of the ship. The next thing they know, the forward fire room was flooding. That was a serious operation. We were in Australia. To try to get the damn leak stopped wasn't easy, and then to clean everything up in the ship was harder than that. Those things happened all the time. It was a different Navy.

WINKLER: For three years you're on board the Duncan, and just had three WestPacs?

MUSTIN: Yes. Naturally. When winter comes, can spring be far behind? No negotiations on the schedule.

WINKLER: And then you wind up on this MHC.

MUSTIN: Yes.

WINKLER: How did that happen?

MUSTIN: As I told you, Pete Smith had done such a good job that I really felt like I ought to be captain of a destroyer. He said, "What do you want to do now?" I said I'd really like to be captain of a ship. So he said, "Well, they have some commands. Why don't you request one? I know some guys in the Bureau of Personnel and I'll put an endorsement on your request that says you ought to get that." So I requested a command.

(Remainder of Side A is blank, about twelve minutes. Side B is also blank up to the same point in the tape, the first twelve minutes.)

WINKLER: Okay, Side B of this tape, continuing Tape II, and we're on board a mine hunter.

MUSTIN: I got assigned to this mine hunter, which was home ported in Mayport, Florida, and which worked for the District Commandant. It was not in the mine force, because it was assigned to the harbor defense unit at Mayport. This was before all the

destroyers went there. The ships home ported in Mayport were three aircraft carriers; an ATF, a fleet tug; and the Bunting, which was a mine hunter.

The mission of the mine hunter was to identify in the approaches, all the way out to the hundred-fathom curve, which was thirty miles at sea, all the mine-like objects in the Mayport channel. Go out and plot anything that looked like a mine, and keep it plotted, so that if ever the Soviets mined the channel, we would know which were mines and which weren't. What made this of interest was that these mine-like objects moved with the current, unless they were buried. Plus, every time a merchant ship come in or out, these guys were dumping trash and paint cans and everything, in and out of the St. Johns River. Plus, we had no navigation past line-of-sight, which was about four miles. And the coastline was so flat that you couldn't radar navigate. So you couldn't map this channel out, which you were supposed to do to the hundred-fathom curve, past about four miles. And the configuration of the mine-like objects, which required very accurate navigation—you know, if you put it here and you're ten yards off, then you've got two—they were never the same from day to day. So it was a real make-work operation, that had nothing to do with anything. But anyway, we did that; that was our job.

Thirty guys in the crew, and I was the captain. Lieutenant (jg). Walked aboard, relieved a guy out of the class of '50 who was a lieutenant, so he was five years senior to me. The chief boatswain's mate came up and said, "Well, Skipper, how many years have you got in? About eight?"

I said, "No. Three." The chief kind of rolled his eyes. But we had a great time. Out of that little ship of thirty guys, we had a guy who had been an all-Navy pitcher, softball pitcher, a first-class ET named Hager, whose family is the family that Hagerstown was named for. And so we would play these carriers in softball, and we'd beat them, because this guy would always pitch a no-hitter. Every time. He was really something. He was a left-hander. In fast-pitch softball the pitcher's got all the advantage anyway. We beat SubLant; we were the hottest softball team on the East Coast for a while, with Hager pitching. We had a couple of guys that had played college baseball, and I had played a lot of baseball in high school. So we had this great softball team, which kind of permeated the ship.

But these make work operations were a real downer for me professionally. I mean, they were fun, to teach the officers how to handle the ship and stuff. But when I reported aboard, the master at arms met me, and the guy had on a blue baseball hat, which was before the Navy used them as uniforms. He had a cardboard yellow star glued on it, which identified him as the master at arms. Now, we've got to be a little more reg than that. At least, we're not going to wear shorts everywhere. Wear the uniform. So when I would come in—if you know the basin at Mayport, the carriers were alongside that north wall, and we were alongside the south wall—we'd come in and make a turn to come to our berth, and we had a sea detail, six guys. So I would sound "Attention," on the IMC. And our top mast was below the sight of the OOD; he couldn't see us. So they would never render honors back. I got madder and madder about this. So I beefed up the power of the IMC to about five watts. We'd come in and play a trumpet blast on the

1MC, and still they didn't respond. So I stormed over to see the exec of the Saratoga, which was the flagship of George Anderson, who later became the CNO. I said, "I'm rendering honors to you all the time and you must respond."

This guy was a full captain. And he, luckily, was a good guy, and he said, "Well, I'm going to take care of that." He said, "What time do you usually come in and go out?" I told him. So he made sure they saw that, and they rendered honors to us. The guys in the Bunting thought that was great. All six of our sea detail came to attention and hand saluted, and six hundred guys returned it. The guys loved this.

So one day my dad was going down to be ComKeyWestFor. He was coming through from Newport, where he was CruDesGru Two. So I said, "Hey, do you want to go out to sea?"

"Yeah," he said. So I took him out for a day's op. We went over and borrowed a two-star flag from the carrier, from the signalman, which, the size being what it is, when we flew this thing it covered the whole mast. We two-blocked the top of the flag and the bottom was almost touching the deck. Anyway, we came in. Admiral Anderson was not aboard, so I figured my dad's the senior. So I went by the carrier. The exec happened to be up on the bridge doing something, and he looked out and we went by him and we didn't render honors. So he said, "I finally got him." I got this flashing-light message before we even tied up, "Why did you not render honors to me?"

So I sent back my signal number 1-9-4. The guy said, "Oh, my God, he's got his father on board." And then the crew thought that was great. We had a lot of fun on that ship.

My dad had told me that you want to be careful about this tour, because you have a lot of fun and a lot of leadership on those ships, but you're still the captain. And if you run it aground, you're going to get all the associated problems that go with running aground. Plus, and I had described what we were doing with this harbor duty, he said, "You know, you're really not in the first string of the Navy. You are in the backwaters, and your colleagues are out learning about carrier operations and air defense, and that kind of important stuff. And you're down here screwing around with the paint cans on the bottom. Plus," he said, "you have to realize that when you get in the backwaters, the people that you're associated with are the second and third stringers. So the people that are writing your fitness reports are a bunch of second and third stringers. And when you come up for selection later on, if Arleigh Burke says you're a good guy, that's got a certain amount of weight. If Joe Schultz says you're a good guy, that's got a lot less weight, and that you're in head-to-head competition." Well, he was absolutely right, because the guy who was the head of the harbor defense unit was a lieutenant commander who had been a boatswain's mate, worked his way up to lieutenant commander as a mustang during the war, and when I left after a year to go to PG School.... He had gotten a lot of the glory for this great softball team, and we had gone on some exercises and done really well. We found a World War II mine in Hampton Roads; the District

Commandant thought it was great. They sent us out in the middle of the ocean in kind of like the perfect storm, to find a sunken tanker on a secret mission, and we found it. I don't know how the hell we did it, but we made up a little search plan, and found this damn thing, sunk on the bottom. It turned out later, I found out, that it was because that was an early Polaris op area, but they didn't tell us that because of the security classification. So he had gotten a lot of glory out of all of this stuff, and when I was getting ready to leave, he said, "Kid, come on in here." Closed the door. He said, "I'm going to break every rule in the book. I'm going to let you see your fitness report." Which they didn't do in those days.

I looked at this fitness report, which I still have, and it said "Frequently excellent," "Often does good work," "Requires minimum supervision," and a lot of the words were misspelled, of course.

He said, "What do you think of that? It's the best one I've ever written."

I said, "Sir, if you put that in, I'm going to be lucky to make lieutenant."

He said, "It's the best one I've ever done," and he was hurt. So, here I am trying to educate this guy on how to write a fitness report. I kept that lesson in mind often later on, when looking for duty assignments and things like that. You've really got to be careful if you stray from the mainstream, for those kinds of reasons, as well as a lot of others. Luckily for me, the District Commandant, who was an Admiral, also put in a fitness report which was very flattering.

But that was a really fun tour. And I was the captain. I'd go to Norfolk for exercises. Go out to the quarterdeck and I'd call up the motor pool, and I'd say, "This is Captain Mustin. I'd like a car to take me to such and such."

"Yes, sir, Captain." After a while though they'd catch on, "What is your rank, Captain?"

WINKLER: I guess you made lieutenant at the end of that tour?

MUSTIN: I made it at Monterey. It was four years to lieutenant.

WINKLER: That's right; it's June '59 here, is when you left the Bunting.

Still, having that experience of command at sea at a young age, although you were in a backwater, is still good experience.

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. Yes. Because you have to learn how to delegate. It's very different when you're the captain. You were able to see at first hand what the exec does, and what you do. Yes, it's a wonderful experience, to be the captain.

WINKLER: Did you have an exec? An ensign?

MUSTIN: Yes. There were four officers. One was the exec, an ensign, who later became a jg. He was a magnificent guy. He was a shortstop from Middlebury College in Vermont--a really nice guy. And then two other ensigns, one of whom stayed in and retired as a captain, in the intelligence business.

We went up to Norfolk one time. Mayport was then an NAAS, Naval Auxiliary Air Station, meaning that the runways were too short for high performance aircraft. So nothing came in there but helicopters and Beechcraft, and logistics aircraft like that. But they had this old broken-down aviation captain assigned as skipper of this Auxiliary Air Station. It was really out in the sticks. Nothing there, no pier, except for that one pier on the north wall. So I went in to see the captain of the base, the old guy. I said, "Listen, every time the carriers deploy you send the station band down there to see them off."

He said, "That's right."

I said, "Well, I'm deploying to Norfolk next week, which is a big deployment for us." In this 136-foot craft with a crew of thirty guys. I said, "How come the band isn't laid on to come down and play for us?"

He said, "That's a gross oversight." These guys were really humoring this brash young upstart. So we come down. The bridge height of eye was about the height of a second story building. Down comes the station band. They're playing songs and everything. Lucy was there with our oldest son, who was a baby, and three or four of the other wives. We got underway and backed down. As we were backing out, Lucy came running down the pier, and she said, "The car keys are in your pocket." So we had to come back. The band had folded up and started away, and then we came back; the band turned around and came back. I leaned over and dropped the car keys, and she caught them. Then we shoved off on our deployment.

WINKLER: Postgraduate School in Monterey—did you apply for that?

MUSTIN: Yes.

There was one other thing that was interesting about this ship. When I first reported aboard, this senior guy, class of '50, by then had been a lieutenant for four years. They were in a private shipyard down in Jacksonville; had to transit back up the St. Johns to get to Mayport. They were tucked in behind a mothballed APA, that had the anchor at the dip. The Bunting had two 20-millimeter cannon, one on each side, as the main battery. So we got underway to go up to Mayport to have the change of command. This was the night before the change of command. I'd been aboard for a day. The captain took her out, and he got in trouble with the current and was set down on this anchor. To my horror, as we went by, the anchor knocked the port 20-millimeter mount—wooden deck—uprooted it from the deck and knocked it over the side, where it sank. So half of our main battery is lost forever. Then I'm looking down at these splinters and everything, and the skipper was kind of unconcerned. I said, "Jesus, how are we going to account for that at the change of command?"

He said, “Well, we’ll have a gun.”

I said, “What do you mean?”

He said, “We’ve got a couple of nails and a couple of hammers, a saw, a can of haze gray paint; the boys will go up to Green Cove Springs,” where all these thousand of minesweepers from World War II were mothballed. He said, “They’ll just saw one out and bring it down and we’ll nail it in place. Nobody will ever know the difference.”

So the next morning I walk on board for the change of command, and here’s this brand new 20-millimeter mount, with the paint still wet all around it. But there it was. Those things are experiences. Sailors can do anything if you just give them a chance, and there are damn few things sailors can’t fix.

WINKLER: Oh, yes. I’ve had some experiences myself.

MUSTIN: Anyway, my father told me.... My dad throughout my career was my advisor. And he said that there comes a time when you ought to get an advanced degree, technical education, and the more senior you are when you do that, the more you’re carving out a block in your career that you should be doing something else. So you want to get your technical education behind you as early as you can. And he said, you’re finishing your second sea tour, even though your Bunting tour is not really, for all intents and purposes, but on paper it’s a sea tour. And there are not really meaningful jobs ashore for lieutenants. So you can go be MineLant’s aide, or something like that, but that’s a zero job, because you don’t want to be an aide for a guy unless he’s a guy who’s going to move up, and MineLant’s always a guy who’s about to retire. So he said, what you ought to do, since you’re really in a place where the Navy doesn’t have a niche for your competitive group, you ought to go to the PG School now, and get that behind you. Then you’ll be back in sync and ready to go back to sea in a better job.

So I applied for Monterey and I got electrical engineering, and ended up with a degree in electrical engineering, which we could not get at the Naval Academy at the time, because it was not accredited. I learned a lot about how to approach problems technically about electricity and electronics, which I was really interested in.

WINKLER: One of the good things about the Bunting tour, plus the PG tour, is that with the Bunting you basically made day trips?

MUSTIN: Yes. We deployed up to Norfolk for mine exercises, but...

WINKLER: Right. But it gave you a lot more time to spend with your wife, and so you’re around when your child is born.

MUSTIN: Yes. First child; he’s one of the two I was there for.

WINKLER: Then, going out to Monterey, she's out there with you for two years. So that must have been nice.

(END OF SIDE B, TAPE II)

WINKLER: Today is still the 8th of January, 2001. Dave Winkler here again with Vice Admiral Mustin, and we were talking about Postgraduate School. Before the tape had run out, you were talking about the importance of the preparations that you had to take, as far as math was concerned, for that Postgraduate School.

MUSTIN: The change in what a technical requirement was between 1955, say, and 1959 was enormous. For example, transistors were brand new in 1959. All of the tubes in the radars were vacuum tubes. There were no solid state circuits, no digital computers. Stereo itself was brand new on the market. To get a stereo record was really something. That had come out in '57. So the opportunity to have professional instructors instead of lieutenant (jg)'s right off a destroyer teaching this stuff, and to really see not only how the new technology worked, but how you could apply it practically, was just wonderful. The approach to problem-solving, the understanding of what things can be done.

I used my PG School education many times throughout my career, even though I never had a payback tour. It's always seemed to me that the people who criticize the Navy because they don't require payback tours in every case are taking a very narrow view of the value of a technical education. I don't care what anybody says; my own view is that a Naval officer is really an engineer. Because if you don't have a basic understanding of the tools of your trade, all of which are engineering-related, it doesn't matter how sound your personnel policies are. You're going to be great ashore, but you're going to fall on your tail at sea. You see a lot of complaints along these lines in the Naval Institute *Proceedings*. I used to be one of the leaders complaining about these weenies that would come out to sea from BuPers and they didn't know anything about anything. They all got all the good jobs because they ordered themselves to them.

So anyway, when we left the PG School I asked for one of the new guided-missile destroyers. The Charles Adams class was just being built, just started. And in accordance with my dad's instructions, or suggestions, I said I'll take one anywhere, as opposed to requesting a particular homeport. I was ordered to the USS Lawrence, which was building in New York Ship, which was then a shipyard in Camden, New Jersey, right across the river from the Philadelphia Navy Yard. In those days the policy for assignment to a new construction ship was that, to be a department head, you had to have been that department head in a conventional destroyer. I wanted to be the weapons officer, but I had to be the chief engineer again. So I became the chief engineer of the USS Lawrence.

Kitty Hawk, the carrier, was also built at New York Ship. We were driving back across the country. Now, Lucy had never been west of the Mississippi when we were married. First duty station: Coronado, California; second duty station: Monterey, California. The Navy's pretty nice. Third duty station: Camden, New Jersey. Night and day. We're halfway across the country with two babies, our oldest son and our second,

who was born in Monterey, and on the radio we hear CinCPacFlt, Admiral Weakley, say that the state of the Kitty Hawk, which had just been delivered, was an absolute disgrace and the president of New York Ship should be put in jail, that the Navy was going to withhold payment for the carrier and adjudicate numerous, departures from specs and shoddy workmanship. I've never, before or since, heard an active duty admiral make a public statement with as pejorative or as inflammatory language as the language that was used about the carrier Kitty Hawk. And he's talking about the shipyard to which I am going, to build this new ship. So you can see that relationships between the shipyard and the Navy were not at an all-time high. And furthermore, the Navy was damned unhappy with the performance of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding and his crew. And finally the shipyard was now on the verge of bankruptcy (it ultimately did fold) and was not going to be able to provide first-class construction features and amenities that you got, say, from Bath Iron Works, who really knew how to build a ship. So off we go.

The ship engineering plant was a disaster. By now, with the help of Blazeski, and more experience and with a PG education, I was ready to take up the challenge. We had these new 1200-pound steam plants. Well, the 1200-pound plants were what I call the ED's revenge on the operating forces of the Navy. They had in them an automatic combustion control system which was pneumatic. If there's any place you're going to have trouble keeping air clean and dry it's in a fire room. But that's where this system was. They had also an automatic feed water control system which was pneumatic, and a third system which controlled the forced draft blowers, which were vertical. Because they had all these automatic controls the personnel guy said, hey, you've got all these controls, you don't need all those people down there; you have to get rid of all these guys. So they got rid of the check man and they got rid of the feed pump watch station. Then the ventilation engineers came in and they said, well hell, if there's no people there, there's no reason to put any ventilation there. In the meantime the maintenance guys were writing up a bunch of maintenance requirements, that required you to do things to the pump every day. Well it became apparent later when we got operational—of course at this time we didn't understand this; we were building these things from scratch—the pumps got so hot, because there was no ventilation on them, that you couldn't touch them to do the required daily maintenance. What that meant was essentially that you would go to sea Monday, and no maintenance would get done, and you would come in Friday, and then instead of going home to see their wives and families, the engineers would have to stay there and do five days' worth of maintenance on the pumps in order to get ready to go back to sea.

And so in engineering, not only was the plant design fundamentally terrible and flawed in every respect, but the morale of the troops was just a downward spiral, because they never got home. The 1200-pound plants are one of the great mistakes that the Navy ever made. It was the engineers' search for enthalpy, which is energy in the steam. They wanted to have the same shaft horsepower with a smaller boiler and a smaller engine. They achieved that. But things got so bad, and we'll talk about it later on when I got to OpNav, that in the endgame we had to establish this propulsion examining board, in which you could not go down and light a fire in your boiler unless you got permission to do so from a four-star admiral. That's how bad things were.

Anyway, we didn't know any of this at the time nor did anyone else. We're looking at all these "wow," these gee-whiz controls. There weren't any ships to use as reference points. Lawrence was number four. Number three had not been finished. Number two was out at sea, and there were indications coming back that there engineering problems, but the focus was on the missile system, the Tartar system, because it was the gee-whiz part of the ship.

So I got to New York Ship. About that time Lucy found out she was pregnant. And I started on this cycle of battles with the shipyard all day. Luckily, each of the officers assigned had been the corresponding officer on a conventional destroyer, so the number two guy, Greg Streeter, was the DCA, and he had been a Chief Engineer. The MPA, the main propulsion assistant, was a mustang, who really knew engineering from the practical side. And the electrical officer was a mustang, and the IC officer. The chiefs were all really qualified, and as opposed to this collection of McHale's Navy types that we had had right after the Korean War, the enlisted men were trained and schooled and eager, and felt like the elite of the Navy. Here we were, you know, with these great new ships, missile ships. So we had essentially an impossible task to be attempted by the best people that the surface Navy could offer. The fact that those ships held together and performed as they did over their lifetime is really a tribute to the guys that operated them. Because they were not easy. Not easy.

There were a lot of specs. The Bureau of Ships, after Admiral Weakley's blast, had come out and said, "We want you to insist that the specifications be met." Great. Well, they used to have an acceptance spec on the boilers that involved something called a hydro-test. You would fill up the boiler with water, put it under pressure, and it would have to hold it at operating pressure for a certain amount of time, to see if there were leaks in the boiler. Also if there were leaks in the valves that went to the boiler. None of the Lawrence boilers could hold a hydro for over a minute. We had, at that time, four months to go to commissioning. The shipyard was going to put in blank flanges and so forth. I said no, we're going to do this right according to Hoyle. Well, all four of the boilers failed, and failed, and failed, repeatedly.

Finally word got out about these boilers and ComDesLant—that's before it was CruDesLant, before it was SurfLant—decided to come and check this out. He was a Rear Admiral named R. H. Speck, referred to fondly by his staff as R. H. Negative. He was the toughest, meanest, wow.... He was a guy who was senior to my dad. But he was going to come check this out. The captain was in an advanced state of panic. The Squadron Commander was Ike Kidd. Ike was in an advanced state of panic. In the meantime we're flailing away. Finally, we got ready for the first of the boiler hydro-tests in the after fire room the morning that the Admiral was due to arrive. I'm down there. We're putting the pressure on the boiler, and it looks like this one's going to hold. The growler rings; it's the exec. "Where the hell are you?"

I said, "XO, I'm down here on this hydro, and it looks like we're going to make it."

He said, "I don't give a damn what you're doing. The captain said he wants all officers up here on the quarterdeck to greet the Admiral. Now get into your whites and get your ass up here," and hung up. This was Stan Counts, a great friend, who became an admiral. The captain had gone into orbit over this. So I went running up to my room with grease all over me, put on my whites, got up there, ran up and got in the end of this line just as the Admiral came aboard. He came down the line. The captain was sweating; this was summertime. He was introducing him to each of the officers. The captain said, "This is Lieutenant Mustin, the chief engineer."

The Admiral did not shake hands. He said, "Aren't you having boiler problems?"

"Yes, sir."

"What in the hell are you doing standing up here on the quarterdeck in whites?"

"I'm here to see you, Admiral." He went on, and I thought, "Oh, boy."

But anyway, we got in the wardroom and he said, "What's the sitrep on your boilers?"

I said, "I've just come from the after fire room. We're doing number three boiler, and I think we've got it fixed, and we've finally got the shipyard in shape."

He said, "You'd better have." Then he turned to the ASW officer and he said, "Hey. Have you got all my instructions on sonar equations?"

Bill Prince, the ASW officer, was a guy who had stood something like third in his class at the Naval Academy, a really smart guy. He said, "I think I do, Admiral."

Well, R. H. Negative said, "What do you mean, you think you do? Get out of here and get sure. Don't come back until you're positive." Bill got up and left. Jesus, the Admiral had been aboard ten minutes.

So there was a dramatic leadership example. I talked to his flag lieutenant, who was a classmate of mine. He said, "Nobody can get through the morning briefings with this guy. He's just murder."

So we went through this long period of six months feuding with the shipyard, night and day. They were trying to cut corners and save money, and we were trying to follow the specs in a fundamentally badly designed engineering plant. In those days you had two trials. You had a PAT, the preliminary acceptance trial, and FAT, the final acceptance trial. Both were done by the INSURV Board. The idea was, the INSURV Board would rack up the ship's compliance with specs on the PAT, and then they'd come back after your shakedown cruise, and after your post-shakedown availability, and have a final trial to see if you had fixed them. So your objective, obviously, was to have a long

list of discrepancies for PAT, and a very short list for FAT. Because the PAT problems were the shipyard's problems, but then fixing them after the FAT was the Navy's problem. We had generated for their PAT the longest list of discrepancies that they'd had since the Kitty Hawk, in the INSURV Board. And now our problem was to get that stuff all fixed by the building yard before FAT. So we went off on this cruise up the St. Lawrence Seaway.

After this, we'd gotten commissioned, we'd gotten ready to deploy, all that stuff. Now the weapons officer was going to be relieved and go to the DesLant staff—Steve Hostettler, who became an admiral. So I said to the captain I'd like to be the weapons officer. He said, "Great." He said, "You've got a guy on board, Greg Streeter, who's a qualified relief. I'd really like to have him...so yeah, you're the weapons officer. You go on off to fire control school, then come on up and meet us in the Great Lakes. Then we'll come back and make a cruise and Steve will leave, and you'll be the weapons officer."

So we got all of these discrepancies. I went off to fire control officer's school. And having just come from PG School, the guy would put up circuit diagrams of the missile seekers and I could read them before he could walk his way through orally. One day the head of the school came in. There were eight of us at the fire control officer's school. He said, "I've just been given an assignment by the Chief of Naval Operations." I wasn't sophisticated enough to understand that that meant the OpNav staff. He said, "I have to write a book on fleet air defense. It's part of a new series of pubs that they're going to have, called NWP's, Naval Warfare Pubs. This one is to be NWP-32, and it's going to be fleet air defense. I'm deputizing all of you guys in this course to write this for me, because all I've got out here at this school is a bunch of warrant officers." So on the side, during this thirteen-week school, we wrote NWP-32, which remained—this was before NTDS had been invented -essentially unchanged until I was ComSecondFlt. I used to go to the TacTraGru guys and all these people, and I'd say, "Hey, look. This publication was written by a handful of lieutenants who didn't know what they were talking about, and before any of the modern concepts of command and control had been invented. And here the damn thing is sitting here and hasn't been changed. What have you guys been doing for the last fifteen years? Get off your ass and start making it up-to-date," which we did. Got it changed significantly, to account for Aegis and other modern AAW improvements.

Anyway, I got back from the fire control officer's school, the ship came back from the Great Lakes, we got a new skipper, Worth Bagley, who was Dave's brother and became an admiral, and we started to operate.

WINKLER: Let me go back for a minute. The first time the ship left pierside and you actually got it away, what was your...

MUSTIN: Well, we left to come down from New York Ship to Norfolk the first time that the ship had been commanded, and the first time that the Navy crew would steam it, because before then it had been the shipyard steaming it. It turned out that there was no knots-versus-rpm table for the class. When you do the PAT and the acceptance trials,

everything is done by technical detail. You're looking at the first stage pressure in the turbine and everything, but nobody gives a damn about knots. They just give a damn about how much steam pressure you need to make so many turns. Whether that's fifteen knots or fourteen, that's irrelevant. So my first challenge was to figure out how to get a sixteen-knot SOA. What's sixteen knots. Well, the only other ship of the class was in the Med, the Charles Adams, and there was no internet. To get a knots-versus-rpm table from them was impossible. So I had to go to the David Taylor Model Basin and get the model data for the hull, and then figure out as best I could from that model data, scale it up and figure out, okay, when the captain says he want turns for sixteen knots, how many turns is that? I made a knots-versus-rpm table. That was problem number one. It turned out to be within a couple of turns of the actual class knots-versus-rpm table. The chiefs thought this was great, to work on this.

The second challenge was, the squadron commander, Ike Kidd, decided that he was going to ride this maiden voyage, to be sure it went okay. Well, the problem of the compliance with the specs, Admiral Weakley's blast about the Kitty Hawk, was front and center in everybody's mind. Admiral Speck, R. H. Negative, had driven that home very forcefully during his visit and in subsequent correspondence. But there was a rule in the Delaware River that you could not operate the evaporators, because of the chemicals that were discharged into the river by DuPont and other people. So as a result of this, the evaps had never been lit off. So we got the ship underway. The captain says make turns for twelve knots; the guys are there looking at this piece of cardboard that I've written—twelve knots is so many turns. Down the river we go. We passed the point where the chemicals were no danger, and the captain said, "Light off the evaps and start making water." Well, we had a brand new set of evaps. We go to light off the evaps, and can't get them to make water. Had a whole bunch of red lights and alarms and all that, and we couldn't make water. There were very strict water chemistry controls for this water. If you didn't make the right mix, the boiler tubes could rupture—another design flaw. So here are all these alarms going off. In the meantime we're steaming off for Norfolk, and can't make any water. We get to about 1700, and I went up and saw the captain and said, "We can't make water. I don't know why."

The captain was a guy who'd spent his life in BuPers. I think he knew that we really had four boilers, but he wasn't positive of that, and never went below the main deck. So he said, "What do we do?"

I said, "Well, if we want to make it to Norfolk, we're going to have to turn off the fresh water. We'll just put all the water in the feed bottoms, and then slow down, and we'll make it."

Well, he was unhappy but said, "Okay. Go ahead." So I went down and turned off the water and passed the word. In those ships, when you turned off the water the immediate effect was, the cold water went off, but the hot water recirculated for a while, so that the hot water tanks didn't blow up. Then the steam to the tank was turned off and then the water stopped. So the practical effect was, if you were in the shower and the guy turns off the water, all of a sudden you get scalded. That's really hot water. So we're

down there digging around with the flashlights and all this stuff with this evaporator, and the word's passed, "Chief engineer, lay up to the Commodore's cabin."

So up I go to the cabin and knock. "Come in." Open the door. And there's Ike Kidd sitting there. Half of his side is covered with soap, and the other side is beet red. He's got this towel over his lap. "What the hell's going on with the water?"

I said, "We can't make water, Commodore. So we turned it off with the captain's permission."

He said, "Well I was in the shower and nobody told me." It was obvious.

"Well," I said, "that's why we turned it off. We can't make water."

He said, "Sure, you can."

I said, "No; I've been through every damn diagram for these evaps. We can't make water."

He had this little black book. He reached in his drawer and said, "The reason that you can't make water is that you've got the first stage vacuum wrong."

I said, "I've got it exactly in accordance with the book, 28.6 inches of mercury."

He said, "No. There's an orifice that has been inserted in that. It was supposed to be published as a change order by the Bureau of Ships. They're late, so you don't have the change order. But I'm authorizing you to go down and change the first stage vacuum to the following number, and you'll be able to make water. Then I can get back to the shower." Of course, this was all interspersed with a lot of pretty salty language from Ike. And I had known Ike ever since I was a little boy.

I went down to the forward engine room, took the first stage, changed the vacuum as Ike had said. All the red lights turned green, all the bells stopped ringing, and we made water. I turned the water back on and he took his shower.

I used that as a key leadership lesson for the rest of my life. Because I was used to commodores who, when you would go in and say I've got a problem, the guy would say, well give it more command attention, or exercise more leadership. But they'd never help you solve the problem. Ike helped solve the problem. And he had found this out by going to the Charles Adams. He made it his business to do that. And I thought, that's the way I want to be. So that's the way I was, to the degree that I could be. I tried to help these guys for the rest of my career. Ike was one of my all time heroes.

So we made it to Norfolk, and deployed in company with the Bainbridge, who was at the time the hottest ship in the Navy. Had their picture on the cover of Time—the first nuclear powered surface combatant. We went over to the Med. Lucy came over. Had

a great time. Made it through without any major casualties. It was really touch and go. Had some successful missile shots; a great time. Came back and started really to operate the ship, when I got orders. Now I really knew those ships, because I'd been both the chief engineer and the weapons officer. So I really knew the two departments thoroughly.

So I really knew these ships. And I got orders to go to shore duty. So I told Worth Bagley. We were by this time home ported at Norfolk, and we'd had these availabilities in Philadelphia, where we were built. So the ship was in Philadelphia, the families were in Norfolk, and we were commuting on weekends by car. It was very difficult on the families. We had thirteen days in home port the first year.

Anyway, I said to Captain Bagley, "I don't want to go ashore. I'd like to be skipper of a DE."

(END OF SIDE A, TAPE III)

Worth Bagley was one of my greatest friends and great influences, and still is today. He said, "Okay. Go on up there. And tell them that they don't have to worry about relieving you, because you've got a guy on board who can take the job, and it's acceptable to me." In those days they didn't have the destroyer school or any of this other horrible tapestry that you have to go through to take a job at sea. The captain said you're ready, and you're ready.

So off I go to the Bureau. I went in to see the placement officer. He said, "Why are you here, Lieutenant?"

I said, "I'm here because I want to stay at sea and not go to shore."

Well this guy, who was a commander, a fat guy, gave me an hour lecture. You've got a shore establishment, and you've got forces afloat, and you've got to do this, you've got to do that. So he said, "Now that you understand the big picture, I'm sure you're delighted to be going ashore."

I said, "No, I'm not. I want to stay at sea."

"Get out of here."

So I went down to see the detailer, who was Captain Al McLane, a famous guy in my era, detailer. He said, "What are you doing here?"

I said, "I just came from the placement officer." And then his phone rang.

He said, "Excuse me." Then he said, "What? What? Jesus," he said, and hung up. Then he said, "Why are you here?"

I said, "Well, I just came from the placement officer." I told him that I wanted to go to sea instead of going to shore, and he gave me a big lecture on the shore establishment. I was prepared to tell him that Captain Bagley said I've got a qualified relief on board, and I could leave right away to go to command a DE if I can get it."

He said, "Wait a minute. I just hung up from a ship that is under construction, new construction, the DDG 17, the Conyngham. The exec had a nervous breakdown during the commissioning ceremony. They threw a net over his head, carted him off to the funny farm, and they need an exec for that ship right now. From what you've said, the captain would let you leave right now."

I said, "Yes. He said that."

So he said, "Well, how'd you like to be the exec of a brand new DDG?"

I said, "Yes, I'd like that."

"You've got it."

I said, "But the placement officer said I was going ashore."

He said, "Don't worry about him."

I was at the time a lieutenant and I was the class of '55. The execs of these DDG's were out the class of '49. So I was really junior. As a matter of fact, all the department heads were lieutenants. After that, during the rest of my career, when young officers would come up to me and say, "Hey, do you think I ought to go up and talk to my detailer about my next job?" I always said yeah, go do it. You never know who's going to have a nervous breakdown while you're standing there?"

WINKLER: Just out of curiosity, where was the Lawrence during the Cuban missile crisis?

MUSTIN: We were part of it. We were at sea the whole time. We had the division commander, Brian McCauley, who became an admiral, aboard. Went down, steamed around in circles with the brand new Enterprise and other ships. As a matter of fact, we were one of the units that was ordered out to make the original intercept, when we were told to stand off, that that will be made by the Joseph P. Kennedy, which caused a little furor. But it turned out that the Cuban missile crisis was, more than anything else, a real test of the engineering department. Because we were at sea almost continually for something like eighty-two days. Luckily for me, Brian McCauley had been a chief engineer. So he wrote a concurrent fitness report. It talked about all the problems with the ships, and that the Lawrence had done very well during this very tough operational period. As a result of that, and some other things that the captain said in his fitness reports, just about the time I got to the Conyngham I was early selected for lieutenant commander. So I was all of a sudden a senior officer.

Yes, we went down to the Caribbean. We were in Norfolk. We got the underway notice at eight o'clock in the morning; told we were going out for a blockade and you can't tell your families where you're going. Go home and get your sea bag together, because that was the middle of October. Go home and get some tropical uniforms and stuff, but don't tell your families where you're going. We lived out by Virginia Beach. We only had one car so Lucy had to come pick me up. We go back out there and I start packing my gear. "Where are you going?" she said.

"Can't tell you."

"How long are you going to be gone?"

"I can't tell you."

She saw what I was packing, and I said, "I just want to say one thing." Her parents lived in Alexandria. I said, "While I'm gone, don't go up to Washington to be with your parents. Have them come down here to be with you."

"Why?"

"I can't tell you." I was worried that Washington was going to be targeted. It was serious stuff, as you know. Can you imagine treating your wife like that today? You couldn't get way with it.

Anyway, Lucy drove me back to the ship, with the three little kids in the car. Got on board the ship. Got underway. Half way out the channel we get this Op Immediate message that says, "Go through your op order. Everywhere it says 'blockade,' cross that out and insert the word 'quarantine'" because blockade's an act of war. So we did that. And then essentially we really just went out and steamed around in circles for eighty days.

We went down to the Panama Canal and picked up an amphibious ready group that was coming through from the Pacific. Which led to one of the great all-time triumphs of my life. Because at that stage I was still the chief engineer, so I was in charge of the movies. They had a PacFlt movie exchange and a LantFlt movie exchange. PacFlt movies were serialized "P-126." LantFlt's were serialized "L-126." So we went down to escort this PacFlt amphibious ready group, and I went over to the flagship, got the chief engineer, and said, "Hey, I want to trade my entire stack of movies with you. Here's what I've got." And we traded.

He said, "Why do you want to do that?"

I said, "Because my plan is to turn these PacFlt prints in to the LantFlt movie exchange, and see what happens."

And the guy said “Good.”

Because you used to get this terrible correspondence from these yo-yos. You’d get a blast that said, “You turned in sea print such and such. You were the last guy that signed the book. And there’s salt water all over the print. Send us a report in triplicate of why you did that, and what did you bad guys do to our movie.”

WINKLER: Oh, yeah. We had a film once go in the water and sink, and you would have thought we lost a nuc.

MUSTIN: Yeah, yeah. So we made this trade. Then I parceled them out, traded them to everybody. So they had these nine PacFlt prints. And when I left the Lawrence a year and a half later there was still correspondence floating around saying, where did these PacFlt prints come from? How many people had signed it? It was mission accomplished. So that was a great triumph.

But the quarantine was essentially an engineering challenge for a destroyer. Not for the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who said that there weren’t enough guns down there to support an invasion of Cuba. And so the Leahy-class cruiser was stopped after nine ships, and the last nine had a 5-inch gun installed on the fantail and became the Belknap class. That was because of the Commandant’s concerns during the Cuban quarantine.

WINKLER: Okay. I did not realize that.

MUSTIN: Yes. The missile guys had said all along we’re going to do everything with missiles, and of course it became obvious that you couldn’t do so.

WINKLER: Gunfire support wasn’t...?

MUSTIN: Yeah. And there was nothing on these damn Leahy-class except a saluting battery and a 3-inch. So that’s how that class got broken.

WINKLER: Was the Lawrence ever involved in one of these exercises with President Kennedy where he would come out and observe the fleet?

MUSTIN: No. Luckily. Ike Kidd had been involved in that as an observer. That was the one where the timing of the seeker had been changed, and they missed every shot. The way the fuse sequence worked was, you had a continuous rod warhead, which was kind of like a Speidel band that went out, and it was designed so that as the missile approached the airplane it would go off, and it would cut a Bison bomber just aft of the entrance hatch. Which meant it would cut it in half at its weakest point, and then the airplane would fall down. And you had a setting you could set in there, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The birds came from the factory with 5 set, because that’s what the spec was for. Nobody knew this at the time, but the drones were all smaller than that half distance of the Bison. So when

the missiles came in they went off properly, but the Speidel bands went through a space where there was no drone, because it was smaller than the distance in the fuse activation sequence. So there was a big scandal. Kennedy was furious, the Navy was embarrassed. But, no, we were not involved.

WINKLER: Okay. Because you being one of the new missile ships...

MUSTIN: Right. The reason that we weren't was that we were in post-shakedown availability.

WINKLER: Okay. I think this might be a good place to close it, because we can pick up next time and talk about your tour as XO of the Conyngham

31 January 2001

David Winkler and William Peerenboom,
Interviewers

WINKLER: Today is January 31, 2001. Dave Winkler here, of the Naval Historical Foundation, with Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, United States Navy (retired). This is our second recording session, Tape I for this evening. You just got orders to be XO of the USS Conyngham. We covered the circumstances of that. The ship had just been commissioned?

MUSTIN: The XO had had a nervous breakdown during the commissioning ceremony. And so, yes, it had just been commissioned. It was still in the building yard. It had not completed all the InSurv trials, the final acceptance trial. And it was the same yard, New York Shipbuilding, that I had just left, having put the Lawrence in commission. So I knew all the people in the shipyard, and I knew all their excuses why they couldn't do things. I knew what they could do. So I arrived on board in this very unsettled situation where the exec had been carted off to the funny farm.

The captain was a fellow named Paul Smith, who was a SEAL who had won a Silver Star during the amphibious assault upon Inchon, by going ashore and spiking some of the guns on the island of Wolmi-do. But he had no destroyer experience at all. Here he was, the CO of a brand new missile destroyer, and the missile cadre itself was very small and new at the time. So he was, understandably, really nervous and upset when he lost his strong right arm, his exec.

Then this new XO comes aboard who was only a lieutenant, because I was five or six years junior to the guys who were XO's of DDGs. But I had been two department heads, so I was one of the few guys who really understood both New York Shipbuilding Corporation and the state of play of the missile Navy. So I was able to pass all of that knowledge along to the officers in the wardroom and to the captain—which was not easy to do, he was a pretty tough guy—in a way that meant that the Conyngham set all kinds of fleet records. The InSurv Board said that it was the finest InSurv inspection they'd

ever conducted. The people at New York Ship said it was the best DDG that they could produce. It was pretty darn good. We won all of the battle efficiency awards and competitions. We set gunnery records and missile records up and down the coast. It was a lot of fun for me to be able to get this ship off to a running start, but it was a lot of hard work.

WINKLER: We were just joined by Captain Peerenboom, who's going to be our co-inquisitor tonight.

MUSTIN: He's going to weed out all the sea stories.

WINKLER: We're talking about the Conyngham and how successful the ship was. You must have had, obviously, a very tight wardroom?

MUSTIN: Yes. The policy at the time was, you couldn't be the department head of a new construction Charles Adams-class destroyer unless you had been the previous department head in a Gearing-class destroyer. There weren't any missile ships. So each of the department heads was on a second go-around. And the second banana in each of the departments was usually an LDO who had come up through one of the enlisted commissioning routes. So you had this very, very competent wardroom, but not very experienced in either the 1200-pound class, which we discussed in the Lawrence section, or in the area of Tartar missiles.

In the Lawrence, because the whole idea of missile ships was so new, we spent a lot of time just trying to keep from melting the radars when we turned them on. As but one example, we had test sets, DSM 55s, which performed tests on the missile, and it turned out that we were using the missile to test the test sets instead of vice versa. DSM 55's were harder to keep up than the entire rest of the system put together. In the Lawrence there were no solid state components; everything was vacuum tube. In the time between when the Lawrence went in commission and when the Conyngham was constructed, the digital revolution was starting and solid-state componentry was being introduced. So, although the ship externally looked much the same with the exception of the launcher, the weapons system was vastly different, easier to maintain, and better. So, instead of just trying to stay afloat and not have a serious casualty, as we all did in the first-generation ships, in the second bunch, Conyngham being one of them. We would work on the tactics. There was a split in the class at Number 15, and they changed the launcher from the dual MK11 launcher to the MK13 single launcher. It was a much easier launcher to maintain. As a result, in the second generation we started to work on the development of fleet tactics to take advantage of these new capabilities.

In the area of anti-air warfare there had been no changes, essentially since World War II, in which you shot at airplanes and you put up a barrage, and you hoped the airplane would fly into it. Now we had weapons on board that had single-shot kill probabilities, where before with 5-inch 38 guns you just put up thousands of rounds and hoped you got a hit. Just about the time we started to figure out how to deal with incoming aircraft, which these ships were designed to handle, the missile threat arose. So

we were in the process in the Conyngham of attempting to generate anti-air warfare tactics that transitioned from barrage fire with guns shooting at manned aircraft to missiles shooting at missiles, which made it really interesting because at the same time this notion of something called NTDS was just rearing its head and being put, in a very rudimentary form, into the Coontz class, which at the time were called DLGs.

So this was a really interesting tactical time, and a time when those of us who were in on the ground floor of it got a fleet air defense 101 experience and a cram course that came back to pay off for the Navy over the next fifteen or twenty years in spades. Because the guys that were in these ships, the great majority of the department heads, particularly of the weapons department, became flag officers, the great majority. I don't know if anybody's ever gone back and racked up the numbers, but even the skippers—Bud Zumwalt, Ray Peet, Harry Train, Worth Bagley and Ike Kidd, and it just goes on and on and on. So this idea of how to use these new weapons and to net the capabilities of weapons to deal with this evolving threat of anti-ship cruise missiles and air to ground missiles was an opportunity that really was challenging.

When I would go around later on as a group commander and a fleet commander I could really see that a number of these young officers did not have the requisite basic understanding of what the hell it was they were trying to do. There were a lot of people running around who had tactics, for example, that had you empty the magazine at the first two or three targets. So you'd be sure of shooting down an incoming something, but the next one that came along would be unopposed.

At the same time we all got a pretty good feel for what you can charitably call an over-designed and under-engineered system. The 5-inch 54 guns that were in these ships had 1492 interlocks between the entry of the projectile in the drum and in the breech in the gun. That's the year Columbus sailed the ocean blue. Every time some sailor backed into a relay or got a shock, some bureaucrat in the Bureau of Ordnance would add another ten interlocks, and one down in the magazine would affect something that was 1432 interlocks away from it. So if something went wrong up here you had no idea where to start to fix it. It was like an ecology problem. You know, they kill all the snakes in Hawaii and the next thing you know they've got too many spiders.

One of the big problems was in the after 5-inch mount. The mount trained at a radian per second. And there was a circuit in it whereby the mount would start from starboard to port, and if there was a missile on the rail, on the launcher, the mount would be firing, but instead of just having a firing cutout, the mount would continue to fire but it would go up and over and come down and continue to fire on the way around. Of course, those rounds had nothing to do with target position. The circuitry that did that, in those days, was about the size of the wall in our living room. These rounds came up from the magazine in something called a carrier, which pinned the ship to the mount. As the mount would be swinging at a radian per second—that's a pretty big moment of inertia—these pawls that held the cartridges in place to get them into this rapidly moving mount would sometimes break.

One time when we were having a shoot, the guys called me up on the JC circuit and said, "XO, you'd better get back here to mount 52."

The CO was saying, "Why ain't they shooting? Why ain't they shooting?"

"I don't know." I went back and I opened the door of the carrier room and stepped in and...crunch, crunch. I was standing on black powder. The carrier pawl arms had ruptured when the mount was training at a radian per second. It threw the cartridge up against the side of the carrier with enough strength to rupture the cartridge, and the powder spilled on the deck. So I got a foxtail and a broom and swept the stuff up, took it out and threw it over the side. Then I went up to the bridge and said, "Well, I think the problem's solved, Captain, but we're going to fire this thing one-sided only for a while."

That was typical of the kinds of problems that we had. When we got into later development of the Aegis system and the Ticonderoga class, all of these guys who had been through these same experiences now were in pretty significant positions in what was then the Bureau of Ordnance and in OpNav so that we could capitalize on that experience, those near-disasters.

The great majority of the time was put into the development of this whole new bag of anti-air warfare tactics. There was not a lot of attention paid to anti-surface tactics or naval gunfire support because the feeling was that they would be handled by carrier aircraft. So nobody paid much attention to that, but I did, because I remembered the Commandant of the Marine Corps insisting that the Navy stop the construction of the Leahy-class cruiser in order to put a 5-inch gun on them, because the double-enders had no gun and therefore he said he couldn't have supported an invasion of Cuba during the Cuban quarantine. So I thought we ought to spend a lot of time on gunfire support.

Well, in the Conyngham we had the first of the digital computers for the gunfire control system. They measured the target position in Cartesian coordinates, x and y. The Lawrence and the first generation were analog, and they measured target position in polar coordinates. So all of the procedures for gunfire support were written in polar coordinates. I was one day down in gun plot watching them getting ready, when we were going down to fleet training group at Guantanamo Bay. I saw the spots coming down from Combat to the guys, and they're cranking these two x and y handles on this computer, trying to get polar coordinate solution. So I asked them, "Well, why don't you just crank in north and south, and east and west?"

"Well," the first-class said, "that would make it a lot easier, but that's not the type commander's procedure." So we changed it. As a result of that, when I left the Conyngham I was presented with a medal, the Navy Achievement Medal, the first medal that I ever got other than a campaign ribbon. In those days nobody ever got any medals. Now all you've got to do is stay alive through a tour, and if you make it through without flooding your compartment as the DCA you get something, which is not all bad, of course. But you didn't then. Anyway I got this great Navy Achievement Medal, which I

was very proud of and still aim. It said, “For developing new gunfire support procedures which improved the destroyer force.”

WINKLER: This is just beginning the Vietnam era, so the gunfire support—I think there’s going to be more attention paid to that.

MUSTIN: Well, I’m leading into that. While all this was going on—we were living down in Norfolk getting the Conyngham ready to deploy and all this stuff—the Tonkin Gulf incident took place. We read something in the paper about these firings, and I said to my dad, “You know, these guys fired 500 rounds and they got no hits on PT boats. If you want to do something for Naval gunnery you ought to have those two skippers relieved.”

He said, “Oh no, they’re not going to relieve them. They’re going to give them Bronze Stars.” And they did. Then it turned out there weren’t any PT boats there anyway, for reasons we know that include the radar ghosts called Tonkin Gulf phantoms. That certainly took the sting out of no hits. But that was my view. If you really wanted to show that you were serious about this stuff you had to have a carrot and a stick, not just a carrot.

Anyway, it became apparent at that time that we were going to go to war. I had orders to leave the Conyngham to go to the War College. So I went to the War College. By this time I’d had been deep selected to lieutenant commander, and I really wanted to go, because I figured, belatedly, that there is a hell of a lot more to this Navy than a couple of guns and missiles and a boiler or two. So I wanted to go to broaden my horizons. When I got up there...

WINKLER: Could I just interject? (To Captain Peerenboom): You’re a former XO. Did you have any XO-type questions?

PEERENBOOM: Well, it would be interesting to know how a ship like this, which is brand new and is coming into a division.... As I recall they put the missile ships in with a bunch of other FRAMs or whatever. In the Pacific they used to mix and match them.

MUSTIN: That’s right. But in the Atlantic they were all the same. DesRon Twenty-Six was the first all-missile-ship squadron, and Ike Kidd was the Squadron Commander.

PEERENBOOM: And then when you operated, you operated together. They kept you by divisions of missile ships. And so you could work these tactics with your counterparts in other ships?

MUSTIN: That’s right.

PEERENBOOM: And with the commodore, presumably. It would be interesting to know how that worked out.

MUSTIN: Well, the people that were the commodores were the *ne plus ultra* of the Navy. Ike Kidd was one of them. Brian McCauley was one. These guys became admirals. Ike went to be the CNO's executive assistant, so he was immediately in a position where he could do a lot to help. It was a very small club, and a very close-knit club. The fun thing for me was the ability to generate this whole set of tactics with my colleagues, and talk to people who were at a similar level of professional competence. There was no problem holding reveille or anything because all these guys that were the DCA and the first lieutenant, they were all mustangs. You would tell these guys, hey, we want reveille to go at 0630 and it would go at 0630. You didn't have to worry about those things.

PEERENBOOM: You presumably worked out exercises and tactics, and then would test these tactics.

MUSTIN: We did. For example, the guy that I had relieved in the Lawrence, Steve Hostettler, as the weapons officer, went to be CruDesLant's force armaments officer. So he understood what was going on, and he was desperate for type commander tactics. So as we would go set these things up there was a lot of old-boy networking, here's what we're going to do, and we're going to sent you a message, put this out as a type commander tac note.

At the time, the type commanders still maintained OpCon of these new ships much longer than they do now. So that the fleet commander's role in this stuff was essentially limited, because he was concerned with the operation of the force that he had, not the generation of a bunch of new tactics for new ships. So the majority of the tactical development at the time was done by the type commanders. That changed later on to be the fleet commanders bag, for the good reason that as we got into this stuff we found that, in particular, AAW was not the private purview of the surface Navy. You had to be able to integrate. As our own and the Soviet missile ranges got longer and longer your chances of shooting down your own airplanes, blue on blue, correspondingly increased. So the interplay between the surface ships and the carrier air wings got to be a very significant and difficult part of that equation. That was beyond the scope of the surface type commander's authority. Because now you had two type commanders: the aviation type commander and the surface guys. So the fleet commander had to referee all those issues.

My biggest XO problem was this poor SEAL CO, who was really a good guy but he'd just never been in a destroyer. He had trouble figuring out how to twist the ship, that kind of stuff. He was very shaky and uncertain. If the captain's not a good ship handler it doesn't matter what the XO does, the wardroom really has problems. So that was my biggest problem.

WINKLER: Was he the CO the whole time you were on board?

MUSTIN: No. He was replaced by a fellow named George Lindgren, who was a destroyer skipper, and who did know destroyers. So that got to be a lot easier. He didn't know missiles, and he didn't particularly care. He loved to drive a ship and he loved to teach the officers. He sort of left the business of tactical development to me, and that was my bag too, so it was a really good mix. The ship continued this magnificent performance record both the years that I was there. We set a gunnery record in the air shoot that my son failed to break in the Donald Cook when they put it in commission two years ago. It has lasted a long time.

WINKLER: During the time period you were XO, was the ship basically working out of Norfolk, or did you get an opportunity to deploy?

MUSTIN: We deployed once. The first year of a new construction ship is a terribly difficult year. Our home Navy yard was Philadelphia, and we were home ported at Norfolk. So we spent a lot of time in post-shakedown availability and voyage repairs and things like that in Philadelphia. And a lot of time with the whole new series of acceptance tests for missile systems, which had not existed before. So that the first year in the Conyngham we had thirteen days in our home port, which we racked up just in time to deploy. That really put strains on the family. We had three small children at this time; it was a terrible, terrible time for Lucy. I don't know if today's wives could handle all that, but she did.

We deployed to the Med. We went over to shoot one of the first U.S.-French joint missile shoots at a French range off Ceres, in the Mediterranean. We were going to use French drones, and the proviso was: the French are really short on drones so don't shoot down any of these drones. Of course that immediately was the objective of everybody—we've got to bag one of these drones. We did have telemetry missiles which were designed to miss. So we went and fired on this range, and we didn't miss; we shot this drone down. The French got all hacked off. ComSixthFlt shed big crocodile tears; he was delighted. That gave us in the Conyngham seven straight successful shots, which was a fleet record at the time. So the captain said to me, "We're going into Toulon. What you ought to do while we're in there for a tender availability is, you ought to take two weeks leave and go on up to Paris and tell Lucy to join you." So I seized the opportunity to say yes, sir. And Lucy and I went to Paris.

We had a routine deployment. They were a lot more fun then because you went much nicer places than you go now, and you didn't have to worry about somebody blowing a hole in the side of the ship. But that deployment was uneventful, except for setting the record for shots. Of course we put out a big press release that said this is a fleet record. Which infuriated CinCLantFlt because he claimed that that was classified information, which it wasn't, but he just didn't want everybody to know how bad things were.

WINKLER: The threat at the time, I guess, was the Soviet Styx missile?

MUSTIN: Yes. That was just becoming a threat. And the feeling in the Navy leadership was, which was dominated by aviators, we're not going to let anybody get close enough to shoot one of these missiles. The aviators said, if we see anybody out there that's a threat we'll just go bag them, at two to three hundred miles. Not to worry. And so we surface types all said, well, okay, we'll concentrate on shooting at air-launched missiles. "Well, we'll take care of that too, if we ever get enough F-14s." So we said, well, maybe you can't take care of them all; we'll continue to pursue this. Senior aviators at the time fought this rather bitterly. Success rates of these expensive missiles were not high. The performance of the systems was not good. And they viewed this as a drain, unnecessary, on funds that should be devoted to aviation capabilities. This is not a new kind of argument. So things like Aegis, and others, were bitterly opposed by the aviators. My own view is that we'd have never gotten Aegis if Bud Zumwalt had not been the CNO. Because a series of aviator CNOs before and after tried to kill it. I'll tell you some more sea stories about that later.

There wasn't anything really unusual in that deployment.

WINKLER: Okay. Well, onto the War College. You were just starting to talk about that.

MUSTIN: Well, I got up there. One of my best friends—I was a lieutenant commander—was an Army major named Vic Hugo, who later became a general. He was a Green Beret. He had just come back from his second tour in the central highlands of Vietnam. About this time the first contingent of aviators, having flown the retaliatory strikes for the Tonkin Gulf incident, were coming ashore and they were coming to the War College. They were starting to talk about, a real war going on here; guys are getting killed.

In the meantime I was soaking all this up, realizing that AAW was not just my purview, and that we ought to spend a lot more time on ASW. And sort of looking in detail at the Vietnamese—their order of battle. It was apparent that there weren't going to be any massed Backfire raids out into the Tonkin Gulf. So what the demands on the surface ships would be, I thought, would be essentially in the area of gunfire support. So I went and talked to my dad. As the year went on we were going to get orders, and by this time he was the J3. So he's running the war in Vietnam, with the dubious assistance of this Mr. MacNamara, all of which is, I'm sure, covered in my dad's oral history. Anyway, I went down and talked to him and I said, "What do you think I ought to do?"

He said, "You ought to go to Vietnam. I don't care what the Bureau tells you; after every war the Navy, properly, divides itself into those who fought and those who didn't. It doesn't matter whether you're the President's aide or Admiral So-and-So's aide, or whatever. If you didn't fight you're not going to remain in the competition."

I thought, that makes sense. So now I went to the Bureau and said, "I want to go to Vietnam."

My detailer was a commander who's a really good friend, Chuck Horne, who became an Admiral. Chuck said, "We're not sending anybody from the Naval Academy in-country. That's not our business. The Navy's interest stops at the high water mark." He said, "All we're sending over there in-country is a bunch of mustangs and LDOs and second-stringers." He said, "You don't want to go over there."

I said, "Yeah, I do."

"Well," he said, "I've got a great job for you here in OpNav. You can be an aide to Admiral Martell."

I said, "Nope."

He said, "Well, you're committing career suicide by doing this, plus you might get killed. But if you really want to, we'll see what we can do." So I got a set of orders much later. The Bureau, acknowledging that they didn't like my dicking around with their plans, gave me ten days to get from Newport to Saigon.

As an aside to that story, after this passionate disclaimer by Chuck Horne.... When I came back from Vietnam I had a whole bunch of combat decorations, because I'd been in the River Patrol Force, PBR, and had a lot of medals and a lot of Vietnamese decorations. Chief NavPers asked me to take a recruiting tour all around the country before I went to my next job. So I went around and spoke at the ROTC units, all that—it took me two months. After that tour—I'm getting a little ahead of my story. I went back to BuPers just to check in with Chuck Horne, my detailer. I walked in and said, "I'm Lieutenant Commander Mustin; I'm here to see Commander Horne."

"Well, he's not here."

"Where is he?"

"Well, he's just cleaned out his desk. He's ordered himself to Vietnam."

I left Newport in the summer of '66. I was a Distinguished Graduate of the War College. I was there at the time that it changed from the gentlemen's club of Charlie Melson to the inquisition of Chick Hayward. I picked up a master's degree in international affairs, which really broadened me and got me started in politico-military affairs. Also we all had to write professional papers. Admiral Melson had never read any of them. Admiral Hayward read them all. And he would ask technical questions. Aviators were writing about fighter tactics, and he'd say, "What's the drag coefficient of this plane?" and most of most of these guys were caught very short. Luckily I had written my paper about air defense. I really knew a hell of a lot more about modern air defense than Admiral Hayward did. He was very impressed with me, he told me years later. So anyway, I became a Distinguished Graduate of the Naval War College.

About this time Lucy found out she was pregnant. She decided to stay in Coronado while I was in Vietnam.

WINKLER: What was her reaction, by the way, when you broke the news that: it was a good idea for me to go to Vietnam?

MUSTIN: She understood that—that if you're going to be a professional officer and your country's in whatever you want to call it—police action or whatever—the professional corps ought to fight. Lucy was and is a perfect model for a Navy wife.

So out we go. It took thirty days to get your household effects across the country, from Newport to San Diego. I had ten days to get to Saigon. So we drove across, moved into an empty house—no furniture—and there was Lucy with three tiny little children and one on the way, and I said, "So long kid; I'll see you when I've won the war." She dealt with all that, which was quite something.

Anyway, I thought I was supposed to go to a bunch of PBR schools and everything. All that was cancelled. "Get over here." I thought, jeez, somebody got killed. I got over there, and the guy I'm relieving meets me at the airport, at Tan Son Nhut, in whites. This was not my idea of Terry and the Pirates. It turns out he's the flag secretary. I'm going to be the flag secretary for ComNavForV, Admiral Norvell G. Ward. I was furious with Chuck Horne and the Bureau sticking me into a Saigon Commando job on the admiral's staff. So I made a number of mistakes on the staff, so that I could get myself transferred to where I had intended to be, which was down in the Delta. In the fall the admiral finally got tired of my carping and bitching and complaining, and he sent me down there.

WINKLER: Okay, you said you were there for three months.

MUSTIN: I was there from November to May...no, that's not right.

WINKLER: It says here, "U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, July '66 to October '66."

MUSTIN: Yes; and then the rest of the time I was down in the Delta.

PEERENBOOM: Where did you go in the Delta?

MUSTIN: Went to Can Tho, where I became the Chief Staff Officer to CTG 116.1.

When I was on the staff at NavForV I could see clearly that the Navy was not interested in the brown water navy business. Admiral Norvell G. Ward, bless his heart, was a really capable guy, a submarine hero of World War II, who had won the Navy Cross for taking a guy's appendix out on a submarine while under depth charge attack, from a medical manual, with a bunch of kitchen knives. But his staff, the captains, were a bunch of second stringers. None of them made flag. And the people on the staff were odd types, has beens and never weres. Chuck Horne's words rang in my ears every day.

Plus, Admiral Ward himself was so junior, compared to this horrendous MACV organization, that he couldn't even get a seat in the senior officers' mess. The Army had more generals in-country than they had in Europe in World War II. It was just enormous. Unless you were a three- or four-star general or an ambassador you couldn't get within a country mile of General Westmoreland.

I could see the infighting not only between the Navy and the Army, but in the Navy itself. And as the flag sec for NavForV, I was on the MACV awards board. So I started looking around while I was there and I saw all these Army guys walking around with all these medals. And these guys from the Navy—I'm reading the reports from the Delta—are having all this action and there are no medals at all. So I found out that at the time, to award any combat decoration the awarding authority for the Navy was CinCPacFlt in Hawaii. The awarding authority for the Army was General Westmoreland in country, CinCPacFlt was an aviator and was focusing, with good reason, on the bombing over Hanoi and Haiphong. So well over ninety-eight per cent of all the decorations in the Navy were going to Naval aviators. They were the ones that were carrying the brunt of the war. It was easy for ComSeventhFlt, who was a three-star admiral, to fire this stuff off by message to CinCPacFlt and get an answer back.

Then I saw that, in the Navy, in order to get a decoration awarded, you had to be senior to the guy who was getting the decoration. So if you were the captain of a destroyer your commodore had to recommend you for something. If you were a department head, your skipper had to recommend you. You had to be recommended by someone senior to you. Not so in the Army. So on the MACV awards board I used to read these cases where an Army patrol would go out. It would be a first lieutenant, a sergeant, a couple of corporals, and a private. They'd come back and the private would recommend the first lieutenant for a Silver Star, etc. etc. So all these guys would recommend each other for all these medals, and they were all approved by the MACV awards board, because that's the way they did it in the Army. They still do today. What happened in Grenada, where they got more medals awarded than were people in the operation shouldn't surprise anybody.

Anyway, I went back to see Admiral Ward and told him I thought the Navy in-country was really getting the short end of the stick. So I invented a form that reduced a lot of the administrative hassle. Because the guys down in the field had no staff support.

A lot of the stuff was coming in, literally, on the backs of envelopes. You'd have to read the message traffic to sort of figure out, hey, the guy who did this ought to get something.

So I got down to the Delta armed with this. I said we're going to make a conscious effort to start getting these guys the kinds of awards that they deserve, because the action was fierce. We ended up being one of the most decorated units in the history of the Navy. We won the Presidential Unit Citation, the first Navy one of the war. Elliott Williams, a boatswain's mate, won the Medal of Honor. We had nine or ten Navy Crosses for a tiny little outfit, eighty PBRs—mostly enlisted men. Williams' battle, in which he took on two North Vietnamese Army regiments in the Delta, has been covered extensively elsewhere. I know he's done an oral history.

We put Boatswain's Mate James Elliott Williams in for the Navy Cross. The awards board at CinCPacFlt downgraded it to a Silver Star. So I said we're not going to accept that. We're going to resubmit it as a Medal of Honor. I made it a personal crusade to go around and get testimony from all these Army generals and all this. We resubmitted this thing with a justification package roughly the size of a dictionary, and he got it. I never did find out what CinCPacFlt said about it, but for the Medal of Honor, CinCPacFlt couldn't award that. That had to come back to be awarded here in Washington, by the Chairman, I think it was, or at least the CNO.

Anyway, he got it. And it took years for this stuff. So when he left country he had three Purple Hearts. He had, pending, the Medal of Honor, the Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, three or four Bronze Stars; a bunch of Vietnamese decorations that they gave him on the spot. So the word of this got around, and *Life* magazine said they wanted to do a feature story on this guy. I said, this guy's going to be the Audie Murphy of the Navy; it would be wonderful publicity. So we went off to CinCPacFlt and said, hey, *Life* is coming over and they want to do a story. Back comes a thing from CinCPacFlt saying, "It's against our policy to discuss awards that are pending." So here's this guy, he's got a Good Conduct Medal and a couple of Purple Hearts—no story. I was unhappy about that, and the Navy lost out.

I was the second-senior Naval officer south of Saigon. My boss was a commander, out of the Naval Academy class of '46, a wonderful guy, Jim Cronander. Who was CTG 116.1. Game Warden was a task group made up of PBRs, helicopter support ships, gunships which we got from the Army—they loaned us twenty—and three LSTs that operated in the river. Jim Cronander was also the senior advisor to the Vietnamese Navy in the Fourth Riverine area, but I had no Vietnamese hat.

I went down there just as the PBRs were coming in the country. I could see that the N3 in Saigon knew nothing about any of this. Neither did anybody else; it was a brand new experience. He had put out a bunch of directives, some of them influenced by the embassy, that essentially hamstrung the operation of the River Patrol Force. "Stay in the center of the river." "Do not do anything that would unduly hazard the crews." Rules of engagement, inviolate: "You can't fire unless you're fired upon."

So I got down there. What was happening was, we got out on the rivers, and this “Stay in the center of the river” policy just put us in irons. At first we had a lot of initial combat to stop the VC from using the rivers as traffic, because at the time there were no bridges over the Mekong anywhere. So we were essentially the highway patrol. The VC used to collect taxes; the commerce of the Mekong Delta moved on the rivers. It was roughly two-thirds of the population of the country, so it was a very densely populated area. We guessed that of the population of the Delta, at least half were VC. So I started thinking over some of this stuff that I had read at the War College by Mao Tse-tung, saying that, “the guerilla is like a fish swimming in a friendly sea. If the sea dries up the fish dies.” We weren’t getting any intelligence. So what was happening was the VC would see us go by in the center of the river, and they’d wait until we were out of sight and then they’d do their crossing and collect their taxes. We needed to dry up the friendly sea.

So I figured out that what we had to do was get a PsyOps campaign so that we could start to get local populace to tip us off when there was going to be significant VC activity in the area. And in order to do that we’ve had to ingratiate ourselves. We’ve got to get around and give tetanus shots and all that. So we started doing that, and the intelligence started to come in and we stopped sitting in the center of the river.

We started to develop the tactics to deal with this. We started to get off the main rivers and go up into the estuaries, which was really hairy stuff, because the range of tide in the lower Bassac was damned near twelve feet. You could go up these canals and stuff where the waterway’s no wider than this room, with dense jungle on both sides. If the tide went out you stayed there till it came back in, even in these little PBRs, which had a draft of about a foot. So we expanded the operation significantly. Brought in the SEALs, brought in the gunships. Developed the bag of tactics to be much more aggressive against the Viet Cong, and to essentially expand our operations significantly throughout the Delta. We did that on my watch. I was very proud of that.

When I left we did get the Presidential Unit Citation from LBJ. They got another one during the Tet Offensive in '68—I was gone by that time. So Game Warden and the PBR operation actually got two Presidential Unit Citations.

But the down side of that was, we had a lot more combat, and a lot more guys killed and wounded. We thought we were making progress. But I later became persuaded that the progress was kind of like a guy climbing up the side of a sinking ship. He thinks he’s making progress, but the ship is still sinking.

I just, getting ready for this, was reviewing this report that General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp wrote in 1968, which says, we’re winning; we’ve got it made. You can’t believe this stuff how misinformed everyone was.

I left Vietnam with a real appreciation that the farther away you get from the Pentagon, the better inter-service cooperation is. And I developed undying admiration for

the Special Forces, the people in the field in the Army, who were fighting the war under terrible, terrible constraints and conditions.

Most Naval officers don't know anything at all about base perimeter security. I sure as hell didn't. So the first thing that I did when we set our base up was, I got one of my colleagues who was a Green Beret and said, "How do we set up a security area?" The guy showed us how to lay out the sandbags and stretch the concertina around, and put beer cans in there so if somebody tried to penetrate it would rattle.

We had a lot of joint operations with those guys that were very, very successful—development of the tactics for the Seawolves, the helicopters, to support us. The Army lent us the helicopters, but the Navy's support in setting up the helicopter support squadron was slow, because the Navy's principal effort was to get the helicopters out to the Seventh Fleet. So we were on the tail end Charlie of the pilot pipeline and the crew pipeline. So initially we had Army crews, gunner, and I was a door gunner on a Huey for seventy-five missions. I got an Air Medal.

I became a different person as a result of that experience. I certainly had a different appreciation for what I thought was important and what wasn't important. And I, for the first time, started to see how all of these organizational matters make a big difference. They're not just wiring diagrams and they're not just theoretical.

There was a disagreement between Westmoreland, who wanted to be CinCSEAsia and the entire Navy chain of command. So when the PBR organization was set up there was an administration chain of command through ComPhibPac; the operational chain of command was through ComNavForV, who was a component commander for Westmoreland. Westmoreland insisted that the PhibPac chain of command have no role whatsoever in the operational matters. So they sent this poor captain over to be the squadron commander for all these PBRs, and he sat behind a desk in Saigon and filled out CasReps and personnel casualty reports instead of getting in on the action. All of the operations were run by those of us who were in the NavForV chain, because that's the way MACV wanted it.

PEERENBOOM: Was that TKF 117?

MUSTIN: 116. 117 was the Mobile Riverine Force. They came in just at the end of my tour. They were up at Dong Tam. They built that base on our watch. That was on the Co Chien River. Had some horrendous firefights there. When the VC saw that base being built, before the 9th Division had come in and before the Mobile Riverine Force had come in, the VC determined they didn't want that base built. Boy, that was hot stuff.

One of my sea stories was recently made fresh in my mind. I have just finished reading an account of the sinking of the Juneau by a Japanese submarine. One of the reasons I was interested in that is that my dad was in the Atlanta, which was a sister ship, which was also sunk in the Battle of Guadalcanal. Except the Juneau survived and was leaving from the area under the command of a captain in a little task group of five or six

ships, each of which had suffered pretty serious damage. The Juneau was torpedoed and sank instantly, and the commodore of this little group did not break radio silence to report that sinking. As a result the guys in the Juneau stayed in the water for four or five days. It was terrible. At the end of the war, or as soon as Halsey found out about this, he relieved this commodore, whose name I think was Cooper, who said that he didn't break radio silence because he'd been told that he was not supposed to reveal his location to the enemy. Admiral Halsey opined that, having torpedoed the Juneau, it was sort of prima facie evidence that his location was, in fact, known.

PEERENBOOM: They knew where you were.

MUSTIN: They had no doubts about his location.

Anyway, I was up on the Ham Luong River one day under terrible, terrible fires from both sides of the river, in an area where it was about as wide as this street out here. Luckily, on the chart I had the Vietnamese artillery batteries located. I didn't have the code book; we didn't have any secure contact. So I called up for a fire support mission from this ARVN battery, and I gave my location in the clear. Wow, we had rounds, jeez. They responded instantly and we got out of there. I got back and I faced this stinging blast from the ComSec guys about, explain yourself before we court-martial you. You revealed your position to the enemy by calling in these artillery rounds. I got up on my high horse and told them that I was reasonably sure that they already had no doubts about my location because the flag that was flying six inches over my head had been shot to pieces. From Guadalcanal to the Mekong River, some things never change.

While I was there, my youngest son, John, was born, and I started to negotiate with my friends at the Bureau for another assignment. They said, your wife's in Coronado; you can go to CruDesPac. I said, great. Then Admiral McDonald, the CNO came over, made a tour. He said, "Well, you're not going to CruDesPac."

I said, "I am going. I've got my orders." I wasn't too aware of how all this stuff worked. So here I was contradicting the CNO.

He said, "No, you're going to go to CinCPac, Admiral Sharp." Of course he was right.

So I figured I would just not say anything more. "Thank you very much, Admiral."

We had some strange times. It was really a Terry and the Pirates kind of operation. One time Admiral Hyland came down. He was ComSeventhFlt, a wonderful Navy leader. He wanted to go out on the river. He was senior to ComNavForV. ComNavForV called and said, "Under no circumstances are you going to hazard Admiral Hyland. He's going to want to get into the thick of this thing. Don't do it." So we got this area of the river cordoned off on both sides by the ARVN lines. We were going to take the admiral up for a little run on the river. We had the Seawolves with us. They were

going to show him how they did their tactics and this stuff. We strapped him up with an M-16 and a 38. He was really eating it up.

Well, we went up the river in this area that was absolutely sanitized. We were adjacent to a Vietnamese air force base and this VNAF pilot took off in an AD. He got about half way to his target and he had some kind of casualty, so he had to come back to the base, but he could not land with his bombs on board. They had an ordnance dump area in the river, that we didn't know anything about. So we're going along and all of a sudden we start seeing these explosions. The guy's dropping his bombs. Jesus, we're receiving fire. Well, the Seawolves started hosing down the area. These helicopters had thousands of rounds of brass, and every time you'd bank the helicopter all this brass would fall out and would splash in the water. So you'd think, Jesus, we are being fired on. So we just emptied everything we got and turned around and ran back. Hyland: "Jeez, this is great. You guys are terrific."

Finally, after he left, NavForV was livid. Finally we found out what had happened. So I went up to NavForV and said, "Here's what happened. Do you think we ought to tell Admiral Hyland?"

He said, "We're not going to tell him anything." He said, "He left on the biggest high I've ever seen. He thinks you guys are great. Just forget it."

WINKLER: Geographically where things were in relation to each other?

MUSTIN: Yes. The Mekong River is one of the major rivers of the world. The Mekong Delta was the rice bowl of Asia for a number of years. Two-thirds of the population of the country lived there. It is the region of the country that was south of Saigon, bordered by the Gulf of Thailand on the west and the South China Sea on the south. The Bassac River, which is the main branch of the Mekong River that came down through the Delta, had a major city on it, Can Tho, which at the time I was there had a population of about 50,000. It was fifty-five miles from the mouth of the river at the South China Sea. The river branched about another forty miles or so north of Can Tho. The branches ran roughly east and west. The major cities in the region were along those branches. The rest of the country was essentially a rice paddy and jungle, which looked a lot from the air like the bayous of Louisiana.

Where we lived was an old French motel. After I left they built a new base. But this was a French motel that was across the highway from the Vietnamese Air Force base, in a town called Binh Thuy just outside of Can Tho. We lived in this old motel, French motel. We had a Navy barge, floating barracks, which was our command center and repair shop. We had, at the time, eighty PBRs. They were little fiberglass thirty-one-foot boats; commercially built pleasure craft. They were divided into ten-boat units, called river patrol sections. Of those eighty we had spread among five bases along the Bassac and Mekong Rivers, in Soc Trang, Vinh Long, My Tho, Can Tho, Long Xuyen, and Sa Dec. Those were the bases that we had, all on the river.

The idea was at first that the PBRs would patrol areas right adjacent to those towns in the Delta. When I got there, after we started getting better intelligence from the indigenants, we saw that if we concentrated in area "A" with this tiny force to cover the whole Delta, the VC would go to area "B". So we adopted the tactic of bunching PBRs. Instead of just putting ten here, we'd bring thirty in from another region. We concentrated our forces in areas where we foresaw major VC re-supply efforts.

That got to be very important on my watch down there, because of the other operation by the Navy called Market Time. That was Task Force 115. Prior to 1966 the majority of the re-supply of the Viet Cong forces in the southern part of Vietnam came in by sea, by steel-hulled trawler. When I say majority I mean upwards of eighty per cent.

By the time I got down to the Delta, Game Warden, which was the PBR operation, had only started in May, but Market Time had been going on for about a year. Market Time had cut the infiltration by sea down to something less than twenty per cent of the overall effort, which meant that the bulk of the re-supply of the VC forces in South Vietnam now came down via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which meant that to disperse it to the forces in the Delta region, they had to cross the rivers. So as the re-supply from the South China Sea was curtailed, the efforts to keep the forces supplied from the Ho Chi Minh Trail ultimately meant that there was a lot more action across the rivers in Vietnam, because as I said there were no bridges across them. In order to support that operation, including many more North Vietnamese regular regiments in the region, the VC had to collect taxes, had to prey upon the existing population for support, for the opportunities for leaks, for intelligence-gathering.

On the boats, a patrol was a terrible test of endurance. You had to be a young guy to be involved in it. A PBR patrol consisted of two boats and they normally lasted for twelve hours. It was a twenty-four hour a day operation. So if you'd go out there at six o'clock at night you were on the river till six o'clock in the morning. The problem was in the last half of that time, which we used to describe as hours of boredom and minutes of terror. The VC started to get wise, even though we made every effort we could to vary our operations so we wouldn't have discernable patterns. They figured out that in the last quarter of a patrol that lasted for twelve hours, the people were tired, regardless of time. Or you might have been involved in a bunch of firefights and you'd be coming back, and you wouldn't have much ammunition left. So that's when they started to hit us the hardest. So we had to develop a whole new set of tactics and doctrines to deal with that.

We made enormous effort to do the cultivation of the population, with medical supplies, cigarettes, candy, and good will. An enormous effort to collect intelligence. I used to go out on the river at night in a captured sampan with a coolie hat on and a starlight scope, another guy and I. We'd cruise up and down the river looking for curfew violators. Although that was pretty dangerous stuff, actually the most dangerous part of it was coming back to the barracks. We'd call up ahead and say, "Hey, we're coming in; don't shoot." Sure in hell the sentry would start shooting.

It was an enormously enervating operation regardless of the dangers, because of the heat. It was just hot—hot and humid. And so it really did take young people. We all thought the bullets would bounce off us.

At the time I had eleven years in the Navy. So I was thirty-one. I was one of the older guys. My boss was out of the class of '46 so he was older than I. But he didn't do all the stuff that I did, because he was the commodore, and also had to split his time as a senior advisor with the Vietnamese Navy.

PEERENBOOM: The other thing that would be interesting is how were you supplied? How did people bring in fuel and food and ammunition and all this sort of thing to you, in a place like that?

MUSTIN: Well, two ways. High priority items came in via U.S. airlift to the air base, which was right across the highway, and a lot of other stuff came in by sea, via LSTs that were parked down at the mouth of the Bassac. And a lot of the vegetables and produce and stuff to eat was just bought on the local economy. Ammunition was a big thing; that came in by air.

We'd started to build the base, which eventually became the base, at Binh Thuy, that replaced this old motel. My brother, who came down a year after I did, occupied the new base, which was a very handsome place. We started to build the boat ramps for that. One afternoon I was sitting there not doing much. In walks this major, a Green Beret. He said, "I need some cement to build a helo pad. I'm up in the jungle up here and I need this cement. I'm willing to trade for it."

We had cement coming out of our ears because we were building these boat ramps. So I said, "What do you want to trade?"

The guy said, "A helicopter."

I said, "Hell, I don't need a helicopter. We've got helicopters; we've got the Seawolves."

The guy said, "No, you don't understand. This would be your personal helicopter." He said, "It's been surveyed, all the serial numbers have been destroyed, and it's not even out of the crate. It's a brand new helicopter that will belong to you. And I'm willing to swap it to you for some cement."

Well, you know, I started thinking, how the hell will I get it home? (Laughter) I gave the guy some cement, but passed up his offer.

It was quite an operation.

WINKLER: Eventually we turned over river operations to the Vietnamese.

MUSTIN: That was after I left.

WINKLER: Right. What was the status of the Vietnamese navy at the time?

MUSTIN: One of the problems that we had was that the Vietnamese navy, and the Vietnamese army, had been essentially fighting this war for twelve years by the time we got there. So you have a very different appreciation for the urgency of the problem when you're going to be there for one year and then go home, than when you see no light at the end of the tunnel at all. So these guys were not very aggressive. Our biggest problem was to get them to operate.

Now, the people who were supposed to do that were organizationally a group called the Naval Advisory Group. They were U.S. Navy advisors, but had no administrative connection with those of us in Task Force 116, who were operating U.S. Naval forces. In combined operations, the idea was that we would be the equivalent of destroyers supporting Vietnamese amphibious forces in operations in the Delta. That was such a resounding failure, because we just couldn't get them to operate to the degree that our leaders wanted, that we had to bring in the 9th U.S. Infantry Division to perform that function, and that was the genesis for the Mobile Riverine Force. The Vietnamese navy, who had plenty of people and plenty of specially designed craft, just wouldn't operate. On a number of occasions we'd schedule operations with them and they wouldn't show up. Or we'd schedule operations and we'd get there and there wouldn't be any VC there because there had been a leak. It was a very, very frustrating time, dealing with both the....

I had gotten to know this ARVN general, Army of Vietnam general. I used to fly around in the helicopter with him. He really understood leadership but didn't do a lot of fighting. He used to speak English. He carried in his pocket a bunch of piasters, Vietnamese money, and in his other pocket a bunch of medals. We'd go places together and he would say, "I want to see your bravest young men." He'd line these Vietnamese soldiers up and he'd go up and pin a medal on a guy and shake hands with him. When he'd shake hands with him, he'd give him some money. He'd get back in the helicopter with a big smile and say, "Two things soldiers love are medals and money. Keep our boys happy." I thought that was a pretty perceptive view. When I was Second Fleet Commander I used to do that, but not with the money.

But it was a very frustrating time trying to get the Vietnamese navy to sea, because they were weary. So was the army. So that's why the Mobile Riverine Force came in. We had to bring in the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army. Why the U.S. Army and not the U.S. Marine Corps, who were masters at amphibious assault? The Marines didn't want to have anything to do with that, because they were irritated at being garrison forces up in I Corps in the Danang region, where they were having terrible feuds with the Army. And then for good measure, the Marines wouldn't make Marine aircraft available to ComSeventhAirForce in Saigon, U.S. Air Force. So finally Westmoreland just said, well to hell with them; I'll bring the Army in. So we had the U.S. Army becoming amphibiously qualified in U.S. Navy boats that were copies of boats that were already

there that had been designed by the French in the early fifties and were being operated by the Vietnamese fleet. They were really something. They had Mike Boats and they were covered on top with armor plate, and they had 50-calibers. They even had a 3-inch 50, one of those, which was the equivalent of battleships.

I went out with the Vietnamese Navy a couple of times. The first time I went on one I showed up with a 38 and M-16. I went on board carrying my weapons, and the Captain looked at me. He said, "Look down there." And here's this damn thing bristling with all this weaponry, both sides, port and starboard, all these guys, with stack and stacks. He looks at my M-16 and my 38 and says, "What are you going to add to that?" and he laughed like hell. I said, okay, I'll throw down my weapons and take movies, which I did.

PEERENBOOM: One other question: Did you get involved at all with Agent Orange in that area?

MUSTIN: No. Bud Zumwalt brought that in, but he didn't get into Vietnam until after I left. He came through CinCPac when I was at CinCPac, on his way. But no, we didn't do any defoliating, not while I was there. There was some done, but not that extensive use. The stuff that was done was done by the Army and it was generally up in the northern regions where the Special Forces and the Army were.

WINKLER: You were there during the monsoon season?

MUSTIN: Yes.

WINKLER: What was it like operating under that rain?

MUSTIN: Well, every couple of years the Delta floods. The fall the I was there—the monsoon in the Delta is in the fall—they had an enormous flood, in the fall of '66. What this meant was, the VC and everybody else were driven out of the jungles into little patches of high ground. So we were all sitting around complaining about the flood ops, just sheets of rain all day every day and everything rusted—it was really hard to keep weapons like the M-16 functioning in the severe conditions—when General Westmoreland did something that I think generals ought to do. He sent out a message and said, in effect, "Stop bitching about the weather and start turning it to your advantage." Overnight guys started to do that. We said they all have to get someplace where they can at least sleep at night and we ought to be able to pinpoint those locations. So we got a couple of PACVs, those air cushion vehicles. Painted sharks' teeth on them and set off. Sure enough, the VC were on the high ground, and we cleaned up. Lieutenant Commander Jim Toole ran the whole operation, and it was great.

Jim had some guys go up into Cambodia, because there weren't any boundaries or road signs. Colonel Desobry was the senior Army officer in the region, stood up and covered for us. I don't mean he covered up, but he supported us. He said, "Those guys didn't know where they were. They were in a big firefight. They didn't know they'd crossed into Cambodia." He said, "I'm damn glad you did."

I don't think that the Mekong flooded the next year, after I left. I think it did again in '68. But I'm not sure. But it's a periodic flood, and of course they had no system of locks or levees or anything else to control it. I see these movies of these towns in West Virginia on the tube, that are flooded, and it brings back some memories.

The PBR, it was a pleasure boat bought right off the rack. It had a couple of diesels and jet propulsion for engines—no screws. The first generation, which is what we had when I was there, didn't have a screen on the intake. So when they went into the flood ops they were now operating in waters where we they getting a lot of grass and stuff in the water. This stuff would come up into the intakes and it would freeze the propulsion. The current would run six knots or seven knots there. The range of tide, as I said, was enormous. The end result of these grasses coming up was, the engines would bind up and just stop. So you'd be in the middle of a firefight and trying to clear the kill zone, and all of a sudden they'd stop. You could see the rounds coming closer and closer. I had been on the swimming team at the Naval Academy. Since I was the best swimmer of these guys, I was always the guy who would go over to go under the boat and try and clear this stuff out. Pull out the snakes and grass and all this crap. And then climb back up the side and clear out while rounds are landing in the water—and away we'd go. I still have some really bad ear fungus that I got from all that stuff, that I can't seem to shake. But the second-generation boats had a very nice screen put across the bottom of the intake that took care of that.

(End of Side B, Tape I)

WINKLER: This is Tape II on January 31, 2001. Dave Winkler here, of the Naval Historical Foundation, with Captain Bill Peerenboom, again with Vice Admiral Henry Mustin. We're wrapping up Vietnam and you mentioned that CNO had told you about these orders to go to CinCPac. Talk about that whole process of going to CinCPac.

MUSTIN: Before I went, as I said, I made this nationwide tour and made all these speeches to gin up support for volunteers to go to Vietnam. When I went, everybody was a volunteer. At some point that stopped and people were being ordered over against their will. But in any case, I always used to say, when I left we were winning the war--then I turned it over to the amateurs. So I made this nationwide tour, with a bunch of slides that I put together and told a bunch of war stories. It was highly successful. Then I went to CinCPac.

CinCPac was an admiral, U. S. Grant Sharp. He was one of the finest gentlemen that I've ever had the great fortune to be associated with, and who is one of the major influences on my career. I went there to be his flag lieutenant. CinCPac at the time was an absolutely pure unified command, and it was the only one of the unified commands that was. It was one-third, one-third, one-third. Army, Airforce, and Navy, absolutely one-third each. CinCPacAF was a four-star Air Force officer; CinCArPac was a four-star Army general; and CinCPacFlt was a four-star navy admiral.

Through Admiral Sharp's eyes I was able to see the interplay among the services, not only in the field, but how they competed for the budget dollars in the Pentagon. And how the tensions in the staff played in a combat situation. These were powerful men, who were used to commanding forces in combat and there was plenty of combat going on. They were highly intolerant of incompetence, dedicated, capable. And hamstrung by the vacillating and unreasonable—I thought and still do—policies emanating from Washington.

In any case, I arrived there. I was born in 1933. Admiral Sharp had graduated from the Naval Academy in 1927, so he had been in the Navy since before I was born. He commanded a destroyer in World War II and won a Silver Star. He had been ComDesPac, ComFirstFlt, CinCPacFlt, and now he was CinCPac. When we would ride around in the car, just the two of us, I used to give him lectures on ship handling, and he very courteously would listen to all this stuff from this shavetail that he had. But I could see within two weeks of getting there that the war that was being presented to CinCPac every day was not the war that I had been fighting.

CinCPac essentially, although he was Westmoreland's nominal superior, in fact had primarily the responsibility for Rolling Thunder, which was the air war outside of South Vietnam. To do that CinCPac had the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the Thirteenth Air Force, which was based at Clark, near Subic in the Philippines. The air war in South Vietnam was conducted by Commander Seventh Air Force, who was a three-star Air

Force general who was a component commander of General Westmoreland's. So you had CinCPac as the theater commander, the theater including Korea, where there was a four-star Army UN commander, Japan, Thailand, and South Vietnam, where Westmoreland was in charge of the ground campaign.

The whole time I was at CinCPac, Westmoreland waged a campaign to become a CinC himself. He wanted to be CinCSEAsia. Admiral Sharp took the position that he certainly could be CinCSEAsia, but he was not going to give CinCSEAsia any of CinCPAC's forces. And that's where the argument died, because in order to provide forces for a new CinC, not just naval forces but particularly air forces, delays in acquisition and construction being what they are, you'd have to rob Peter to pay Paul. SACEur and other commanders worldwide, who were very concerned about the situation with respect to the Soviet Union and China, were not about to pull forces out of Europe or out of Korea or other places to send them to support Westmoreland. In addition they'd already had a number of forces sent over there. Almost two-thirds of the U.S. Navy was involved in the Vietnam war in one way or another.

So you had the interplay between CinCPac and ComUSMACV, who was fighting the ground war in Vietnam and the air war in South Vietnam; CinCPacFlt, who was conducting the Naval air campaign in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam; ComThirteenthAirForce, who was conducting part of that campaign. And you had this terrible setup with rudder orders and contradictory policies coming from Washington, including detailed target lists sent from the White House. It was the goddamnedest thing you've ever seen in your life.

Shortly after I got there, there had been enough complaints made by the senior officers and returning pilots involved so that Congress said they were going to hold hearings on the conduct of the air war in North Vietnam, headed by Senator Symington, who had been a Secretary of the Air Force. And one of the questions was: Have you requested authority to hit any targets that have been denied by Washington? This panicked McNamara and his crowd, and Johnson, because we had page after page after page of targets we had requested that had just denied, for no reason. Came back, "Not granted, no reason, just denied." As a result of that, in the weeks before we went back for this testimony we got, all of a sudden, directives to hit more targets than we had the time or forces to hit in the time remaining before the testimony. It was like the Clinton pardon flail. At the end of this flood of approvals, some of which had been pending for years, a secure voice call came out from Mr. McNamara, who pointed out in no uncertain terms that he believed that now there were no targets that had been requested.... And therefore truthfully the Admiral if asked that question would respond, "No, there have not been."

So then we got Rem Robinson, the Executive Assistant to CinCPAC, to call Symington's office and say, "If you ask that question, ask the next question, 'When were those targets approved?'"

So we go back to Washington. The Admiral says, "No, none of the targets that I've requested were denied."

“When were those targets approved?”

“Well, hundreds of them were approved last week.”

“How long had those requests been pending?”

“Some as much as eighteen months.” So the truth came out. But that was the way McNamara and company dealt with those kinds of issues.

So we had a series of conferences following this. President Johnson came out; other players came out. Dean Rusk, MacNamara, Nguyen Van Thieu. One of the things that Admiral Sharp did -- which I tried to do later when I became an Admiral -- when I first got there he said, “Now, look. You’re going to have to put up with a lot here, because I have a lot of entertaining to do. You’re going to have to watch all my contingency funds, watch my liquor allowance, watch the way the stewards work, all of this stuff, all the protocol is yours. It’s a terrible burden. And you can’t make any mistakes. Because we’re going to be dealing with the President, the Secretary of State, the King of Thailand.” He said, “I recognize that’s not the kind of thing you have done or want to do. But I’m going to make that up to you to the degree that I can, because you are going to be in on all the decisions that I have anything to say about. Any time I go in to see anyone that works for me, like Westmoreland, you’re going to be there. You’re going to be hearing how we discuss these issues, what we think is important. And you’ll be able to tuck that away and use it some day.” And he did that. That’s the greatest gift that he could have ever given me. I had the opportunity to see the war and all of the myriad political issues, the inter-service rivalry issues, operational control of people like SAC, Curtis LeMay, through his eyes. It really was just a mind-blowing experience. Plus I had such absolute admiration for Admiral Sharp, who really was a magnificent officer. It was lucky the country had him in the position he was in.

One day, just before he retired, I said, “You are sending these reports back to Washington almost daily, the body counts. We don’t have any idea what the body counts are. We used to make up numbers when I was down in the Delta, because we were told to. ‘Your message of such-and-such not complete; how many were killed by air?’ So we’d say, oh, must have been at least fifty.” I said, “Can you imagine Eisenhower putting up with this crap in World War II? Feeding this stuff back to Alain Enthoven and the systems analysts for some weird analyses to camouflage what’s going on to the American people? I think you ought to write a book about this.” And he did. It’s a hell of a book. It’s called “Strategy for Defeat.” He wrote it right after he retired. It formed the basis of much of my thinking, which I was later able to put into effect at the highest levels of NATO, which I’ll explain later. The point that he continually made was that no war in history has ever been won by a purely defensive strategy. Even an overall defensive strategy—which ours was in Vietnam, to defend South Vietnam—has to have offensive elements. And the only offensive element that we have in this strategy is the air war against North Vietnam. If we aren’t permitted to conduct that element—which is our only offense—if we aren’t permitted to conduct that element the way our military judgement

tells us it should be conducted, then we're not going to win the war. He said this over and over and over again.

WINKLER: You were there between August of '67 and August of '68, which is a very eventful time period. You had the Tet Offensive, you had the Pueblo incident. Could you go through some of those?

MUSTIN: Yes. We went to WestPac once a month. A WestPac cruise with CinCPac is an experience, because we covered his domain, which was the Philippines up to Thailand, to Vietnam, to Korea, to Japan, to Korea, and back. If you do this in the winter this means that you have to have every uniform known to man. And when you're doing it with a four-star admiral, you've got to have every flavor, which meant short-sleeved white, long-sleeved white, medals, ribbons, swords, winter outfits for Korea, greens for Vietnam, different covers for the caps, uniforms of unparalleled complexity.

I didn't do many smart things, but one thing I did: When I first got there we went to Thailand. The King was going to present the Admiral with the Royal Order of the White Elephant. No U.S. uniform regulations cover how to wear this. So I got the photographer aside and said, "As the King puts this medal on the Admiral, take a picture of that and let me have it." This was a medal that had a big sash, and then it had starbursts stuck all over the place. So the guy takes this picture of the Admiral. A year later we come back and call on the King. He wants to wear the Royal Order of the White Elephant. So he's in there and all of a sudden the steward comes in and says, "The Admiral wants to see you." So I grab this picture. The Admiral said, "Goddammit. Why is he putting these all over the place? This isn't where they belong."

So I picked up one of these starbursts and stuck it on and said, "That's where it goes."

He said, "It is not. It is not, goddammit. That's not where it goes."

So I said, "Well, Admiral, that's where the King thinks it goes. Here's where he put it on when he gave it to you, as can see from this picture."

"All right, all right." You get a few small triumphs.

But we would make these tours through his domain, and get the different perspectives of the commanders, all of whom were flag and general officers, all of whom had different axes to grind, and all of whom recognized the utter futility of this basic U.S. policy in Vietnam, except, in my view, Westmoreland, who thought we could win by defeating the enemy in South Vietnam. I was persuaded from what I saw in the Delta that if we continued on with the progress we were making when I left, it would take us forty years to win the war in South Vietnam. So unless we could, as LeMay said, build a dam at the top of the waterfall—that is, take firm offensive action against North Vietnam, it could go on forever. And that historically turned out to be the case.

We were in the Philippines when the Pueblo was taken. The communications at the time were very rudimentary. We had secure voice. We had what was called the Blue Eagle, which was an airborne command post, part of the nuclear survivability scheme, had a crew of forty-five Air Force guys and a whole bank of computers from which they could execute the SIOP. We got very garbled reports of what had happened. But it soon became clear that the Koreans had taken the Pueblo. The Admiral said we should not let them get away with that. We should go take it back. We should tell them that we're going to come take it back, and if they know what's good for them they're going to turn it and the crew back over to us immediately, or they're going to be sorry this ever occurred. The word came back from the Pentagon, we're not going to do that. We're not going to take any military action against the Koreans. We're going to settle this through diplomatic pursuits. No reason was given.

The reason given later, which had some merit, was that the reaction of the Chinese to an incursion in North Korea at a time when a lot of South Korean armed

forces were fighting in Vietnam, and the fact that our forces were really spread thin everywhere else in the world, we just didn't want to take on the problems of another potential large scale conflict on the ground in Asia. That was the reason it was turned down. That's all debatable, but that was the reason. I still think it was a mistake. The Army guys on the CinCPac staff.... I used to get these little cartoons from these majors that would say, "Hey, fellas, please give us back our ship," with a picture of John Paul Jones on his hands and knees begging for the ship to come back. It was a time of great frustration.

WINKLER: What was the contingency plan? Just to go in there and...

MUSTIN: Just go take it back. We could have done it. There was not that much Korean ground force at the port they towed her into. We could have done it if we did it promptly. We could have gone in and gotten it out. And then the decision about whether we wanted to get into a major ground war with them or not would be up to them. The South Koreans were all for it. The biggest problem while I was in CinCPac was restraining them. We were worried every day that they were going to declare war. But that's what happened with the Pueblo.

The Tet Offensive—we saw that, as did Westmoreland, as the death knell of the VC. The last gasp of the North Vietnamese effort in Vietnam. They had stunning losses. They came up out of the tunnels, they came up out of the hidden places, and they got killed. So we thought, hey, this is what we've been waiting for. They had been a will-o-the-wisp all of these years. Finally they had come out and fought us in the open, and we had cleaned their clock. That was the opinion of the Admiral and Westmoreland. They just didn't understand the extent of the anti-war sentiments in the United States. So that what in fact was a humiliating military defeat for the North Vietnamese ended up to be a diplomatic victory of the highest order. You've heard the famous story, which is true, of the two colonels meeting during the peace talks in Paris. The U.S. colonel says to the Vietnamese colonel. "Well, we're negotiating for peace, but I want you to know that you never defeated us on the battlefield."

The Vietnamese colonel says, "That's true; and it's also irrelevant."

But we were elated as the first reports of the Tet Offensive came in. At last, they'd stood and fought. So we could bring all our firepower to bear, and we could do it in South Vietnam without the strings we had had put on us. The constraints were many. Then it went on down. We did get approval when I was in OpNav to mine Haiphong, which is a whole other series of really interesting stories. But as far as I'm concerned, the war in Vietnam was over with Tet.

WINKLER: Well, that was one thing, when I was interviewing Vice Admiral Houser, who was in planning at the Pentagon at this time, looking at short-range contingencies, one of which was mining. They were trying to sell that up the chain of command, and they were not having any success.

MUSTIN: No. CinCPac had the plans. There were two, and we had them from day one of the war. The first one was to mine and seal Haiphong, which was where all of the re-supply from North Vietnam was coming from. The second was to take out the Red River dikes, and flood out Hanoi. We could never get permission to do either.

Finally, when I was in OpNav—when I get to that part of the story I’ll tell you. I was working directly for Bud Zumwalt and Worth Bagley. I had just come back from being skipper of a destroyer. We finally got permission to mine Haiphong. Admiral Bagley said to me, "go in a private room here and don’t say anything to anybody. I want you to write down what we ought to be concerned about in the rest of the world. He said the President’s going to come on the tube tonight, and he’s going to announce we’re going to mine Haiphong. So I was doing that and the President came on. He said we’re going to mine Haiphong. Then he said—and we didn’t know he was going to say this—if you guys give up we’ll come in and clear the mines for you. Then the TV broadcast was over. Bud Zumwalt was there. Nixon said to Bud, “I presume you’ve got your best guy in charge of the mine force, right, Admiral?”

Bud said, “Yes, sir.” He came back and called up Worth and he said, “Who the hell’s CoMineWarCom?”

Worth said, “Well, actually, there isn’t any. It was Jamie Adair. He retired a month ago and we haven’t replaced him yet. We’ve got a captain who’s Acting CoMineWarCom.”

So they grabbed Brian McCauley, and said, “Not only are you CoMineWarCom, but you have been since Jamie retired two months ago. You got it?” Yeah, we got it.

WINKLER: During that time period you mentioned you had the opportunity to sit in and meet a lot of the key players. Any particular meetings that you have striking memories of?

MUSTIN: Yes. There was an alliance called SEATO, which was a Pacific equivalent in many ways, not exactly but close, of NATO. The U.S. military representative to that was CinCPac. We had a SEATO meeting in Bangkok a month or two before LBJ announced that he wasn’t going to run. The purpose of the meeting was to reassure our SEATO allies that we were firmly committed to Rolling Thunder, which was the bombing of North Vietnam, and why the U.S. thought it was important.

The U.S. official to do that was Dean Rusk. Dean Rusk came. He had prepared a strong, detailed defense. We got off the plane in Bangkok and went to the SEATO meeting. At all these international meetings the countries speak in alphabetical order. So the United States is usually the last. We walked in and sat down. The principals were sitting here, and the strap-holders, of which I was one, were in the next row behind. A guy walks up to Dean Rusk and says, “I have to talk to you, Mr. Secretary. President Johnson just announced a bombing halt, saying that we’re not getting enough results to justify the carnage of civilians. The guy went back and sat down, and I saw Dean Rusk—I was looking right over his shoulder. All these other people were speaking

around the table, all of them saying how they supported the bombing, because we'd been doing an awful lot of spadework. Dean Rusk is writing four little bullets. They got around to him, and he gave a fifteen-minute speech in flawless English, with no uhs or ands or buts or any of that, that supported, as lucidly and as in-depth as you could possibly get it, a bombing pause. He raised the issue about whether or not we were getting maximum advantage from it, what we could do, why the U.S. felt that this bombing pause was necessary at this time.

Later, I looked at the transcript of his speech, and it looked like he had been working on that for six months. It was organized in paragraphs—the transcript—the sentences flowed beautifully, the grammar was flawless. I've never seen anything like that, before or since. I immediately started reading a lot of Dean Rusk's writings. You can agree or disagree with what he says, but as far as I'm concerned, he is a better writer than Ernest Hemingway or any of these guys. The things that he says are said so lucidly, so concisely, so persuasively, whether you agree with him or not, you have to admire the strength of his intellect and his grasp of his subject. I never forgot that. I was just stunned.

WINKLER: Of course I imagine your boss's reaction to the Johnson speech probably was a little different?

MUSTIN: Oh, by that time he was used to having his legs cut out from under him by that gang of sycophants in Washington. It wasn't until a year or so ago that McNamara wrote his mea culpa, that I still can't bring myself to read. It would just open too many old wounds as far as I'm concerned. I spent a lot of time with my father, who was the J3 during all this stuff, and talked to him about how these things happened.

WINKLER: He was the J3 on the Joint Staff?

MUSTIN: The Joint Staff, yes.

After that SEATO meeting, the second meeting that I remember very clearly had to do with assignment of Marine Air to I Corps, which is where the Marines were billeted. The Marines took the position that Marine air-ground team integrity meant that orders and assignment of air operations daily were the provision of the Marine commanding general in I Corps, not the provision of Westmoreland's Air Force deputy, Spike Momeyer, who was commander of the Seventh Air Force, who was conducting the air war in South Vietnam. It turned out that Momeyer's guys did a little assessment, and they found that the marines had somewhere between forty and sixty per cent of their strikes that were scheduled every day were not flown. So what Momeyer said was, I would like to have those assets to fit into my air plan because I don't have enough to hit all my targets, and you've got a surplus. The Marines said no. And that came to CinCPac for resolution. CinCPac sided with Westmoreland and Momeyer and the Air Force. Admiral Sharp sided with them. It had to go back to the Joint Staff; the Chairman decided. He supported Admiral Sharp. The Marines were furious about that and never forgave him.

PEERENBOOM: Who was the Chairman at the time?

MUSTIN: That's General Bus Wheeler. Army. So I remember that series of meetings clearly. And I remember when we had sliced through all the smoke and all of General Krulak's passionate pleas about the integrity of the air-ground team, Admiral Sharp just said, "Spike doesn't have enough aircraft to hit his targets, and you've got excess aircraft every day. Why can't you give them to him? I think you should, because I think he needs them." There was no problem with the White House target lists in South Vietnam. It was the targets in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia that they controlled. So I remember that meeting clearly.

The final one that I remember was my intro into the high level inter-service arenas. At the time the Navy had a plan called SIOP, where the carriers participated in nuclear strike plan formations. It's been modified many times over since then. They had launch points that they'd go to. Periodically CinCPac ran war games to exercise the SIOP plan even though, at the same time, he was fighting a war in Vietnam. It was a very, very demanding time. So on one hand we have this simulated exercise going on with the SIOP. Now in the real world a major typhoon came through the western Pacific. The J3 in CinCPac was a Marine two-star general. His deputy was an Air Force colonel named John Moench, who later became a general, a really good guy, a very capable. The typhoon comes through during this exercise. So John Moench writes up the exercise report. In it he said, unfortunately a typhoon came through and it prevented the exercise carriers from reaching their launch points, so the Navy was unable to execute its responsibilities in the SIOP. Obviously, the message was spend more money and buy more Air Force airplanes, and you'll be able to correct this kind of problem. This comes up to Rem Robinson. I was sitting in his room. He was the Navy Executive Assistant. He said to me, "Read this."

I read it, and said, "This all makes sense to me."

He said, "Okay. Watch this." "Johnnie, come on up here; let's talk this over."

"Sure." Both these guys were masters of their profession.

Rem says, "Hey, I got your report here. It talks about Navy carriers not making it to the SIOP launch points."

Johnnie said, "Yeah, that was really kind of interesting. We got carrier skippers and we said, could you go through these kinds of seas? And they said no they couldn't, so they couldn't make it to the launch points. So we felt compelled to report that."

Rem said, "I remember when that typhoon came through. What happened to all those B-52s in Guam and Clark? Didn't they go back to the States for some reason?"

John said, "Well yeah, they did."

Rem said, “Well, don’t you think you ought to put that in the report too?”

“Well, yeah.” A little smile. “Yeah, I guess we probably ought to.”

Rem said, “Why don’t you just take it out? Put in either both or none.” So it came back, and it had something bland, saying that bad weather affected both.... But that was the kind of stuff that, as we speak, is going on today. What you get is true but not always the whole story.

WINKLER: Okay. We’re just about to wrap up this side of the tape. We’ll move on to your next tour the next time we meet.

PEERENBOOM: Did you leave at the same time Admiral Sharp did? Did he retire and then you went on?

MUSTIN: I stayed on for two months with Admiral McCain, at his request. I wish I had left with Admiral Sharp. I learned a lesson there. Whenever you’re on somebody’s personal staff, when he leaves everybody ought to go. I stayed on at McCain’s request, and it was night and day. He brought in his own set of guidelines and his own way of doing business. I had ways of doing things—that certainly had been satisfactory to Admiral Sharp, or I wouldn’t have completed the tour—that Admiral McCain didn’t like. There wasn’t anything I could do right. So I became pretty quickly identified with everything McCain didn’t like. Luckily, Admiral Sharp had set it up so that I could go get command of a DDG. So I got out of there one jump ahead of the sheriff, two months after he left.

WINKLER: That would be a good place to pick it up next week, or whenever we get together.

7 February 2001

WINKLER: Today is February 7, 2001. Dave Winkler here with Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, U.S. Navy (Retired), continuing our series of oral histories.

I want to go back. I just had a quick question, going back to your tour in-country in Vietnam. The SEALs—you mentioned you worked with them. There’s one SEAL, this guy Marcinko? He’s kind of like made a career of writing about...Rogue Warrior and everything. Was he in-country during your time period?

MUSTIN: He was. Demo Dick. He’s not held in very high regard by anybody who knows him or was there, because in a number of the stories that he passes off as him being the hero, he wasn’t even involved. A number of guys have called me up about his first book and said we ought to sue him. My answer was, you can’t get in a pissing contest with a skunk. He’s a convicted felon, who did time, as you know. You’ve got to consider the source.

When I was there he was an ensign, a very low level guy. The senior SEALs were lieutenant, damn good guys. We were told in no uncertain terms by MACV's Op J-3, and by ComNavForV, that the whole subject of the SEALs in the Delta was a very politically sensitive subject. In fact, the Navy's being there at all was very sensitive. So we were to play this low-key, and not go seeking interviews with the press; keep the lid on what we were doing. We all took that to heart, because we were in the service and we were supposed to do what we were told. And we recognized the sensitivity of the U.S. forces being down there in the Delta.

Then just a few months before I left.... They used to have a series of magazines, Argosy and these things. One of them I think was called True Male Adventures. And we were horrified to pick up a copy in one of the exchanges of True Male Adventures, and see a cover that showed a bare-chested guy with a machine gun taking on a whole nestful of guys, with some scantily clad gals in the background, and it said, "Demo Dick Marcinko, the One-Man Viet Cong Killer" does such-and-such. And then in there was this interview with Marcinko, where he described all these things that he allegedly had done, none of which he'd done.

But Larry Bailey and Bob Ghormly and Jake Rhinebolt and some of the other guys who were there then took great umbrage with the stuff that Marcinko said in his first book, which was allegedly true. They got logs that established that he was at command headquarters A when his book said he was off fighting battle B in the field, these kinds of things. He made a lot of very good guys very unhappy with this stuff. He said a lot of things about me that were outright lies.

A footnote to this was—having said all that, he was still a shipmate of mine in Vietnam, even though he was kind of a sleazebag. In 1981 when I was the deputy at ComNavSurfLant, Dick Marcinko was in command of SEAL Team Six, which was a counter-terrorist team, essentially. They had a bunch of very highly classified things they were supposed to do. And I became aware when I was there that he was charged with a number of general court-martial offenses, for falsifying travel vouchers, for putting fraudulent expense accounts in, fake TAD records, and all that stuff. I said initially, you can't do this to this guy; he's a good guy and they're in a free-wheeling operation, and they're all essentially undercover officers, and so we have to cut them a lot of slack. I was the number two admiral in the force; the boss admiral was getting all this very convincing information. So I said I'm going to really make sure that this guy gets every break that he can, just because he's an old shipmate of mine, he's a combat veteran, and I don't want to see him railroaded by a bunch of overeager NIS guys.

Well, the more I got into it the more I saw that he really had done an awful lot of very shady and dishonest and illegal things, some of which were really felonies. There were some charges of selling weapons on the open market, all kinds of things. Anyway, he was court-martialed, and reduced in rank as I recall. He had been selected for promotion to captain I think—I may be a little shaky about this—and that was stopped, and he served time. So that's the guy who's now reaping a fortune by writing all these

stories in which he becomes Bob Ghormly and Jake Rhinebolt and all these other guys. He's got a very sizable number of the real combat veteran SEALs unhappy as hell with what he's doing.

WINKLER: Okay. I was curious about that, because it came up in conversations back at the Historical Center. When we closed last time we were talking.... You were with CinCPac and there was a change in command. You stuck on under Admiral McCain for a little bit, that turned out to be a painful experience for a short time, and then you got your command at sea?

MUSTIN: Yes.

WINKLER: Let's talk about the Henry B. Wilson.

MUSTIN: Yes. It was the DDG 7, Henry B. Wilson. By this time, 1968, these brand new ships had been run very hard, and the glaring inadequacies of the engineering plants in particular were coming to the fore. As I mentioned in a previous session, the Navy had built these in three different yards and had gotten three completely different engineering plants: Combustion Engineering boilers in one third, Babcock and Wilcox in another third, Foster Wheeler in another third. So that the spare parts common support among these ships in the engineering department was almost non-existent, because all the ancillary pumps and things had been built by different companies in order to spread the wealth. It was a very dumb thing to do, but that's what the Navy did.

The idea that you would not use these Tartar missiles to shoot down airplanes, but rather to shoot down missiles, was just beginning to be realized. But all of that was masked because the North Vietnamese Air Force rarely came to sea, and the VC had no air force. So instead of preparing for massed Backfire bomber raids shooting AS-4s and AS-6s at our formations, we were in an air-defense environment where if one MiG came out to sea every other month that was front-page news in the *New York Times*.

As a result of the lack of an air threat in the Vietnam War, the bulk of the responsibilities that accrued to the destroyer force were in the area of gunfire support. Not only gunfire support, which specifically means in support of land operations, but naval gunfire, which often is not in support of a land operation but just to destroy targets ashore. These were done up and down the coast of South Vietnam, and occasionally up into the North. Not on my particular deployment in Wilson, but on several other deployments the ship had gone north of the DMZ. So this placed a major demand on the guns.

It became apparent very quickly that the 5-inch/54 Mark 42 Mod 7 was a terribly over-designed and under-engineered gun. I described some of that stuff in a previous interview. But the fact that these ships had at least two guns on them, and many of the Forrest Shermans had three, meant that you could usually keep one shooting. If you had a one gun ship you were out of luck.

So we started to emphasize the business of naval gunfire with these ships to degrees that no one had envisioned. As a matter of fact the guns were sort of an afterthought on these ships. And as I said they didn't even have any on the Leahy-class cruisers until the Commandant of the Marine Corps complained in the Cuban quarantine.

I took command of the Henry B. Wilson in San Diego. It was a very fine ship, with fine officers. One of the officers became a vice admiral, Connie Lautenbacher, who just retired. One became captain of a battleship, and would have been an admiral had he not had some heart trouble, Lee Kaiss. We just had a very, very unique combination of senior enlisted men and officers.

The senior chief was a boilerman, Teddy Ross, who at the time had maybe twenty-five years in the Navy. He fought all through World War II, in Gearing-class destroyers. He was an old-time chief, in the fullest and best sense of the word. He and I became really great friends during that cruise. He later volunteered, and I'll talk about this to come, to stay on active duty after his fortieth year, to come over and be my master chief when I was a DesRon Commander in Athens, Greece. And we still stay in touch till this day.

I brought my two sons—that's a sea story—back from Athens on the ship, and other male dependents as well, from Athens to Philadelphia. They went ashore, and I told Chief Ross, "These two boys can go ashore with you, but if either one of them gets the clap, you're in serious trouble."

He said, "I wouldn't worry about it."

We had, then, a destroyer force in the Pacific that was approaching the material status of the ships like the Duncan, that I described, at the end of the Korean War and World War II, the ship had been run very hard now, they had had truncated overhauls and availabilities, and they were plagued with fundamentally flawed engineering design. Luckily for the Navy we had by this time, in '68 and '69, enough people around who knew how to keep them running. The way you kept them running, essentially, was with beeswax and bailing wire. I shudder to think what the PEB or any of these examining boards today would say if they saw the things we had to do to keep those ships steaming, but we did.

So we went through the work-ups. The first problem that we had was we had some superheater failures.

WINKLER: Let me just step back. When you took command the ship was in San Diego?

MUSTIN: Yes. Had been back maybe three or four months from a WestPac deployment, meaning that we had about three or four months to go before we went back.

In the preparations for the forthcoming deployment we concentrated on naval gunfire, but we had three superheater tube failures. The water chemistry in these particular plants was crucial, because scaling on the inside of the tubes couldn't be cleaned when you were operational, and the tubes would fail. So I did a big investigation of all these tubes in my own ship. I had more knowledge about these boilers than almost anybody in the force, including the force material officer, because by this time I had put two of them in commission. I plotted where these things had failed. And I wrote a letter to the type commander with this plot, and explained why I thought they were failing. I said, "Before we go to deploy I strongly recommend that all four superheaters be replaced," a major yard overhaul job.

After I sent this letter we started receiving CasReps from the ships in WestPac for superheater failures. One ship, the Hull, spent the majority of their deployment in Subic Bay waiting for superheater tubes to be flown out. They had to be welded in place when replaced, and had to be welded by a qualified high-pressure welder. It was a very, very tricky and time-consuming job.

WINKLER: The Hull—isn't that a Forrest Sherman-class?

MUSTIN: Yes. They had the same boilers, same problems. So I sent this letter off to the type commander. I was pretty impassioned about it. And at the end of the letter I said: No amount of command attention is going to solve this problem; the only way to solve it is to replace the superheaters as recommended before we deploy, and that will require a yard period in Long Beach (because there was no yard in San Diego), and so we will have to take yea or nay on this promptly because we've got a lot of check-off lists to get through before we can get ready for deployment.

The force material officer said we're not going to do that. I said, well, I want the Admiral to say that. So the chief of staff, Roger Spreen, who was a wonderful, wonderful guy and a great friend, who later became an admiral and the chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, called me up. Whenever the chief of staff calls, that causes a certain anxiety. He said, "We've got your letter here about the superheaters. The Admiral wants to know why you put in this gratuitous crap in your last sentence, about command attention."

I said, "Well, I put that in there, Captain, because when I called the material officer and asked him for some help, that's what he told me was required to solve the problem." I could hear him starting to laugh on the other end. Everybody thought that the force material officer was kind of a pill. So the next day I got a message saying: Go on up to Long Beach and replace those superheaters. Which we did, and they held up through the deployment.

It just showed the condition that these ships were in. And it also showed the amount of money that was required to fix them, and the determination that was required on the part of the skipper in order to get anything done at a time when the moneys were being spent on other things, namely buying bullets and stuff like that.

So we went through all the pre-deployment work-ups. They were vastly different from the ones that we had in the Duncan. At one of these points Admiral Sharp, who had retired and was living in Point Loma, called up and asked if he could come down to lunch. He was affiliated with Teledyne Ryan, and had a new radar he wanted to talk about. So he came down. I went down to meet him at the quarterdeck. He came aboard carrying a briefcase and saluted. “Welcome aboard, Admiral,” I said. “Let me take your briefcase.”

He said, “Captains of ships don’t carry briefcases. I’ll carry my own,” and we went down to the wardroom.

Anyway, off we went to WestPac, in company with the Ranger, commanded by Joe Moorer, who became a great friend. Half way across we were told that one of the DEW Line, Distant Early Warning Line, ships had a guy on board with an emergency appendectomy and no hospital nearby. This was north of Midway. So we had to divert and go up and get within helicopter range, so we could go over and pick this guy up and take him to the carrier and operate on him.

The end result of that detour was that we had a twenty-seven knot SOA from Midway to Yokosuka, Japan, a long, long way, over 2,000 miles. So that meant four boilers for the Wilson, the whole time, an engineering test that I don’t think any Charles Adams-class destroyer has had before or since. We didn’t really know, for example, what the fuel consumption would be at that kind of speed, because the ship’s curves ran out at about twenty-four knots. But it did mean that we had to refuel about every other day. We were burning fuel so fast that we’d be bobbing like a cork on the ocean. If we’d run into really rough weather we’d have had to ballast. That was a difficult thing on those ships.

Along the way, in the forward boiler, Number 1A—I got a call in the middle of the night from the chief engineer, who I thought was a real wimp. He said, “You’ve got to come down in the forward fire room; I’m about to secure Number 1 boiler.”

I said, “Don’t do it. I’ll be right down.”

Down I went, and he said gas was coming out into the space. The seams of the boiler had ruptured on both the starboard and the port sides. If you walked up behind the boiler you could look in and see the fire. He said, “We’ve got to wrap this boiler up.”

I said, “We can’t wrap it up. There’s a war going on. We’ve got to get there. We’ll fix it when we get to Japan.”

He said, “Well, what do you intend that we do?”

By this time the senior chief, Teddy Ross, was there. I said, “I’ll tell you what we’re going to do. We’re going to go down and cut some shoring timber out of the forward damage control station, we’re going to stick that on the sides of the boiler, and

we're going to get hydraulic jacks and we're going to jack that son-of-a-bitch closed. Hold it there with hydraulic jacks till we get to Japan."

Chief Ross said, "Hey, that's a great idea. That'll work."

The chief engineer said, "I refuse to accept responsibility for that."

So I said, "Okay. You no longer have any responsibility. Get out of here and you're relieved as the chief engineer. I'll put you off in Japan." I didn't know whether I could do that or not. But I had had a lot of trouble with this guy on other things, just not getting the job done.

So we jacked the boiler shut, and the gas no longer escaped—you couldn't look in. We steamed on another 3,000 miles and made it to Japan where we fixed her up with devcon and pop rivets. There we put the chief engineer off. Sent a message to the Bureau saying I've relieved this guy for cause because he didn't meet my standards. And I've got a qualified relief on board so I don't need a replacement.

This guy was black, and his wife was a civil rights lawyer.

WINKLER: The chief engineer that you relieved?

MUSTIN: Yes. So this whole flail about that sort of made me aware of some of those kinds of things. It worked out well for the Navy because we met the commitment. And it imbued the ship with a spirit of: there's a war going on here; we've got things we've got to do, and we're going to do them. If we have problems we're going to fix them. We're going to carry out our orders and our mission, because this is a real-world combat situation.

During that cruise we fired about 8,000 rounds, which was about eight years' worth of peacetime firing. The liners came out of the guns, the paint blistered off. At one particular stage the Navy had gone to anodized steel cartridges, but up to 1952 the Navy had still used the brass cartridges for 5-inch semi-fixed ammo, which is where all the nice ash trays were coming from. And there were still a few of these old 1952 cartridge lots buried in the bottom of people's magazines. We were emptying the magazine. So one day I was on the bridge in the middle of a big fire support mission, and I looked down on the forecandle. All the empties were lying around and there were four brass cartridges in amongst this whole stack. So I said to the OOD, "I'm going down to the forecandle and get one of those brass cartridges; you take over." And I ran down to the forecandle. By the time I got there, there was only one left. So I got it, and that's that ash tray behind you.

We got to Subic, and the Hoel, a sister ship, DDG 13 I think, had had an in bore mount explosion. Word came from CruDesPac: Cease firing 5-inch rounds while we find out what's the cause of these in bore explosions. It was an amazing explosion. The ship was there and the forward 5" mount looked like a hobo smoking a cigar butt. When the barrel had ruptured it put out two little streams of shrapnel that went down and penetrated

the main deck, penetrated the crew's quarters, and straddled the side of a fore and aft bunk with three guys sleeping in it in a tier, and none of them was hurt. There were holes in the overhead and holes in the deck on either side of them. Amazing.

It turned out that the castings in the cartridges had been improperly done and there were gas bubbles in the powder itself. So when the grains were compressed the gas in the powder grain compressed and the temperature went up and caused that in bore explosions. It was only in a certain lot of cartridges. So I went over with Lieutenant Lautenbacher, the weapons officer, to the ammo depot at Subic Bay in the rain. We took the tarpaulins off and crawled all through all the acres and acres of cartridges. We found 1200 of them with the approved lots. I got a truck; we started loading up. We off-loaded all the prohibited cartridges. Put on the new ones that we found in the rain in the ammo depot at Subic. Loaded back up. Reported to the type commander and to the cruiser-destroyer commander in WestPac that we had approved ammo and were ready to go. At that time we were the only destroyer that was ready. The cruiser-destroyer commander was a brand new rear admiral, Worth Bagley, who had been my skipper in the Lawrence. So he sent us off.

We did some very interesting and hairy gunfire support for him. One operation took place.... We were at anchor in Danang, and we were told that two north Vietnamese regiments had an ARVN, Army of Vietnam, regiment pinned down alongside the Cua Viet River, which is right by My Lai, where the Calley massacre took place. That was about fifty miles from where we were, many of the charts of South Vietnam were dated from hydrographic surveys taken in 1898 or 1900. Anyway, we got underway in the middle of the night from Danang. At the time we were prohibited from anchoring, for obvious reasons, when we were doing gunfire support, because that made us a sitting duck from the enemy ashore. We put on four boilers and went racing in the middle of the night down the coast of Vietnam with these 1898 charts.

Got to the point that they had said the action was going on, and I could see that in order to bring the mounts to bear on where the action was I would have to put the ship in a place where the charted depth was less than the draft of the ship. So I told Lieutenant Lautenbacher to get in the gig and take a lead line and a hand-held radio, and go on out in front. He went out and sounded, and we went and picked our way and found a way to get in. Then, in order to get both guns to bear, we had to anchor and put what was called in the Asiatic Fleet a wind moor. You let a line out of the Number 6 chock and bent it onto the anchor chain, and then winched it around so you could winch the ship around ninety degrees to the current and tide. We did this, in violation of all existing regulations. I had not bothered to inform the commodore of all this, because he was asleep, and I didn't want him to say no. He came up on the bridge and said, "What are we doing?" I told him. We then looked up this river so we had both guns to bear on it, guns trained 270. He said "Great work."

WINKLER: What time of the day is this?

MUSTIN: This is first light.

The spotter was a U.S. ANGLiCo, which was the air naval gunfire liaison officer. The command usually was, we would fire a couple of rounds and they would spot and adjust the fires until we had the target covered, and then they would say, "Fire for effect." So a normal chain of events would be, you would fire a round, you would get a command like, "Drop one hundred yards and fire again." You'd fire again and they'd say, "Add fifty yards," or "Left two hundred yards." So we fired a round out of Mount 51. The spotter said, "Left ten feet, and fire for effect both mounts." We emptied the gun mounts by noon, 1200 rounds. We decimated these two North Vietnamese regiments, just a slaughter. We had no ammo on board at the end.

The ARVN, Army of Vietnam, general came out in a boat and came aboard and presented both the commodore and me with the Cross of Gallantry. Which made the commodore, who was a little bit unhappy about all these regulations that had been violated, that assuaged his concerns. And he thought that wind moor was a neat idea. We backed out of there very carefully and went on.

About this time the Admiral, Worth Bagley said that he was having trouble with the navigation beacon on the ship up keeping station for the air strikes, Yankee Station, in the northern part of the Gulf. The beacon is called a TACAN. What you did was you put a destroyer out with a TACAN on so the returning strikes from North Vietnam could come back in on the beacon and then vector from there to the carrier. The TACAN on the ship up there had crapped out. So he said complete your reloading, and congratulations on taking charge of these two NVA regiments (which later turned out to be a division). Go on up and relieve this guy whose TACAN has crapped out.

Well, we hadn't lit off our TACAN in three months. So I got hold of the EMO and I said, "How's the TACAN?"

He said, "I don't know." We turned it on and it wouldn't turn on. He said, "Jesus, what are we going to do?"

I said, "Well, we're going to fix it, whatever it is."

Well, the EMO, who was an ex-enlisted, finally came up and said, "Hey, we found out what the problem is. It's one of the coils. We don't have a spare and there's nobody in the immediate area who has one. The voltage across this thing is a couple of megavolts, so we're out of luck."

I said, "I'm not going to tell the Admiral that I can't pull this thing through. We'll make one."

He said, "You've got to be kidding."

I said, "No." So I had all my textbooks from PG School. I went back down in the machine shop and I got the thickest copper wire that I could find. And I got a couple of

cartridges, 5-inch cartridges. And I calculated the number of turns that you ought to make to get the requisite impedance. Started winding this thing, had it all laid out on the wardroom table, making all these turns with this wire around this cartridge. I took the cartridge out, and I had this coil. Then I had to calculate the inter-coil capacitance, which I did. Then I carried this thing all up to the TACAN room. We got a GI can and filled it up with oil. The electronics technicians and electricians were all watching this; they thought I was nuts. I was explaining to them what these formulas were and all that. In the meantime we're steaming for station at flank speed.

I took it up and put it in the TACAN room, which was right behind the captain's in-port cabin. I was still the picture of confidence, till the time came to turn this thing on. And then I was conscious of the three to six megavolts that I was playing with, but I wasn't going to show any concern to the troops. So I hooked it all up. Then I got a long broom and I backed out the door and leaned in with the broom handle and flicked the thing on. The TACAN started humming; it worked perfectly. That GI can with that coil in it stayed there for the rest of the deployment.

When we came back to San Diego I was going down to my cabin to get ready to leave the ship to go home to Lucy and the kids, and a bunch of guys from the tender who were there for post-voyage availability were aboard to see what the scope of their work was going to be. As I stepped out of my cabin, which was right by the TACAN room I saw one of the ETs in there talking to this guy from the tender, and he was saying, "This is what the captain did. Look at this thing."

And the guy was saying, "Jesus!"

As I had said at one point earlier in this history, I thought we could pay back the PG education in a number of ways. That was just one.

The destroyer operations, essentially, for all of that war, were operations that were lumped under a heading of Sea Dragon, which was gunfire support. I know that no one fired a Tartar missile. A couple of Talos were fired; I think maybe a couple of Terriers. But I don't think any of the Charles Adams ever fired a Tartar missile. But we sure did fire a lot of 5-inch. And we sure did demonstrate that when you're at sea, if you are given a mission and lives depend on it, you can find a way to do it. It's just a matter of doing it. And it's also a matter of knowing your stuff and being prepared to take some risks.

WINKLER: You were aboard as CO February of '69 to August of '70, so it was a year and a half tour. I guess you deployed about June or July of '69?

MUSTIN: Yes.

WINKLER: And it was about a seven-month tour, so you got back early in '70?

MUSTIN: Yes.

WINKLER: Okay. So these incidents you're talking about were probably October-November time frame?

MUSTIN: Yes. There's a date on that 5-inch cartridge there.

WINKLER: Yes. 4 November '69—and this is when you're off the coast—to 18 March '70. And that's one heavy piece of metal.

You're in combat but you're also training officers and crew. The training's kind of ongoing. What sort of philosophy did you have as far as....

MUSTIN: I had reached a point in my career where I very firmly believed, influenced by my father, by Pete Smith, my second skipper, by Worth Bagley, and by Ike Kidd, that the most important legacy that you can pass down as an officer in the Navy is the knowledge and the attitudes of the people that have worked for you. Because after a while all the rounds you've fired and all the boilers you've fixed are just footprints in the sands of time. It's how you pass on attitudes that lead to winning that's important.

So I wanted each one of my officers to feel that he was not only ready to be captain of a destroyer, no matter what his rank was, but that he would be a better captain than I was. So I insisted that whoever had the watch perform all the functions on the bridge, that they kept track of that, that they became qualified for command, really consistently. I gave them very broad latitude to make mistakes. And that came because I was confident that there was no mistake that they could make that I couldn't fix. I'm making that sound easy, and it may not have been that way now and then, but that was what I wanted to do.

So I remember when we left for this cruise there was no Coronado Bay Bridge, and when we came back there was one. We came under the bridge, we're getting ready to tie up, and the senior watch officer came up with his little list of who should tie it up. He said, okay, it's so-and-so's turn. And I said, "Well, Lee, I'm going to make this landing."

He said, "But it's not your turn, Captain. It's Lieutenant (so-and-so)'s turn."

I said, "Yeah, but this is my last time at sea. I may never get another chance to do this."

"Yeah, but...." He was incensed that I was butting into the line. And I thought back to how irritated I'd been when Pete Smith took the conn from me because he'd never been alongside at night. But I decided I wanted to do this, and so I did. But unless it was a very, very unusual circumstance the officers handled the ship. And my experience in destroyers is that a captain who is a good ship handler, and who lets his officers handle the ship, can overcome a hell of a lot of sins and shortcomings in a lot of other areas. Because the way the ship is handled permeates the engineers, the boatswain's mates, all the people in the deck force, and it's the face that the ship presents to the outside world. And that's what the officers talk about in the wardroom.

Whenever we would go alongside, we would go alongside at flank speed and back down full. We had all kinds of records for the fastest approach and the quickest hookup times. Tom Kenneally was a JO, later became a captain. He was the probably the best ship handler that I've been associated with, even better than I was; there wasn't any question. My predecessor on the Wilson had gone to Vietnam as the senior advisor to the Vietnamese navy. He brought the Vietnamese fleet CinC out to the ship, because we were considering giving the Vietnamese navy a couple of DEs. I don't think we ever did. So he brought out this Vietnamese admiral to watch operations. We did some shooting. Then we replenished at sea from an oiler. Tom Kenneally had the watch. We were going along port side to an oiler. Tom had the conn, and I was standing, deliberately, with my back to Tom. He was looking forward and conning the ship, and I was looking back, aft, talking to this admiral and to Gene Finke, my predecessor, who had been the captain of the Wilson. I hear Tom say, "All ahead flank."

(End of Side A, Tape I)

WINKLER: Okay, you were onboard....

MUSTIN: ...coming alongside at flank speed. I saw the fantail of the oiler out of the corner of my eye; had my back to the bow of the ship. It was very close, very fast. I figured, hell, there's nothing I can do about this now, so I kept talking. I saw Gene Finke and this Vietnamese admiral looking sort of puzzled. Tom said, "All back full." We stopped precisely on station. We were about from forty to sixty feet away and the hoses came almost straight down. In less time than I can tell you the hoses came down and, thwack, we were hooked up and taking oil. And here we were; you could throw things across to the guys on the oiler. I was acting like this is routine and all. It was the best approach I've ever seen, before or since, magnificently done. Gene Finke and the Vietnamese admiral were just blown away by this. It was really something.

That was my idea then and henceforth, was to make sure that whatever I was doing I passed on to the officers associated with me. I felt a great deal of responsibility for that. If there's anything I'm proud of in my career it's the young officers who have been associated with me who have risen to flag rank, including the present CNO, Vern Clark, who worked for me twice. So I'm very proud of that. I think that I've passed on to the Navy some pretty good guys.

WINKLER: That time period you're in Vietnam, I guess Admiral Zumwalt was Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam? Your operational chain at that time, when you're doing these gunfire support operations...

MUSTIN: Seventh Fleet. In support of MACV. So it was very complicated. ComSeventhFleet had opcon of all the ships, unless they were inside the high water mark, in which case they reverted to MACV, who exercised that control through ComNavForV. But we were Seventh Fleet assets.

Admiral Zumwalt left Vietnam to be the CNO. So when I got back from Vietnam in the Henry B. Wilson the Z-grams started to come out, and all of that stuff with the sideburns and all with the beards and all of those things. And I wrote the Bureau and said I'd like to go to OpNav. They wrote back and said, nope, you're going to NavSea. You're going to pay back your PG tour. So I said, well, I don't want to go to NavSea; I want to go to OpNav. They said, nope, you're going to NavSea. So I said, well, I'd like to come back and talk to you about that.

I had a bunch of letters, and I had dinner with my dad, who by this time was J-3, director of operations on the joint staff. So I stayed with my parents in the Navy Yard. I said, "I don't want to go to NavSea; those guys are a bunch of weenies. I'm going to tell them if they don't send me to OpNav I'm going to resign." He said, you'd be crazy to do that. You never want to make an offer like that, because they'll take you up on it. He said, you've got to find a way out of this, and if all else fails, go on to NavSea.

So, dejected, I took my lecture from the detailer on the importance to the Navy of payback tours, and why the PG School is under pressure from the Hill, and blah blah blah. And I was the only guy who could save the future of the Navy, save the disgraceful condition of the Bureau of Ships—it wasn't NavSea then, it was the Bureau of Ships. So I said, yes sir, I understand all that, and went back out.

Admiral Ike Kidd became ComFirstFlt, which at that organizational time was a San Diego home-ported fleet. He came aboard one day and we resumed our acquaintance. He said, "Where are you going?" I told him the story—I'm really unhappy about going to NavSea. He said, "I'll take care of that. You're coming to First Fleet."

So I said, "Great." Ike made a couple of calls and, bingo, I got orders to First Fleet.

Two days before the change of command I got a call from Worth Bagley. He said, "Listen, CNO has brought me back here to OpNav. I want you to come back and work for me here in OpNav in the planning and programming business, unless you really want to stay out there."

I said, "No, Admiral. That's what I've tried to do for the last six months."

He said, "Okay. It's done."

So then I got this irate phone call from my detailer. He was a captain. He said, "I don't know what the hell you're doing, but you're causing me a lot of trouble. Anyway, your orders to Third Fleet (sic) are canceled."

I said, "Well, Captain, I've got a change of command tomorrow. Where shall I say I'm going?"

He said, "Fake it." He was really mad, and he hung up.

So I got up and said, “Here are my BuPers orders. I’m under oral orders to proceed to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.” And off I went to OpNav to work as personal assistant to Worth Bagley and Bud Zumwalt, a pretty interesting pair of guys to work for.

WINKLER: Before you get into that, just one more question about the tour on board the Wilson. In that time period you have the draft, the Vietnam War is controversial in this country, there’s a rise in the use of drugs; could you address some of those issues?

MUSTIN: Yes. I’m glad you talked about that. In my time in-country it was early enough in the war so that we thought we were going to win. We thought we saw a light at the end of the tunnel, and Westmoreland came back and said that. So all of that stuff about the drugs and the fragging and the mutinies didn’t occur when I was there. The same in the Wilson crew. I’ve often said that shooting solves a lot of leadership problems. Because all of a sudden there’s an awful lot of self-interest involved in being well trained and capable and having your gear working properly, since your life is on the line. So at this particular stage the crew was motivated, proud, thought we were doing our bit for our country.

The terrible riots and all that stuff had not yet occurred. They occurred while I was at OpNav, on my next tour. But at San Diego and places like that at this particular stage of the war, there was firm support. I went to small claims court a couple of times with my sailors and I’d go in my uniform, with my ribbons on. And the judge would always rule in favor of the sailors. It didn’t matter what the issue was. We’ve got to do well by our boys.

So I was lucky in that regard. I did not have the terrible, terrible leadership problems and the race riots and all of those things. I had none of those things. I would be tempted to claim that my brilliant leadership led to that circumstance (phonetic), but I can’t, because my experience during that particular time frame was representative of my colleagues’. A year later it was much different, much different. So I was lucky in that connection.

WINKLER: Drugs were not a problem?

MUSTIN: ...a year later. And I’ll touch on that, because Admiral Zumwalt sent me out to WestPac to canvass the ships. I’ll talk about that.

WINKLER: Okay, let’s go ahead. You’re working for Admiral Worth Bagley. Which Op code was he?

MUSTIN: He was Op 90.

WINKLER: Okay. The money guy.

MUSTIN: Well, the planning and programming guy. In today's organization he would be Op 70. But he also was a special assistant to the CNO, and so was I. In Op 90 I also had the chance to work with a gentleman who also became an enormous influence on my career, and that was then-Captain Jim Doyle, who later became the best Op 03 that the Navy ever had. In fact, he was so good as Op 03 that the whole organization that you have today was designed to break up Jim Doyle's lock on the system, which he achieved through a lot of personal brilliance and ability to accumulate talent to work for him.

Anyway, there I was, the first time in OpNav, and delighted to be there. Worth sent for me the first day. He was a flag selectee, a frocked captain, two-star. This was 1970. In 1973 he left, and took me with him, to go be CinCUSNavEur as a four-star admiral. Four stripes to four stars in three years ain't bad. There was a lot of resentment about that.

Anyway, he sent for me the first day and said, "Welcome to OpNav."

WINKLER: This was your first time in the Pentagon.

MUSTIN: Yes. My dad had told me, don't go to the Pentagon too early. He said you get to be kind of a palace guard guy if you're there too early. And you're taking time in your career off when you should be learning other things. So he said, essentially, if you go there and you're junior to the grade of commander, you're going to end up being the guy who goes around at 1630 every day and checks the wastebaskets to see there's no classified material in them. Not a bad calculation, the way things worked.

So anyway, I was a commander. Worth sent for me and he said, "Admiral Zumwalt has made a number of changes."

I said, "I know some of them."

He said, "He has a program that he wants to do to change the direction of the Navy. He calls this Project 60. Project 60 is essentially the major changes that he wants to make in the way the Navy does business, in his first sixty days in office. There are a number of programs associated with this. They all take money. The money can only come from other Navy programs." So he said, "It may surprise you to learn that sometimes people don't do what the CNO says he wants them to do." I said I couldn't believe that. "That's right," he said. "Some of these guys don't put enough money there even though he's told them how much money."

I said, "Well gee, he's the CNO."

He said, "Well, anyway, I want you to be Admiral Zumwalt's project officer for Project 60." What Project 60 was, was a briefing that Bud had given based on a review of the Navy that he had done right after he came back from Vietnam, spearheaded by Stan Turner and Worth Bagley, and a very small group of guys that worked with them.

Essentially what this was an attempt to do was to recognize the major change vis-à-vis the Soviet navy, and to emphasize sea control rather than power projection.

Since the end of World War II there had been no issue that anyone could prevent us from going where we wanted to go and doing what we wanted to do. So there was no challenge to sea control. He very astutely saw that the Soviet navy was now in a position to challenge that. So if you had to take the U.S. fleet from point A to point B in order to project power, if you concentrated on projecting power but were unable to get to point B you had a no-win situation. So the Navy would have to stop emphasizing power projection and emphasize sea control.

Well, the problem in a nutshell was that power projection was the private purview—in a conventional sense, nothing to do with nuclear sense—of Naval aviation. So everything that you did to emphasize sea control had to come out of the hide of Naval aviation. This caused frictions and passionate feelings on the part of aviators that still exist to this day.

Bud was very, very persuasive in the way he laid this out. Sea control, to him, was essentially the submarine force and the surface navy. In order to finance Project 60 and the changes he wanted to make his overall plan was to—and this is eerie in the way this came back to bite us under Bill Owens in the Clinton era—we were going to cut the Navy in half. We had a thousand ships and twenty-six carriers when I got to OpNav. We were going to cut the Navy in half and use those moneys to finance the changes and improvements in sea control that he wanted to institute. What he didn't realize, and which I realize now and saw repeatedly with the Clinton crowd over the last eight years, is that when you do that your force structure cuts are always gleefully accepted but you don't get the money back. The money goes into the U.S. Treasury, or it goes to the Air Force, or it goes to midnight basketball, or it goes someplace else. But it doesn't come back to the Navy. So we have repeated, under the aegis of re-capitalization, a whole new set of vocabularies to describe the same problem: Lay up the present force structure and use that to fund the necessary improvements, and then the funds for the improvements are not forthcoming. That's exactly the situation that we're in today. You can read that in this morning's Washington Post.

I talked to General Dave Jones this morning. He and I worked out together. He said the Air Force is going to have to start grounding airplanes. I said the Navy's going to stop building ships.

But that was Bud's scheme. The acrimony was exacerbated by his system of Z-grams and his expressed statements that the changes that he wanted to make were taking too long. A lot of people in the chain of command felt that he had set up a lot of ways to bypass them, where people could go direct to the CNO through various means; and he did. He bypassed the chain of command. And that infuriated particularly the large numbers of people who were still in the Navy who were very senior to him. He was in roughly the same position as Arleigh Burke. I think he was the youngest CNO ever, at the time. And he had gone from three stars to CNO, which bypassed a lot of guys.

The first thing he did was cancel all the CVSs, which were the ASW carriers. That took us down from twenty-six to fifteen. And he said we'll handle the ASW problem by taking the CVAs, which were the attack carriers, and making them CVs, so that half the wing was an ASW wing. That infuriated both the CVS guys and the CVA guys. They fought that bitterly. He then said we're spending too much money on fixed-wing aircraft and we can't buy enough airplanes or recruit enough pilots to fill up the fifteen decks. So we're going to concentrate on vertical aircraft, and he invented something called the sea control ship, which was a small carrier that had no catapults or arresting gear on it. All that could take off were the V/STOL and helicopters. The aviators were apoplectic about that.

He said that we need to have attack submarines escorting these carrier battle forces, so we need more submarines and we need a new class. That was the 688 class. That made Rickover very happy but it infuriated the aviators because that came out of their hide. But at the same time Bud said that these nuclear-powered surface ships were too expensive. He said we don't need any more CLGNs and we ought to look at conventional-powered carriers.

WINKLER: I guess at that time the South Carolina and...

MUSTIN: DLGN 38 was the key issue, and he did not support that. He was supporting the Spruance-class destroyer. Rickover got Warner, who was the SecNav, to have Title VIII construed so that any ship, I think, over 3000 tons had to be nuclear unless the President said it wasn't in the interest of the country. So to get the Spruance and to get the FFG 7 we had to get the President to say it's not in the interest of the country for them to be nuclear powered.

Aegis was the weapons system, which at the time had been specifically designed for the DLGN 38 class, which did not come to fruition. So we had to shrink Aegis in order to fit it into a Spruance hull, which itself was a very expensive proposition.

You see, the Spruance had come to pass when Bud Zumwalt was on McNamara's staff in systems analysis. McNamara really liked single-purpose ships. So there was a DX and a DXG. There were to be thirty DXs and thirty DXGs. As this program progressed it became apparent that the AAW system, which was the DXG system, was going to be enormously expensive. These ships were to operate in pairs. The DXG was cancelled. So now you had the Spruance, which was a single-purpose ASW ship, and you had no air defense ship to counter-balance that single purpose. I'll never forget the CNO Executive Board meeting when Admiral Connolly, who was Op 05, looked at the characteristics of the Spruance, which we called an escort at the time. The officer who had done the analysis was talking about how the carrier air wing was going to provide this umbrella over the Spruance. Admiral Connolly said, "I just have one question here. Who's escorting who?" He said, "Is the carrier escorting the Spruance, or is the Spruance escorting the carrier?" Everybody had a chuckle. Not a bad question.

Well, all of these things, superimposed on the Nixon presidency, Watergate, race riots, dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War—just a very unique and difficult period of time. Half way through this tour Bud Zumwalt wrote a fitness report on me that said I was the best commander in the Navy. Not a bad thing for the CNO to say about you. So naturally I was selected for captain, almost three years early, which was unheard of at the time. It caused a lot of ill will in a lot of places. But this tour was enormously demanding, enormously educational, and a set of experience that I think is probably unique in the 20th century part of the Navy.

The bitter infighting over this force structure issue was something to behold. It was passionately felt by all of the players. And Bud's one failing was, he was so smart and saw things with such clarity that he made no effort to sugar-coat the pills.

But anyway, I certainly admired him. He set up the CNO Executive Board. The CNO Executive Board had a secretariat that consisted of two people: Captain Bob Monroe, who later became an admiral, and I. We published the agenda for the CEB, we wrote the issues that would be examined at each of these meetings, and then we wrote the reports of what was said and what was decided. Of course, whoever's got the pencil has got enormous power. So since a lot of these decisions that the CNO was making were bound to irritate at least half of the constituencies—Bob Monroe and I obviously were the guys who were writing—so it became a case of get the messengers.

I went to one meeting, before I was selected for captain. The submariners wanted the Harpoon in submarines. We went to this meeting; I was a commander. They were all sitting around getting ready to take this issue up, and I said, "I don't think you need that. We've just got all this money for this long-range Mark 48 torpedo, and I don't think you can target that Harpoon. Because my experience is that you guys have got a distance to the horizon of about four miles with the periscope, so I don't think you need it."

There was a two-star submarine admiral who was responsible for getting this. He came over to me after the meeting, put his arm around my shoulder, and said, "What was your name again?"

I said, "Mustin."

He said, "Are you up for captain?"

"No, sir."

He said, "Well, you will be some day." So there was a lot of that.

But the series of programs that came out of that flail include the Nimitz-class carrier, the F-14, the Los Angeles-class submarine, the Trident submarine, the Spruance destroyers, the Aegis weapons system, the Aegis cruisers, the Tomahawk, the Harpoon. I later became Op 35, the guy in charge of all of these weapons. I go aboard these ships now and I see all the things that I labored over in 1970 in OpNav, and they're on all the

ships. The SLQ-32, the CIWS, the towed arrays, the Aegis itself, the 5-inch gun. You know, we got that old Mark 42 replaced. So I'm very proud of the prescience of Worth Bagley and Bud Zumwalt, who foresaw that these major changes had to be made.

And I also learned how not to make major changes. Whenever you do that you're going to have some controversy. George W. Bush has got it right. You can do these things in a civil way, and it was not done in a civil way. People were fired just like that. People went out with all guns blazing. In fact, there was a movement to impeach the CNO. This group was going to install Admiral James Calvert as the CNO, and they were going to get Bud Zumwalt dumped. That did not come to pass, largely through the support of some very influential senior guys like my dad, who went to bat for Bud Zumwalt. Bud never forgot that.

WINKLER: How far into his tour did this...?

MUSTIN: '72.

WINKLER: So that was about two years into your tour. Because it's kind of interesting...

MUSTIN: Calvert was gone within a week.

WINKLER: What command did Calvert have?

MUSTIN: I think at the time he may have been the superintendent of the Naval Academy. He had been a fleet commander. He was an enormously charismatic and persuasive guy, and still is, and a wonderful Naval officer. He was just the figurehead of this operation. But the aviators were really determined to get the CNO out of there.

The CNO, then and I think still now, is selected for a two-year term. It was at the reappointment time that this "dump Zumwalt" movement was instigated. I mean it was a serious thing.

WINKLER: That's true, because Admiral Anderson was just for two years.

MUSTIN: Yes. Well, that was McNamara.

WINKLER: That was McNamara; they had crossed swords. So I guess there was a lot of pressure...

MUSTIN: Warner was no help in any of this. As a matter of fact, Warner was referred to by his own staff as a tower of jelly. The relationships between the CNO and the Secretary were very poor. The relationships between the CNO and a large number of this blue suit constituency were very poor. Luckily the relationship with the CNO and people like Nitze and the big shots in OSD were very high. But the problems of the race riots and the carriers and stuff like that were just terrible.

WINKLER: It probably didn't help, the fact that you had Chaffee and then you had Warner.

MUSTIN: Chaffee was wonderful. But Warner was not.

WINKLER: He was very young.

MUSTIN: He was. Warner was not popular with the blue-suit Navy at the time. He's certainly done a lot for the Navy since then. There were some very, very bitter fights going on, and he just was not helpful.

WINKLER: One of the other things you mentioned is that you went out on a fact-finding...

MUSTIN: Yes. We started to get these reports that ships were running out of ammunition, and the material status of the Seventh Fleet was out of control, down. Admiral Zumwalt said, "I want you to go to WestPac and find out what's going on." So I went out and spent a month in WestPac. I visited forty ships; I knew most of the skippers. I stopped through CinCPacFlt, where I was greeted like a polecat at a beach party, a spy coming in, just like a guy from Ernie King's staff wearing gray in World War II.

So I went out and checked in with CinCPacFlt, gave him my orders, had a briefing, went out, visited forty ships, and came back. Came back to CinCPacFlt. I think I told you the story about how the ammunition reports were coming in. MacNamara was making statements that no fire mission had ever been aborted for lack of ammunition. Well that's because the ships told the Marines, don't ask for ammunition because we don't have any more. So the Marine requirements were not being met, but technically no mission was cancelled, because they were not scheduled. I took some snapshots analytically of the fleet, and over fifty per cent of the 5-inch guns in the fleet were down on any given day. The material status of the fleet was terrible.

And the drugs were really coming into play. The captain of one of the cruisers said, "While you and I are sitting here talking, as least one person is smoking a joint somewhere in the ship." I was stunned. And of course it was a lot more than one sailor. But the drugs came in.

While I was in San Diego, seven sailors from the Lynde McCormick came up—I think I told you this story—held a press conference and said: We can't take it any more in the engineering department; we're jumping ship and going down to Mexico.

So I came back with all these facts about the terrible material conditions; the ships in the fleet had just been run too hard. And I told Bud Zumwalt the story about the seven sailors from the McCormick deserting, essentially. And that I thought that they had a case. I went into the whole business about the ventilation in the fire rooms, the fact that

you had to do a week's maintenance on the weekends and never got home, and it was unsafe as hell. He said, "Well, what do you think we ought to do about that?"

I said, "There aren't any standards. Each ship is writing its own. We ought to have a set of standards. And we ought to have a way to inspect these ships, so that they know what's expected of them. Because right now there are no standards among cruisers, or destroyers, or amphibs, or any of these other ships. But the real problems are in the 1200-pound plants. We need to have the type commanders establish an inspection board, sort of like the combat systems inspections, for the engineers."

He had what he called decision sheets. They were called green-strippers or Z-grams. So he said, "Write me up Z-grams for what you think we ought to do." So I wrote him up five.

One of them became the PEB. First, it was for 1200-pound ships only. And it was a two-year program designed to bootstrap the fleet up by assisting them. At the end of two years it was supposed to work itself out of business, because the fleet would have been bootstrapped, so you wouldn't need it anymore. I wasn't as aware of the first law of bureaucracy as I am now, which is, "Once created, nothing can be uncreated." So I watched with interest over the years as the PEB grew and grew and grew, and went into 600-pound plants and gas turbine plants. It got so bad that you couldn't light off a boiler once the PEB, representing a four-star admiral, told you you couldn't. You had your LOE. Coming out of a shipyard, you could not light off a boiler until the PEB said you could. So I, through the years, have said that's how bad those 1200-pound boilers were. You couldn't put fires to them until you got permission from a four-star admiral. That's really saying something.

Anyway, all of the PEB and those five green-strippers came out of that WestPac tour. And I didn't realize it at the time, but part of the notion that we're going to cut the Navy in half came from this experience. We can't afford to fix the ships we have so we've got to drop them. And at this time of course the focus was shifting to sea control, so you didn't need all these Gearing-class destroyers with World War II sonars on them.

I thought Bud was an imaginative CNO, and a guy who had enormous loyalty to the people below him. Till the day he died he looked out for me. He got me interviews with all kinds of really big wheels after I retired, for consulting jobs—Norm Augustine and people like that. As I said, when the CNO writes a report and says this is the best commander in the Navy, that's really something. So I thought my association with Bud in OpNav during that time probably taught me the best insight into his vision for the Navy, which essentially is the Navy that you have today. And Worth Bagley's knowledge of how to work the system in the program and budget business, which was stunning, and how to present arguments in OpNav-ese; that was an experience that was invaluable.

The aviators—the notion had been since World War II that the main battery of every combatant should be resident on the flight deck of the carrier. So we'd try to put Harpoons on these ships and they'd say, Hey, no, we'll just take care of those guys with

A-6s. I developed a line of argument that said that JSOP, the force structure bible, says you need twenty-six carriers. We've only got twelve. If we don't have the number of carriers that we need, how are we going to fill in that firepower gap? This was the argument, it got at the issue without threatening aviation

All of the issues of long-range targeting came up at that time. All of the issues of the inadequacies of the sonars. And as we built the Los Angeles class specifically to be escorts of the carrier task force—we didn't call them battle groups—we found all the inadequacies in communications with the submarines while they are submerged. So the things that you see now—submarines with NTDS, submarines with Tomahawk and Harpoon, submarines integrated into the striking forces of the Navy when required, the acknowledgement that you've got to disperse offensive power through platforms other than the carrier—all of those things were seen by Bud and Worth Bagley. The problem was there wasn't any technology available to implement them. To get the Aegis and to get the Tomahawk and to get these things, you had to spend the money. That money was going to come out of aviation, and everybody knew it. So the aviators just said there's no reason for the Aegis ships; the F-14s will do the air defense job. Because it was apparent we were going to have fewer F-14s if we had Aegis ships.

So it was a very, very turbulent time, internally as well as externally. I remember a very senior aviator, who I won't name, said to me one day when I was a captain, and Bud was still the CNO, he said, "You'd better enjoy every day that he's the CNO, because you're not going to see another one during your lifetime who's a black-shoe."

WINKLER: It took a while.

MUSTIN: It took till Boorda.

WINKLER: And after Boorda we were wondering if it was going to be another lifetime.

MUSTIN: I can't give enough credit to three guys there: Bud for the vision, Worth for the way to execute that vision, and Jim Doyle for the way to manage the dollars to bring that vision to fruition. The Navy that we have today is their Navy, and it's going to be that way for a long time. When I get into the next go-around in OpNav I'll point out the heroics of Jim Doyle. My next tour in OpNav started, I guess, in '75. Bud and Worth were both gone. And so Jim Doyle was now the spear carrier for this, with no senior black-shoes at the helm. He had to do as a three star what a four-star CNO had previously done.

21 February 2001

WINKLER: Today is the 21st of February, 2001. Dave Winkler here with Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, continuing our series of interviews with the Naval Historical Foundation, on his career.

One of the things that we want to touch on before we leave your career in OpNav and move to Europe is: One of the reasons you wound up in Europe was because of your involvement in the home port issue. Could you discuss that?

MUSTIN: Yes. One of the initiatives that Admiral Zumwalt had, as I discussed before, was called Project 60, which was the way that he wanted to change the direction of the Navy. The direction essentially was to emphasize sea control at the expense of power projection, and that meant emphasizing ASW and anti-surface warfare at the expense of carrier aviation, and so caused a lot of very fundamental and deeply held convictions to be brought to bear on the problem, as we discussed.

At the same time, he felt that the country and the Navy were not adequately aware of the rise of Soviet sea power. The Soviets had been viewed by the Army and the Air Force, and essentially by NATO, as a massive land power. The Gorshkov era, the rise of the Soviet Navy to a blue water force, as opposed to a coastal defense force, had gone largely unnoted. Admiral Zumwalt felt that the linchpin of the NATO strategy for the non-nuclear, conventional defense of Europe was the re-supply of Europe, and that therefore if the Navy was unable to win the battle of the Atlantic, and win it convincingly and early, then the whole NATO strategic rationale was undercut and nuclear exchange was strategically inevitable. But the problem was that the Navy was so heavily committed to the prosecution of the war in Vietnam that there were no forces left over to increase the Naval presence in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

So Admiral Zumwalt also felt, largely based on his own experience as ComNavForV, that we were in a quagmire in Vietnam and the sooner we could get out, the better. But while we were trying to do that, we must do something to increase the Naval presence, particularly in the eastern Med., because the Soviet Black Sea fleet was getting larger and larger, and more powerful. Therefore the political balance in the eastern Med with the NATO countries of Greece and Turkey was increasingly tenuous, in his view, because the Soviet's increased naval presence that we were not offsetting. So we needed much more Naval presence there in order to reassure those two allies that we weren't going to abandon them in the event of a NATO crisis in central Europe. A way to do that, to increase that Naval presence in the Mediterranean, without drawing down on the forces committed to the Pacific Fleet to fight the Vietnam War was to home-port ships in the Mediterranean. He also wanted to home-port ships in Japan for the same kinds of reasons.

We had an age-old thumb rule at the time, which still applies, that in order to keep one ship deployed, you needed three in inventory. There would be one in overhaul and one getting ready to deploy, and one deployed. Those numbers are pretty sound even today, although various analysts make it 2.8 or 3.2, or whatever. One in three is not a bad way to look at it, but overseas homeporting breaks that mold and gives you a virtual 3 ships for 1.

The notion of home-porting a carrier and a destroyer squadron in Japan was acceptable to the aviators because the Japanese airfield Atsugi was immediately available for them to do all the many work-ups and training exercises that they had to do to maintain day-to-day readiness just to fly off carriers, let alone do combat ops. The problem was, in the Mediterranean there was no comparable infrastructure to do that, because in the western Med the countries did not want a carrier there, and where there were airfields there was no room at the inn because of the NATO and USAF aircraft presence. The idea, therefore was not to beef up the western Med, although some submarines were home ported at La Maddalena ultimately, but to go to the eastern Med. So in OpNav we were studying all the various countries that would be candidates to do this home-porting scheme. The combination of geography, NATO membership, and what we thought was stable government led us to Greece, in the Op 06, the political-military, context.

WINKLER: You mentioned NATO. At that time Spain, under Franco, was not a player.

MUSTIN: That's right.

So the political-military conclusion was: Go to Greece. The aviators were very, very much opposed to this, because there was no counterpart of Atsugi in the Athens area. So part of the plan had to involve getting U.S. and NATO funds to create an airfield where the aviators could keep up their qualifications. That was settled upon at a half-constructed Greek airstrip at a town called Megara, which is about twenty-five or thirty miles west of Athens. The carrier, at the insistence of the aviators, would not be home ported in Greece until the necessary construction of the airstrip was completed, and that cost was figured in to the homeport package. In the meantime, there were all kinds of considerations about military airlift flights, how to get the spare parts into Greece, interfaces with Greek commercial aviation, etc.. The aviation community was just dead set against this, did not want to go there. They thought it was expensive, they thought that they would not be able to maintain their basic level of training, and they would not have the pipeline necessary for their spare parts, not only for aircraft, but for the carrier itself.

That was an impasse.

The decision on the destroyers on the other hand, was not that complicated. To assuage some Greek sensitivities, in a town called Elefsis, which is again about twenty miles or so west of Athens on the Bay of Elefsis, a temporary pier was quickly constructed. This was a pier large enough to berth six destroyers and, on the other side, a tender. It had water and power connections. At the head of it there was a tiny little complex provided for security. That could be done very rapidly, and the word "temporary" meant it could be removed just as quickly.

First the CNO, in a very controversial set of meetings and decisions, decided upon the deployment and the home-porting overseas, and then he personally sold it to OSD and the State Department.

WINKLER: Was this about '71, '72?

MUSTIN: Yes. But the decision process got a little bit convoluted. The devil started to get to be in the details there. The policy was all right. But the decision was: Okay, the destroyers will go over. They'll establish a U.S. presence. They'll start to really get a handle on what requirements are there, in terms of a U.S. infrastructure, exchanges, commissaries, post offices, the whole nine yards for ship and dependent support. We'll put in a Naval Support Activity, initially designed to support the destroyers and their dependents, and ultimately to support the carrier and air wing, which is a very, very different proposition.

And in order to get the best cross-section of military capabilities—and this is where the decision was really flawed—we will send six different kinds of destroyers. So there was a straight stick Forrest Sherman destroyer, the USS Manley; one of the ASW-converted Forrest Sherman destroyers, the Barry; a Charles Adams destroyer, the Sampson; the Vreeland, which was an FF 1052; the Page, which was an FFG 1 class; and the William M. Wood, which was the oldest Gearing-class destroyer still on active duty in the Navy. Those six ships would go. That decision was made. When I was in OpNav the machinery was set in motion so that they would go, and arrive on scene about the first part of 1973. It was all done very fast, in a very compressed time period. The dependents were sent over by special sea lift.

Then Worth Bagley was nominated by Zumwalt to be CinCUSNavEur and I went along with him at his request, and became a frocked captain. The reason that that gets to be important will become apparent as we talk about CinCUSNavEur. At that time CinCUSNavEur was a four-star officer, who was in the U.S. chain only, because there was another four-star admiral in Naples, who was CinCSouth, who was a NATO major subordinate commander. This became interesting to me later on when I was the NATO Striking Fleet Commander. The function of CinCUSNavEur was the peacetime, day-to-day operation of the Sixth Fleet and of everything east of a departure point in the Atlantic, the north Atlantic essentially. Upon NATO contingency the Sixth Fleet would chop to NATO, and CinCUSNavEur's responsibility would change to only that of logistics support and personnel support to the U.S. forces of NATO, which is the way all the U.S. forces were in NATO. Even when the NATO machinery was activated, the individual nations were responsible for the re-supply and support of their own ships.

We arrived in London to find it really a Sleepy Hollow, which was bad news for the guys on the CinCUSNavEur staff, because Worth Bagley is about as activist a guy as you're ever going to find. An idea a second. One of the people who had been pole star of Bud Zumwalt's programmatic revolution and ideas, funding his programs. He had very firm ideas about what should be done in the Sixth Fleet and the Mediterranean, and what should be done to make the home-porting work, which was high on the list, and what

kind of staff support an activist four-star admiral ought to have. It wasn't these long-time retired-on-active-duty captains who were homesteading over there because they all liked to walk around town with their rolled-up umbrellas and their homburgs. It was an amazing scene.

So along with him he brought a separate little mini-staff. I was of the people he brought; I was a brand new captain, two years early-selected, mainly because of his work and Bud Zumwalt's fitness report. A commander who became a captain, Scot McCauley, who later became a vice admiral; a really smart young man named Jay Rixse; and a long-time NATO expert, a commander of Dutch descent, whose brother later became the CNO of the Dutch Navy, a guy named Arie Sigmond. He installed us as kind of a mini-staff. His flag lieutenant was Conrad Lautenbacher, who later became a vice admiral, and who had been my weapons officer in Henry B. Wilson. Admiral Bagley decided that it was time to wake up Sleepy Hollow. The chief of staff was a wonderful Rear Admiral named Don Engen, who was killed recently—magnificent guy, aviator. But the rest on the staff were really second- and third-stringers.

Then the Arab-Israeli crisis of '73 erupted. And to our amazement the Soviets put ninety-nine ships in the Mediterranean. There was no NATO involved in this so it was a U.S.-only operation. The first phase of the operation that involved the U.S. was the re-supply of fighter aircraft to the Israelis. No cooperation from Spain, no cooperation from NATO. The replacement aircraft would TransLant and then go to ports in Italy. The function of the Sixth Fleet was to make sure that they could do that without the Soviet navy interfering. The Soviet navy was an amazingly powerful unit—submarines, cruisers, all of whom were equipped with varying degrees of anti-surface missiles.

It became apparent very quickly as we surge deployed our own forces that we had no tactics to deal with the defense of the fleet against these modern anti-surface missiles, because we'd been spending the last decade doing nothing but shooting at the Vietnamese ashore, and flying air strikes at Haiphong and Hanoi with no opposing fleet to stimulate fleet-on-fleet tactics. The whole body of tactics and weaponry and the modus operandi of the fleet was really in its formative stages. It caught both the aviation and the surface communities very, very much short.

There were a number of reasons for that. One of them was that the Soviets had a practice of taking a very heavily armed combatant and stationing it about two thousand yards from the carrier. It was called a tattletale. The rules of engagement under which we operated were very stringent, because of the NATO connection in anti-Soviet operations. The issue was "hostile intent." "Hostile intent" was defined as: You see the guy load a missile and point it at you, and smoke coming out of it, and then you can do something. It became apparent that if you had a CAP, U.S. airplane on station, at any altitude, that even if he saw the missiles loaded and aimed at the carrier on the Soviet tattletale, by the time that U.S. aircraft could get there to a weapon delivery point at the tattletale, the tattletale could have damn near emptied his magazine at the carrier. So there was no bag of tactics to deal with this partly because of the rules of engagement. That was just one of the problems.

The surge deployment of the U.S. forces, which included nine submarines, was always a day late and a dollar short with respect to the Soviet deployments, because they were coming from the Black Sea and from the Northern Fleet, both of which were much closer than the East Coast of the United States.

Luckily for the U.S. and for NATO, that crisis tamped itself down without any shots being fired. What we got out of that was a huge bag of lessons, most of which showed how prescient Bud Zumwalt and Worth Bagley's views about the rise of the Soviet navy had been. Nobody believed them before all of this, in particular how important the rules of engagement were, the fact that we were not oriented or trained or properly indoctrinated to deal with fleet-on-fleet engagements, and how we had been way, way behind in the game of how to deal with these anti-surface missiles, largely because the aviators had just said: Hey, we'll sink everything before they have a chance to shoot at us, which of course ignored the rules of engagement.

WINKLER: The Soviets, though, had their Okean-70 exercise. That should have been a warning.

MUSTIN: In the Navy that was an eye-opener, but not in the rest of the military establishment, which then and now, in Europe is dominated by the land powers. Very simplistically the army, who was the dominant strategic position and always had the Supreme Allied Commander, SACEur, position, viewed the NATO position as a central front with two flanks. The army and the air force were involved in the central front battle, which is essentially a battle for Europe. The navy was involved on the flanks. The logic was, we will take care of the problems on the flanks after we have satisfied ourselves that we've solved the problem in the central front, which is our highest priority for strategic defense. It was pretty apparent to everybody that we were short almost a hundred divisions in NATO against the Soviets in the central front; that the so-called NATO trip-wire strategies, controlled escalation strategies, had only one end game.

It also became apparent at the time, not in the context of your original question, that there was a serious glitch between Europe and the United States. I later found when I was a senior NATO commander myself that the European nations, France being just one example, had no intention of ever fighting a long conventional war in Europe again, because it results in the devastation of Europe. Their view of the NATO strategy was: A conventional war will not occur because in every case it's going to be a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviets won't try to take one country in Europe and subject themselves to the threat of losing their own country.

The strategy, in simplest terms, was: If a conventional war starts in Europe, if NATO start to lose NATO goes nuke, with tac nukes, to offset the large numerical inadequacies that NATO had. It was a given that that was going to happen. The Soviet strategy was: There's no such thing as a tactical nuke; if they tac nuke us we take out Washington and New York. This is the way it was seen in Russia.

The second part of the NATO strategy was: If we're winning, then the Soviets go nuke. And the third part was: Well, maybe there'll be a stalemate, but that nobody realized was in the cards. So in every end game with the strategy, no matter what you said about controlled escalation, graduated response—there were a whole series of buzz words that covered all this stuff—none of the senior people in NATO or in the Soviet Union subscribed to a conventional war in Europe because of the force imbalance.

Well, the whole reason for Bud Zumwalt's re-supply-of-Europe strategy was that the foundation of the NATO strategy was a conventional war in Europe that needed long-term re-supply, and therefore the Navy was critical to that because we had to run nine convoys back and forth continually. And you had the senior people in the U.S. Army, Air Force, and the NATO commanders privately saying that's irrelevant; we're not going to do that. So when it came time to get money and funds here in Washington for Navy NATO functions and for NATO infrastructure funding to build Navy support bases and things in Europe—they were way, way down on the priority list for funding, both in NATO planning and in infrastructure planning. This was because nobody thought that either of the flanks or the re-supply of Europe was really relevant to what was going to happen. A lot of lip service was paid to it, but not the money. That's why "Follow the money" is as true today as it ever was. The words kept saying, yes, the Navy's important and we've got to re-supply Europe, but the music didn't put the money to it. I didn't understand all this at the time, but I do now, and I did when I became NATO's Striking Fleet Commander.

So the problem was essentially for Admiral Zumwalt was to search for a rationale to get the Navy more involved in Europe. At the time there were no Tomahawk missiles. The range of carrier aircraft was exceedingly limited. And if you tried to lump a couple of carrier air wings into the maw of NATO aviation assets, they became a very small, marginal contribution. As a matter of fact, SACEur would say on many occasions: We don't really particularly care if you send your carriers over here, but please send all your airplanes. At the time there was a strategy whereby the Pacific Fleet carriers would "swing" to the Atlantic, but they would not get there in time. In every war game that I played in NATO, when very senior people played themselves, within a very few days, ten days or so, SACEur would always say: I need nuclear release authority, because I'm being overwhelmed.

That was the problem that Bud Zumwalt had. He had to try to make the Navy more relevant, and at the same time he had to try to get the money to do that. And he had to find a language that would make it so compelling an argument that all these other hidden agendas could not reject him. The President could not say to the American people: We've got a strategy in Europe that says it's always going to be a nuclear exchange between us and the Soviet Union. And the Europeans weren't going to publicly say that they weren't going to support the existing NATO strategy. But that's what was going on, and that was common knowledge among the cogmoscenti in the business. I'm sure you've heard all these kinds of comments before.

WINKLER: My understanding is that our strategy almost dates back to the Eisenhower administration, with the...

MUSTIN: Massive retaliation.

WINKLER: Yes, massive retaliation, or New Look policy, where we introduced nukes to Europe in the first place as a way of offsetting that numerical inferiority.

At this time I remember there was a series of books called “Understanding Soviet Naval Development.” I guess that had its genesis during that time period?

MUSTIN: Yes. Gorshkov wrote a book called, “The Sea Power of the State.” It came out in about ’74 or ’75, when I first started to see translations of it. In it he outlined his plans for a Soviet navy that was essentially a mirror image of the U.S. Navy, completing the transition from largely a submarine coastal defense force to a force capable of projecting Soviet power well beyond the confines of Europe. All of these things became apparent later on, but Bud Zumwalt was way, way ahead of his time in seeing all this.

Anyway, that was sort of a digression. We arrived in London. The ’73 Arab-Israeli War was a real eye-opener.

WINKLER: When did you get to London?

MUSTIN: Got there in the summer of ’73.

WINKLER: Let’s see—August of ’73.

MUSTIN: Yes. I may be off a month or two in there because I couldn’t find my DD 212. But it’s somewhere in my file—all those dates are in there.

Anyway, it was right after we got there that this crisis erupted. We had to exercise the staff to try to support this stuff. Try to find out: What is ASW in the Med? Does that mean you want to keep track of all the Soviet submarines that are in the Med? If so, how do you do that? Admiral Zumwalt wanted to be able to glue a U.S. submarine on every Soviet submarine in the Med, and have it stay with it twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year in the pre-war posturing period. That’s a very force-level-intensive idea, and it’s particularly difficult to do with the Soviet diesel submarines, which are very quiet. I’m being sort of careful how I say some of these things, because they were very highly classified at the time and I suspect many of them still are.

But anyway, suffice it to say that, in my view, the Zumwalt-Bagley thesis of the Navy of the remainder of the twentieth century, the years from the seventies to the end of the Cold War, was demonstrated for the first time in 1973 to be the proper Navy to deal with the Soviet Union. And also demonstrated that, since it takes a long time to build ships as opposed to training an infantryman, if you want to make a sea change in the way your fleet is configured and what the role of the fleet is, you have to be able to do that by

making combat system and other improvements to the fleet that you have. This is why, to this day, I've always believed that you simply must build ships that have room in them to grow. That's a very expensive proposition. So, as I think I told you before, Bud Zumwalt essentially cut the Navy in half in order to get the money to make this sea change, and then the money was not forthcoming. The cuts were accepted but the money was taken away and not returned.

At the time CinCUSNavEur, as I said, was a four-star officer, and also had in his command the force in Bahrain, the Middle East force. So we had a very large empire. Worth Bagley, who was a very imaginative guy, tried to preside over this really out-to-lunch staff. It was a time of very, very hard work for Connie Lautenbacher and Scot McCauley and me, all of us guys in this kitchen cabinet.

Worth was a workaholic, and he had a flat within Headquarters Building. Our headquarters was at 7 North Audley, which is right downtown in London, at Grosvenor Square, the same square with the American Embassy. It's the building where Eisenhower had his headquarters in World War II. It was a series of flats in a building of about seven or eight floors. The top floor was communications—an antenna farm. The fourth floor was a flat for the CinC and his family, a magnificent flat, well outfitted. And he had a home at Virginia Water, Romany House, which was a country estate, that he could go out to on the weekend. This meant that we would work till 7:30 or 8; then he'd get in the elevator and go upstairs and have a martini, and the rest of us would have to find our way home. Then we'd get in there at 6 o'clock in the morning and he'd be there at 6:15. It was a lot of hard work and a really good education under a magnificent guy.

While all this was going on we started to get these reports that the destroyer home-porting was falling on its face. The ships were CasRep'd all the time; they couldn't get underway. They had desertions. They had incidents where the sailors would brutalize and rob taxi drivers. It was occasionally kind of a hooligan navy going on down there. Since the homeporting was one of the centerpieces of Zumwalt's strategy, Admiral Bagley was very interested and concerned about this. So he put a lot of time, and we put a lot of time, into making sure that the support activities, the shore-based Navy facilities, were in place, and that the ships were being properly supported. He initiated a whole bunch of preferential manning policies and all that stuff to try to make life better. But still the ships kept doing worse and worse. The InSurv Board went over and bilged a bunch of the ships, badly. The PEB went over and tied a couple of them up. So that was lurking in the wings. And Worth's London tour ended up being very much abbreviated when Admiral Zumwalt's tour as CNO ended.

In the meantime we had had many opportunities for face-to-face meetings with General Goodpaster, who was SACEur, who I really admire and to this day am close to. We would outline our views on the role of the Navy in Europe, and he would be very frank about describing the problems that I just told you. General Goodpaster had a better appreciation of sea power than many of our admirals.

Along about this time Admiral Zumwalt's tour as CNO was ending, and there was a lot of jockeying and pushing for who was going to relieve him. There were very bitter fights, most of them I'm sure documented in other people's histories. Worth was one of the major candidates and Bud Zumwalt's personal choice. But by then the aviators were in a state of outright mutiny. So Admiral Holloway, an aviator, was to succeed Admiral Zumwalt. At Zumwalt's insistence Worth was to become vice chief, and return to OPNAV from London. I had learned my lesson with McCain and Sharp, so I told Admiral Bagley, "The day you leave I want out of here," and I told him why.

Well, he sent for me one day, and he said, "What do you want to do for your next assignment?" At the time they had a command screening proposition. One of Bud Zumwalt's initiatives which I did not agree with was to beef up the prestige of the guys who were commanding shore stations. They had been essentially second string. So the command screening process, by fiat, was to go down the list of guys screened and you'd say: Okay, number one gets a cruiser, number two gets a destroyer squadron, number three gets a shore station, number four gets a cruiser, number five gets a destroyer squadron, number six gets a shore station.

WINKLER: The same thing in the aviation community.

MUSTIN: Well, a little different. As a matter of fact, a lot different.

WINKLER: I thought air stations and carriers would be equivalent to...

MUSTIN: A lot different. CAGs played in there, and Super-CAGs played in there. They have their own series of interactions that are similar, but they have a lot of major, major differences because it depends on what kind of airplane you fly and a lot of other things. You're not competitive if you fly VP or helicopters or all that kind of stuff. And you're third string if you're a tailhook ASW, second string if you're tailhook attack, and first string if you're a fighter. They've got all of those sub-unions.

But anyway, Admiral Bagley said, "What do you want to do?"

I had screened for a command at sea, so I said, "I want to be a destroyer squadron commander." They were just instituting this horrible pipeline of about a year, which I object to today as fervently as I did then. I said, "So I guess I'm ready to go off to school."

He said, "No, how about this: How would you like to take over that DesRon Twelve down at Athens?" He knew that I was a supporter of the whole idea. The notion that if that wasn't a go then the carrier was not going to come was firm in everybody's mind. Many of the senior aviators were delighted to see this experiment falling on its sword. So he said, "We're going to fire that squadron commander down there. I want you to go down and take it over." But he said, "You can't tell anybody about this, and don't tell Lucy." He said, "I'll sort this all out in the next couple of days and let you know. The year pipeline will not be a problem."

So I went home and looked around this magnificent palace we were living in a flat in Portman Square. I said, "Geez, I'm getting kind of tired of the life here."

Lucy said, "Are you out of your mind? This is the greatest place we've ever had."

I said, "Yeah, I'd like to go someplace like Italy or Greece."

She said, "Greece? They're burning people's cars down there." This was just before the junta fell. So I didn't say anything further.

In a couple of days Worth said, "Okay, here's the deal. All of your schooling is waived. You'll have to go back to the States for a week to meet with ComCruDesLant, but that's all." "Meet with ComCruDesLant and kiss his ring. And go to BuPers and make your peace with the people who are irritated at you for skipping all the mandatory schools like motorcycle safety and chaplain corps and sensitivity and all that stuff. Then after that week in Conus you go down and relieve that guy in Athens."

So that's what I did. Came back for a week. Went to see ComCruDesLant, a rear admiral named Strat Wentworth. He told me that he was spending more time worrying about the Barry than any other ship in the Cruiser-Destroyer Force. As a matter of fact, he was spending more time worrying about DesRon Twelve than the rest of the force in the aggregate. He said, "I'm very, very unhappy with what's going on down there. I want it squared away, and I want it squared away fast."

So I said, "Yes, sir." It was pretty obvious how he felt. It turned out that his staff was not as supportive as it could have been, for a number of bureaucratic reasons. At the same time the formation of SurfLant was occurring, and Strat Wentworth all of a sudden became Deputy SurfLant. The person who'd been PhibLant became SurfLant when they combined them.

So with all of that going on in Norfolk I went back and picked up Lucy and the children and down we went to Athens, to live on the economy. When I got down there the Barry was tied up, prohibited from going to sea by the order of the PEB. So I went to the Barry first, since that's what the Type Commander had said was his first concern. It was a Forrest Sherman ASW conversion.

WINKLER: It's half a block from my office.

MUSTIN: Oh, I know it is. I was familiar in detail with the engineering plant, having been on three DDGs by then.

(End of Side A, Tape I)

So I got hold of the skipper and we toured the ship. The engineering plant was in a shambles; it was in pieces on the deck plates. When you walked past the after fire room

the smell of pot coming up out of the hatches was enough to give you a high. They had people over the hill, that had been over the hill for months somewhere in Greece. The captain was a guy who looked for other people to blame the problem on. He blamed all this on two things: on BuPers for not sending him the proper number of qualified people, and on the fact that across the pier about two blocks down the street, there was a cement factory. The cement dust came from the factory and went on the ship, and he thought that screwed up everything they couldn't operate. So he'd just thrown up his hands.

I said, "Well, okay. You're fired." I sent a message to BuPers saying: I hereby relieve the captain of the Barry. This was a lot less arbitrarily than it sounds, because I'd been watching all this for four or five months from London. Watching the reports and talking to people that had been down there. So I had formed some pretty knowledgeable opinions about what was going on.

I got hold of Admiral Bagley, who was the vice chief, and said, "I've taken step one. Step two is, I need a new skipper." I said, "I have volunteered to take command until the new skipper comes, because I want this guy out of here. He's a whiner." Of course, he knew that.

He said, "Well, is there anybody you have in mind?"

I said, "Yeah. I want Commander Greg Streeter," who had been my MPA in the Lawrence and had relieved me in the Lawrence as the chief engineer. So poor Greg was down in Mayport cooking steak and getting ready to go to his destroyer command, when he gets a call Friday night from the Bureau saying: Cancel your orders and catch a plane Monday; you're going to Athens, Greece. Your family will follow you in several months. In the meantime, go down to sick bay tomorrow morning and get twenty-five shots, and all that.

Down came Greg Streeter. He put that ship back together, with the result that it won the Arleigh Burke Award that year, going from the worst in the fleet to the best. It was a real accomplishment, a great, great leadership feat on his part.

Then I got all the others. Went to the next ship that had been tied up. It turned out the captain was kind of a wimp. The exec was a really good guy. I said, "Okay, here's the deal. The PEB's coming back. If the ship passes the PEB, XO, then I qualify you for destroyer command. If the ship fails again, then you and the skipper are out of here." By this time these guys knew that I could do that. So Gene Black, the exec of the Manley, turned that ship around in nothing flat, and the PEB said that Manley was the finest ship of that class that the PEB had ever seen. .

These guys first weren't doing was fixing things. When something would break they'd blame the manufacturer and they'd send off a CasRep and order a bunch of spare parts. In the Manley they had the same computer we had had in the Lawrence. The gunfire control computer had been down, CasRep down, for six months. So I went and I said, "Why is this down?"

They said, “Well, we need a 5,000-ohm resistor.”

I said, “So?”

They said, “Well, we’ve had one on order for six months.”

I said, “Have you got any 1,000-ohm resistors?”

“Yes, we’ve got some.”

“Go get a four-by-four.” So they got this four-by-four, hooked all these resistors up in series on this board until we had the requisite ohm level, 5,000 ohms. They hooked it up, and the computer was up. So they cancelled the CasRep to NavSea. The fire control officer—out of there. It was a really bitter time.

In the William Wood, a new captain came in—John Castano, who was a wonderful guy. The ship had been tied up for who knows how long. It was the oldest Gearing destroyer. The first time he was getting underway he said, “Hey, do you want to go out with me for a couple of days? I’ve got some trials.” Since he was a 600-pound plant he was outside the purview of the PEB at the time, so he didn’t have any of these mandatory restrictions on steaming.

I said, “Sure.”

So we were up on the bridge; John said to the OOD, “Now, this is my first time at sea. I’m going to get plenty of time with this ship, so I’m going to let you take it out.” The word came up: Engineering department says ready for getting underway. So John says to this jg, “How are you going to do this?” And the guy gave this really weird set of commands and rudder orders. John said, “Wait. We’re not going to do any of that. We’re going to say, ‘All back two-thirds.’ We’re going to say, ‘Port engine stop.’ We’re going to say, ‘Right full rudder’ and ‘Port engine ahead standard,’ and we’re going to spin right out of here.

The officer of the deck said, “No, sir. We can’t do that.”

“Why not?”

He said, “Well, there is no port engine.”

John said, “What do you mean? The engineering department just reported ready for getting underway.”

He said, “Well, when they say that they mean the starboard engine is ready. The port engine is CasRep’d, and has been for x months.”

We backed out of there, and as we backed out the -10 radar fell off the mast of the William Wood, bounced off the deck house, bounced over onto the deck of the ship next to her, the Manley. It's lucky no one was killed. At the same time—they had their port anchor at the dip—they managed to scrape that on the side of the Manley. Anyway, the next year John Castano put that all together. So when he left the William Wood, everything on that ship worked. You know, they don't have a lot on those ships, but every valve worked, you could spin the main stops with your finger, it was great. They would shoot and they would steam.

Then to the Vreeland. The exec of the Vreeland was Lew Glenn, who later became an admiral. The captain was an absolute Erich von Stroheim; had no confidence in himself or any of his officers. He never let any of the officers handle the ship at all. He'd had a number of problems with the 1200-pound engineering plant.

WINKLER: This was a relatively new ship here.

MUSTIN: Oh, yeah. This was '74. Yeah. Single screw.

So I got all the captains in and I handed them a letter that I had written. I said, "I want to give you a few thoughts on how I see some things. I think seamanship is one of your most important function here." I went into the philosophies that I'd learned from Pete Smith. I said, "You must train these young officers to be competent mariners. I assume that you already are, or you wouldn't be where you are. But just to make sure that what I want done is done, I will tell you that unless I see your officers at the conn of your ships under all but the most hairy circumstances—and I'll be the one who decides the hairy circumstances—I'm going to give you an unsat in seamanship on your fitness report. Anybody have any questions about that?"

"No, sir." And off we go. Bingo. All these junior officers are handling the ships, except for the skipper of the Vreeland.

So I watched him make a couple of these evolutions, and I sent for him and I said, "Either your officers start handling the ship or you're going to get an unsat on your fitness report in seamanship, just as I told you."

"Well," he said, "I think you're overreaching your authority in this matter. I can handle my ship any way I want to."

I said, "You're absolutely right; you sure can. But I also have the authority to render my judgement on your performance, and I told you what I'm going to do." Well, the guy didn't do it, so I gave him an unsat in seamanship.

I got a call from Joe Metcalf, who was the detailer at the Bureau. He said, "Hey, we got this fitrep you wrote in here on this guy. You made a real typo, the report says you gave him an unsat."

“Joe, that was no typo.”

As a result of that, we started having all kinds of great competition. These young officers got great. Two of them won the SurfLant OOD seamanship competition in a year. And they all loved it.

So, one by one we went around and got all these ships put back together. Three of the skippers left. Three were replaced by good guys who, by this time, were ready to work the problem and not just complain about it.

WINKLER: Talk a little bit more about the Barry, because that seemed to be the most extreme case. Obviously, you put a good leader in there, but how did you support his efforts?

MUSTIN: Well, mostly by helping him expedite the spare parts, and ramrodding the SurfLant staff to get stuff over that he needed, and by using my authority to reward good performance. Second, by going around the ship with him every day, and taking names and kicking ass. We were both ex-chief engineers. He'd take a fire room and I'd take a fire room. We did it in ways.... For example, in the after engine room there was a kid who was a first class machinist's mate, Oskazar. He was a Turk. He was really afraid to go on liberty in Greece, because of the stuff that was going on. So he spent all his time on the ship, studying. He was really a good guy, first class. The space was a disaster. The previous skipper had not given him any support. So I said, “Okay, here's what we do. Take this after engine room of yours, Oskazar. You get this thing through the PEB, and you'll be a chief machinist's mate three months after this.”

He said, “It's a deal, Commodore.” He put it back together. I'd go down and pat his back, and he became a chief and later an officer.

When I was ComSecondFlt, in '84, I got a call one day. The flag lieutenant came in and said, “Warrant Officer Oskazar wants to talk to you on the phone.”

I said, “Yeah, I'll talk to him.” It was Oskazar.

He said, “I'm going to be commissioned tomorrow as an ensign. I'd appreciate it if you would come down and preside at the ceremony.” So I did that. It was quite a story. I got my PAO and said, “Cover this. Because only in America could something like this happen.” I said, “I want to make sure you understand that this is not a public affairs story about me. It's about this guy Oskazar.”

At his swearing-in he said, “When I was a young boy and American ships would come to Istanbul, my father and I would go down to the pier and see if we could get the garbage to take home to feed our family.” He said, “So today I'm an officer in the U.S. Navy; it's my proudest day.” It was really something., the kind of thing that makes a Navy career so rewarding.

But in each one of the ships, in each one of the spaces we found a guy like that, and we gave him the authority and the prestige. We took these pot-smoking guys and shipped them home by the carload. Finally the Bureau said, hey, we can't replace these guys. I said, "I don't give a damn. I've just got more problems than I can handle now and these guys are part of it. Get them out of here. I'd rather be undermanned than manned with scum like some of these guys."

So as the whole squadron turned around, about that time the Cyprus crisis erupted. ComSixthFlt determined that it was too sensitive for the U.S. ships to be in port in Athens, because it looked like we were tilting toward Greece. So we were directed to get underway. We did, and stayed underway for forty-five days. Those guys found out that they could stay at sea and operate, and they stopped all this whining and crying about not having the right kind of people, and started fixing their problems instead of complaining about them. So when we came back in forty-five days later the ships were really in great condition and the morale was up.

I had gotten in a bit of trouble because right around that time was when all the fuel crises broke out. So we had been told to conserve fuel and steam on one shaft and drag the other, and all that stuff. In the meantime I knew that what inspired these guys was competition. So I'd line up all six ships and they'd have modified full-power runs. Then I'd give each one of them a little flag that said, you're the champion of the month. Well, the type commander and Sixth Fleet were really irritated at all this fuel use, but at the same time the ships were getting better and better and better.

Then, since they started to get so good, I said, "All right. Instead of sitting here at the pier—we're starting to pick up operational commitments by other units that couldn't get underway. So we're going to do the entire competitive year—battle efficiency year—every quarter. Which means that we're going to do the battle efficiency competition four times this year." So the ships scheduled that. And we had deals cut when ships would deploy to the Sixth Fleet, if come over and where they for some reason couldn't shoot their ASROC, we'd pick up their training firing. The Sampson, who was a good ship, the best of the ships, picked up a lot of missiles to fire as well as guns to shoot. So the ships all did the type commander's battle efficiency competition four times.

We had long periods when we couldn't go to sea because of the very complex political situation in Greece as well as the fuel squeeze. And so we really put our heads together to figure out: what can we do in the way of training that you don't have to go to sea to do. It turned out that when you really put your mind to it, in engineering you could do every drill in the type commander's battle efficiency competition, except stop and lock the shaft. You could do high water and low water and loss of emergency feed. You could do all of those drills. You could do all of the dry firing in the gunfire support. You could do all of the communications drills, all of them. They'd just read the flags from across the pier. So we structured an in-port training program to get at that, so that when we went to sea we only had to do the things that we really had to go to sea to do. In gunnery, you know, ninety per cent of that stuff is procedural. Turn these switches in the proper

sequence, and then shoot. Well, if you learn how to turn the switches, when you go to sea, all the real shooting is a piece of cake.

We started having competitions. We had what we'd call "Damage Control Olympics" and "Boatswain's Mate Olympics." The judges for the competition were the senior chiefs of each of the ships. So for the Damage Control Olympics there were six judges. They were six Machinist's Mates and Damage Controlmen, and all that stuff.

When I got to be the deputy at SurfLant I implemented all this stuff force-wide. One of the drills was pipe-patching. You had a little pipe rigged up to the high water pressure on the pier. The chiefs thought a lot of these drills up. The pipe-patching one was, the guy who was doing the patching had a stop watch. He had to go patch the pipe, and then he had to sit on it and turn on the water. Really neat. You'd see all the guys on the other ships watching.

Then we had the Boatswain's Mate Olympics. One of the events was knot tying. The champion from each ship would stand there in front of the E-9 boatswain's mate with a stopwatch. He'd say, "Sheepshank." Each guy would tie it and drop it, and the first guy whose knot hit the ground won. Then the old boatswain would go over and make sure it was properly tied. You'd see the guys practicing these things, you know, on the forecastle. It was really great. We made up little squadron flags, for the champion in the Damage Control Olympics, Engineering Olympics, all of that stuff.

The guy who really helped most with that was my old pal, by this time master chief, Ted Ross, who'd been with me in the Wilson. When he heard I was going to DesRon Twelve he said, "They're trying to get me out now. I've got thirty-five years in and they say they don't want any more than thirty-five years. If you could find some way to get me extended, I'd love to come over and give you a hand with these guys."

So I called up Admiral Bagley, and I said, "They're trying to get these old chiefs out. But as I read the policy, they're trying to get them out because they all want to stay ashore." I said, "This guy is a gold mine. If he comes down here I'll guarantee you that in six months these ships will be in great shape, but we need to get a waiver on him to stay on active duty."

He said, "That's easy." Bang. Over came Teddy Ross, who had been in a Gearing class destroyer in World War II, and then had been in the Henry B. Wilson and the 1200-pound ships subsequently. He was a master chief of the old school. Just a wonderful guy, great leader, and still a good friend.

There were a bunch of guys around that he called "Zumwalt chiefs," guys that didn't stand in the head of the chow line. He always did; went right to the head of the line. "I'm not waiting in line, I'm a chief, damn it." He went into the William M. Wood after that first "There is no port engine" drill. Went down in the forward fire room and started laying down the law to these guys. "This is a pig pen."

The chief down there said, “You’re another one of these guys from these 1200-pound plants. You don’t know your way around this ship; you don’t know what you’re talking about.”

Ross said, “You son of a bitch.” He said this in front of the whole crew. “You and I are going to get blindfolded, we’re going to start at the forward bulkhead of the forward fire room, and the first one that can trace the auxiliary steam line from the Number 1 boiler to the end of the after engine room is the guy who knows the plant.” And he had finished before that chief got out of the forward fire room. Boy, did that have an impact. It spread throughout the squadron instantly. And that loud-mouthed chief later became a pretty good guy. Teddy Ross gets a lot of the credit for the rise and the great material condition of the ships.

So really, after we got them up to those stages we started to work seriously on this bag of tactics that was so inadequate. The operations officer of the Sampson was a lieutenant named Neil Byrne. He had invented a dice game that you played on the wardroom table with ship models. He outlined all the capabilities, as we knew them, of the Soviet ships and ours, and you played tactical games. It’s called NavTag. Later on, when I was Op 35, we brought Neil back to OpNav, automated his game, and installed one of them at the Naval Academy and one at the War College. So that people started playing it. But at this time it was played on the wardroom table with dice.

We started first as a competition between the ships. The wardrooms ate it up; they loved it. Then we started a project where we played all the Type Commander’s TacNotes, and eighty per cent of them were no good at all. We very carefully documented why we said this, and sent all this stuff into the Type Commander's staff, who did not really welcome them in the spirit intended.

Then we played ComSixthFlt’s anti-tattletale tactics, which is where we reached the fundamental but previously overlooked conclusion that you couldn’t get there from here if you tried to deal with the tattletales solely with carrier air.

About the time I arrived, Rear Admiral Forrest Petersen became CTF 60, a magnificent guy. He had been out on the high desert with Yeager and those pioneers when the sound barrier was broken. At one point he had personally held the altitude record. He was a nuclear engineer. He had been captain of the Enterprise, and now he was CTF 60. He was watching all of this stuff like the full-power runs and the improvement of the ships with a great deal of interest. I was raising a lot of hell with the Type Commander for lack of support, and Pete stood by all my fights with the bureaucracy.

One time I went down to the fire room of the Sampson. They had really gotten it ready for the PEB. I said, “This place is beginning to look pretty good,” meaning it was outstanding. I said, “But I want to see it better. I’ll tell you what, when you’re ready for me to come down here and eat lunch in front of this boiler in my whites, give me a call and I’ll see you.”

In about a month and a half the chief came up and said, “Commodore, we want you to come down and have lunch in the forward fire room in your whites.”

I said, “Okay.” So I went down, and the place was immaculate. I’ve never seen a fire room like it before or since. They had a guy down there who took a picture of this that ended up on the front page of the *Navy Times*.

Pete Petersen thought that was great. So when he came down to inspect the ship they asked him to inspect the forward fire room in his whites. Which he did.

He said, “I’m going in the bilges.”

They said, “You can go anywhere you want to, Admiral.” It was really great. They had all sort of caught the spirit.

Anyway, Pete was very supportive of all of these efforts to get at the tactics, and in particular the tactics where we were trying to work with: How do we deal with the tattletales, and what do we do to improve the way that surface ship air defense is integrated with the carrier air defense. A lot of that came from the NavTag stuff. We would go to Pete and his staff to get the capabilities of the F-4, which was our front-line airplane at the time, and the S-3. He would have guys provide it. Then when we were playing these games with their tactics he’d send the squadron commanders over. The F-4 squadron CAG would come over and the F-4 squadron guy, and we’d play these games seriously. Pete really supported it.

At the end of this, all of a sudden, the junta fell. The U.S. was very strongly identified with the support of the junta. The Greeks withdrew from NATO. And so the Greeks asked us to leave. We left at the end of the summer of ’75.

When we left, ComSixthFlt and Admiral Petersen awarded DESRON 12 the Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation. Each of the skippers was awarded a Navy Commendation Medal. ComSixthFlt and CTF 60 said that this was the best destroyer squadron that they had ever had in the Mediterranean in the last ten years, and that the tactical performance and material condition was a high standard for the rest of the destroyer force to shoot for. So the captains of the ships, two of whom were early selected for captain, and I, and everybody else, were prouder than hell of that. To take that forlorn bunch of whiners and turn them into winners was quite an accomplishment by all of us.

It really just became a plain old leadership matter. When you figure out that you’ve got a problem, don’t blame it on somebody else—fix it. We did that. When I went on board the Barry, that first skipper.... They had the only VDS in the Med that had been CasRep’d for six months. So I sent for the skipper and said, “Why is the VDS CasRep’d?”

He said, “Well, this guy came over from BuShips. He looked at the tow cable, and he said, ‘Geez, that thing’s frayed. You ought not stream that—you’re liable to lose your fish.’ He said, ‘You’d better CasRep it.’”

So I said, “Who the hell’s the captain? You, or this weenie from the Bureau of Ships?”

He said, “Well, I am.”

I said, “Well, that’s your VDS. Who the hell’s he, to make a judgement like that? And where’s this spare that he promised to send you right away, six months ago?”

“Well, we don’t know.”

So I said, “Run the damn thing out on the fantail. Let’s take a look at it.” We went over the thing inch by inch. I said, “I don’t see any frayed places; it looks great to me. Stream the goddam thing.”

He said, “I can’t take responsibility for that.” This was the same line the chief engineer for the Henry B. Wilson.

I said, “Well, you don’t have to. I’m taking responsibility, and I’ll give it to you in writing,” which I did. “Now stream it.” Streamed it and it was fine. And it was fine a year later, when we left, without ever having gotten the promised replacement. That was the only VDS in the Mediterranean. That C.O. had no sense of urgency, and he failed the test of command.

So I learned an awful lot about what you can do if you want to fix things. I learned an awful lot about task force, now called battle group, tactics, not only at the destroyer and individual level, but at the integrated level with the very, very capable and knowledgeable carrier task force commander, Pete Petersen. I was able to put all of those lessons to real fruition what I became a more senior officer, because I implemented all those important training things in SurfLant and Second Fleet. We called it “sweat week” for Surface Warfare Training week. I first did it down in Charleston when I was Group Two. We had the same regimen. Only by then we were starting to get things that we could play games with, like NTDS, that none of the ships in DesRon Twelve even had. Then when I got to the Second Fleet I did it at the fleet level. And then we started to integrate with Dam Neck and people like that, and put a lot of money into that. I started in my Second Fleet tour something called BFIT—Battle Force In-Port Training, which really paid off for the Navy.

WINKLER: But you had basically six different ship types. How did that accentuate your challenge?

MUSTIN: Oh, it magnified it immeasurably. The Forrest Shermans, as with the Charles Adams’s, had been built in different yards. So you had Delaval pumps here, and you had

Carrier pumps here. There was a minimum of mutual support in these ships. Even the guns were different caliber. The William M. Wood was 5-inch/38; the Sampson had a different Mark and Mod from the Barry; the Barry had a VDS, which nobody else had; the Sampson had –39 radars and air defense suites that nobody else had in the Med. It made mutual support, which was the only way we had survived Vietnam, very, very difficult. It placed an enormous reliance on the pipeline from the United States. This is a very expensive way to operate. If homeporting overseas is ever done again—and periodically those notions re-surface, for the same reasons, there are some real lessons here.

WINKLER: I imagine your staff supply officer was a key figure.

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. The ships' supply officers were magnificent.

The other part of the problem, that I haven't really talked about, was the unauthorized absences, the pot smoking, the desertions, beating up the cab drivers. You had two categories: the young sailors who were bachelors, and the young sailors who had families. The problems were not with the young family guys, but with the young sailors who were unmarried. You can only go tour the Acropolis so many times before your hormones start raising themselves. So I figured out that one of the things that's causing these kids trouble is, they're going over and they're getting drunk. We've got to find some alternatives for liberty for them.

So I got hold of Pete Petersen and I said, "You know, we've got this little set of shacks at the end of the pier. I want to establish Navy Moving Picture Exchange, Athens. Then I want to get the first-string sea prints sent over here by the carload." I said, "I'm just going to start showing movies for these kids at sunset, and we'll turn them off at taps. See if we can't give them something to do other than go ashore and beat up taxi drivers. Then I want permission to open up a little slop-shoot and sell beer and hard liquor. And I want to have some recreation funds to go buy foosball games and shuffleboard and everything. And I want to build a little EM club right here out on this pier."

He said, "Geez, that's a great idea."

I had gotten this idea from this council of senior chiefs that I put together. I'd meet with those guys once a week. "What are our problems? How are we going to solve them?" These chiefs, led by Teddy Ross, would come up with these things. So we established this NMPX. And we got the guys on the ships together and we built this little EM club, put a bar in there with beer on tap, had a liquor license, and all of this stuff that you do when you run an O-club. The supply officers managed all that. And all of a sudden the incidents started going down. We had a little area where you could play catch, throw footballs around and stuff.

When John Wayne visited Vietnam, he said, "If I can ever do anything for you boys, let me know when I get back."

So I wrote him a letter. I told him, “We’re having all this trouble with these guys getting in trouble ashore, and I’d really appreciate it if you’d do about a one- or two-minute movie for them, that says, ‘Welcome to Athens. You’re here as representatives of your Government. You guys have got to be careful and not get in trouble, etc. etc.’” I gave him the script.

And he did it. He sent us this movie where he comes on and says, “Hi, I’m John Wayne...” We had all these other indoctrination movies for these guys, and they’d all fall asleep in them. It was some chaplain telling them they’ve got to go to chapel; the motorcycle safety guy would say you’ve got to watch out. They were really deadening. Then on comes the Duke, who tells them to be good boys and red-blooded Americans. They ate it up; they loved it. He said, “Hey, DesRon Twelve is special.”

All of these things kind of played together for the sailors. Everybody that I served with there, aside from those that we mailed home by the carload, looks back on that experience as a formative, really great experience. Dave Stone was an ensign on the Manley. He is now a Rear Admiral, one of the guys doing the investigation of the Greenville collision. Dave was captain of the basketball team at the Naval Academy. We had the best squadron basketball team—we even beat the carriers.

WINKLER: And that also helped your UA problem?

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. Guys started to come back from the hills. When ships operate, sailors like it. When you sit there alongside the pier and the cement dust is blowing all over you, they don’t like it. When the ships started operating, going out and getting all these kudos and having all this fun and setting all these gunnery records, then all of a sudden the sailors started coming back from the hills.

I think the Barry won the Golden Anchor and I think the Sampson did also, for retention. Whereas before, the squadron had had the lowest retention rates in the cruiser-destroyer force, and maybe in the Atlantic Fleet. They ended up among the top two or three at the end of this year. It was a remarkable, remarkable accomplishment.

WINKLER: I know that Greece always posed a challenge. Ouzo was one.

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. It was really something. The friendships that were formed. The performance of the ships was a real eye-opener. All done by a bunch of guys who figured there was no problem that they couldn’t fix.

WINKLER: Two follow-on questions before the squadron goes back to the States: first of all, how did the squadron interact with NATO? And then give an assessment of running up against the Soviets, because they were out there.

MUSTIN: We had some very interesting interactions with NATO. It was a good operational introduction. All of the weapon ranges there are owned by foreign countries. The French have one at Ceres, the Italians had one, the Greeks and the Turks each had

one. Any time you do a firing exercise, you do that with NATO units on their range. The first time we did one of these I was put in charge of it. My six destroyers, six Italian destroyers, and four French destroyers went up for four days on an Italian range. So I was laying out all these requirements: Here's what we're going to fire the first day for rehearsal, here's the exercise. I got a personal from the Italian commodore asking if he could come meet with me and discuss this. I said, "Sure."

We got together and he said, "I am really embarrassed to tell you this. We don't have the bullets. You have laid on for me almost three years of firing in the first four days of this exercise. I can't do that. But at the same time it's terribly embarrassing for the Italian Navy to have to say that. So if you could please modify the exercise schedule, I'd really appreciate it."

I said, "Of course. I don't want to embarrass you. Don't worry." But I learned then that when you do exercises with these NATO navies you start off in kindergarten, and you never get much beyond that. So that if you had a notion at the time that we were going to be this magnificent integrated force, that was a pretty naive notion. It was the U.S., and then all others way, way behind. None of them had NTDS of any kind.

The amphibious exercises that we supported were always interesting, because the Greeks would always back out at the last minute if the Turks were scheduled, and vice versa. But what I learned, and what I found in spades when I was the Striking Fleet commander in the Atlantic, is that the rest of the NATO navies, with some pretty obvious exceptions, weren't up to our standards.

(End of Side B, Tape I)

WINKLER: This is Tape II on February 21, 2001; Dave Winkler here with Vice Admiral Mustin continuing our interview. You were just finishing up a point you made that, with the exception of the Royal Navy, a lot of the other NATO navies really just didn't measure up to par.

MUSTIN: I ought to be careful to say the NATO navies in the Med. Because at the time the Germans were prohibited from going in the Med, and the Dutch. So I'm really speaking of the Greek, the Italian, and the Turkish navies. We did operate with the Spanish navy, even though they were not members of NATO. And we did operate with the French, even though they were not militarily part of NATO.

The reason that I had been so strong on being a destroyer squadron commander was that I had talked to my dad about this whole business of command. He said, well, you should understand that once you've had command, you've had command. If you've had a destroyer and you have a cruiser, you still have to hold reveille, you still have to do battery alignment, you still have to have sweepers piped. Whereas, if you go to be a destroyer squadron commander, you find the challenges of unit command, where you're commanding commanding officers instead of yourself commanding your own ship, are

very different, and are the best prep school for further command if you're going to stay competitive for flag rank. So I took that to heart.

Based on that and some other observations, with the exception of those three skippers whom I canned right away, I made a concerted effort to do things with the ships that enhanced the stature of the commanding officer. So that the crew would look to him as the captain.

I rotated my flag once a quarter; a quarter in each ship, to really zero in on things. When I would go to the ships I had my own mess. The rest of the officers on the staff ate in the wardroom, but I had my own mess. I did that because I wanted the captain to be able to sit there and tell his own jokes, have his own guys see him sitting at the head of the table, let him pick the movies, and do all the things you want a captain to raise his image with his junior officers. I figured that I could be a real wet blanket on these things. Anyway, about two or three weeks into the tour in the R. L. Page, John Stouffer, the skipper, came to see me. He said, "I really would appreciate it if you would come join us at the mess, if not every night, at least two or three times a week."

I said, "I'd be delighted to, John. I would very much like to." But then I went through my reasons for not doing that.

He said, "Well, that's a concern." He said, "But I can handle that. But you have to realize that to most of these young officers, you're the only captain that they've ever seen. As far as they're concerned, you represent Captains, U.S.N. Most of them have never seen a guy with eagles on his collar. So it's important for them to see you in other than crisis and professional situations. For that reason I'd appreciate it if you'd join us." And I did. He told the other skippers, and they all came and said the same thing. As a result I got to know a lot of these younger officers. I liked a lot of them, and still do. They had great ideas on how to improve things, and I listened to them and implemented those I could.

I think the training as a DesRon commander gave me an awful lot of insight into how to command commanders. The more senior you get in the business, and the larger the forces that you're involved with, the more that's your job. When I got to be ComSecondFlt, for example, I knew, having been a group commander, that the whole Navy training establishment was designed to train TAO's and people like that. But there was nobody to train the admirals. The only training they got was out at Idaho Falls, under Rickover's kooky notion that they ought to all be chief engineers. So I made it my business as ComSecondFlt to set up a training regimen that concentrated on training the rear admirals, not only to be rear admirals, but to be future fleet commanders. That was an insight that had not been prevalent before then. I set up an infrastructure to do that that exists to this day.

So those were some of the lessons from being a DesRon commander.

WINKLER: The one other thing to touch on was the Soviet navy.

MUSTIN: Yes. Fox Turner was the commander of the Sixth Fleet. What the Soviets were doing—we didn't really realize this at the time—they were coming and trying to stake out places in international waters as Soviet sanctuaries. When they'd send their ships into the Med, essentially they'd anchor them. They didn't do very much, unless they came out and put a tattletale on the carrier. They never fired their guns. The submarines essentially tried to stay with the carrier. The Soviet surface navy went to anchorages. One of the anchorages was Kithira, which was at the southern tip of the Ionian Sea just where the Adriatic turns north. We went by Kithira, an island, on the way to and from Athens. There was always a bunch of Soviet combatants anchored there. So Fox Turner said, "Henceforth, when you guys go home to Athens, stop and anchor overnight in Kithira every time before you do, so the Soviets can't claim that that's a Soviet sanctuary." So we'd do that.

Then one day we're going in. One of the training exercises was towing and being towed. Had to do that four times a year. So I got the Barry and the Sampson going in. I got Greg Streeter and Bob Whitmire, and said, "Hey. You're going to do your towing exercise here." I had made sure that all these exercises were observed by somebody from another ship, or I would observe them. I said, "Let's have a little fun with the Soviets while we're here, do a little cover and deception. What we'll do is, we'll go in and one of you anchor. Then get a bunch of smoke pots and stuff, and bring them out and light them. Lay mattresses alongside the deck and set them on fire, so that it looks like the ship's on fire. Then the other ship will come by and pick you up and tow you off over the horizon. We'll see what the Soviets do about that."

Well, these guys really got into this drill. The next thing that happened was, we went in there, and the Barry anchored—Greg Streeter really got into it. They lighted all these fires. Guys were jumping over the side. The Sampson came by and picked them up and towed them off over the horizon. We're listening. We could hear all these Soviet radios crackling; they were really talking up a storm about this stuff. I thought this was pretty funny. I sent this off to Admiral Petersen and he thought it was great. Fox Turner did not have much of a sense of humor. So, although Pete laughed like hell and said, great idea, Fox Turner said, well, that was a lot of fun but don't do that any more. Don't play games with the Soviets.

Our biggest interaction was in protecting the carrier from submarines, and developing anti-tattletale tactics. To do that, on many occasions in exercises we had one of our ships be an Orange Force tattletale. It really raised hell with the carriers when we'd do it. They didn't like that. The carrier navy doesn't like to have exercise reports that say the carrier's sunk. All of those Soviet combatants had these large numbers of torpedoes. When I was the Orange Force tattletale, I'd just bring the tattletale in to 2,000 yards abeam of the carrier. And when we felt like it we'd just launch five torpedoes at them, and that's it.

What you can do when you put your mind to it. Each of the ships had an ASROC except the Manley. So they were required to undergo a nuclear inspection. We had what

was called a TSI, technical standardization inspection, for the squadron—not conducted by the Navy but conducted by DASA, the Defense Atomic Support Agency, through their outfit at Sandia Base, out at Albuquerque. They sent teams around to all the Services, to do nuclear standardization and safety inspections—very detailed inspections, very hard, very high standards. I'd had my first one when I was the weapons officer of the Lawrence. We had gotten zero deficiencies, the first time that had ever happened in a destroyer. Had one in the Conyngham: zero deficiencies. Had one in the Henry B. Wilson: zero deficiencies. An enormous amount of work went into that.

So I got the skippers and I said, “Okay. We are shooting for zero deficiencies here.” By now every ship had done the type commander’s training requirements twice. I said, “All right. I’ve been involved in three of these in a ship and got zero d’s. So that’s going to be our standard. Anybody who doesn’t get zero deficiencies will not be eligible for any weapons department battle efficiency ‘E’. This is your final test. Get yourself 100 on this TSI with all these guys from the Air Force and the Army and the Navy, and you’re in the running for the battle efficiency competition and the weapons department ‘E’s. If you don’t, you’re out.”

They all got zero deficiencies, except for one, the William M. Wood, who had a great weapons officer. I wanted him to get an “E” because he’d come from nothing, from dropping his –10 radar on another ship when they got underway, to really a great ship. The weapons officer came over with tears in his eyes. I really wanted to waiver, but I didn’t. As a result the TSI inspection report said: This is the finest Navy inspection we’ve ever had. All of the ships except one got 100, and that one ship got a 98. That all went into the unit award from ComSixthFlt, of course.

I just realized over and over and over again on that tour that if you set the bar high enough for motivated guys at sea, not only will they leap that bar, but they’ll surpass it. They were really something. It was a great outfit.

WINKLER: You’re booted out of Greece; obviously you have to go home. Where did they reassign the squadron to?

MUSTIN: We went to an overhaul in the Philadelphia Navy Yard, and to subsequent home port in Norfolk. We went up to the overhaul, and I was once more on my high horse. One of my big themes for the captains was: You’re the captain; you’re responsible for the ship. Some weenie from BuShips isn’t responsible for the VDS—you are. So you have to determine what it is you want done to your ship. Don’t get into the shipyard and let these guys from Shop 51, who have a completely different agenda—they’re trying to keep their workload up—tell you that you need a lot of stuff you don’t need. You want to get into the shipyard, get fixed what should be fixed, and get out of there. Don’t let them workload you for their own purposes.

Well, they sent over this team of two hundred guys just before we left to come back to go to the Philadelphia Navy Yard. I was sitting there in my coveralls one day. A couple of these civilians from the yard who didn’t know who I was, were talking,

chuckling, about having a little fun with the skipper. “He thinks he’s in charge of this overhaul. We’ll get him up there and we’ll educate him on who’s in charge.” So I made sure all the skippers knew that.

I sent a message to OpNav noting that the policy was that you would take male dependent members to sea overnight if you depart from and returned to your home port. So I said, “We are departing from our home port of Athens and returning to our home port of Philadelphia, so we meet that requirement. And I’ve calculated that I have x number of male dependents over here. If they come back on the ships we can save y amounts of dollars. It would be a good thing to do.” I sent this off from Athens. Within a day a message came back saying: Permission granted. So I got hold of the Naval Academy and I got all their plebe summer training syllabuses to fix the minimum age, we set a standard that the young man had to be tall enough so that he couldn’t fall through the bottom life line, kind of like those signs you see, “You can’t get on this roller coaster unless you’re tall enough to touch this sign.” As a result of that many, many of the ships brought back a lot of male dependents. It was a four-week trip. Came all the way across the Med, stopped in Mallorca, stopped in Rota. It was a great experience. I brought two of my sons back. I turned them over to Master Chief Ross, who gave them a pretty good education.

We arrived in Philadelphia. I had gone around to this council of elders, the master chiefs,....

WINKLER: Just a break right there. As far as the time frame you had to get out of Greece—you had a lot of dependents who had settled over there.

MUSTIN: Yes.

WINKLER: How much....

MUSTIN: We didn’t have to leave in the middle of the night. We had a couple of months, where we had enough time. That was part of the deal with the U.S. Government structure through the Embassy. People had to get out of their leases and arrange for moving, and that stuff. So it was orderly. I don’t remember exactly how long, but it was a couple of months.

WINKLER: Okay. Back to Philadelphia.

MUSTIN: I asked this council of elders: What can we do to make this homecoming memorable for all these guys that have been gone now for a couple of years, many of them? They came back and said the things that these kids miss the most are Big Macs. So I wrote a letter to the chairman of the board of McDonald’s, who was Ray Kroc at the time. I said: We’re bringing back these six ships that have been over here for a couple of years; I’ve got 1200 sailors. I want to find out if there’s any way that we can put in an advance order for 2400 Big Macs to be on the pier in Philadelphia when we arrive home. It was a long deployment.

He wrote back and said: We sure can; they'll be there and it's a "Welcome Home" present from McDonald's. When we got there I left the ship to drive home with Lucy. We lived down here in Washington. There were five huge McDonald's trucks out there, each one of them just mobbed by these sailors. It was great.

I had been told that I was going to go to OpNav. So when Lucy came back she went to our house in Alexandria, and I commuted down on the weekends. I was in the yard with the ships for three or four months, and then I came down here to OpNav, to work for Admiral Jim Doyle, who was by then Op 03, in what was then Op 32, which was the fleet requirements branch. It was headed by a rear admiral named Bob Morris, who had been captain of a Pacific Fleet DDG at the same time I had been. So I had known Bob for ten years. I went to work for Jim Doyle, who I think is the one person who deserves the most credit for the surface Navy that we have today. Bud Zumwalt and Worth Bagley charted the course. But Jim Doyle expanded on the notion of dispersed offensive power, and at the same time, brought in under his umbrella not only the cruisers and destroyers, but the amphibians and the service force ships. Essentially ninety per cent of the weapons and tactics that you see today are those that were developed—hardware and software—were developed by Jim Doyle during those years, over some pretty serious opposition.

WINKLER: This period marks a step up in the professionalization of the surface warfare community. You have the warfare pins.

MUSTIN: Yes, we got those while we were in Athens.

WINKLER: And also you had the destroyer school, but that's now the surface warfare officers' school.

MUSTIN: I came back and reported in to Admiral Doyle and to Admiral Morris. Went to see Bob Morris. This was December. I checked in. Bob Morris said, "Hey, we're having the surface warfare party in a couple of months here. Are you intending to go?"

I said, "Hell, no. I used to go to that party when it was a destroyer party. But I don't want to go to a party with a bunch of damn amphibians and service force weenies."

He said, "Well, you've got that wrong. Not only are you going but, number one, you're in charge of it. And number two, you're going to have a great time, Captain."

"Yes, sir."

Jim Doyle went to great lengths to spread the talent out. There had been essentially a feeling, that was accurate, that the first-stringers were all in cruisers. They were the fighter pilots of the surface Navy. He made a great effort to break that up. And at the same time, the number of carriers having been cut in half, the aviators had to look

for other places to have their major commands. So they staked out pieces of the amphibious force and the service force for both their deep-draft and their major commands, which you had to have to compete for flag rank. So Jim Doyle was faced with the task, at the OpNav level, of creating a surface force, and at the same time protecting the turf of the surface Navy in terms of the number of command opportunities available for surface captains, because roughly half of the amphibious force and service force were now designated, by an aviator CNO, as aviation commands.

In addition, the Aegis was just on the horizon, strongly opposed by the aviators, who felt that it was a big waste of money to try and fight air battles with the Aegis ship when you could do it all with F-14s, and they wanted Aegis dollars to buy aircraft. The inadequacies of the Charles Adams class against missiles, and in particular against long-range missiles, were becoming apparent. And the absolute inadequacies of the Talos missile became apparent. So it didn't take long for Jim Doyle, Bob Morris, and I, who were the requirements guys, to figure out that we needed an Aegis fleet, which was programmed, very slowly. But at the same time we needed a new destroyer. So we undertook to develop the requirements for the DDGX, which became the Arleigh Burke.

So on Jim Doyle's watch we brought in Aegis, brought in LAMPS, brought in the vertical launchers, brought in the SM-2 missile, brought in the Tomahawk, brought in the digital computer versions of NTDS. We brought in what is now called cooperative engagement—at the time it was called battle group AAW. We brought in the CIWS, the close-in weapons system. We brought in the SLQ-32, the modern anti-missile ECM suite. We brought in towed arrays. We brought in the new generation sonar. We significantly upgraded the capabilities of the design of the amphibs, the LHAs, the AOE's. It was an amazing time.

WINKLER: Spruances were starting to come on line.

MUSTIN: Yes, Spruances were new. I was very unhappy with the Spruances. The Spruance had been a McNamara invention. It was to be the DX and the DXG. There were to be thirty DX's, which were ASW ships, and thirty DXG's, which were to be AAW ships, and they would operate in tandem all the time. Then the Typhon weapons system, which had been designed for the DXG, became too expensive, and so the DXG was cancelled. Now you had the DX, the Spruance, the single-purpose ASW ship, with no DXG. So the whole rationale fell apart. Here we had all these ships out there, which were the largest destroyers that we had ever built, and they had nothing on them. They had no weapons to speak of. We were furious at this. On Jim's watch we took the Spruance hull and turned it into the DXG with the Aegis fleet, it is the Ticonderoga-class cruiser. But it was ten years behind the Spruance in getting to sea.

Then I think that it was Jimmy Holloway—it was either Holloway or Tom Hayward—who changed the DDG to CG. I was in charge of the force structure as a captain, and I remember one day, with a stroke of the pen, we went from the Soviets having more cruiser than all of NATO combined to NATO outnumbering the Soviet cruiser force by almost two to one. DLG's became cruisers.

WINKLER: Right. I think '75 is when it happened. The DLGs became CGs, the DEs became FFs.

MUSTIN: Yes, we solved the cruiser gap by changing the names to protect the guilty.

Doyle did all of this. He had an extraordinary group of captains. I think I told you, he was able to manage that so that they didn't eat their young and compete with each other head-on. So many of them were selected for flag, and deservedly. It was an amazing performance.

One of the unstated reasons for the reorganization of OpNav at that time was to break up the Yankees. Jim Doyle was responsible for about two-thirds of the platforms in the Navy, and he really had a lot of money. He had a lot of power.

For example, I don't know if I told you the story of the LAMPS and how that worked. The deal when I got there was that, for the LAMPS helicopter, SH-60, Op 03 would pay for the R&D, which was the weapons suite and avionics. Op 05, the air warfare czar, would pay for the procurement of the fleet of the all-up airplane. Op 05 had rigged it for seven years so that the first procurement was always one year outside of the POM, because they wanted to spend their scarce aviation procurement dollars on tailhook aircraft, and not on helicopters to go on destroyers. Doyle was furious about this, but they had two aviator CNOs. He said, "We've got to do something about this."

So I said, "You know what we've got to do? We've got to get our nose under the tent. What you ought to do in this POM cycle is, you ought to, number one, accelerate the R&D by putting in more money for two years, and then in that third year you give up FFG 7 and you take that money and buy the helicopter. Then, if you do that and you get that first buy in there, then Op 05 is going to be committed in the out-years to keep on. He isn't going to like that, but how's he going to argue with it? And how can he argue with it in OSD; how can he argue with it against the Hill?" In the meantime the people in OSD were saying, every banana republic navy in the world has got helicopters on the fantail; how come you guys don't? We'd always mumble something. So anyway, that's what we did. That's how we got the SH-60 to sea. That was one of my programs in this period.

It became apparent that we had to stop building these FFG 7's in order to get the new destroyer, and the principal contribution of the new destroyer should be its land-attack capability—with the Tomahawk missile, but there was no Tomahawk missile. Also we had to have some way to shoot it. The then-current version of the vertical launcher was two feet too short to accommodate the Tomahawk missile. So the first thing we had to do was lengthen the launcher, which was an enormously expensive proposition. It required ship re-design to do. Second, in order to get the Tomahawk in surface ships, we had to get a Tomahawk and we had to overcome the Mark 26 launching lobby, which was the lobby that was going into the first seven Aegis ships. They didn't want the vertical launcher to come along because that jeopardized the Mark 26 launcher.

So we had Tomahawk, which was opposed bitterly by the aviators, because they said we'll do all that with A-6s; we had the launcher, which was opposed by the vertical launcher guys, because it meant changing their launcher and therefore delaying their program a year; and we had the Mark 26 guys, who did not want to have their launcher jeopardized just as it was entering the fleet. That wasn't including all the people who didn't want to do it on the outside.

So we cut a number of deals with DARPA, who essentially invented this digital scene-matching business. We started off with a year's study to determine the requirements for the new destroyer. Rich Fontaine, who would relieve Bob Morris as Op 32, was put in charge of that study. While he was in charge of that study I became the acting Op 32 as a captain.

The study showed that we We knew how to do AAW and ASW modeling—a bunch of missiles come in, you shoot a bunch of missiles at them, and you've got them. We knew how to do ASW engagement. But we had no measures of effectiveness for the Tomahawk. So I devised a series of analyses where we ran an air strike against Petropovlovsk with carrier air, and then we ran that same air strike with carrier air supported by the Tomahawks where the Tomahawks went in and beat down the air defenses before the A-6s went in. We drew a curve that showed the cost of the air strike in terms of aircraft attrition and the procurement of Tomahawks. The cost without Tomahawk was up, because there were so many aircraft attrition; we had all these Soviet capabilities approved by the Director of Naval Intelligence. The costs came way down as you brought the Tomahawks in, and then after a while it started to go back up again if you bought too many Tomahawks, because they'd already killed all the air defenses, so you didn't gain any more cost reduction by reduced aircraft attrition.

We took that analysis to the CNO, Tom Hayward. He said, "I do not support this destroyer." When the CNO tells you that it's got a very chilling effect. In the meantime Op 05 was saying he didn't support Tomahawk. He supported everything except the strike function, which he thought was unnecessary. And besides, Tomahawk had not been service approved for procurement, which violated all of the "fly before buy" rules. And the Aegis guys were saying, you're spending too much money on Tomahawks and not enough on Aegis.

I went over to the Hill to gin up support for the DDGX. I talked to Margaret Chase Smith, talked to her about how we're going to stop the FFG 7's up in Bath; so we're going to have to put something else in there or else Bath is going to be in serious trouble in the years to come. Talked to Senator Stennis and a lot of people. Strong interest came back from the Hill for this new destroyer. OSD didn't want it.

WINKLER: Did you work through OLA?

MUSTIN: Oh, hell, a lot of this stuff was done meeting in parking lots, that kind of stuff.

WINKLER: Okay. Because if I recall Admiral Kilcline was OLA.

MUSTIN: Tom was OLA.

WINKLER: And he was an aviator.

MUSTIN: That's right. CNO had said he didn't support it. It was very carefully handled. Anyway, Congress put enough heat on the OSD so that OSD said, all right, we think you ought to do this. We want you to cancel your Charles Adams improvements, a pretty expensive program, and get on with the finalizing of the design of the DDGX. The big issue was the vertical launcher for the Tomahawk. So we got the Congressional language to say that this ship should be capable of firing Tomahawks.

Then we went back to the CNO, who was pretty unhappy about this turn of events. He knew who the culprits were, which I found out to my distress later. He gave the go ahead, but conditionally.

He said that he needed more F-14s and the F-18. And he could not undertake a shipbuilding program that requires a lot more helicopters." So he told us to get out and figure out why we don't need a helicopter in the Arleigh Burke. If we could, then he'd support it.

So we went out and I did a bunch of analyses which showed that if you made a lot of assumptions about other ships in company with the task force, you had enough LAMPS so all you really needed on the Arleigh Burke was a landing platform so they could hopscotch, and an in-flight refueling capability. So we designed the ship that way, and that's why the first flight came out with no helos on them. Everybody has said ever since then: Hey, why didn't you have a helo on them? The answer was because we couldn't get it through OpNav. And the reason was, the aviation procurement budget was very tight, and the Navy's priorities were for tailhook aircraft.

Jim Doyle and I were really sensitive to this issue, having just gone through the LAMPS flail. And CNO was very sensitive to that, having seen the aircraft procurement money start to go to the LAMPS. The Army buy of the Blackhawk, which we were piggy-backing on, had shrunk and shrunk and shrunk. And every time that happened the unit cost of the birds went up, and the unit cost of our birds went up, because they were at the tail end of the production line.

Anyway, about that time I was sent for by Jim Doyle, in February of '78, I guess. He used to send for you and you'd say, "Well, what does the Admiral want to see me for?" They'd never tell you.

So you'd go in there and he'd have this huge, thick case that you had given him maybe three weeks before. And he'd say, "Now, back here in enclosure 12 you said the following. Why did you say that?" And you couldn't even remember your own name. So he sent for me, and he said, "Listen. I'm going to tell you in advance that you're on the

flag list for selection. But you can't tell anybody until it's released. You can't even tell Lucy. I had put in for, as a captain, Harvard Business School, and I'd been selected. He said, "Congratulations. You're going to be a rear admiral. And forget the Harvard Business School."

I went back to my office. Jim was in the E-ring at the Pentagon, and I was four rings away. I walked back to my office. My secretary was out in the corridor to meet me. There was snow out on the window ledges at the Pentagon. And they had all these champagne bottles out there. The word was all over the building who had been on the list. I came walking back and everyone in the office was in there and they were popping all these champagne corks. I said, "What's the party for?"

They said, "You were selected."

I said, "No, the list isn't out yet." Some secret. So that was quite a day. Jim Doyle's doing; he knew how to do that.

I formed a respect for Jim Doyle at that time, and a personal relationship that exists to this day. I just think he's great. He's the unsung hero of the surface Navy. His was the "execute" part, the hard part. There was never any shortage of ideas. There's always a lot of shortage of money.

(End of Side A, Tape II)

WINKLER: In the Carter administration there was the challenge of the budget, but you were able to get a wad of programs started. There's a perception out there that the Navy was stymied during this period. During the late part of the Carter period with Afghanistan and that situation, I think the funds were starting to make their way s towards the Defense Department that allowed these programs to get going, and it just picked up under Reagan.

MUSTIN: I don't think that they really started until Reagan got there. The principal stumbling block was in OSD, not on the Hill. Congress wanted to fund more defense; OSD did not. And OSD was of the view that the Navy was sort of irrelevant to the NATO strategy, for the reasons that we've discussed. So while we were looking into making these new capabilities, we were developing arguments for why the Navy was relevant.

The Tomahawk was the key that unlocked that, because that gave the surface Navy for the first time the ability to influence events ashore, beyond the range of the 5-inch gun. That meant that in the battle for Europe you could now hold at risk the Kola Peninsula with other carrier air. From the eastern Med you could hold at risk targets in Russia, that you could not do before unless you put the carriers way, way up in the Adriatic.. So all of a sudden the Tomahawk unlocked a lot of doors in OSD.

But at the same time the arms control talks were going on. The Soviets recognized this just as clearly as we did. We had an aviator CNO in Admiral Holloway. And so in

the protocol to SALT I a restriction was put on the Tomahawk: Number one, you could develop it but you couldn't deploy it; and you couldn't have a range greater than six hundred miles in it. It was not even in the SALT treaty; it was in the protocol.

The nuclear guys, faced with the prospect, which I later ran into when I was Op 06, of START—which would take the intermediate-range weapons out of Europe—looked at the Tomahawk as a way to offset that pending loss. Because even though you took the ground-launched cruise missiles out of Europe, you could replace them with sea-launched cruise missiles. Then the ABM treaty was staring to play in this. The so-called nuclear-free zone that the Soviets kept coming up with started to play.

Despite all that we pressed on, in the surface Navy, for the development of a conventional capability. At first it was called TLAM—N, Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile—Nuclear. We said we want a TLAM—C, Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile—Conventional. That was an expensive statement of requirements, developed by Jim Doyle and me. Because, with a nuclear weapon, if you just put it within a couple of blocks of the target, the target's in serious trouble. But with a conventional weapon, you've got to fly it through the goal posts in the field, as we used to say. So the accuracy comes way down, measured in feet instead of hundreds of yards, and the size of the warhead—all of those things get folded in. It's much more expensive and difficult to make a conventional cruise missile than it is a nuclear one.

We were going to get no help from anybody in funding that. All of the analyses that were coming out of OSD were battles in the central front, where we were doing this initial nuclear escalation. But we persisted, saying that the NATO strategy requires an initial conventional defense; now we will have a surface Navy that is able to play in that initial conventional defense, in that it will add firepower and at the same time save money because if properly deployed it will reduce aircraft attrition.

WINKLER: During this time period, Admiral Zumwalt was concerned about this battle for the Atlantic because of the onrush of Soviet submarines, keeping the sea lanes open. In the late '70s the Soviet submarine force kind of retracts, and because of the range of their ballistic missiles they could hit you from Murmansk now; they kind of develop a bastion strategy and actually retract from their forward positions in the Atlantic. What was the assessment to this? And a lot of the Soviet capability is determined to be, instead of anti-surface, is actually ASW capability. The new carrier coming on line is really an ASW carrier. How was the Soviet threat being reassessed?

MUSTIN: That particular reassessment and the bastion theory really came into play after Bud Zumwalt on the watch of Jim Watkins and John Lehman, with the development of the Maritime Strategy—'79, '80, '81. What the bastion strategy meant was that, just as we were saying we wanted to move more of our strategic nuclear response capability to sea, so were the Soviets saying that. In order to protect their bastions, instead of sending their SSN force out into the Atlantic to attack our convoys, they were going to retract their SSNs up into the North Cape area and the Kola area to protect their boomers, just as

you said. And they would attack our convoys with long-range Soviet naval aviation—the Badgers and the Bears and the Backfires. They had aircraft that could fly all the way down to Cuba from the North Cape.

What this meant to us, all of a sudden, in the surface Navy was that, whereas before we had looked at protecting the sea lanes as a predominantly ASW problem—which the submariners loved, because that meant more submarines—now we looked at it as an AAW problem. That meant that you de-emphasized ASW, because now their submarine force is all going to be way up north. We've got to pick convoy routes that go down south, and we've got to be prepared to defend against regimental-size raids of Soviet aircraft that could fly down and attack our convoys. That was one of principal arguments for the Aegis system that we were going to put in the DDGX. The FFG 7 had no, essentially, air defense system. It had an SM-1, open-ocean capable.

So there was an enormous shift in threat assessment in the surface Navy that we started in conjunction with the bastion theory. Which meant that we really butted heads with the submariners. Our logic, which was later confirmed by the bastion theory, was even if they send their submarines out into the Atlantic, when you looked at the numbers of submarines they could send, you found that the only way they could saturate your defenses was with large numbers of aircraft firing large numbers of missiles at you. So we figured that we could handle the ASW threat with the towed arrays and the things that we had bought, but we could not handle the saturation air raid threat that now was brought into place with the advent of Soviet naval aviation and their long-range capabilities, and the AS-4 and their long range missions. You know, they had 200-mile air-to-ground missiles. We had no way to deal with that 200-mile missile, even with carrier air.

This brought into sharp focus the need for Aegis, in the NATO context. Luckily, we had seen these kinds of issues coming in that '73 war. And the Aegis ships were just starting to trickle in to the arena. When I was ComSecondFlt we only had two Aegis ships in the Atlantic Fleet. That was 1984. That's how long it took to get it to sea.

WINKLER: One of the things when I interviewed Admiral Doyle which he pushed for was the training for Aegis and that. He was nuclear-trained under Rickover, so he kind of insisted that be part of the package. Was that an issue that you were working on?

MUSTIN: Yes. When I was selected for admiral he said that he would like me to stay on as one of his division directors, to be Op 35, who was then the guy in charge of all the surface Navy weapons. One of the things we all wanted to do was to be able to keep Aegis modernized, incrementally. So we wanted engineering models ashore. We had Aegis in a cornfield in Moorestown. So we wanted an engineering development station, for the development of Aegis. Essentially we wanted it to get smaller and smaller, without giving any capability away, so that we could get it into the Arleigh Burkes.

The phased-array radar was really new. The whole idea of the engagement algorithms, and the fact that you don't look at raw video—everything you looked at is generated—showed that you needed a whole new regimen, not only of engineering development, but at the same time of training. But we didn't have enough ships to train the people to man the fleet it was coming in. So these engineering development models had to have, as a Siamese twin, classrooms and the ability to train crews and sailors on the Aegis weapon system. That's easy to say; that's hard to do. It's expensive as hell. When you start putting a lot of money into the shore establishment at the time the fleet's coming down and funds are really squeezed you always get a lot of political heat. But to his credit he insisted on that, and got it. Years later, after Jim had left, John Lehman had one of his big crusades, wrongly, was to break up the Yankees with Aegis because so much of the money was going into the Aegis system. We'd keep telling him it's the best-maintained system we have. He didn't want to listen to that. He wanted to spend the money on other things. But yeah, Jim Doyle got all that. And he did this through sheer force of personality and logic.

I remember Walt Locke was the Tomahawk guy—the original Tomahawk project, before it became a joint program. He was a rear admiral. The only people who were looking at the Tomahawk were the submariners. They were looking at it as an anti-ship weapon. We knew that there was no way in hell you were ever going to be able to target a ship 600 miles away, because we couldn't target the Harpoon. You fire this thing out there and no matter what you do with the seeker, at some point you're going to turn it on, and whatever it sees it's going to attack first. So they had a whole scheme of targeting systems they called "outlaw shark." We were saying the anti-ship version of the Tomahawk should be a third priority. The first priority should be the TLAM—C, conventional version of Tomahawk. Submariners didn't really like that, because the warhead of the TLAM—C was a 1000-pound bomb. And in order to really contribute to anything you had to carry a lot of them. They didn't have the real estate in the submarines to carry enough TLAM—Cs to make any difference in a conventional scenario. Which is one of the reasons why they're pushing to get these Tridents reconfigured. So, as I said before, there was no support from any of the other unions for the Tomahawk, but we persevered.

It got to the stage, as a matter of fact, where the PR campaign that we had mounted was so successful that later, when I was Op-06, one day I went to Bill Crowe, who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and I said, "You know, we've got to be really careful here, because if we're not careful President Reagan is going to tell us to shoot one of these Tomahawks at Iran, and we don't have any damn idea whether it will work." We had this picture of the thing going into a blockhouse, a famous picture. Reagan thought that was great. I took it over and showed it to him. He thought that was gangbusters. And I had the whole spiel about no aircraft attrition, no POWs, no.... "Wow." I went back and thought we may have been a little premature. It turned out we weren't. The first time we used the thing it was, while not as successful as originally reported, it was still pretty successful—at least half, 50 per cent.

One day Walt Locke, was working on this submarine scheme. I had been telling him: We've got to get this TLAM—C warhead and seeker incorporated into your program. That we're prepared to fund it but you're going to have to change your program at NavAir to do it. It was a NavAir program, they didn't like it anyway, and he didn't want to do it. So I went to see Admiral Doyle, and I said, "Walt Locke isn't going to do it."

He said, "Tell him to come over here; I want to see him." Walt and I walked in to see Jim Doyle. Jim Doyle said, "Walt, maybe once if you're lucky, in your Naval career, you come across a capability that's going to be a change in naval warfare on the order of sail to steam." He said, "In my view, Tomahawk is that change during our lifetimes. What we have to do is stop this complaining and get on with it. We've got to have the launcher to support it, we've got to have the targeting, and we've got to have the seeker and warheads to do the job. Because," he said, "we now have about half of the number of aircraft carriers that we all say we need to perform the Navy's function in a NATO war, and we're not going to get any more. So if the Navy is going to stay relevant it has to have a capability like the Tomahawk, and fortuitously the technology is such that that capability is now at hand. So you are the Naval officer who will be able to bring that to bear." Walt Locke almost stood up and cheered. He walked out of there and he was a convert. It was one of the most compelling senior officer man-to-man discussions that I've ever been in. Walt was turned around like that. We gave him the money, and he marched off.

WINKLER: That's a good anecdote, as far as portraying a vision.

MUSTIN: Yeah. Jim had the vision. He had set up the command structure, the composite warfare commander it was called. Now that you've got all these new systems how do you operate them at sea, and who's in charge? Nobody had tried that; he did that when he was ComThirdFlt. I did a lot of work on that when I was ComSecondFlt, to integrate that into the amphibious operation. And also to incorporate multiple Aegis ships, which we didn't have until then. But Jim was able to motivate people to do that. And at the same time to handle the serious assaults. His programs were looked at as a cash cow, to fund all these submarine and aircraft improvements that were also terribly squeezed for money. He was able to beat off those assaults, without any four-star help. It was an amazing performance in a very difficult time. The Carter people just didn't want to spend any money on the military, not just the Navy, but the military.

WINKLER: Your thought on the FFG 7?

MUSTIN: I was influenced on my thoughts on the FFG 7 in two ways. I viewed it as a single-purpose ship. Which meant that, unless you were going to escort convoys for a living, you couldn't use the ship. And I was just inherently dead set against single-screw ships. I did not like them then, and I don't like them now, kind of like green eggs and ham. I just don't like them. Too many things can go wrong to a ship, so that two screws is more than twice as good as one.

In any case, the Oliver Hazard Perry was designed by Bud Zumwalt to increase the number of ships. None of the aviators opposed it, because it was cheap and it threatened none of their turf. The submariners didn't oppose it, because they didn't want to get in the convoy escort business anyway. The ship was deliberately designed so that it couldn't keep up with the carriers, and it didn't have any air defense capability to offer to the carriers. The FFG-7 was one of the very few Zumwalt ideas I did not agree with.

Now you say all that. We started to build FFG 7s in numbers since we didn't have enough cruisers and destroyers. I pointed this out when we started the Arleigh Burke, in that force structure study that I did for Jim Doyle. The FFG 7 was incapable of providing wartime capability to the carrier battle groups. But because we didn't have enough destroyers, when we deployed people in peacetime the FFG 7 class ships would deploy with the carriers. So what I pointed out in my intro to the force structure rationale for the Arleigh Burke was, okay, we have to run nine convoys continually back and forth to Europe. They start from Norfolk. When the tensions start, if they start in the next four or five years, half of the destroyer force in the Mediterranean is FFG 7s. In order to comply with our force structure rationale, half of the destroyer force in the Mediterranean would have to leave the theater just when the war starts, in order to come back to Norfolk to escort their convoys. If you think that anybody is going to be naïve enough to send half of his force home just when he's crying to double it, you don't understand the interplay of forces. So the whole rationale for the FFG 7 assumed a Navy that we now see we do not ever intend to construct. We're not going to have enough destroyers. In order to make the NATO force rationale work, we need to have more destroyers that can operate with the battle group and bring capability, so that we don't have to deploy those FFG 7s in lieu of destroyers. Now that was a pretty sophisticated argument.

Then I threw in the fact that, of all the NATO allies, we were the only ones who had the money and the technology to build the Aegis ships, and all the Brits and all the Italians and all those allies were starting to build frigates. The requirement for battle group forces in time of war, by our own definition, could not be met by the FFG 7 class or any of the alliance frigates. If you look at the mission of those ships you'll see that it rules out battle group operations, and says that they are explicitly for escorting convoys, amphibs, and URGs.

So that was the idea. I made the argument as ludicrous as I could. "Can you imagine ComSixthFlt sending half of the fleet home? Just at the time the Soviets are putting a hundred ship into the Mediterranean?" Ridiculous.

That was my view of it. And that was Jim Doyle's view of it. We departed from Bud Zumwalt in that region because we had come to the conclusion that, if you have to choose between quality and quantity, always go for quality. Because if you elect for quantity, you'll never get the quantity that you elected for. We'd been burned when we cut the Navy in half and didn't get the money to rebuild. We've built these FFG 7s with these assumptions that we'd have all these Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and we got half of what we wanted. It just didn't work out. So the high-low mix force rationale was based on assumptions that required a larger force structure than you ever were going to achieve

in any practicality. We saw this clearly as the budget doors swung shut with the Carter administration. So we said we're going for quality. That insight was one of the principal changes from the Zumwalt era to the Doyle era.

But luckily the weapons systems that Bud had envisioned and that Worth had envisioned fit right into the new concept. Because we did need the Aegis system, although originally we thought we needed it for protection of the sea lanes against Backfire raids down in the south Atlantic, we also needed it to protect the carrier from the Backfire raids in the eastern Med.

So anyway, that was a big departure, and a fortunate one for the Navy. We would not have the Arleigh Burke class if Jim hadn't taken an admiral, Rich Fontaine, and given him a year off to go do this study. And he had the best guys in the Navy working on this study. Pete Roane, who became an admiral; Wayne Meyer was deeply involved; I was deeply involved; Ron Tucker, who became an admiral, was deeply involved; Ted Parker, who became a vice admiral, was deeply involved. It was the first string of the surface Navy working on this study, the requirements for the DDGX. I have a copy of it someplace. It was an amazing thing.

WINKLER: Okay. That's a good place to close for tonight.

6 March 2001

WINKLER: Today is March 6, 2001. This is Dave Winkler, of the Naval Historical Foundation, with Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin. We are picking up our interview with your ComGruDesGru Two tour. Was there anything from that tour in OpNav, from March of '76 to January of '80? We covered quite a bit last time. Was there anything else you needed to add?

MUSTIN: I learned in that tour in OpNav, particularly as Op 35, the tremendous potential of the whole new family of weapons systems that were on the verge of entering the surface Navy. They included the Tomahawk missile and the Harpoon, guided projectiles, electronic warfare systems such as the SLQ-32, and towed arrays for ASW. All these things were poised to enter the fleet.

But the fleet is not an experimental unit. Because the fleet has to maintain proficiency with the weapons that it has, and not play imaginary games with death rays from outer space and things like that. So while we were on the verge of providing this hardware, which in my view would change the nature of surface warfare forever, we were not doing anything in the fleet to develop the new tactics to use these weapons. So I determined when I got my orders, thanks to Jim Doyle, to be a CruDes Group commander, that I would focus very heavily on the tactical development, and the things that you could do as these new weapons were introduced.

At the same time, I could see that there was an enormous infrastructure built up to deal with the engineering status of the fleet. The PEB, that I think I told you I had been responsible for initially, had grown into an enormous bureaucracy, but there was no counterpart in the area of weapons or weapons development. So there was no clearinghouse for any of these tactics, the maintenance procedures were not established, and so we were really starting off from ground zero. The organization of the type commanders' staffs, the capabilities and the imagination and the knowledge of the people in the staff structure had to be developed from the bottom up, because all these weapons were being introduced from the top down.

So when I went to Group Two I had these thoughts in mind.

WINKLER: Okay. Now you'd just made flag; you asked for the orders for ComCruDesGru and you got them. First of all, as a flag officer, I understand that CNO's the detailer?

MUSTIN: Yes. In the case of surface flags, Jim Doyle was ninety-eight per cent of the surface detailer. You could go nowhere if he said "No." And if he said he wanted you to go somewhere, the chances were ninety-eight per cent that you were going to go, particularly if it was to a surface billet. Now, if he was going to order you to be somebody's chief of staff who was an aviator, that was a different story. But for the surface navy, he developed the command screening process and brought his considerable talents to bear on all these issues in a way that nobody before or since ever did in that job. He just was towering.

WINKLER: He had the job for what, five years?

MUSTIN: Yes. And as I said, one of the principal reasons, unstated, for the reorganization of OpNav was to break up the Yankees. He was just too powerful, as seen through the eyes of his competitors, namely the submariners and the aviators.

WINKLER: Talk about ComCruDesGru Two. I assume you were based out of Norfolk?

MUSTIN: We were in Charleston.

WINKLER: Charleston?

MUSTIN: Yes. Which is a very supportive town for the Navy. The Navy made a great mistake ever getting out of there, because you ought to go places where the people like you. For example, one of my first days there the flag lieutenant came in and said, that Senator Thurmond was in the outer office. I was brand new. I wasn't really checked out on how this "admiral" stuff works. It I'd been there a couple of days and toured the facilities. In came Senator Thurmond and made a very gracious speech welcoming me and Lucy to Charleston. He asked if he could do anything for me. I made the mistake of

saying, “Well, there is one thing you can do, Senator. We’re in dire straits for a pier down here and we’re having a little trouble getting the funding.”

He said, “Oh, is that right?”

I said, “Yes. I’ll show you where it is.” So we went out to the proposed pier site. He gave me his crab cake recipe, which Lucy still uses. Every time I see him I tell him I have his crab cake recipe.

Anyway, he left and I went back to work. Then in about a week I get a call from the vice chief, saying, “What the hell are you doing down there? We have a MilCon budget and we’ve submitted that, and the President has approved it. Now you’re constructing an alternative budget for the Navy?” and a few strong words along those lines. Anyhow we got the pier.

At the time there were several admirals down there. There was a Sub Group commander; the commander of the Mine Warfare Command was there; a CruDes Group commander; and a Naval District commander, who later became the Naval Base commander when the districts were reorganized. We all lived on a very, very lovely antebellum base, with huge live oak trees. We all got along very well.

There were no aviation flags there was because of the depth of the river. You just couldn’t get ships that were much larger than destroyer tenders or sub tenders up the river. That was one of the principal reasons for the base going when it went. Because the kinds of ships that could be operational from that base were very limited.

The river also had an enormous range of tide and current. In the ship handling manuals at the time they had a bunch of case studies in the back of the books, and at least half of them had to do with people trying to do things in the Cooper River at max ebb, when the current runs eight knots or so—a tremendous tide.

I arrived down there, and immediately went off on a fleet exercise in the Caribbean. The exercise had been fully planned by my predecessor, Gordon Nagler, who had been ordered to OpNav and been promoted. So I went down; it gave me a good chance to see the staff in operation. The staff was terrific. From that little staff, Al Gomez made admiral, Doug Katz made admiral, Jim Amerault made admiral. Of the four Destroyer Squadron commanders, John Nyquist and Dick Donnelly made admiral. A really outstanding group of people. We had the potential for an interesting and creative environment, to have all these great people involved.

Anyway, I could see that the tactics and the procedures that were involved in this FleetEx that had already been laid on were essentially no change from those that I had seen in the Lawrence or at DesRon Twelve. So I determined that the next fleet exercise, which was a quarter away, was going to be very different, and we were going to set up a training program to get ready to try to develop the tactics to bring in all this new hardware.

I've always been a big bug on ship handling, as I mentioned in the DesRon Twelve section. And I was somewhat dismayed to see that none of the skippers ever handled the ships alongside the piers, which meant that none of the junior officers ever handled the ships alongside the piers. They just turned the con over to a pilot. There was a regulation—a NavBase, a Naval District regulation—that said you had to have the pilot when you came up the river. But there was no regulation that said you had to have one to tie the ship up. That had been sort of instituted over time by the pilots' association union. So I got all these skippers together. I said, "This is a bummer. Your junior officers are not learning any ship handling. They've got to learn how to tie ships up without relying on pilots. So I want this stopped." And went through my DesRon 12 speech to the effect that if I see pilots handling your ships to the degree that I think is excessive, you're going to get an unsat in seamanship. I wrote this in a directive which I promulgated to them. The pilots association grumbled a little, but I brushed them off. After a few arguments from the ship's C.O.s like we've got expensive sonar domes and all that stuff, I just said, "You've got to train these young officers, so go ahead and bang your domes up or anything like that alongside the pier, just say that you're doing what I told you to do, and I'll take it from there."

We set up navigation and ship handling competitions, and they got to be really fierce. Toward the end of my tour these C.O.s were asking me to please come down in the barge and meet them at the mouth of the river and ride their ships up, so I could observe them and see how they were doing. It was great, and they all loved it. The JOs loved it.

At the same time I figured out that I wanted to meet all these officers and COs in other than crisis situations. So I set up a series of meetings that we would have at the O-club once a month. We'd go have lunch and have a couple of beers, and talk things over. The people who attended the monthly luncheons, the captain and the senior watch officer and the bull ensign of each ship, were pretty carefully selected by me to get the kind of cross section that I wanted. At one of the first meetings, one of the senior watch officers complained that he had so much paperwork he wouldn't get out and check out his gear. I said, "Then don't do the paperwork. Nobody reads half of it anyway."

And then I told them the famous story about the commissioning of the Lawrence, which was a true story. Stan Counts, who was the commissioning exec later became an admiral. He was a guy with a large set of cojones. When we were getting ready to go in commission, he got us all together and he said, "For the first month that we are in commission, we will submit no reports. The second month we will submit only those reports for which we were jiggered the first time." We all thought that was a pretty great thing to say and do, and we did that. For the first year and a half when the Lawrence was steaming around, we were submitting about twenty per cent of the paperwork that the rest of the cruiser-destroyer force was involved in. Sadly, when we had our first admin inspection that all ceased. The paperwork is largely a creation of a bunch of bureaucrats. After I told this lieutenant that, he thought that was great, and I got a standing ovation. But this shook up the poor XOs. I got a visit from a bunch of the execs, they said: "What

are you trying to do to us? We're trying to run the ships the way the Navy says we have to." I said I hadn't intended to mess them up, but that I wanted all hands to understand where my priorities lay.

Along the way, I also determined that the operating budget was such that we were not going to get enough time underway to get ready for these fleet exercises and programs. So I wanted to expand the boatswain mate Olympics and the damage control Olympics and in-port training regimen that we had developed in Athens. I got all these COs and bull ensigns and senior watch officers together one day and said I wanted to do this. And we wanted to call it "surface warfare training week," which was SWT week, and that was immediately called "sweat week." But now we had a lot more to work with. We had NTDS ships, we had cruisers, and so I wanted to really get at some of this stuff. I figured out once again that eighty per cent of the things you do at sea are procedural, and you can work on those procedures alongside the pier, including gunfire support and most engineering drills. We really instituted that on a much broader scale. We still did the boatswain's mate Olympics and the damage control Olympics, but this time now we started to use NTDS to do AAW problems, and we would do some pretty good training in AAW. I found that there was no real way to simulate, in port, ASW. You had to hand out a little slip of paper that said you've got a submarine out there. But there was a fairly extensive, although rudimentary, AAW training modality.

So I got all the warrant officers and the EMOs together one day and brought them up to the office. I said, "Okay, we're going to start doing this stuff now in port, and I want to have NTDS be a great portion of it. Because there's a lot of new tactics here that are going to be brought in with the Aegis and I want to start working on procedures, and I need the inputs from the people at the level who really understand the gear. I told them how when I was a lieutenant, just as I was one of the guys who developed the original NWP-32, because I knew what the missile systems were. Now I need today's lieutenants to do that, for our new tactics.

Well, we lined up all these ships and tried this the first time, and nobody could get NTDS to link. So I had another meeting. A warrant electrician off of one of the cruisers stood up and he said, "You're not going to be able to do NTDS in port, Admiral."

I said, "Why not?"

He said, "The ships are too close."

So I said, "How far apart do they have to be?"

There was a long silence. He said, "I don't know. But I'll tell you they're too close if they are just across the pier."

I said, "Well, I'll tell you how far apart they have to be. They have to be eight microns, because that's how much distance it takes to form an output wave at the frequency that your NTDS operates at. And the distance across the pier is well in excess

of eight microns. So don't be telling me things when you don't know what you're talking about. Get out of here and go figure out how to do what I told you to do." The guy did, and the next week everybody was linked up. Incidentally, we became very close friends after that and he volunteered for duty on my staff.

So we started to really work on tactics. And the captains of the ships were terrific. A lot of them became admirals. One of them became the chief of the Naval Reserve. He had one of these little tiny reserve DEs. One day I went down to observe the SWT week in-port exercises.

WINKLER: Which chief of Naval Reserve?

MUSTIN: Well, we had reserve ships in the group at the time. It was Frank Harkness.

It was the middle of the summer. It was hotter than hell, and I'd insisted that everybody wear battle dress. I went down, and here's Frank Harkness in his DE, with his little tiny CIC with a bunch of status boards and guys writing backwards in grease pencil, and maybe two radar repeaters. He was a commander at the time. He said, "Admiral, I have a suggestion for you."

I said, "What's that?"

He said, "I think that I have spent about as much time as I ought to training this crew of mine how to shoot down an incoming AS-4 missile with a 5-inch/38 without any 3-D radar. If you concur, we'll stop working on that part of the drill." He was saying this with a straight face.

I said, "I've got the picture, Frank. I think you're right."

He said, "So what I'd like to do is go off and see if I can figure out a way to really get my ship and myself trained in the things that we're liable to do, which is towed-array operations." So in a very diplomatic way, he was saying: You're way off base with what you're telling us to do. And I could see instantly that he was absolutely right. So we changed his stuff on the spot. I could also see that Frank was going to be an admiral some day, because he knew how to approach a very determined, aggressive admiral in a very nice way, and get him to change course 180 degrees.

Anyway, as a result the ships started to really improve tactically, and I was able to focus more and more on the tactics, because the innovations of the PEB had now brought the engineering readiness of these ships up to a status where we didn't have to worry so much about whether they could get underway, but rather what they would do after they got underway. So I started to work on the Tomahawk tactics and the AAW tactics as my highest priority.

I was more and more aware about how much resistance there was to the Tomahawk in surface ships. The CNO was resistant. He thought it was an unnecessary

drain on naval aviation. Admiral Holloway, whom I dearly love, had referred to the Tomahawk as a silver bullet that we just didn't need, in Congressional testimony. This is not conducive to high morale if you are a Tomahawk advocate.

Anyway, I went out to work on Tomahawk tactics, which involved a lot of pretending. The trick was to work on maintaining proficiency with the things that we had, but at the same time incorporating into each exercise some of this "Let's pretend we have Tomahawk" stuff, so we can see what we're doing.

The first time we did this, I had a carrier down in the Caribbean working, and we were going to go down and join them for a FleetEx. I arranged with the CarGroup commander that on the way down we would conduct a force opposition drill. The carrier would come out and try to sink my flagship, and we would try to locate and sink the carrier. Everybody said: Great; great exercise.

So we went out in Bill Peerenboom's ship, and took five ships to go down for this. We went down in electronic silence and along the coast. The carrier couldn't find us. In the meantime we had sent a couple of submarines down, and they located the carrier. So they were keeping us informed of the carrier's position and we were still in silence. The carrier air wing was searching all over the Atlantic Ocean and couldn't find us, because we had very carefully gone in one of these merchant routes. When we reached Tomahawk range we fired not only on the submarine-reported position, but on electronic signals that we received from the carrier at long-range. We fired what we called six Tomahawks; then we rolled the dice and said: Okay, two of them hit. Then we found out what the carrier had been doing at that time, and it turned out that they'd had a bunch of airplanes on deck, and things like that.

When we got down there I went over and saw the admiral on the carrier, and I said, "Hey, here's the way the exercise worked out, as I see it. We fired these simulated missiles, and rolled the dice. Here's what we had for your position."

He checked it, and said, "Hey, you had us."

So I wrote up a personal message to ComSecondFlt, Tom Bigley, and told him all this. I said, "I think that we're on the verge of something here that's really going to change naval warfare. It shows that surface combatants now will have the capability to engage at long range a vastly superior force." At the time we were worried about the Kiev, the Soviet nuclear-powered cruisers, and the Soviet carriers, which were coming into their inventory. I worded this very carefully. I put in the message that the CarGroup commander concurred with this message, after he'd said that he did, and sent it off to ComSecondFlt. Tom Bigley thought it was great. He was a surface warfare guy.

A few weeks later a couple of officers came down from OpNav. They had heard about this. One of them was in OLA, the Office of Legislative Affairs, liaison with Congress. I told them about the exercise, and they asked me for a copy of this message. I made a mistake and gave it to them. The message ended up on the Hill, in the hands of

Tony Battista, who was running the R&D for, I think the House Armed Services Committee, or Senate Armed Services Committee—one of the authorization committees. He was on the civilian staff. That message came back to really bite me later on, because it really irritated the CNO, who wanted to spend more money on aviation programs than on cruise missiles, and who also was very sensitive to issues of carrier vulnerability.

Anyway, we pressed on with the development of the tactics, with trying to figure out what differences Aegis would make, what differences the towed arrays would make, and how we could raise the overall proficiency of current forces in a time when we saw that the underway opportunities would be less and less and less. Then we deployed.

At the same time I had gone up to see the type commander, Vice Admiral Dave Johnson, several times, when he had meetings of his field commanders. I told him that I thought the maintenance organization ought to be restructured. I said, “Ever since I was chief engineer of a destroyer when I was a jg, my ambition has been to have command of a destroyer tender. I think you ought to take those two destroyer tenders that are in Charleston and Mayport, and put them under the command of the group commander. If you’ll do that, I’ll leave a section of my staff behind when I deploy to the Med, but I’ll be the reporting senior for the tender skippers. I think that will really improve the material status of the combatants.”

He thought that was a great idea, because then they worked directly for him, and he had other fish to fry besides trying to see what the tenders were doing.” So we did that.

Then I went back to Charleston and I said, “Okay. We’re going to have a policy now where no work request will be denied by a tender. When a destroyer or cruiser puts in a work request, the tender is going to accept it and get it done. If you have to farm it out to a local agency or you have to farm it out to the shore establishment, fine. But the tender will take responsibility for the accomplishment of the job. And on the other hand, the destroyer will take the responsibility for not submitting a bunch of stuff that it ought to be able to do, or a bunch of stuff that obviously nobody can do without a shipyard work request.” Everybody said fine. So I said, “All right, to make sure this gets up and running now, when these destroyers have their arrival conference on the tenders, I’m going to attend the conference. I will be there to support the chief engineer of the cruiser or destroyer.”

The first time we go in, there’s a bunch of warrant officers sitting there in the tender. It was just like being the chief engineer again. The engineer put in a job to get something done, and the repair officer said, predictably, “we can’t do that.”

I said, “What do you mean, you can’t do it?”

He said, “We can’t do it.”

I said, “Have you looked at the job?”

He said, “No, Sir.”

“Then how can you say you can’t do it?”

“That’s what my people tell me.”

“Well, I’m telling you that you’re going to do it. And as a matter of fact, I want to know how you’re going to do it before you go on liberty this afternoon, or don’t bother going. And furthermore, didn’t you get my message about accepting these jobs and farming them out if you can’t do it?” That was all it took. One of those confrontations. The job acceptance rate went up to well over ninety-five per cent. There were some they couldn’t do. But they at least gave it a shot. The chief engineers of the ships loved it, because they weren’t going to get all this doubletalk from a bunch of tender sailors who traditionally had knocked off at 1600 and gone on home.

At the same time, I became convinced that the concept of the destroyer tender was over. Because those ships were set up, and their shops were manned, to work on torpedoes and 5-inch/38s, and calibrate voltmeters, and things like that. But they couldn’t do any work on any of the modern systems. They couldn’t work on NTDS, they couldn’t work on phased-array radars, they couldn’t work on 5-inch/54 guns, they wouldn’t work on towed arrays. So it became apparent to me then that the day of the tender, unless you made major changes to the kinds of people that were in them and the kinds of capabilities they had, was over.

That was a lesson that I was able to take back to OpNav with me later, and also into the Second Fleet. Because if the intermediate-maintenance-level function disappears, then there is a major problem in the Navy’s hierarchy of maintenance. Ship-level maintenance is called organizational maintenance; the work that the ships can’t do is done by what’s called an intermediate maintenance activity, which was the tenders; and then the stuff that the tenders can’t do is called depot-level maintenance, which is the shipyards. If you take away that middle rung, then you’ve got to make major changes in the way you do maintenance.

Out of that pile of observations came the organizational changes that resulted in what were called the readiness support groups, where essentially we moved the tender functions ashore, and used the guys in the shore facilities to do what they could, but gave them the contracting authority to be able to contract out the stuff that they couldn’t do. That gave them direct liaison with the vendors, so when something went wrong with a RCA radar, you got hold of RCA and they came and helped you fix it.

So we’d done all that. Deployed over to the Med. Vice Admiral Bill Small was ComSixthFlt, a wonderful guy. He became the vice chief, and my boss when I was the Inspector General.

WINKLER: Yes, I interviewed him about two years ago.

MUSTIN: He's really a wonderful guy. He got all bound up in that Beirut bombing stuff. But at the time he was ComSixthFlt. Of course, I went to pay my call on the Admiral. He said he was interested in how to use some of these new weapons. Well, that's the stuff I'd been working on for a couple of years. So I outlined for him how I thought Tomahawk would play, and how some of the new AAW concepts would play, and how the battle group would use Aegis and some of these new things that he was going to get. He asked me to write him this in a letter, which I did.

Then he said he was going to put me and my staff in the Forrestal as the carrier strike force commander for the Sixth Fleet. Carrier battle force commander. The first surface warfare guy to do this. The aviators did not like this. At the time, the carrier striking force commander, whose job I would be taking, said, "You know, we can't have him alone on the carrier. He's going to really screw things up. How about if I and my staff stay on board to keep an eye on him?" This was all done by messages, with inputs from OpNav and Op 05 and a lot of very interested parties.

Bill Small said, "No, we're not going to do that. You get off there, and let him go on out and run these operations." So I did.

WINKLER: Where did he go?

MUSTIN: He went to Naples and sat there in a building. He had done a lot of things with NTDS that were technically wrong. He had essentially the surface ships sort of steaming around, not in a carrier battle group formation of any kind, but in a sort of an independent operation—stay out of the way and hunt down submarines. But there was nothing to hunt because we didn't know where they were. So it was really a needle in a haystack operation, steaming holes in the ocean.

So I got on this carrier and I determined to my satisfaction, and to Bill Small's, who was an aviator, that there was nothing wrong with having a surface officer in tactical command of an aircraft carrier. As a matter of fact, that changed the whole carrier dynamic. What it did was let the captain of the carrier be the captain of his ship. Because whereas these aviator CarGroup commanders were sitting up there on the flag bridge figuring out what wire these guys were picking up when they were landing and second-guessing the skipper in every respect, I was thinking about how we were going to use these airplanes once they're airborne, and what they're going to do. As part of a task force instead of an independent operators. I think this *modus operandi* had evolved because the CarGroup commanders in the past, when I was an ensign, had four carriers in their groups. Then that came down to two, and then to one. Well, if you've got one admiral and one ship, it's very difficult to call him a group commander, and it's very difficult for the captain of the ship if all he gets is criticisms from a "super captain" about how he's conducting his flight ops and why did reveille go late, and all that stuff. I didn't do that.

So the captain of the carrier and ComSixthFlt gave this experiment a very strong up-check. The captain of the carrier, Skip Armstrong, later became an admiral. And of

course that's the way we do business now, without batting an eye. All of the CruDesGru commanders are assigned to carrier battle groups. But it was a pretty controversial thing then. Admiral Hayward was the CNO. He was watching this very closely. Admiral Hays, who was an aviator, was CinCUSNavEur—Ron Hays, a good friend, was watching this very closely.

Along about the third week or so that I was in this “commander, carrier strike force” hat, on the deployment, we got one of these “Rattle Qaddafi's cage” operations, that took us below the “line of death” in the Gulf of Sidra. The mission was to escort a reconnaissance aircraft—an Air Force aircraft—that took off from Greece and flew an electronic reconnaissance path below that line. The carrier was there to provide air escort for it, because the Libyans had said they were going to shoot the next one down.

I was looking at the rules of engagement that the previous ComCarStrikeFor had laid out for these guys. I went down to the briefings in the ready rooms. The rules of engagement prevented the pilots from doing the mission, because they were there to protect the reconnaissance aircraft, but they could not engage or shoot down a Libyan aircraft until it had actually fired at the aircraft. So it was the old “hostile intent.”

I changed the rules right there. You know, “You're up there escorting this guy and your mission is to protect him. If you think by whatever means that one of these Libyan aircraft intends to take hostile action against the reconnaissance aircraft, you are authorized to shoot that guy down.” I sent this up to CinCUSNavEur and Commander Sixth Fleet and said, “Unless otherwise directed, these are the rules that I'm going to follow. And here's why: The previous rules prohibited the accomplishment of the mission.” The aviator whom I had displaced didn't like that. Both ComSixthFlt and CinCUSNavEur, who were aviators, thought it was gangbusters. They loved it. As we went down and the reconnaissance aircraft, which was an Air Force C-130, went below that “line of death,” up came some Libyan aircraft. Our guys interposed themselves, and the Libyans turned around and went home. Those were pretty tense times.

And then my time on the carrier was over, so I got off and went back on my cruiser flagship, Bill Peerenboom's, and came home to find that I had a relief ordered. I'd been there for a year, year and a half. That was a normal rotation. Except I started getting these rumors that I was going to retire. My friends were calling me up and saying, why are you retiring? I said, I'm not retiring. Well, it turned out that this personal message that had gone over to the Hill, that I had given to some officers on Admiral Hayward's staff.... He, Hayward, determined that I had sent this over to the Hill to get money for Tomahawk, and therefore to drain money off from the aviation budget, and he wasn't going to put up with that kind of disloyalty. So he didn't have a job for me. I didn't know this at the time; I just was hearing these rumors.

About this time Ace Lyons was Commander Second Fleet. He said that he wanted to run a little exercise, carrier versus carrier, when the Forrestal out-chops from the Med. He would run this exercise so that the Eisenhower, the newest of our carriers, and the Forrestal will have a carrier-versus-carrier exercise when the Eisenhower's on her way to

northern Europe. And he would like me to take my staff and fly back over to Rota, get on board the Forrestal as she left the Med, and run the Forrestal air wing. So I said: Great. I flew back over in a C-5 with the staff and we picked up the Forrestal when she left the Med, now out of Sixth Fleet's bailiwick and under CinCLantFlt's bailiwick, and Com Second Fleet, Ace.

I gave my staff the following guidance: "What we're going to do is, operate in total electronic silence." This exercise had to be weapons that you had—you couldn't pretend you had any new stuff. "We're going to take our Harpoon escorts and we're going to peel them off, three of them; send them way up north to the GIUK gap; and then, in electronic silence, just have them drift down with the merchant traffic as it comes down out of the gap into the central Atlantic; and we will see if, through electronic deception: number one, we can remain hidden in the Forrestal from the Ike's aircraft, and number two, if you shooters, by mingling in with the fairly heavy merchant traffic and remaining silent, can get close enough to the Ike to shoot Harpoons at them."

Well, it worked like a champ. The carrier-versus-carrier exercises in the past had just been a bunch of guys revealing their positions, launching strikes at each other, and then saying, "Hah, hah. I bagged you."

WINKLER: A Midway reenactment.

MUSTIN: Yes, exactly. Well, they couldn't find us in the Forrestal.

(End of Side A, Tape I)

WINKLER: Okay, Side B.

MUSTIN: The Ike's aircraft couldn't find us in the Forrestal. We weren't flying. We were just drifting along near the coast. They were looking for us coming out of the Med, and not for this group coming down from the GIUK gap. And they were looking for a battle group, and not a bunch of scattered single contacts that were camouflaged in the pretty heavy traffic. So before they found us, two of our Harpoon shooters got in and launched simulated Harpoons at the carrier, from point-blank range in the middle of the night. It was about three o'clock in the morning and they had the carrier dead to rights. They were something like nine miles away. They could see them. A carrier at nine miles would fill the field of your binoculars.

WINKLER: Sending "Golf, Golf, Golf?"

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. And rolled the dice and said, "Okay, here's how many times we bagged you," and your airplanes were on deck. Well, wrote that report up and sent it off to ComSecondFlt, Ace.

That became a very contentious exercise, because the Ike was brand new and the funding for the new carriers was at issue. This was deemed by senior aviators to be a very

inflammatory exercise, because it highlighted the vulnerability of the carrier to a determined enemy who was going to employ electronic deception and use anti-ship missiles. So Ace delayed and delayed and delayed the exercise report. The drafts would come back and I would keep changing them to say we hit and severely damaged the carrier, and it would have been out of action for x hours. Those remarks kept getting deleted from the final report of the exercise.

And I kept hearing these rumors that were getting stronger by the minute that I was going to retire. It turned out, and I didn't know this, that Dave Johnson, who was SurfLant, and Harry Train, who was CinCLantFlt, were told by the CNO that he didn't have a job for me. When he says that, you're finished. They said, "You've got to have a job for him." Dave Johnson said, "I'll put him on my staff until we can sort this out," and Harry Train said, "That's the way I want to do it." So Admiral Hayward caved in, and I got orders to go be the deputy at ComNavSurfLant. I didn't know any of this. In the meantime I couldn't figure out what was going on—why I was in such bad graces with OPNAV. I had some ideas, but I had been really careful about how I had said these things, and I didn't say anything to the public. This was all internal stuff. So Dave Altwegg came down and relieved me, and I went off and reported to Norfolk as the deputy at ComNavSurfLant.

Just to tie up the loose ends of that story, which is a little out of sequence, I was at SurfLant for about six months, maybe?

WINKLER: That's about it; you have February to September.

MUSTIN: Jim Watkins was announced as the new CNO. I got a call from Ace one day, and he said, "Listen. You're going to get an offer for a job that you won't like. Take it. Just say you'll take it. Because it's going to be a temporary tour in the penalty box."

I said, "Okay."

Within a couple of days I got a call from Chief NavPers, Lando Zech, another really good friend. He said, "Listen. We have a job for you. We'd like you to be the Inspector General. What do you think about that?"

I said, "I'll go wherever the CNO wants me to."

He said, "Well, I knew you'd say that, so that's where we're going to send you." That's how I got to be the IG. Ace had set this up with John Lehman, the SecNav. So I really owe my subsequent time in the Navy to Harry Train, Dave Johnson, and Ace Lyons, because as soon as Admiral Hayward left and Jim Watkins came in, I served a tour as Inspector General, and then went to be ComSecondFlt.

By this time, when I found all this out, which was after I got to be the IG, I had learned a pretty good lesson about flag officer politics, and how quickly the views of the people very senior and remote to you can be changed, and how you can be tried and

convicted in absentia without ever knowing that you committed a crime. I've subsequently talked this over with Admiral Hayward and exchanged correspondence, and we're on great terms. I assured him that I never sent that message over to the hill, and that I would never do anything disloyal to the CNO, and that all of my efforts had been to introduce new weapons. Since my grandfather invented aircraft carriers, I was one of the strongest proponents and had done a lot of work with the Forrestal, and all that stuff. He acknowledged that.

But that's the fine line that you walk. Really, people around very senior people—and you see this not just in the Navy or other Services but in the White House—the rumor mills poison the well for you. You walk a very difficult line, particularly when you're at the front edge of innovation. You find a lot of guys who get ahead to very senior positions by never making any waves and by perpetuating the status quo. That's the easy way, because while you don't make powerful advocates, you don't make powerful enemies either. All it takes is a couple of those powerful enemies when you're in the rarified atmosphere of the flag business, and you're out of there.

Anyway, without knowing any of this, off I went to SurfLant to be the deputy.

WINKLER: While we're on ComCruDesGru Two, what's the composition of a CruDesGru at this time?

MUSTIN: Of course, it varied by home port. In Charleston it was twenty-eight ships: Two cruisers, the remainder destroyers, and a destroyer tender. I think it was something like the twelfth-largest navy in the world; it was a big navy. It's not that big now.

WINKLER: Did they have the high-low squadron system?

MUSTIN: Yes. They did. That had been brought in beforehand before I got there. There were two low squadrons there, and two high squadrons. One of the low squadron commanders and one of the high squadron commanders made admiral; the other two did not.

I was not a fan of that system. My objections were practical. I could see that it was a rather transparent way to get more type commander representation in the various home ports, and that it was also a rather transparent way to get more major command opportunity for the captains in the surface Navy. But having said that, I didn't like it. And we had fought all this out when I was in OpNav.

WINKLER: You might just want to explain the high-low business for a potential scholar reading this.

MUSTIN: The Navy has got two chains of command: an administrative chain, which flows from the Chief of Naval Operations, and an operational chain, which flows from the unified commanders. The administrative chain involved the type commanders—SurfLant in this case—and they were responsible for the training, maintenance, and

overall material status of the surface forces in the Atlantic Fleet. The operational chain flows from the fleet commanders—ComSecondFlt in this case—down through a series of operational commanders who have got Second Fleet task designators. Many of these guys in the past were all double-hatted. The high-low squadron concept was an effort to separate the two chains. What it did, essentially, was give the type commander representatives in each of his home ports, in the form of his low-numbered squadron commanders, and take away from the high-numbered squadron commanders all maintenance and support functions, and have them deal only with the tactical end of the business, which was the purview of the fleet commander and the operational chain. That was the theory. What that meant was, every time the tactical squadron commander took a bunch of ships to sea, which had been provided to him by the maintenance squadron commander, he had a pickup team. He would go out and try to do tactical development and things like that, and then he'd come back in port and go out the next week with a different bunch of ships, and do the same things over and over again. He had no long-term clout or fitness report-type control over these guys.

What I had said was, when I was a squadron commander doing both functions, which was the traditional mode, I could not separate the tactical from the maintenance functions. Because we would go out on an operation and I could see that what the ships would have to do the next time in would be to lay up this boiler, or fix this pump, or align this battery, so that a lot of the maintenance functions became apparent as a result of the operation. So they were Siamese twins; you couldn't separate them.

I thought this was an arbitrary and illogical way to administer the force. You can't deny that from the type commander's perspective, it was great. He got a bunch of hard-charging captains now who were his reps, essentially, in Mayport and Charleston, as well as in Norfolk. They had staffs, and so he was able to exercise much better control from his point of view. But I didn't think it was a good idea, and I didn't like it. I was glad to see that it was repealed a year or so ago.

Anyway, I got up to SurfLant and I decided that while I was there I wanted to reorganize the SurfLant staff to put as much emphasis on weapons and tactical development as was being put on material matters—hull and mechanical and electrical matters. I wanted to have an organization where there was an assistant chief of staff for combat systems, just as there was an assistant chief of staff for engineering. I wanted him to have the same scope of responsibility, and I wanted him to have equal vote into what went into the yard overhaul packages, how much modernization was to be done, where it was to be done, and how to operate these equipments.

There were no standards for NTDS. The tactics had been generated by a bunch of guys who didn't know what they were talking about. For example, the track management scheme that worked with NTDS was a bunch of ancient history. When you were trying to manage the track of an aircraft or a missile, you assigned a number to it. And depending upon the rate that NTDS regenerated that number and the speed of the missile, you were looking at a point in space where the missile was several seconds ago. When a missile is

doing Mach 3 or 4, that's enough to have your missile miss, because it's fired at a point in space where the target is no longer there.

All of this could be addressed to a large degree by managing NTDS differently. In order to do that you had to understand more about NTDS than ninety per cent of the senior people in the surface force did. I'd talk to captains and admirals about this, and their eyes would glaze over. So I said, ah-hah, what we're going to do is we're going to take the CruDesGru Two SWT week, and we're going to make it the SurfLant SWT week. We're going to do it in every home port and we're going to do it once a quarter, and we're going to set it up the same way that we had set this thing up before. It will be run by this new assistant chief of staff.

Well, it took almost three months of my tour, over the strenuous objections of the SurfLant staff, to persuade Admiral Johnson to make this change. But he did. Boy, we got that SWT week going and it turned out to be gangbusters, for reasons that I'll explain later.

NTDS performance started to come up. I would go out to the tactical training schools out at Damneck and I would give my presentation about why I thought they were all off base and didn't know what they were talking about. And I kept going back to this story about this bunch of lieutenants writing all these doctrines when we didn't even know what NTDS was. We formed local equivalents of the PEB, only for weapons purposes, and started conducting institutionalized inspections and assist visits. We established standards for performance, standards for NTDS, basic stuff for fire control.

At one of the first SWT weeks, I went down to the waterfront to sit in on it like I used to do in Charleston. I was interested then on using guns to deal with Soviet PT boats, the Osas and Komars. So, as a part of the exercise we had generated scenarios that involved OSAs and Komars. The order was: "you've got to take it out." At the post-exercise critique the squadron commander said, "We've done that, Admiral Mustin. You'll be delighted to know that we spotted this thing and reacted, and we fired."

I said, "Great. Did you use a rocking ladder?"

The squadron commander said, "What?"

I said, "A rocking ladder. Did you use a rocking ladder?"

"I don't know what you're talking about."

I said, "Okay." The weapons officer of the ship was there. I said, "Did you use a rocking ladder?"

He said, "Well, there isn't any rocking ladder in the Mark 86 fire control system."

I said, "You're kidding, there has to be."

“No,” he said, “there’s none there.”

So I said, “Well, I’ll look into that. But anyway,” I said, “would you use an up ladder or a down ladder?” In an up ladder the first round you fire is short and the second one is long. In a down ladder the first round you fire is long and the second round is short. At long range when you can see the target you try to do it with a down ladder, because if you use an up ladder the first round falls short and then you can’t see the target while the second round lands, because the water fountain obscures your vision. So you use a down ladder.

Anyway, it turned out that, not only was there no rocking ladder in the 86 system, but there was no discussion of fire control doctrine for its anti-PT boat firing. The MK 86 was a new system at the time; it’s not now. So I called up the Bureau of Ordnance and I said, “How come you guys are putting out these damn systems here with no instructions on how to use them?”

This civilian that I got on the line at BuOrd said, “Well, the reason that we didn’t put out any rocking ladder instructions on the 86 system is that the system is so accurate we don’t need it; we shoot to hit.”

So I said, “Okay. I want to understand what you’re telling me before I call your superior and tell him you ought to be fired. We’re shooting now at a target at a range of 13,000 yards that’s doing forty knots. You’re saying that, with a time of flight that is close to a minute you’re going to be able to predict in advance where this maneuvering target is going to be? When it’s going to be roughly 1500 yards from where it was when you fired the round in the first place—almost a mile?”

The guy said, “No, I didn’t mean that at all.”

I said, “Well, what did you mean?”

He said, “Well, I don’t know.”

Anyway, we got the crap from the bureaucrats in BuOrd under control, and went out and fired with the 86 system, and developed a series of anti-PT boat tactics that involved the use of rocking ladders, all which flowed from one little waterfront visit in a SWT week, the kind of thing that you can do in port if you’re really serious about training.

So when I was at SurfLant I reorganized the staff to raise the level of awareness and interest in the business of weapons to at least equal that of the hull, mechanical, and electrical union; and instituted the surface warfare training weeks, SWT weeks. I think they’re still doing that. They were the last time I visited down there.

And I also did some special projects for Harry Train, who was becoming a controversial figure himself at the time, because he had openly championed the notion that there should be a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That was not the position of the new CNO, Jim Watkins, who used to say things like: Jeez, these diesel submariners down in Norfolk—both Harry Train and Dave Johnson were diesel submariners—these guy are out of control down there. So I was doubly damned with, now, this Hayward view of a disloyal guy who goes over and rats on him to the Hill, and this Jim Watkins' brush of being one of the stooges of this gang of diesel submariners.

So with all of that baggage I arrived at the Inspector General's office, which was my next stop.

WINKLER: Okay. One thing—your focus was with the weapon ships. SurfLant at that time also had cognizance over the amphibis and also the service force ships. Did you have any involvement with those?

MUSTIN: Yes, I did. And it was the same set of issues. There was a set of tactics and developments. Although with the amphibious forces and the service forces, the major problems were still in material status. They were generally older ships. They were not being properly maintained. The focus that I had on raising the weapons status of the combatants was enabled by the fact that the PEB had gotten their material status up to a point where we really didn't have to worry about it as much, in the combatants. But the PEB was just expanding itself to the non-1200-pound ships. So the oversight for the material status of the service force ships and the amphibious force ships was essentially that of raising the material status. The SurfLant staff was eminently qualified and able and interested to do that. So they needed less of my time and effort to apply the prod in that area, because they were already up and running.

I was able because of that to put the bulk of my time into trying to reorient the staff to get more time and intellectual capital to the weapons area, because, as I said, I could see this flood of really significant new capabilities about to enter. At this time we still didn't have any Aegis ships. We didn't have any Tomahawk. We had just gotten a few Harpoons, and we had so few that a guy could finish his whole tour in command and never fire an exercise Harpoon shot. So I was trying to prepare the ground for the introduction of all these significant capabilities that still were just sort of trickling in one by one. I figured that the type commander would have an enormous role in that, and his organization ought to be prepared to aid and abet that introduction, and not just in the area of buying the spare parts.

When I was on the SurfLant staff I had made an assistant chief of staff for weapons, Bob Ailes, later became an admiral and became the present-day incarnation of the chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. He was a hell of a guy. He was able to overcome all this inherent staff resistance and opposition, and manage a fairly major cultural reorientation, and did it very skillfully.

WINKLER: During your tours as ComCruDesGru Two and at SurfLant, in the last year of the Carter administration and the first year of the Reagan administration, did you see an influx of dollars to support the maintenance?

MUSTIN: Yes. I did. It was really interesting. I guess I forgot one sea story, which was of interest. When all this stuff was going on about how we have no job for you, and you're going to retire, one day I got this call; they said, "The Secretary of the Navy would like to see you." John Lehman. I didn't know him from Adam.

Of course I said, "I'll be there."

I went in, and he said that there was this arms control operation going on over at Geneva, and he was thinking of nominating me to be the Navy rep to this arms control exercise. What would I think about that?

I said, "Jeez, I don't want to do that." I said, "I'm familiar with what happened with Roy Allison," who was a great guy when I was at CinCPac, an Air Force general. I said, "When you get in this arms control morass you either stay in there till you die, or you get fired for speaking out some heresy against the logic which is being used in the arms control environment itself. And so I just don't want to do that."

He said that he was going to put my name in anyway.

I said, "Yes, sir. Of course I'll go where you send me. But your question to me was, do I want to do it, and the answer is no. I said, I don't have any experience in that. I don't have any interest in that. And I don't want to do it.

He said that he wanted a guy who speaks his mind and all that stuff. But anyway, my name was thrown in the hopper with a bunch of Air Force and Army guys, and the Air Force guy got it because he had been in arms control for twenty years and knew all the esoterica. So that was all lumped in with: I don't have a job for you; you're going to retire.

But back to the Reagan money. As a result, particularly of John Lehman's efforts, the money really started rolling in very quickly, very quickly. But the problem is when you buy stuff, the armed forces are no longer the predominant consumers of electronic goods and other things, so there are significant time delays.

To illustrate, when I was Op 35, the Shah of Iran fell and the Ayatollah took over. The first thing that we were really concerned about was that our own weapons were going to be used against us if we had to go to war against the Iranians. We had sold them a bunch of stuff, F-14s. At my instigation we ran a bunch of tests on the west coast on how to defeat Harpoon if fired at us. It turned out that the only thing that we had at the time to defeat the Harpoon seeker was chaff. Chaff was a little biscuit a little bit larger than a dinner plate. It's a bunch of pieces of reflecting material cut to certain wavelengths to deal with the frequencies of the missile. You fire this out of a little gun with

compressed air, and it goes up and blooms into a cloud, and the missile thinks that that's the ship and it goes for the chaff cloud instead of the ship.

After we ran these tests we determined that we've got to load these ships that are going to the Persian Gulf up with chaffrock, because that's the only thing we've got that can defend them against our own weapons. And we didn't have enough. People that were coming out of the Gulf were turning their chaffrock over at the pier at Subic Bay to the guys going in, and they only had enough for one round or two of firing. So I went up to see Jim Doyle. I said, "Here's the story. We've got to have more chaffrock rounds."

He said, "Well, how much do you need?"

I said, "I need about 13 million dollars worth of these things, and I've found 13 million and I'd like to get them."

He said, "Go get them."

So I called up the guy who was manufacturing chaffrock. It's a small business. I said, "Hey, partner, I've got a check here for 13 million bucks I'd like to mail you for chaff rock. When can we expect the first rounds?"

He said, "In about eighty weeks."

I said, "Come on; we were building destroyers in fifty-two weeks in World War II." I said, "This thing's a little biscuit full of aluminum foil I could make in my garage."

He said, "You don't understand. First I've got to get the aluminum foil. Then I've got to gear up, I've got to buy the equipment, I've got to hire a work force, I've got to comply with OSHA directives. I've got to fill in all the DoD equal opportunity blocks, and I've got to be environmentally safe. I've got to do all that stuff, and in order for me to increase my output to the degree that you've said, it will take me close to two years."

Now, I go into that long story because, when the Reagan money came in it came in fast, but the fruits of that money were delayed significantly because the production capabilities had been allowed to atrophy so badly. The other side of that coin is, when you commit yourselves to these high tech weapons like Harpoon and Tomahawk and the Standard Missile, you can't make them very fast. So you concomitantly commit yourself to large on-hand inventories if you intend to use those weapons in combat in any number, because they can't be replaced. No matter how pure your intentions or how big your checkbook is, they can't be made in real time.

One of the things that has bothered me through my time on active duty and much more now after I've retired is the fact that we have made this decision to rely on precision-guided weapons, but we have never come up with the money to adequately fund the stockpiles. You saw that in Bosnia when the Air Force got down to something

like eighty cruise missiles left in inventory. It will be years before that inventory is replaced.

Anyway, that's a long answer to your short question about the Reagan money.

WINKLER: The second thing is people. At the time there were manpower shortages in the late seventies. There was the story that one CO didn't get his ship underway. The quality of people and dealing with the difficulties—it was Watkins, I guess, who finally came down firmly with a Navy policy for drugs.

MUSTIN: That was Hayward.

WINKLER: Okay, Hayward. That's right.

MUSTIN: Those were terrible problems. Luckily for me, because of the PEB and the gross inadequacies in the 1200-pound plants, which permeated the Navy—you know, we were just introducing the gas turbine ships, the Spruance destroyer, and the FFG 7—the combatants, because of the PEB prod, the personnel shortages and problems and the training had been implemented. Now, personnel and training is a zero-sum game. If you beef up one end of the Navy in order to achieve that, you shortchange another end of the Navy. What happened was, the non-PEB ships, essentially the amphibs and the service force, were shortchanged. That particular skipper that you talked about was an aviator and he was the captain of an oiler, which was one of the kinds of ships that were severely shortchanged, essentially in order to beef up the combatants so that they could meet the standards of the propulsion examining board. That was a terrible problem, and that at the same time re-enlistments were so low that Admiral Hayward properly referred to as the hemorrhage of talent.

The morale was down. Mondale.... I'll remember this till the day I die. The Vice President of the United States referred in public to George Brown, who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown, the guy who had led the raid on Ploesti in World War II, as not fit to be a sewer inspector. General Brown had gone to some seminar at Harvard or someplace and made some comment that the Jews controlled the press in the northeastern United States. Which is true. There's nothing wrong, I think, in saying that. And he said that in an arena where he was told that there'd be no press coverage of his remarks. But anyway, it got out, and Mondale jumped on that in order to get votes for his campaign for the Presidency. So here you have the Vice President of the United States saying that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is not fit to be a sewer inspector. Now, that doesn't make the morale of the United States armed forces particularly high.

It was a very, very bleak time, the Carter administration. Everything that Reagan did, bless his heart, to raise the morale and the prestige and the dignity and honor of military service was right on target and sorely needed. And it's badly needed today. I'm just delighted to see President Bush going the same way. It's the same situation. Had that gang of hillbillies in Levis running around running the White House, refusing to talk to

Barry McCaffrey and things like that. That word gets around. And when the President is a draft-dodger it doesn't help. So most of those personnel problems were a sort of a result of this overall malaise. The pay was low, guys were on food stamps, people were moonlighting trying to feed their families. It was a very, very bad time. Luckily for me, as I said, I was associated mostly with the combatants, who were the beneficiaries of the zero-sum game, but the amphibians and the service force had to be pillaged in order to do that.

WINKLER: Okay. Navy Inspector General. I work for the Navy Inspector General in my reserve billet, so I..

MUSTIN: I created that.

WINKLER: The reserve unit?

MUSTIN: Yes.

WINKLER: Oh, okay. I thank you for my reserve billet.

MUSTIN: I'll tell you how I created that. When I got to the IG job they were a bunch of guys who were essentially—it was like fleet TraGroup or the InSurv, sort of the warrant officer-chief petty officer level. They came around and they looked to see if your watch, quarter, and station bill was up to date, and if you had all your OSHA regs. Jim Watkins sent for me and said that he was not interested in that. He didn't give a damn for all that stuff, He wanted me to go around and make major recommendations on the organization of the Department of the Navy. He didn't want me to feel bound to go back and inspect naval station A just because it had been inspected three years ago and the clock has expired. I want you to really get serious about how the Navy is organized, and what are we doing, and what should we do about making some fundamental changes.

“Yes, sir,” says I. So I went back and looked at this bunch of passed-over commanders, and the sort of dregs that we had in the IG office. Ron Hays was the vice chief, so I went to him and I said, “Here's what the CNO says he wants, and I can't do it with the people that we have. They're just not capable.” I said, “I understand that I can't go get the first string of the Navy to be in the Inspector General's office.” We were up in the medical—on 23rd Street.

He said, “Well, what do you want to do?”

I said, “I want to establish a naval reserve unit, and I want to be the guy who selects the people in that unit, not the RedCom.”

He said, “Okay, go ahead and do that.” So I went out and I got a couple of guys and we sat down and structured this unit. On it we had the senior VP of Westinghouse, we had the dean of management at Stanford University. We had guys on there that were CEOs and CFOs of major corporations, guys that had studied management theory, as

well as operational guys. I went down the list with a couple of trusted agents and picked out the initial bunch of candidates. RedCom didn't like this. He wanted to select all his buddies because the reserves, then as now, were a very highly political organization.

So I went back in and saw Ron Hays and I said, "I have the first series of people to fill these billets that we've structured for this organization."

He said, "Are they any good?"

I said, "Listen. If you and I had applied to make this unit, we couldn't have made the cut."

He looked down there at the background of these guys and said, "Wow."

I said, "Yeah, we're going to have some fun with these guys."

He said, "That's approved."

From the gleam in the eye to the creation of that Naval Inspector General reserve unit, with all the wickets to go through and all the crap about mobilization billets and all that stuff, was sixty-one days. That stands as the all-time world record for the standing up of a naval reserve unit. That's how it was created. And I presume that the talent level is still about the same if you're a member of it.

WINKLER: That's kind of flattering. I think the only problem now is that the selection now is done at ResFor. The RedComs don't do the selection any more.

MUSTIN: Well, they did it then, but not in my unit.

WINKLER: There is tremendous diversity of very talented people in the unit.

MUSTIN: One of our first inspections was of CNET. I took Vern Clark along with me on this inspection. He still tells that sea story. The first sentence of my report said, "The Chief of Naval Education and Training is the chief of neither education nor training," and then went on to show why. We also showed a little graph of the size of his staff in the ten years that he had been in existence. We had this chart that showed over a ten-year period, with no new tasking from the CNO, the size of the staff had tripled, and the tripling was all in the civilian side, not the military side. It turned out that this was a bunch of civil servants that wanted to go down and retire in Florida. They liked Pensacola.

(End of Side B, Tape I)

WINKLER: Today is still March 6. This is Dave Winkler, Naval Historical Foundation, with Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, continuing about the Inspector General. We were down in Pensacola talking about how the CNET staff had grown over a period of ten years.

MUSTIN: They had a program for something called an Ed Spec, an educational specialist. We wrapped up a little review of that with a couple of paragraphs, one of which said that if the Ed Spec program continues at its present level of accomplishment and funding, it should complete some time in the year 2156. This kind of stuff.

I had determined from talking to these reserve officers and others that, instead of just going around with this time clock and inspect, what we ought to do at these major commands was try to time our inspection so that it was within the first thirty days or so of the new person in command. Because it would be of enormous value to him to have this assistance, and he would not be forced to defend his previous practices. So Jim Sagerholm was the admiral who was just coming in at CNET when we did this, and of course the inspection was very, very beneficial for him. It was really serious stuff. We pursued that with Naval Personnel and Chief NavRes, inspected both the surface reserve and the aviation reserve. The surface reserve was unsat, and I gave them an unsat. We inspected the Naval Medical Command and reorganized it; found them unsat.

WINKLER: We're re-doing them in June. I'll pull out your report.

MUSTIN: I was sitting in my office up there on 23rd Street and the Surgeon General came in. He said, "Well, you smart son of a bitch, you'd better never get sick." Then he said, "You've imposed this huge reorganization on us, which we don't need. But I'm here to tell you that, as a part of the reorganization, we're going to need to take back this building that you're in to put more staff in, so you've got to get out of here." So that's how the IG got down to the Navy Yard. We had to move down there because the doctors were really unhappy with us.

There was some really interesting stuff going on with all these things. The fraud, waste, and abuse was high on everybody's hit list, with the \$600 toilet seats. I had to go over to Congress to defend all this stuff. Of course, the \$600 toilet seats were an accounting device, and everybody knew that. They were lumped in with overhead. But I had a little spiel that at the time was accurate. It said, "Look, the Navy is one of the largest corporations in the world. The Navy is now spending somewhere between two and three hundred million dollars a day, which means that, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, somewhere in the world every three seconds, someone is signing a contract for the Navy to spend money. Now, how many of these contracts are you unhappy with?" All the responsible people in Congress understood this, but most of them chose to ignore it because they were running for office and they could get on the evening news and brandish these \$600 toilet seats, and have a lot of fun.

But in order to deal with fraud, waste, and abuse, and to deal with the new Defense Department Inspector General, who had just been created, I determined that what we ought to do was automate the headquarters. We had to have some way of finding out where the fraud, waste, and abuse was occurring. Also to automate our follow-up, whether our recommended actions were being done.

The concern of the Secretary of the Navy, properly—John Lehman—was that unless the Navy IG, the Naval Inspector General, which included the Marines, was significantly stronger, it would be disestablished and absorbed into the OSD IG, which caused a great deal of concern, obviously, on the part of the Navy. Particularly because the Inspectors General of the Army and the Air Force were three-star officers. So he was very concerned that the Navy IG's office get much better very fast. He totally supported this tasking by the CNO to change the focus: Stop checking the watch, quarter, and station bill, and see how the Navy is being managed, and what we can do to change it. So that's what we did.

We set up an automated system, and of course the system proved Willie Sutton's old adage. You know, when he was asked why did he rob banks, he said, "Well, that's where the money is." We started to look at where the money was. We set up a Navy hot line to compete with the OSD hot line. I don't think a lot of people understand what the hot line was then. It may still be the same. Whenever an accusation is made at an O-6 or senior, in any of the Services, the next morning that accusation, with the name of the accused—and these can be anonymous accusations—that accusation was on the desk of the Secretary of Defense. So it was another one of these: You can be tried and convicted in absentia and never even know that you are on trial. By this time I had found out all the chain of events that brought me to my present position in the Inspector General's office knew all about that. In any case I said, the only way that I can see that we can compete with this OSD hot line is to have a Navy hot line and encourage people in the Navy to call us instead of the DOD Inspector General. Well, the DOD IG guys didn't like that, but there wasn't a lot they could do about it because of the way we phrased our proposal. Hot lines are a very controversial subject, but ours was sort of a defensive mechanism, even if it did short circuit the chain of command, I viewed it as the lesser of two evils.

Anyway, we found that the majority of the allegations and the mismanagement of funds was in the Material Command, as you'd expect. So we started to keep book on that, and this involved some fairly serious confrontations with Chief NavMat, Admiral Steve White. Because I was sending these reports directly to the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO, and was putting him on report. He didn't like that. So we had a number of confrontations where I would go over and say, "Here's the facts."

He would say, "Where'd you get all this stuff?"

I would say, "I got it from your people." That solved the problem for me. It didn't solve it for his poor guy.

In a very turbulent period, with the strong support of the Undersecretary in particular, Jim Goodrich, and the Secretary and the CNO and the vice chief, who at first Bill Small, then Ron Hays, and then Jim Busey, we really did reorient the IG's office. And I became the principal advisor to the Secretary and the CNO on, not only Navy organizational matters, but the management structure of the Navy. And I became their principal liaison to the Congress in areas of fraud, waste, and abuse. And we automated

the office and completely changed the modalities of the Navy IG's office, all the time carefully watching the interface with the Marines—who had their own IG, but Naval means Navy and Marine—and the interface with the DOD Inspector General, which was a very tenuous and thorny relationship, because of course they wanted to disestablish all the Services and have their own little empire. I managed to survive all that, do a number of special projects for John Lehman involving hot line allegations of his people. He was obviously happy with how these things turned out, because my next assignment was promotion and assignment to ComSecondFlt.

WINKLER: Let me ask a few follow-ups because of my personal interest in the IG and the history of it. First of all, what was the turnover process to become IG?

MUSTIN: My turnover process was—Ed Carter was the guy I relieved—I had a couple of days and he told me what he was doing, which was essentially the old way of doing business, and then he left. I can't remember whether he became ComOpTevFor or he retired.

WINKLER: I think he might have gone to OpTevFor.

MUSTIN: It was a standard flag officer turnover, meaning it was about three days. It was all done at a very high level. But the turnover that I had with Ed Carter was meaningless, because of the new guidance that I got from the CNO. Jerry Tuttle relieved me, and vastly improved the automation of the office and kept it going on the same plane.

There was some talk at the time about promoting the IG to equal status with the Army and the Air Force, but we were doing such great things at the two-star level that SecNav said, and I agreed with him, that he could use the three-star billet elsewhere. The number of three- and four-star billets is very carefully controlled; it's fifteen per cent of the total flag population. So as the flag population numbers come down, the number of three- and four-star billets comes down. So I opposed promoting the Inspector General, and so did Jerry Tuttle, who relieved me.

This notion that the IG and the Superintendent of the Naval Academy ought to be tombstone jobs, I think is grossly in error. The logic behind it is faulty. The assumption is that both of those guys would be compromised, because of their ambition, to do things that would be detrimental to the position that they hold. I think that's wrong in both cases, and it's an insult to the integrity of the officer who's assigned to those jobs. But that's the rationale. So now the IG, I guess, is a three-star, and he's a tombstone. He agrees to retire by the end of his tour.

WINKLER: It has been the case.

MUSTIN: No, that's the agreement. I've talked to Dave Bennett about that. He was the first guy that had that specific agreement.

WINKLER: Right. And the last fellow just retired from that job, Vice Admiral Gunn.

You talked about these reserves. Once you got them, how did you use them within the organization?

MUSTIN: When we would go to inspect we would call them to active duty, activate them. And they would come down as a member of the team. We couldn't get the whole unit every time, because of course these guys were big wheels. But we could get enough, and then I would augment them not only with members of the reserve unit, but if I were going to go to a LantFlt next-echelon-down activity, I would go to CinCLantFlt and ask for active duty people from his own staff—which, as they saw what was going on they were delighted to provide, because they got a lot of really good dope about what was going on in their major activities. That's how we did it.

Then the two principal assistants, senior management experts, used to stay and help write the reports. The reports were really great. Rod Rempt, the VCNO's aide, who's now the N86, said he used to sit there and hear the vice chief laughing out loud when he'd read these reports, because they were very carefully done, and really left no stone unturned. Very critical of the management of the Navy. The fact that there were 400 separate little data systems in BuPers, was among the nuggets we uncovered.

One of the examples I used, I said, okay, we're going now to inspect Chief NavRes. I have active duty officers and reserve officers accompanying me. The pay systems of those two officers do not interface, so that the reserve who flies on the same airplane with the same ticket has a completely separate structure to handle his funding than does the active guy. Furthermore, if you activated the reserves in time of war, the computer capacity of the active duty could not handle that influx of new people. This is a terrible and gross and inefficient way to manage two fairly large organizations. But nobody had ever sat down and said that in words of one syllable like that before. Those were the kinds of things we were talking about. It was very useful for the Secretary and the CNO to have this information.

And the special projects came in. One of them was the boiler scandal at the Philadelphia Navy Yard with the Saratoga. Saratoga left a multi-million dollar overhaul, went back down to her home port in Mayport, and all the boilers popped. I was on leave and going to Charleston with my wife and children to catch a MAC flight to Bermuda when I got a call at the MAC terminal: Return immediately; the vice chief wants to see you. Naturally, Lucy was unhappy with this. I got back and said to the vice chief, "You know, this is the first time this has happened to me since I was the captain of a destroyer. We had a typhoon coming and I was pulled back from Baguio to Subic Bay. What's going on?"

He said, "Well, the SecNav wants you to go up and find out what happened in Philadelphia with those boilers." Well, it turned out that instructions to the welders in the boiler shop, high pressure boilers, for a new BuShips-supplied welding machine—the

instructions provided by BuShips were wrong. Technically inaccurate, causing the welds to fail. Each of the tubes was welded in place.

So I wrote a report of this, at SecNav's insistence. He wanted it fast. I said, you ought to have some accountability for this. While it's stretching the accountability of the chief of the Bureau of Ships—they didn't call him ComNavSea at that time—to hold him responsible for the performance of somebody in shop 51 in the Navy Yard, he cannot dodge his fundamental responsibility to provide accurate technical guidance and documentation. In this case he did not discharge that fundamental responsibility. That's the reason you had this casualty. The chief of the Bureau of Ships should be censured for this; he's the person responsible. I took this into Jim Goodrich, who was the UnderSecNav, who had been the chairman of the board of Bath Iron Works and understood all this stuff. The chief of the Bureau of Ships was a vice admiral, Earl Fowler, really a lovely guy, a great engineer. He said, "What has Earl's boiler officer said about this?"

I said, "Well, if you want to have a little fun with Earl: They've got this matrix organization over there now in the Bureau of Ships that they're really proud of, and there is no boiler officer." I said, "You call up Earl and tell him that you'd like to see him and his boiler officer in your office Monday morning at eight o'clock, and see what happens." So Jim Goodrich calls up Earl and says he wanted to do that. Monday morning I walked by the UnderSecNav's office and there were thirty-five guys sitting in his outer office, none of them responsible.

Anyway I took this report in. SecNav said he wanted to have a meeting about this. So we go into the SecNav's office. John Lehman sat at the head. Earl, as I said, was a lot older guy and a dedicated engineer. SecNav reads the report and said, "Earl, you got any problem with this?"

He said, "No, I don't."

He said, "Well, I'm not going to censure you, but you are responsible and you've got to clean up your act. You've got to get a boiler officer." Jim Goodrich had told him the story. And he said, "I'm going to make sure that you do that; and if you don't, Darth Vader here," and he pointed to me, "is going to be all over your ass like a wet blanket."

Earl was probably the only person on the planet who didn't know who Darth Vader was. Earl said, "Who?" He said, "Hank?" The SecNav was sort of take aback by this. It was obvious that Earl had no idea who Darth Vader was. Anyway, that was the kind of special project that the SecNav would throw in from time to time on this.

That made that a very educational tour, and a very interesting set of observations, which have come back and helped me after retirement in the corporate world and things like that.

WINKLER: The Chief of Naval Material—Lehman disestablished that. If I recall he didn't see eye to eye with the Chief of Naval Material on some acquisition issues.

MUSTIN: That was not an IG—directly—issue. I had provided a lot of stuff that showed how screwed up the Material Command was in its internal controls. But I believe that that was strictly a personality conflict. Lehman disestablished a couple of organizations based on personality conflicts. The systems analysis group in OpNav—he didn't like their analyses so, bang, they were history. And he didn't like Steve White, so, bang, the Chief of NavMat was history.

What he did there was a great mistake, because he took all of the functions that Chief NavMat had had, and brought them into the secretariat, not into OpNav, where they should have gone—to Op 04. So now you have a guy who is called the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Acquisition, and something else, with a staff of about ten to fifteen people. He is to perform all of the functions formerly provided by the Chief of Naval Material, and he can't do it. So the acquisition process has suffered enormously from that basic decision, which has never been undone, for reasons that are not clear to me because I'm no longer involved.

WINKLER: The IG—who at that time did you work directly for?

MUSTIN: The CNO and the SecNav. Day to day I would go to the SecNav's briefing, every morning. I did not go to the CNO's morning briefing; I went to SecNav's. Normally if I had a matter for either the SecNav or the CNO, I would take it to them via the vice chief and the UnderSecNav. But there was no question in anybody's mind about who was the boss. And those two guys—well, three guys, because there were three vice chiefs, Bill Small, Ron Hays, and Jim Busey, plus Jim Goodrich—all four were wonderful, great guys.

WINKLER: I know, having interviewed Admiral Small, there was a problem with Lehman and the CNOs, and it got to a point where Lehman and Small didn't see eye to eye, because they clashed on the F-18.

MUSTIN: That's correct. Incidentally, that really came back to bite Bill Small when he left to go be CinCUSNavEur. Because that investigation into the Beirut bombing was run by the SecNav.

WINKLER: Right. So how did you work through the personality differences?

MUSTIN: Very carefully. I was aware of all of them, and I was very careful. The leavening factor in that was really Jim Goodrich, who was a magnificent guy and who was sort of adult supervision for John Lehman. Generally when there was something to be done that was a little bit contentious, Jim Goodrich would go smooth things over, to the degree that he could, with the CNO and the vice chief. Yes, there was plenty of acrimony to go around, and I was really careful. So that I never dropped any names. I

never went in and said, “Well, the vice chief says this...” or anything. I was really careful about that.

And I got some really good advice from retired Admiral Bob Long, who ran the Beirut investigation—he was called back to active duty to do that—the Beirut bombing investigation. He pointed out, just as you did, there are terrible personality conflicts here. He said, “You’re going to have to really be careful not to get identified in the minds of any of the players as being a member of the other camp.” He said, “You’d better get a little log and log how much time you spend in office A and office B and office C, and the times better be roughly equal, or somebody’s aide is going to finger you.”

WINKLER: What’s interesting is, you know, my thought is you either worked for the CNO or you worked for the SecNav. It’s kind of like you managed to work....

MUSTIN: Not easy. Jim Goodrich was an enormous help.

WINKLER: Okay. You’ve highlighted BuMed, CNET, were some of your....

MUSTIN: Chief NavPers, Chief NavRes, CinCPacFlt. That was really about it.

WINKLER: How was the CinCPacFlt...?

MUSTIN: Well, CinCPacFlt we probably shouldn’t have done. That was one of the first that we did, and I didn’t have the reserve unit at the time. So even though I had the new guidance from the CNO, I was unable to do it. So we really went out to CinCPacFlt and sort of took the last inspection and went to see how they were doing on that. We didn’t make any sweeping recommendations. I did go out there to see how they were coming with the new policy that said the battle group commanders would be whoever the deploying group commander was, regardless of union. Because CinCPacFlt had dragged his feet so that every time you looked to see who was taking the carrier out, the surface guy was always the next one to deploy. For some reason it would happen that he would slip, and so an aviator would take his place. So I went out to check on that. That caused a little friction out there. But they eventually complied with that policy.

It’s hard now to realize, because it’s so routine, how contentious that was at the time. Can you imagine saying: Okay, we’ll let that guy aboard but we’ll keep our staff here, so you have two admirals and two staffs on one ship?

WINKLER: There was one incident with the Navy Auditing Service. You had found out that they were actually costing more than they were collecting. Then there were some problems with the Naval Investigative Service, which I guess today is the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. What was the one incident with that?

MUSTIN: There was a commander, a PCO for a new construction Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate. The Navy is very careful about who it assigns as PCOs, so there’s a presumption of excellence on the part of these guys, historically valid. The PCO had no

Navy quarters, so—I've been through that route twice—you go up and you find a motel near the shipyard where the ship is building, and you stay in that until the ship is completed, and then you move on and go about your business in your home port. This commander was staying in a motel without his family, because they were in Charleston, where he was from—his wife and two daughters.

One of the maids in this motel claimed that this guy was a flasher and was flashing himself daily. NIS went out, took testimony from this maid, went to the shipyard commander, who was his nominal boss, had the guy relieved and assigned a meaningless job in a little cubicle, with no charges and no reason for any of this, other than he was under investigation. One of this commander's friends was a Naval Academy classmate of mine. He called me up and said, "You really should look into this," and I did.

It turned out that the accused commander was a physical fitness believer and he would go out and jog and work out, trying to stay in shape. On several occasions when he was getting ready to take a shower in his shorts, the phone would ring and he'd go out, and if the curtain wasn't pulled and the maid happened to be out there looking right into the window, she might see the guy. But he was no flasher. He had no history of anything like this. And her testimony turned out to be really suspect, because if you went and stood where she said she stood, you couldn't see in his room anyway.

It turned out that she was kind of a local round-heel and really of dubious virtue. It turned out that what she wanted to get was an out-of-court settlement from this guy for some money. So it turned out that the incident was completely without merit. The Naval Investigative Service had caused this guy a terrible, terrible miscarriage with no efforts to follow up. They just put him in this limbo and left him twisting slowly. When I found all this out I was furious. So I got to the vice chief, Ron Hays, and he was furious too. He said, "What do you think we ought to do?"

I said, "You should send for this young officer—he was a commander, he wasn't young—and apologize to him on behalf of the Navy, and offer him command of any destroyer in any home port that he wants, to in some way make retribution for the indignities that have been visited upon him." Admiral Hays did that. The guy accepted a Charleston destroyer, and he went on to become a great skipper.

A couple of weeks later I went in to see the UnderSecNav, Jim Goodrich. He said, "You know, we've got to do something." Everybody who found out about this was just livid.

I said, "If you really want to square away the NIS you ought to put them under me. I'll take care that nothing like this ever happens again." And within three weeks the NIS was investigating me, showing that if you mess with the bull you get the horns. But I formed an opinion of the capabilities of the NIS in that and several other similar occurrences, where they really did get way out ahead of the problem and got overzealous and, in this case, inflicted a terrible miscarriage of justice. By the way, I was not able to

get the Audit Service or the NIS under the IGs control. I still think that should be the case.

That episode with the FFG skipper is one of the things that I'm most proud of to this day. And of course I never told the officer what had happened or why, and never will.

WINKLER: Okay. We'll close then, for the evening.

21 March 2001

WINKLER: Today is March 21, 2001. This is Dave Winkler, of the Naval Historical Foundation, again with Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, United States Navy (Retired). We left last time with the IG and we were talking about historic items. The Battle of Midway came up in our conversation, and you were talking about rectifying a situation. I'd like to try and get that on the record. Could you tell that story?

MUSTIN: Yes. At the time—he may still be, I don't know—at the time I was the IG he was also the president of the Navy-Marine Awards Board. That is, all the decorations that could not be awarded by someone in the field came to the Navy-Marine Awards Board. We met once or twice a month and ruled on them. I was the president, the Marine IG was the deputy, and then there were several captains that were members of the board. One day I got a note from John Lehman, the Secretary of the Navy, saying that he had a request to look into the award status of Captain, retired and deceased, Joseph Rochefort. This request had been brought by Joe Rochefort's surviving son, who I think has subsequently died. Anyway, he asked that I look into that and get back to him with a recommendation.

So I got into this fascinating story. It went back to the early stages of World War II, when Joe Rochefort performed a communications intelligence function for Admiral Nimitz that was unique in the history of the Navy. It involved breaking the Japanese code and then interpreting what was said by the Japanese, after the code was broken. Rochefort is now considered by many to be the father of ComInt, but at the time he was just another staff officer, a commander on the staff of Admiral Nimitz.

He was a very prickly personality. He was an odd duck. He used to wander around in a basement room in a bathrobe. He neglected to take baths and showers and shave; he was a chain smoker; he didn't suffer fools very well; and he had made a number of rather bitter bureaucratic enemies in the Navy Department, in OpNav. So he was sort of a person who did not spread sweetness and light wherever he went. He had a very small fan club, which consisted essentially of two people: Eddie Layton, his boss, and Chester Nimitz, the commander-in-chief of the Pacific area.

Anyway, Rochefort began to determine that there was a big Japanese operation coming up. Of course, the issue was, where would the operation target? Would it be the Aleutians? Or Midway? Or Hawaii? Or perhaps the west coast of the United States? As he began to collect this intelligence and interpret it, and send his interpretations back to OpNav, a group of advocacies arose for each one of these particular places. The people in OpNav, for example, thought that it would be either the Aleutians or the west coast. Rochefort was convinced after a while that it would be Midway. And of course Admiral Nimitz was faced with the decision of whether to spread out his vastly inferior forces to try to cover all these bets, or to concentrate them and put all his eggs in one basket—which he did, largely at the recommendation of Joe Rochefort and Eddie Layton, and over the objections of the intelligence crowd in OpNav, who had the ear of Admiral King.

Well it turned out, of course, that Layton and Rochefort had fixed the Japanese position and order of battle with remarkable intelligence, which had in turn enabled Nimitz to position his inferior force in an area where they would be least likely to be detected by Japanese scout planes. The results of the battle are well known to everybody who ever read a history book.

After the battle, Admiral Nimitz recommended Commander Rochefort for the Distinguished Service Medal. All this correspondence was available in a folder in the archives of the historian. The guys in OpNav that he had had feuds with said, well, he was only doing his job, and besides, so many people deserve credit for this operation that it's very difficult to single one out. So, Admiral King, what you should do instead of awarding Rochefort this medal is just send a BZ to Admiral Nimitz for a great job. Incidentally, in the same set of folders were awards that these particular people in OpNav had recommended themselves for, and which Admiral King approved.

Anyway, Rochefort got nothing. He went on to feud with these guys, the issue becoming who deserved the credit for the intelligence breakthroughs that led to the Battle of Midway. The people in OpNav, although they had not singled Midway out as the place, taking credit.

After the war was over, Rochefort ran into Admiral Nimitz, and he told him that he'd never received any award for the Battle of Midway. So Admiral Nimitz then wrote a letter to the then-Secretary of the Navy. This was after his tour as CNO and after he'd retired. This was just before his death in the sixties. He wrote this letter and he said, "I made this recommendation at the time. And at the time I considered that Rochefort had been enormously influential on the Battle of Midway, which was one of the turning points of the war in the Pacific. Upon reflection, I feel even more strongly about that. So I urge that you reconsider this award and present it to this highly deserving officer, and right this wrong."

Well, he got back a letter from some transient political appointee, assistant secretary of the Navy for some function that no longer exists. Obviously the SecNav was at least smart enough to not himself turn down Admiral Nimitz. This letter was a terrible

piece of bureaucratic doubletalk and crap. It advised Admiral Nimitz that the statute of limitations had expired on the award. Then it went on to advise him that he, Admiral Nimitz, might not fully understand all the implications of the Battle of Midway, the various views of the people in OpNav at the time, and how therefore since the statute of limitations was over and the views of the people in OpNav—they were no longer around to defend their position—with a great deal of regret Admiral Nimitz's personal second request for this award was reluctantly denied. Warm personal regards, Joe Schultz, the Ragmaker.

Well, as I was reading this pile of stuff I got more and more infuriated at the terrible injustice that had been done to Joe Rochefort, and the equally humiliating indignity that had been inflicted on Admiral Nimitz. To tell him that he didn't understand how the Battle of Midway transpired, and didn't understand the statute of limitations, was just beyond....

Anyway, I went to see John Lehman and I said, "This is a terrible, terrible miscarriage of justice. You now have it in your hands to right this wrong and posthumously present this award to Joe Rochefort and give it to his family here at a ceremony in your office." Which he did. I explained the thing to him in just about the same context and tone that I explained it to you. So when that episode was completed I felt like a footnote to history. I'm very proud of that.

WINKLER: That is an interesting footnote. Because now, to anybody who knows squat about the Battle of Midway, Rochefort is the man.

We pretty much covered the Inspector General tour last time. I guess when you had received the job of Inspector General there was an understanding from Ace Lyons that this was a lay-low position and we can spring you for something later.

MUSTIN: That's right. When the CNO changes.

WINKLER: The CNO had changed, so when did you find out about Second Fleet?

MUSTIN: I guess I had been the IG for a little over a year. Then Bill Lawrence, who was the chief of personnel, called me up and told me. Of course, when you get a call like that when you're a flag officer, you're told by the chief, or the CNO, whoever tells you, particularly if it's for a three-star or above position, you can't announce that or discuss it publicly until the Senate advises and consents. So I was enjoined not to discuss it with anybody. Bill Lawrence said: You can discuss it with your wife, but don't say anything to anybody else right now.

The problem is that these nominations now—this tremendous OSD bureaucracy has created a situation in which every transient assistant secretary of defense for something, of which there are more and more every year, all get a vote on these. They don't know you from Adam. But the thing comes by their desk and it says: This nomination is for Rear Admiral Mustin to be promoted to vice admiral and go the Second

Fleet—Yes or No. They all generally rubber stamp these things. But they're under no injunction whatsoever not to discuss it. So what happens is, you get these terrible cocktail party rumors where people come up to you and say, "Hey, I hear you're going..."

You have to say, "Well, jeez, I don't know anything about it." That happens to everybody who gets one of these positions. It's just one of the interesting aspects of the promotion process.

But I got this, and went and talked to the Secretary, who was very happy, and the CNO, who was very happy, Jim Watkins. I got some pretty explicit instructions from them. Jim Watkins in particular said, "Now, when you go down there you must realize that you will be in a NATO command level. You will be what is called a major subordinate commander, which is a NATO echelon above ComSixthFlt, and which in the NATO organization puts you on a par with CinCSouth, who is also a major subordinate commander. So you have the equivalency of four-star NATO rank for your Striking Fleet Atlantic position, and as ComSecondFlt you'll be one of the four fleet commanders (at the time) in the Navy. So you have to realize that when you say something in public you're speaking not only for yourself, but for the Navy and the United States Government. And you'd better not be writing a lot of stuff unless you want to see it in the Washington Post the next day." That was really good advice. It turned out to be very true.

So down I went to Norfolk to relieve Joe Metcalf as ComSecondFlt, just after the Grenada operation had concluded.

WINKLER: It's funny you mentioned that, because one of my chores at the Inspector General right now is, I'm going through old case files to determine which ones are historically significant, and I came across his case file on the AK-47 war trophies. And I thought that happened on your watch as IG; I guess that must have been very awkward.

MUSTIN: No, it wasn't, because I had left. It all started after I got.... The thing was handled by NIS, not the IG. So I didn't even know about it when I was the IG. I didn't know about it until after I had relieved Joe; that's when it all blew up. Cartoons were in the Post and all that stuff. Of course, the guy who did it was the PAO on his staff, and he lied about it all the way through it. But I don't think the truth ever came out. But it was a bad scene and Joe took the rap. I finished that PAO's career with his detaching fitness report.

WINKLER: How was the turnover process with him?

MUSTIN: It was great. We're old friends. We had been destroyer skippers together. We went off on a FleetEx in the Caribbean. Essentially I rode down with him on the transit for three days, and then Joe flew back and I came back with the fleet.

He gave me some pretty good advice. He said that he thought that the Striking Fleet Atlantic, which was the only striking fleet in NATO at the time, was a NATO

position that had not been given sufficient emphasis by the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Government. So he thought that the Second Fleet Commander ought to tilt more toward the Striking Fleet role and less toward the Second Fleet role. The Second Fleet role being essentially one to handle the Caribbean, but to work forces up to deploy to the Sixth Fleet. He viewed the Striking Fleet role as very, very important. I would never really have considered that in that light unless he had made those observations.

I started thinking more and more about it as the background for the maritime strategy started to emerge. As the notion that we would no longer be fighting the battle of the Atlantic in the Atlantic became extant, mainly because we thought the Russians would retreat to their bastions up in the Murmansk area and the Kola Peninsula area, the way that the Navy could contribute in the battle for Europe became very, very different. A succession of SACLants had said that they were somewhere around a hundred ships short of being able to escort the convoys to Europe that the European strategy, the SACEur strategy, said were required to be there within ten days, and then to support the war. So you had a SACEur European strategy that required a continuous stream of convoys, and you had a series of SACLants who said: We can't do the job because we don't have enough forces. Of course the SACEur strategy said: If I don't get this stuff then I start to lose, and if I start to lose, I go nuke. So this was not a small-time political exercise by any means.

And separate from all of that, the Navy's role had been envisioned by the Army as being only one of providing the convoy escorts, because the principal operation that the Army viewed this as was a central front operation through the Fulda Gap and the plains of Germany, and the Navy's role, principally in the Sixth Fleet, was very, very peripheral. So NATO funding put the Navy at the bottom of the pecking order, and the arguments in our Pentagon for U.S. funding put, in the NATO context, the Navy at the bottom of the pecking order—way, way behind the Army and the Air Force.

All of this stuff was in the back of my mind when I started to look at the battle of the Atlantic. I determined that we can't fight the battle of the Atlantic in the Atlantic, based on the testimony of a succession of Supreme Allied Commanders in the Atlantic. But if the Russians are going to go up into their bastions, what we should do is go up into the fjords in Norway, and from the shelter of the fjords we can attack, not only the Soviet fleet and keep it penned up in its bastions, but the Soviet facilities in Kola. And also we can prevent the loss of Norway. So we can win the Battle of the Atlantic in Norway

The SACEur's counterpart of the Center for Naval Analyses had done a study that said: If the Soviets invaded Norway they would take it over in three days. The reason that they would take it over in three days was because they had total air superiority. They'd do this in the winter and these Soviet tank divisions would just come across the northern plains of Norway and then just stream right on down through the country. Then you would lose the Baltic Sea and things would get very dicey in the central front, because the Soviets would have the northern flank.

I did some analyses. I said, okay, we have all the SACEur study estimates, and we did some analyses with the Center for Naval Analyses rep on my staff, Dave Perin, who's now a big wheel over there. He was my OEG rep. We said, okay, we'll take the Norwegian air order of battle, which is the key operation here. Now if we add in one carrier, you still lose the land battle. If we add in two, it becomes a wash. And if you add in three carriers, air wings, we win. So the secret is that we have to get three carriers up there. But they have to be there when the war starts. They can't try to fight their way up, because the Soviets will have taken over the place in three days, so fighting your way up will get more and more difficult.

The only game in town to do this, to offset this Soviet air superiority, is carrier air, because there aren't enough airfields in north Norway to support a U.S. Air Force TransLant or influx of U.S. airplanes. No air strips. Therefore you need to have the carriers up there.

And how are we going to figure out how to make the carriers survivable in the face of this enormous Soviet fleet? The answer was: If we would go operate inside the fjords, we could use the radar shadowing provided by the mountains to confuse the Soviet air-launched anti-ship missiles. So we could handle Soviet air attacks, and we could seal off the fjords by mining so that Soviet submarines couldn't get in there. We should be able to do this in the time that our spooks had determined it would take the Soviets to reinforce their forces in the region enough to make this eight-division purge across the northern tip. That was a period of about twelve to fourteen days. So what I developed was a logic that said: When we think we're twelve to fourteen days away, we should send the two Atlantic Fleet carriers up there, and take the carrier out of the Sixth Fleet and send it up there. That was the strategic plan.

Now, in order to do that we had to figure out a number of practical things. Number one, we had to figure out whether we could operate airplanes in the fjords, because they're a very restricted space. Number two, we had to determine whether all of my thoughts about the radar shadowing were accurate. And number three, we had to see whether we had the force structure and the rules of engagement and things like that to permit the sealing-off of these fjords so that the three carriers could operate in there.

In order to do that we structured a series of NATO exercises, major exercises with all the forces, to test this theory out. We did this twice on my watch. The first time we went up and just flew a few sorties, and it turned out to be a piece of cake. We also took a bunch of B-52s to see about dropping the Captor mines to seal off the fjords from submarines, and we started to work on the idea of integrating with the air defenses of Norway. We got some airborne radars that were equivalent to the best that the Soviets had, and we flew passes at the carriers.

What we determined was that the radar shadowing was so effective that the Soviet airplanes could not launch air-to-ground missiles at these carriers until they were inside the minimum range of these missiles. Plus, in order to come in to even try to get a shot, they had to get within the range of our surface-to-air missiles from our missile destroyers

and cruisers. So that, instead of shooting at their missiles, we're now shooting at their airplanes. There's a very, very significant difference. So their saturation air raid attacks on the carriers were absolutely neutralized by the radar shadowing idea.

And the notion that they would go nuclear against U.S. forces, which had always been one of the problems with the war at sea, now meant that they were going nuclear against one of the land components in Europe, because we were inside Norwegian territorial waters and near Norwegian cities. So there was no way to isolate this conflict at sea, which is one of the big bugaboos in the rules of engagement.

The rules of engagement in NATO are no different from the concerns that the U.S. military has today, but they're exacerbated because at the time you had sixteen countries worrying about it instead of three services. The fundamental issue is always hostile intent--what is it, and who in the chain of command can declare it. The essential element of that dialogue is that the land commanders never want some isolated incident at sea to drag them into a land war that they're not quite ready to fight. You saw that reflected in the Gulf War in a lot of that stuff that went on when the Navy was furious about Saddam mining in the Gulf, but Schwarzkopf would not permit any action against that because he wasn't ready to fight the land war.

All of those rules were in the background, and hashed out and fought. The relationship with the land commanders had to be worked out, the command relations. The utilization of the Marines and the amphibious forces and how we would operate them all became part of that strategy. This was all done at very high levels by me, with the senior commanders in NATO on board with this. It became an important element in the U.S. position in NATO and the U.S. strategic concept for NATO.

And of course the salesmanship of it was very difficult because there are a lot of people in NATO who say that this was a defensive alliance, and these were offensive moves. I was falling back on Admiral Sharp's problems in Vietnam, where he said that there has never been a war won by a solely defensive strategy. You can have an overall defensive strategy but there must be offensive elements in it. Therefore the basic strategy that I was proposing was that we would go up and defend Norway. The way we would defend them was that we would defeat these attacking Soviet armies by guaranteeing air superiority in the northern region.

A lot of people in Washington did not realize what was going on up there. When I went up the first time with the America, the commander of the Norwegian air forces in the northern region came out for lunch with the prime minister and the minister of defense. He said, "How many airplanes have you got on this ship?"

I said, "We have about a hundred."

He said, "That's three times as many as I have in all of northern Norway." So when you talk about adding three carriers up there you are talking about nine times the air power suddenly available.

The King, Olaf V, came out. He loved this stuff. He came out in a snowstorm and landed on the flagship, went into my cabin and sat down. I think I may have told you this story. He reached into his greatcoat and pulled out a bottle of brandy, and he said, "Well, let's have a drink."

I said, "Your majesty, I can't drink, because we don't drink on Navy ships."

He said, "You don't understand, Admiral. Wherever I go is Norwegian territory. So while you are sitting at this table with me you are now in Norway, and therefore I command you to join me." Well, what can I say? I sat there and had a couple of pops. That was funny. He was a wonderful, wonderful person. Very supportive. He loved the navy. The King, of course, is an air chief marshal and an admiral of the fleet, and a general of the army, and he used to just infuriate the other two services, because whenever he would go to any function that was military he would always wear his admiral uniform. These air force guys and these army guys in Norway didn't like it.

There were some pretty interesting things that came out of that. After the Quisling experience in World War II, when Quisling surrendered the government and the King did not want to surrender, Olaf put out a directive that was posted in the headquarters of every commander. The directive said: If you ever receive an order from the headquarters of government, and it's an order that you feel is not in the interests of Norway, you are to disobey it and act in the interests of Norway. He didn't ever want the forces to surrender.

Right after that they started to have trouble with these Soviet submarine contacts, so Olaf put out a directive that said: If you ever get an unidentified submarine contact in Norwegian territorial waters, you are to attack and sink it immediately. No questions asked. So I went to see the chairman of the joint chiefs of Norway, a fellow named Bull-Hansen, who was a wonderful guy, almost a dead-ringer for Gary Cooper. I said, "We've got some problems here, because we're going to have a lot of forces up there in these fjords, and we're going to have in particular almost five times the ASW capability that your forces have. So if we detect an unidentified contact in there, do you want me to tell you about it?"

He thought for a minute, and he said, "under no circumstances are you to notify us of any unidentified submarine contact. The last thing I want to do is start a shooting war with the Soviet Union." He didn't want to know because he didn't want to have to attack these guys, which would mean war.

Up that far north, which is well north of the Arctic Circle.... The border town between the Kola Peninsula and Norway is a place called Kirkenes, which in terms of longitude is due north of Istanbul, so it's way east. If you go to that border town, which I have been in, in the town square is a big statue of a Red Army soldier, because the Red Army liberated it from the Nazis in World War II. So you get a lot of conflicting sentiments up there about who the bad guys are. A lot residual good will toward the Soviets.

Anyway, in that particular element of the Second Fleet tour, I was able to significantly change the organization of the NATO structure in the Atlantic, and to make major changes in strategy for how the U.S. and NATO navies would be employed in the NATO tactical sense. And to try it all out and work it. Books have been written about this by NATO historians. One's called, "The Battle for the Fjords." There's about a chapter devoted to what I just told you in this book, about all this stuff. It meant that I was concentrating on this particular bag of tactics, and not very much on working up the forces to go to the Sixth Fleet, because I was working them up to go up and fight in the fjords. That was a very different kettle of fish, and a whole different bag of tactics. All of a sudden the exercises that we were running down in the Caribbean, now we're drawing off little geographic sections that look like fjords and operating in them, instead of pretending that we're operating somewhere in the Med.

Having said all that, we got all that done. It was a very, very significant development of the Navy's evolution of the maritime strategy, and how we played in the overall Cold War, as well as an initial look into the peculiar problems associated with littoral problems. I've been told by a number of people that that was one of the pieces that persuaded Mr. Gorbachev that he'd go broke trying to defeat the free world in the Cold War, so he just decided to stop. There were many others, but that one happened to come at a time when a number of other things cascaded along, arms control developments and things like that.

So I was very proud of that strategic concept. There were a lot of opponents of that. Many of the aviators didn't think we could do it at all, but after the first time we got in there and flew some, they were the most enthusiastic supporters. Snuffy Smith was one of the guys. That was a very interesting set of events in NATO. All done under the Striking Fleet Atlantic hat, and all sort of started off by that little kernel that Joe Metcalf planted during our turnover when I relieved him.

WINKLER: The working relationship. First to touch on is, the submarines at this time are beginning to take on cruise missiles. What was your relationship with SubLant and how to use submarines in that strategy?

MUSTIN: Bud Kauderer was ComSubLant, a wonderful guy and a good friend. It became apparent to me when I would go to the morning briefings that I knew much more about what the Soviet submarine force was doing than what the U.S. submarine force was doing, just by the way they structured the briefing. So I told Bud: I've got to know more about what you're doing. He said, "You're right." So he arranged that I would go to his briefings in the morning, which was really an eye opener for me.

There had been a lot of complaints that we could never get submarines for exercises, to practice against and to practice with. So I went to him and said we need more submarines. He said fine. We ended up with more submarines than we needed in many of our exercises. We had enough so they could be both the opposition and the Blue. In previous exercises essentially they had played the Soviets, and so we had not had a lot

of time to play them as U.S. because we didn't have the forces. But Bud made them available.

In turn, seeing Jim Watkins as the CNO and others, I said, "You know, I think if these submariners are going to be Fleet CinCs and CNOs, they ought to at least understand something about fleet operations. So I will make you an offer, Bud, that in every one of my FleetEx's I will take a submarine flag officer that you want to send, and I'll give him a warfare commander function that is not related to ASW." I said, "The first one, we'll have him be the anti-air warfare commander and we'll put him in an Aegis ship, and I'll make sure that he's got a proper staff so that he doesn't get embarrassed, but he can go down on this fleet exercise and really learn something about AAW." At the time submarines were just getting NTDS. A lot of problems that they had, coming up to the periscope depth that you needed in order to be able to play and all that stuff.

I said: That's an offer. And he said, "I'll take you up on it." Then I went to AirLant and said the same thing about the carrier aviators, except I said I'm going to put them on these cruisers. Because I had determined that the Navy training establishment stopped training people at the captain level. There was no apparatus, no infrastructure to train flag officers. So I wanted to do that.

Anyway, Bud Kauderer went out and polled the flag officers that he had in SubLant, and J. D. Williams said he'd love to do that in the FleetEx. He had that experimental squadron job, SubDevGru up at New London. So he went out on an Aegis ship and became the AAW commander with some good guys working for him, and he's a really good guy. He came back from that thing and he invented NTDS, he invented surface-to-air missiles. He loved it. It was a whole new world, and it really paid off for him when he got to OPNAV as a Vice Admiral.

So I had opportunities to use these submarines in ways that had not been before. I think that was just because Bud Kauderer had much broader vision of what submarines ought to do than some of his predecessors had had. And nobody had really ever gone over and asked him. So I have, number one, very great respect for Bud, whom I see now on the tube periodically talking about the Greenville. And I think that our relationships were really terrific. We learned an awful lot about what you can and can't expect from a submarine when he is acting for you and not just as an opponent in an exercise.

WINKLER: Then you had to work with your NATO counterparts.

MUSTIN: Yes. And the Air Force. And the Army. You see, ComSecondFlt at the time—I think he still is the same—had three hats. He had the U.S. Commander, Second Fleet hat, which included Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic and forces from the three type commanders, AirLant, SubLant, and CruDesLant—SurfLant. He had the Striking Fleet NATO hat, which I discussed, which is a very, very senior NATO command. And then he had a CJTF 120 hat, which made him the direct subordinate of CinCLant. That was the hat under which Joe Metcalf ran the Grenada operation. In that one the 101st Airborne and a bunch of the forces from Tactical Air Command reported to me. So in the U.S.

CJTF hat we did an awful lot of work with the Air Force and the Army in the integration of forces.

This whole notion that I had of using the fjords and everything was really the precursor to the littoral operations. Because that's where we saw for the first time that our radars didn't do too well over land, and that if you're going to fly airplanes in somebody else's air space instead of at sea, you've got to be prepared to deal with his air controllers and that kind of stuff. If you're going to shoot long-range missiles at targets in his real estate, you're going to have to know how to do that.

(End of Side A, Tape I)

WINKLER: Continuing along, working with these allies, and the Air Force, and this is the predecessor of littoral warfare...so you had an opportunity to work with the Air Force. Of the NATO countries, I know that we've always had a strong relationship with the British. Any...?

MUSTIN: Yes. I had a British rear admiral working for me, Julian Oswald, who later became the First Sea Lord. He was the ASW commander in the Striking Fleet. I reorganized him to put him in a different position, whereupon Sir William Staveley, who was the then-First Sea Lord, immediately promoted him to vice admiral.

I had very close relationships with CinCNorth, who was a Norwegian Army four-star general, and his component commanders. Very close relationships with the Portuguese four-stars.

WINKLER: Was that IberLant?

MUSTIN: Yes. Outside of Lisbon.

When I got the job they had one of the surface warfare parties. I was just getting ready to leave in about two weeks, and I went. Admiral Burke was there; my dad had been on his staff. So I went over and introduced myself. He said, "What are you doing now? How's your dad?"

I said, "Well, I'm on my way to take over the Striking Fleet. As a matter of fact, I'm going over to some meetings in London next week, to talk to the First Sea Lord."

He said, "Well, let me tell you a little story." He said, "Right after the war, when Pete Mitscher was CinCLant, he took me along as his chief of staff. One day we got the word that the Brits wanted to discuss some new command and control scheme with us, and would we come over to Whitehall and go over this with them? We looked at the plan and it was pretty clear that the Brits wanted to command everything and they wanted to do it from a bunker in Northolt. So, having figured out what the agendas were, off we went. We landed and we were greeted by the First Sea Lord who took us to Whitehall and made a very gracious presentation. Then the Second Sea Lord presented."

“All during this, Admiral Mitscher, who was not a man of a lot of words, said nothing. Then various other staff officers came and presented. Then we had a delightful lunch. One presentation after lunch. Then the First Sea Lord got back up and he said, ‘Well, Admiral Mitscher, we’ve presented our plan to you. Since you have made no objection to anything you’ve heard, can we assume that you concur with our plan?’”

Arleigh Burke said, “At that point Pete Mitscher spoke his first words, other than during the social hour. He said, ‘No, you cannot.’ The First Sea Lord said, ‘Well, would you tell us why?’ Pete Mitscher said, ‘Certainly. The nation that provides the forces will command them.’ The First Sea Lord said, ‘Well, thank you very much, Admiral Mitscher. We understand your position.’”

So Arleigh said, “When you go talk to these guys, that agenda has not changed and will never change. So keep your hand on your wallet, because they’re going to be charming and friendly, but what they’re going to want to do is take command of your forces.”

I found that at every step of the way. We had a lot of fun and raised a lot of hell together, but I knew what the agendas were. I was determined that we were not going to work for anyone other than SACLANT. On my watch, the guy who was trying to take command of the Striking Fleet was the Air Chief Marshal of the Royal Air Force. The Royal Navy gave up all air to the Royal Air Force. It was land based, except for a couple of Harrier squadrons. All air operations were run by the Royal Air Force from bunkers ashore. They wanted to run the carrier air the same way. None of those issues ever change.

But that was fun to see Arleigh Burke. I had spent a lot of time reviewing his operations in the Pacific. The U.S. Navy really took it on the chin in night engagements for a long time in the war. The first time that we won a night engagement convincingly was at the battle of Empress Augusta Bay. Arleigh Burke wrote a very detailed after-action report of that. It had a number of basic principles in it, all of which apply in spades today with modern weaponry.

I took those principles and I wrote a doctrine for the Striking Fleet and Second Fleet—part for the NATO and part for the U.S.—called Fighting Instructions. I spent a year writing this myself, laying out all the command relations and the principles about how we were going to do this and why. Then I sent a copy of it to Admiral Burke, only the part that had to do with his Empress Augusta Bay report and was unclassified. I said, “I thought you’d be interested in this, because this is what we’re going to do now, and the modern weaponry only enforces all these principles.”

Within a week he wrote back. He said, “You’re right on target. These principles never change. I’m delighted that you’re not trying to over-manage this, because if you try to write doctrine and make it too detailed, you’re always going to forget something that’s important. So you want to sort of keep things at a level where an intelligent subordinate

can be given direction like ‘No captain can do far wrong if he lays his ship alongside that of the enemy and....’” So anyway, I cherish that correspondence with him.

At those levels of command, and indeed at those levels of the bureaucracy in the United States, the issues are always very thorny and difficult. All of them can be solved by men of good will. If you want to solve them and you don’t get too rigid and inflexible, you can.

When we started these operations the Marines had an amphibious operating area in Norway that took over all of Sweden. And they insisted, but it was obvious, they couldn’t do that. They couldn’t have an AOA that went outside the bounds of at least Norway. So we had to negotiate those things, and we did.

At those levels the personal relationships are critical. You can see President Bush’s understanding of that now, as he’s moving around to set up his infrastructure. I was really pleased and happy with the personal relationships that I had, and I was pleased and happy with the way these guys came to support the major changes that we were making to the strategy and the role of the Striking Fleet.

WINKLER: You worked for, principally, CinCLant and SACLant—the same guy.

MUSTIN: Same guy, Wes McDonald. SACLant is a NATO major command, and StrikFltLant is his direct subordinate.

WINKLER: So basically he was your boss. How was that relationship?

MUSTIN: Terrific. A wonderful guy. Wonderful man. There was a saying about Halsey in World War II that he could go aboard any ship and he would be welcome. It was the same with Wes McDonald. He would have these big, big parties for the NATO people at his headquarters. He’d go around and we’d all be sitting at these tables, and he would name every foreigner by name. He’s just a wonderful, wonderful man, perfect fit.

SACLant was really more an ambassador than a Naval officer. It’s all changed now. Now he’s nothing but a provider of forces. But when NATO was important because of the Soviet Union, he was a major player. Well, the three major NATO commanders were SACEur, SACLant, and CinCChan, which was just a sop to the Brits. But the big men were SACEur and SACLant, and Wes was a wonderful, wonderful SACLant. When he wanted to do something in NATO it got done. You know, there’s an awful lot of buttons on a typewriter, so you want to figure out which ones you want to push. You have to husband your efforts. He was a master at that. He husbanded a lot of his efforts in shepherding this new strategy through the senior corridors of NATO.

I think he’s just terrific. I have great admiration for him, and really like him as a person. He and I used to play racquetball together in the morning, before the staff meeting.

NATO used to have a big war game up at Newport every year. The principals would play themselves. I was on a big kick about Tomahawk. Subsequently I got a lot of this changed when I was Op 06, but it was being treated like a nuclear weapon, only with a conventional warhead, 1000-pound warhead. So that the CinC was the guy who did all the release authority and all the targeting. Now, that meant that if you wanted to shoot at a target in Europe you had to get SACEur opinion and approval and use SACEur's target list. But all the weapons were coming from SACLant ships; all the Tomahawks were on Striking Fleet ships, and SACLant's targeting was done in Norfolk.

So we had this war game up there and we were going to play this new strategy. In the meantime the actual SACEur was playing the land war. Hank Mauz was a senior guy on the NATO navy staff. So I said, "Let's have a little fun with this exercise, Hank. I will send a message to SACLant saying that I'm in position and I'm prepared to launch Tomahawks at the Kola Peninsula. Then you send a message back from SACEur saying you do not agree with that; that you would like to have those weapons targeted somewhere else. And we'll see how that resolves itself."

So I put out my message and out comes SACEur's response. I think probably those two messages are still just circulating around the halls of the War College someplace, because Wes just laughed—Bernie Rogers was SACEur—Wes just laughed, and he said, "Hey, this is too hard. We can't handle this."

And Bernie said, "Yeah." But anyway it got them thinking about how do you do this stuff. They recognized that it was—that's the kind of stuff you had to deal with.

But the personal relationships at all levels, on my watch, were terrific.

WINKLER: Ace Lyons was a predecessor at Second Fleet, and he's the one who kind of gave you a call and said lay low. What was your relationship with him. During his tenure at Second Fleet he took very aggressive stands as far as taking the carriers up into the North Sea.

MUSTIN: He didn't take them into the fjords. Because the strategy at the time was a roll-back strategy. And the strategy at the time assumed that Norway was still friendly. The information that Norway would no longer be friendly after the first three days of the conflict had not been made public on Ace's watch. And it really hadn't been made public on mine. I just happened to make a tour of that SACEur CNA and when I found that study I said, jeez, this is what we're looking for.

Ace and I had been friends for years, a long, long time. Ace is a very controversial and opinionated guy. But he certainly saved my bacon, pulled it right out of the fire. He did that because of his relationship with John Lehman. As soon as John Lehman left, all the forces that had been saying we're going to cut Ace off at the knees rose up and did. But he saved my bacon. I owe him for that.

WINKLER: Any other aspects of the Second Fleet tour? I assume you flew your flag from the Mount Whitney?

MUSTIN: Yes. The Mount Whitney went into an overhaul for about the first third of my tour, so I was in the Nassau. We modified the flag communications spaces in the Mount Whitney significantly during that overhaul. So I went to the Nassau and then went to the Mount Whitney for the final two-thirds of my tour. Of course, the communications that we had then were vastly different and more rudimentary than they are now.

One thing that I did in the Second Fleet which I'm kind of proud of was a continuation of the damage control and boatswain's mate Olympics and the SWT weeks. As Second Fleet I could go beyond the lifelines in the cruiser-destroyer force and get the submarines and aviation units involved in tactical development and in training in port. So we started to have what we called BFITs—I think they still do that, battle force in-port training—where we would link up with Damneck and tried all kinds of experiments to get the tactical training devices to approximate the PacMan game. We had a pretty sophisticated way of training for anti-air warfare, largely because of Aegis experience. But there was nothing like that in ASW or anti-surface warfare. I told you, we were still passing pieces of paper saying there was a submarine off the port bow. So we developed all kinds of ways to link these things up, and a whole set of requirements to expand the ability to train inport in all warfare areas.

One of the things I found, for example, was that no one in the Second Fleet, and by extension in the Navy, was really working on how to do war-at-sea strikes against modern Soviet forces. The aviation type commanders essentially were concerned, properly, with aviation safety. So that when you were a carrier skipper, AirLant's principal concern was that you got everybody into the air and then you got them back on board safely. Once they were airborne and they went off to drop their bombs and do their things, that was not really the type commander's concern. So each of the carrier air group commanders had his own set of tactics.

All of the tactics, for example, in the war-at-sea strikes started off with the assumption that they knew where the enemy was. Well, I was mindful that in the Battle of Midway, and in the tactical preparations before that battle, in the late thirties, the aviators developed a bunch of tactics which essentially said that the torpedo planes went in low and the dive bombers came in high at the same time, and the enemy was forced to split his battery and couldn't figure out where to put his combat aircraft patrol. So he was either going to be dive-bombed or torpedoed, and everybody got his Legion of Merit and they loved these tours. Well then at the Battle of Midway they didn't really know where the enemy carriers were. As a result, the torpedo planes got there first. So I used to say that if you want to talk about the efficacy of that particular assumption, that you know where he is, let's get hold of Ensign George Gay and discuss it with him. Because he's the only guy left out of Torpedo Squadron 8. So we're going to change all these tactics. You're going to start off with the assumption that you don't know where he is, and you're going to combine search and attack tactics. Well that changed everything.

Then we took all of their tactics—by this time I had gotten Neil Byrne, the inventor of NavTag on my staff and he had automated it, put it in the computer—and we played all of the aviators' war-at-sea strike tactics in the computer, to figure out which one of these eight carrier air group commanders had a set of tactics that made any sense against Soviet modern SAM defenses. We picked the best tactic, which not surprisingly was the one developed by Commander Art Cebrowski. That became the Second Fleet war-at-sea tactic. So we did all that kind of stuff, an awful lot of it. The aviators loved this.

It was an interesting viewpoint from which to be able to watch how the surface type commander and the aviation type commander and the submarine type commander stayed within their own little pookas until somebody mixed them all. That's the role of the fleet commander. I spent a lot of time with Bud Kauderer and Bob Dunn and Scot McCauley, who were the type commanders, and with Al Gray, who was the Fleet Marine Force commander, keeping these things working together. We all got to be really good friends, and had a great time doing this stuff. It was a matter of personal relationships in the end.

WINKLER: You were getting some new toys to play with. Aegis—Ticonderoga is commissioned out in the fleet. The battleship New Jersey is commissioned and deployed. How did you plan for and integrate these new assets?

MUSTIN: We had the first two-Aegis ship exercise. There was a big debate about how you use Aegis—whether you used it away from the carrier to manage what was then called the outer air battle, or you used it in close to the carrier just to shoot at incoming missiles. My view was that if you used it in close to the carrier you weren't using an Aegis ship, you were using an SM-1 ship. So it ought to be used to manage the air battle, because we had determined that, to handle massed Backfire raids, you had to engage these guys essentially before they fired. That meant that you had to engage them at a couple of hundred miles.

I went back to my Vietnam experience. The big concern about the Seawolf helicopters had been that their legs were too short. But what happened on every occasion was they went out and they expended all their ammunition long before they ran out of fuel. So there are all these tactics that had these carrier air patrol stations out at hundreds of miles, and the aviators were looking at these as a problem of keeping them re-tanked and refueled. But in these NavTag war games we showed that that wasn't the problem at all. The problem was they shot up their load of Sparrows and Sidewinders instantly, and then they had to come back a couple of hundred miles, and you had to have more airplanes with weapons on the way, and there was no way to tank weapons. So a whole set of tactics flowed from that that were very different from the existing long-range engagement tactics. In order to do what I just said, you needed the capabilities of something like Aegis to manage the problem, with the Spy system. So we worked on that.

We then, at the same time, were working on these long-range air strikes. I set up a four-carrier exercise off the east coast and one down in the Caribbean. This was to show

what carrier air power could do, and it was a very high visibility exercise in the political arena. We had a map of the east coast and we would hit targets up and down the east coast, widely separated, so that it would be impossible for an enemy to target them all, let alone find them with enough accuracy to launch missiles. The idea was that all four carrier air wings' strikes would occur within a five-minute window. One of them was a thousand miles long. Dick Dunleavy was the CarGru commander who was in overall charge of this. Anyway, we ran this wonderful exercise. We took it over to Congress and showed how we could have gone into St. Louis, Missouri, and made a couple of statements which really caught their eye. Four carrier air wings now possess the ordnance strike capability of 800 B-17s. I'd go over to Congress and say: You guys all remember these newsreel photos of World War II where the skies are full of B-17s going over Germany. Well, we can do that with four carriers. And nobody can target multiple carrier locations, so the carrier vulnerability issue is way over-exaggerated. So don't cut the carrier forces. Interestingly, as a surface warfare officer, I was becoming the Navy's principal spokesman in support of aircraft carriers.

But anyway, management of the outer air battle with the Spy-I and the Aegis was magnificent. It changed everything. It impressed Jim Watkins so much, because he was having a big flail with Aegis funding at the time, that he asked me to write him a personal letter. So I wrote him a letter and said, "This is so spectacular that I'm taking the unusual step of writing you personally. The detailed reports of these exercises will follow." Then I wrote about a two-page letter that was deliberately designed to be Unclass and understandable, in language that a layman could understand. He entered that in the Congressional Record, and the Aegis sailed through, for that and other reasons.

We did a lot of work with how to target and use the Tomahawks, one of which was that exercise up in Newport that we talked about, highlighting the fact that if you maintained control of it at the CinC's headquarters, then the tactical value of the weapon went to zero. So you had to have an on-board means of targeting these things. And you had to have release authority extant in the battle group commander who was on-scene. That was a very bitter struggle. Many of the staffies on the CinCs' staffs didn't want to do that. Wes McDonald, bless his heart, an old tactical aviator himself, the guy who led the first strikes on North Vietnam, understood that and supported that. Of course, from all of that stuff flowed the on-board targeting, the things that you see now, that are just going into the ships. It was those early exercises that identified the futility of trying to treat this thing like a poor man's nuclear weapon. You'd get no use out of it at all, particularly if the Navy was in support of somebody else's campaign. SACLant's target list was irrelevant to SACEur, and vice versa. So we worked on that.

All these things were really new at the time. We didn't have any SM-2s. We were just putting the NTDS into the submarines. We concentrated on those kinds of issues. Developed a number of new AAW, anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-surface warfare tactics; folded those into joint operations with the Army and the Air Force in the Joint Task Force 120 hat; and the NATO procedures in the SACLant/StrikeFlt hat. All of that kept us pretty busy.

WINKLER: One issue that's kind of touchy nowadays is Vieques. Were there any problems when you were...

MUSTIN: No. The problems were political unrest in Puerto Rico, predominantly regarding the statehood issue. Duke Hernandez was down there at the time. He had to carry a pistol; there were threats on his life. There were periodic rumblings about Vieques, but nothing like there is today. And we used it whenever we wanted to.

WINKLER: While you were in Second Fleet you had El Dorado Canyon in Libya, and also problems in Lebanon. Were there any lessons learned that came back, that you benefited from in Second Fleet?

MUSTIN: No. As a matter of fact, most of the stuff that was used in El Dorado Canyon was a bunch of tactics that we had developed in Second Fleet for the use of Harpoon, and for the way that the air strikes were conducted. So, no, it was the other way around.

WINKLER: Okay. As far as the quality of the sailors in Second Fleet, how did you utilize the force master chief, and what was the caliber of the sailor at that time?

MUSTIN: They were great. There had been a number of problems as we discussed before, essentially in the amphibious and mobile logistics support force—about undermanning. But that stuff was being cured by the time I was Second Fleet. The sailors were really great and they were excited about all these new, high tech weapons and electronic systems. The training had caught up, Reagan had been in for a while, the morale had turned around, the military was again respected. That showed up in all the retention statistics, and recruiting, and the quality of the sailors. We didn't have to take these guys off the chain gang any more like McNamara wanted us to do. We were turning people away from the recruiting stations. So the sailors were great.

I did the same thing with the force master chief that I had done in DesRon Twelve, in CruDesGru 2 and in SurfLant. I assembled meetings. I would take monthly meetings with the chiefs, go talk to them. It was a larger group. But I'd get the master chief off every ship that was assigned to the Second Fleet and we'd go have lunch and have a couple of beers, and talk life over. And I would act on what they said they wanted to act on. I'd always tell them that I couldn't do anything about the parking. Then I'd tell them what I wanted them to do, and they told me what they wanted me to do. So I kept very close to the chiefs through the force master chief. And very close to the skippers of the ships.

I took that leadership tactic of that Vietnamese general. When I'd go aboard the ships I would call up the captain in advance and I'd say, "I'm coming down to the ship. I'm not coming to do an inspection and criticize, you've got plenty of that from other quarters. What I want to do is have my visit be a positive thing." I said, "I want you to find a very junior enlisted man and a very junior officer. Tell me who they are in advance, and I'm going to give each one of them a Navy Achievement Medal."

I would say, “When I come aboard, now, I don’t want to talk about your problems. Your type commander will do that. I want you to take me to your best spaces, spaces that you’re most proud of.”

Vern Clark was the skipper of one of those destroyers. He took me into after steering, which on a destroyer is really the south forty. There’s usually a kid back there in anonymity, who labors away. This place was spotless. The sailor was standing there. I said, “This is the best after steering I’ve ever seen, and I’ve been in a bunch of them.” I reached into my pocket and pulled out a medal and pinned it on this kid. I got a letter from his mother a couple of weeks later, saying how grateful she was. I used to do that a lot.

I’d take these submarine skippers along on fleet exercises and give them specific things to do that were very different from their past tactical practices. Then I’d invite them to the Second Fleet briefing to talk about the operation they’d been on. Then I’d usually give the guy a Navy Commendation Medal after he finished his briefing. That was rewarding, and really motivated those submarine skippers, who previously had not been involved very much in area other than ASW.

WINKLER: Anything else before we move on to Op 06?

MUSTIN: Yes. Carl Trost had become CinCLantFlt and CinCLant, and he was named as the CNO. I was named as Op 06, which is now N3/5. All of a sudden Jim Watkins, who was still on as the CNO, called up and said he wanted me to handle the Incidents at Sea in Moscow meeting. He said, “You know, we normally don’t send a fleet commander, but you’ve just had two operations up in the Norwegian Sea. I’d like you to do this.”

I said, “Great.” It’s really interesting. So off I went to run the first of three Incidents at Sea meetings.

WINKLER: At the time had you been already slated to go to Op 06?

MUSTIN: Yes. The reason was, there was some flail in Op 06. The guy who I was to relieve had been transferred. He was a big buddy of Weinberger’s. He had gone down to Weinberger’s staff, so the job was gapped, which is kind of weird. It was kind of like the mine warfare commander being gapped after the mining of Haiphong. Anyway, off I went to this multi-agency group in Moscow, at the height of the bitterness in the Cold War.

I went up to Washington and met with the guys from the CIA, the State Department, and the Air Force, the whole group. Off we went to Moscow in the summertime. The uniform was blues and they were having a heat wave. In the meantime I’d talked to Secretary Weinberger. This was during the period when Colonel Nicholson had been murdered. So Weinberger wanted no exchange of any pleasantries, no cocktail parties, no socializing or anything else. All business.

So we arrive at the airport in Moscow in blues, through nine time zones; I was exhausted. It was 95 degrees. I was met by Admiral Navoytsev, who had had years in the Incidents at Sea business. We went in to the naval headquarters. It was hot; I had sweat dripping down my back and was tired. He said, "We're going to have our first session right now. We're going to go to headquarters." So off we went. We got into the headquarters. We sat on one side of a long table, and Admiral Navoytsev and the rest of the Soviet delegation sat on the other, except that there was one Soviet on our side. He was a KGB guy and he was there to keep an eye on his own people, not us.

So down we sat, and we each had our interpreters. Admiral Navoytsev said, "I want to know why you have committed these dangerous acts in the Mediterranean, which are dragging the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust. I call upon you to cease and desist from these acts immediately."

WINKLER: Did you mean the Persian Gulf?

MUSTIN: No, I meant the Mediterranean. What had happened was, there was a lot of tension in Lebanon. We had drawn these keep-out circles around our ships. Our biggest problem was keeping the journalists from flying inside of them. Anyway, we had published these in NOTAMs. I also knew that the week before I got there the Soviet navy—I can't remember whether Chernavin had taken over then or not; I think he had. Chernavin was the CNO. They had summoned a Polish admiral and they had literally ripped the buttons off his coat and fired him on the spot, sent him out a broken man. Anyway I get this speech, "dragging the world...."

So I said, "Just a minute. You're not talking to a Polish Admiral. I am a Fleet commander in the United States Navy. The actions that we took were in accordance with international law and you know that. The procedures that we followed to put out these notices to airmen and mariners were properly followed, and you know that. We're not going to sit around and let people come in and threaten our ships. So if this kind of incident happens again, I'm here to tell you that we'll do the same goddamn thing." The translator was going along, and when he got to "goddamn" he said "goddamn" in English and then he went on in Russian.

Admiral Navoytsev said, "Thank you very much, Admiral. I understand your position." He told me later, privately, that his speech was for the KGB guy, and not for me. But I didn't know it at the time, and I thought, jeez, I don't know if I'm going to make it out of this building. I may end up in a camp someplace, looking out through barbed wire. Anyway, that was very interesting.

Despite Secretary Weinberger's views, the Ambassador did have a party at the embassy. The editor of Pravda was there, and he gave me a cartoon, which shows me sitting on the forecastle of the Missouri with a cowboy hat on, and I've got these dogs with nail spike collars on them in front of me, and the Soviet dove of peace is flying away in terror. The caption on it says the aggressive NATO commanders are up here

trying to start World War III. The editor of Pravda presented me with this cartoon with a big smile on his face. I said, "Thank you very much."

It was a whole new set of experiences and opened up some friendships which I enjoyed for the next two years. The Soviets came over to the U.S. the following year, and then my last year I went back over to Moscow. Which occurred after Gorbachev had come in and we had glasnost, perestroika, and all those things. It was very different and interesting to see the very significant changes in Russia from the first one, '86, to the last one in '88.

I came back and reported to SecDef, and SecNav and CNO on that. Then we took the fleet up for a final set of fjord operations. I was relieved on station up in Norway, and came back to Op 06.

WINKLER: Op 06, you mentioned, had been vacated for a little bit, gapped. Could you give a quick overview—what's the function of Op 06?

MUSTIN: Op 06 is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations. He is also what's called the Navy Operations Deputy, which means that he is the second of the two Naval officers who are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So he and the CNO are the two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Navy. He is in charge of all Navy plans and policy. He is the interface with the fleet for operations, worldwide. He is the interface with the joint staff and the joint arena for policy and operations worldwide. And he is the keeper of Navy force structure and force justification and all of those things.

(End of Side B, Tape I)

WINKLER: Today is the 21st of March. Dave Winkler here with Vice Admiral Mustin. This is Tape II of today's interview. We're continuing. Sir, you just took over as Op 06 and you were explaining the various duties of Op 06.

MUSTIN: Op 06 at the time, and still, is a very, very critical guy in the operation of the Navy, and a key position. A wonderful job. A great staff. An awful lot of time and effort in the joint arena. On my watch the Goldwater-Nichols Act had just been implemented. The Navy was very, very hard over against it. John Lehman, who was the Secretary of the Navy, was very hard over against it. Nonetheless it was the law of the land, and so we had all the transition pains as the authority for many, many of the issues that affect the armed forces migrated from the services to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Power in Washington is a zero-sum game. The big winners in the Goldwater-Nichols Act were the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the big losers were the service secretaries and the service chiefs. Goldwater-Nichols essentially enabled the creation of a longtime Army dream which had been personified by George Marshall in World War II, which was to have what the Germans called a general staff, with great power and authority. The Navy position on the matter was that that was

dangerous over-centralization, that you stifled dissent, and therefore increased the risk of making bad decisions; and that we didn't like it. When I got up there the Secretary of the Navy made no bones about telling me that, that that's how he felt, and that I was down there to guard the gates against these assaults by the Army and the Air Force.

So we had all of those transition pains. At the same time the Congress, with a bunch of staffers who had varying degrees of misguided opinions about the Defense Department, were embarked on an overhaul of the DoD organization, including the unified commands. So we had what was called the CinC-of-the-month club, where as an example, the Congress would direct us to create a commander in chief for special operations forces. Then the authorization bill would say: Have it in Tampa Bay and the staff size will be as follows.... And they would dictate the specific numbers of the staff size in the law! They created the special operations command. They created the transportation command. They vastly changed the structure of the joint staff, the authority of the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, the authority of the CinCs. And all this done by these anonymous staffers, with no audit trails to pinpoint their involvement.

What happened in all of this was, it became apparent that the Navy officers' structure was not adequate to man both the Navy and this burgeoning joint arena. There are more officers in Air Force ground than there are in the Navy. At the time the only headquarters that was absolute one-third, one-third, one-third was CinCPac. But none of the others was. We just didn't have enough people to man these, to make sure that Navy views were properly represented in the operations of these new commands. So CinCCent, which was created during this time, had a very small Navy representation on the staff. When the special operations command was created by the Congress and the manning was directed, I was the mission sponsor for the SEALs. I pointed out to the CNO that if we comply with this authorization act, we'll have five O-6 SEAL captains in the field. All the rest will be in Tampa Bay. We just don't have enough people to compete.

The down side is if you get these large headquarters staffs—if they're ninety per cent Army and Air Force and ten per cent Navy, not only the Navy, but the country ends up losing. This was demonstrated in spades in the Gulf War. And when the Navy loses in this new environment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the field commands, the Navy's going to lose in Washington. And so we'll have a great deal of difficulty in the future because we're too small. You can't get there from here with this new command structure. That's not by accident, both the Army and the Air Force are delighted with this state of affairs.

Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, when the joint staff wanted to do things they made up a proposal and sent it around to the services. If the services didn't like it, the Joint Staff couldn't do it. That's no longer the case. They'd make up a proposal and they'd send it around to the services, except now it would say: Here's what we're going to do. If you guys have got any inputs, make them; but we're not going to change what we're going to do. And they did. So the whole relationship was changing in a way that was ungood for the service chief and the service secretariat, and very good for the Chairman and his staff.

I'm sure Carl Trost's oral history will go into his relationships with Bill Crowe at great length. Mine got off to a pretty rocky start. I called a meeting in OpNav and I asked that all the Naval officers in OpNav and the joint staff come to this meeting. I wanted to talk to them. We had it in this auditorium. They were all there, hundreds of guys. I had found that when people went down to the joint staff from the Army and the Air Force they maintained very close service ties. They essentially took forth the service position. So I told this assembled crowd: Now when you go down there, don't forget that you're in the Navy. Make sure that you understand our positions, and that you're prepared to defend them. Also, don't forget that when you finish your joint tour you're going to come back to the Navy. You don't want to do anything down there that's going to make it tough for the Navy to welcome you back with open arms.

Bill Crowe found out about that and he was furious. My classmate, Powell Carter, was his director of the joint staff. He said, boy, you really have got Admiral Crowe on the overhead. So I didn't handle that well.

I was fighting the creation of the special operations command, at the SecNav's insistence.

WINKLER: Was it still Lehman at this time?

MUSTIN: Yes. I was also fighting the creation of the transportation command. Mainly because each one of these commands—SecNav would say, “We want to get that command. Go down there and tell them we want that command.” So I'd go down to the tank. I had to go down there three times a week and spend the day down there, arguing with my counterparts, all of whom were good friends.

I'd say, “Okay, the Navy wants to be in the hopper for CinCTrans.” And the answer would be: Fine; in order to nominate somebody for a four-star billet you've got to give up a four-star billet, because the number is fixed. So all you've got to do is tell us which one of your billets you want to give up. I'd come back and tell Carl Trost, that Lehman says he wants to play in this game. But in order to do it we've got to be prepared to give up a four-star billet.

Carl would say that he didn't we don't want to give up a four-star billet to take over that transportation command, which was just a bunch of guys pushing around MAC airplanes. So I had these kinds of issues swirling around.

Carl and John Lehman detested each other, which is a charitable way to put it. Carl thought that I was a spy for John Lehman, who I barely knew. My association with him only had been third-hand, through Ace. Carl detested Ace. Carl and I had been pretty good friends through the years. Except now he was really worried that Lehman had put me there to spy on him, Carl. So I had all of these conflicts, which were very different from this really great set of personal relationships that I'd had at NATO and with the type commanders in Norfolk, swirling around during my Op 06 tour.

During my Op 06 watch, Reagan went up to Reykjavik and announced that we were going to give up nuclear weapons. So all the intermediate nuclear weapons arms-control issues, all the ABM treaty issues, and all the Star Wars cost and developmental issues suddenly were dumped on the table, with the background of all of this CinC-of-the-month stuff. It became a very, very demanding job. Which I enjoyed a lot, but it was hard. We won a few battles, but the politics of that kind of job are enormous.

I was able to do a lot of things because I had friends over in the White House staff. I also had a lot of friends—Sandy Woodward, the senior...and Julian Oswald, who was Second Sea Lord at the time—a lot of high friends in NATO. Whenever an issue came up that involved them and the U.S. Navy, we could handle that right away. But the politics of the Op 06 position and my particular role in it were really difficult. And challenging.

Having said that, the ops depts, the number twos of the services in the Joint Chief's organization, were all really great guys. Harley Hughes was the Air Force ops dep. The Marine ops dep was Carl Mundy. The Army guy was Bob Rissassi and then Norm Schwarzkopf. The Air Force guy was Mike Dugan. So we had a really great bunch of guys there. Powell Carter was the director of the Joint Staff. He was a classmate of mine, a submariner. He was a particular favorite of Crowe's.

My personal view was that we had to try to integrate the Navy into this new structure, because, like it or not, we were going to have to live with it. The hardest people to integrate were the nuclear guys, and their champion was Carl Trost. Where the issues about nuclear qualified officers came up for the first time was something called "joint duty" and a "joint specialist." A number of specifications were assigned with a joint specialist. You had to have at least a twelve-month tour in a joint job, and those jobs were defined by Congress and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Then you could become what was called a joint specialist. But if you were not a joint specialist, you were not eligible for selection to flag rank.

Well, of course the people who were not joint specialists were all the nuclear guys, because Rickover would never let them get out of the nuclear program. The only guys that he would let out were the people that were second-string nuclear engineers. So the only nuclear engineers who knew anything about anything other than neutrons were the second-stringers. The first-stringers were just kept in their nuclear power billets forever. And so all of these nuclear guys, particularly the submariners, but the aviators as well, and to a lesser extent, the surface guys, had had no joint duty. So what were we going to do? Here we had a set of directives that said, in effect, that no nuclear guy could be a flag officer because he did not have the required joint duty. It was very difficult. And Bill Crowe had a scoreboard that he was keeping on it.

Bill Crowe gave us a year to work that out. The first flag list, which I had been on the selection board, was sent down and asked for a waiver for some really good nuclear guys, we got it. The next time I was not on the flag board. Same thing, asked for a waiver, and Crowe said no, the waiver period's expired; those guys can't be flag officers.

Carl was really infuriated. I said that what we ought to do is tell him that it takes about a year or so to make your number. What we'll do is we will send these guys down to the joint command center and we'll let them serve a hitch down there as CIC officer of the world. We'll ask Bill Crowe to designate that as one of these jobs that qualifies you for a joint tour, so that as the guys finish their tour in the command center it will be just about the time they make their number, and will be in compliance with the law.

We gave that to Crowe and he said that we could do that for a couple of years. We then got into a big review of why is it that these nuclear guys can't have a couple of years off to go into a joint tour? Why is it that these aviators can't go and be joint...? Well, it turned out that there were a bunch of internal hair shirts that both the nuclear and aviation communities had put up, all of which amounted to: That's the way we've always done it. And they weren't going to change. Carl Trost wasn't going to change the way the nuclear guys trained or were assigned. And the aviators were not going to change the way the aviators had to stay in the cockpits in order to meet their aviator qualifications.

So what was happening was, the best officers in the submarine force and naval aviation were the guys who had the most difficult time in making flag. At the same time they were penalized because this mickey-mouse tour down in the command center was not a joint job in terms of the knowledge needed to understand the cultures of the Army and Air Force, as well as that of the non-nuclear Navy. Anyway, that was a terribly, terribly divisive and contentious set of issues—just one of many.

The issue in arms control about the relationship of the intermediate range nuclear weapons to the overall arsenal became very quickly an issue between the Navy and the Air Force, who wanted the MX and the Minuteman, and we wanted the Trident missile. That was a very bitter and contentious set of arguments. I formed a separate analysis division headed by Captain Bill Owens over at CNA to analyze that kind of issue. And I formed a reserve cell, like I had done when I was the IG, to help me deal with the Congressional staff.

Everything sort of came to a boil at that time, which exacerbated the Navy's feuds with the Air Force, with the Army, and with the Chairman himself. It was very difficult.

WINKLER: You also had almost a diplomatic hat, because you had these bilateral meetings, and also the initial seafaring symposium?

MUSTIN: No. I did have all the navy-to-navy talks. And on my watch we had France—I knew most of the senior French guys. With Korea. With Japan. With the Royal Navy. And of course I had the continuing sequence of Incidents at Sea talks with the Soviets.

Incidentally, Admiral Navoytsev came to Washington my second year. When I had gone to Moscow I told the guys I want to get my picture taken standing in front of the Kremlin. Which I did—a picture that I cherish. When Admiral Navoytsev came he said he wanted to have his picture taken standing in front of the White House, which he

did. He got one with a big smile on his face. Not much difference among sailors, no matter what country they are from.

He told me that he was the only guy in the world who had commanded both a U.S. and a Soviet ship. I checked around and, yeah, we had given them some DEs right at the end of World War II, and he had had command of one of them. So I got the guys to get a picture of his DE from the archives. Framed it and put a little brass plate on it describing the history. The first meeting back here we were still under Cap's indictment about no social contact. I had a little cocktail party anyway and gave Admiral Navoytsev this picture, and this hardened old Soviet sea dog actually cried, he was so touched.

The Soviets were straightforward, I thought, to deal with. There was none of the bombast or the speaking for the KGB guy when they were here, although he was with them. But when you were on their turf everything they said was for their own political consumption, very little to do with us.

The OpNav staff was badly equipped to handle the transition to Goldwater-Nichols. It was not helped by the nuclear cabal, and to a lesser extent by the senior aviators, but particularly the nuclear guys. And certainly not helped by the Secretary of the Navy. Before I got there, there had been a meeting in the tank where Goldwater and Nichols came over to discuss their pending legislation with the joint chiefs. Jim Watkins, the CNO at the time, had told Goldwater that he thought this was modeled on the German general staff and was un-American. Those were the exact words he used, un-American. Boy, I want to tell you, that didn't make the Navy any points. The staffies that had ginned this all up were the same guys that made the service academies graduate people with reserve commissions instead of regular commissions. A very, very, very difficult time.

WINKLER: You also went through a period of transition in your tenure—you had, what, three SecNav's?

MUSTIN: Let's see, we had John Lehman, we had Jim Webb, and Will Ball, yes. The way that ended up was, John Lehman wanted me to be CinCLantFlt, because I was really qualified. He knew that I had dealt at the highest levels of NATO, and that I had spearheaded the new weapons systems. Then he left. And he left a lot of broken china behind, a lot of ill will toward him on the Hill and in the joint arena, because he'd been both so successful and so blunt talking. Jim Webb came in and he really wanted me to be CinCLantFlt too. Lehman could have had the clout to get it done. I don't know whether Jim Webb ever would have, but he was strongly in support of it. He told me. And then he left suddenly. Will Ball came in as the selectee of...

WINKLER: He was tied with Towers.

MUSTIN: He was one of Towers' boys. They put all of Towers' guys over in the Pentagon, and then Towers didn't get confirmed. So Will was a real lame duck.

What ultimately happened was Bill Crowe took his guy, Powell Carter, and put him in as CinCLantFlt. That froze me out. At the time there had been a deal between the Army and the Marines that CinCCent would always be an Army officer or a Marine officer, and the guy down there was a Marine Corps four-star, George Crist. Al Gray, who was Commandant of the Marine Corps, said that he would withdraw the Marine nom and put me in. He wanted me to be CinCCent. The Army guy was Norm Schwarzkopf. The Chiefs voted in the tank. The Army and the Air Force voted for Norm, and the Navy and Marines voted for me, leaving Crowe to break the tie. He voted for me. It went up to Carlucci, who by then was the SecDef. Colin Powell was the national security advisor in the White House. Carlucci called up Colin Powell and said he was sending a nom over from the joint chiefs, and it's for an admiral to be CinCCent. In the meantime the Army had mounted a terrific PR campaign for Norm. Pictures of us were on the front page of the Post. Carl had not done the same for me, for reasons I've never known.

Colin Powell told Carlucci that CinCCent was going to be an Army general, and if he sent that damn thing over with some admiral on it, he (Carlucci) was going to have more trouble than he could handle. So much for having a non-parochial national security advisor.

Carlucci, being a tower of jello, said, okay he'd send over Schwarzkopf's name." So he did. Overruled the joint chiefs and sent it over. Norm got the job. I've had several occasions to reflect on that since that all occurred. That's the way that played itself out.

WINKLER: You could have had the best-selling book.

MUSTIN: I'll tell you what, the Navy and the Marines would have been used very differently in that war.

I was still on active duty during the flagging of the merchant ships and escorts and stuff—with Iran, not for Iraq. During Desert Shield, after I retired, I went down at Al Gray's request to Quantico to look at Marine amphibious options. We determined that we could make an amphibious operation in Basra, because the restrictions on Iraq provided for humanitarian supplies. So we watched the way these ships were going in there and we knew where the channels were. They weren't mined, because these huge ships were going in there. So I worked with the Marines down at Quantico. We proposed this amphibious op, which would essentially be an Inchon. It was to be in conjunction with the Hail Mary pass.

Well, Schwarzkopf and the Army had a continuing hard-on for the Marine Corps. You can go back to Belleau Wood. Pershing thought the Marines got too much credit for World War I. So they were not going to let the Marines do that. It was not going to be done. So instead the Marines' amphibious forces were used as a decoy. The Marines, of course, went up into Kuwait over land. Schwarzkopf's Congressional testimony and Army thought all along has followed this sort of line: Well, the Marines did a great job in the Gulf War, but they didn't do anything that a well-trained Army division couldn't do. And they didn't really use this amphibious capability. So what do we need all this

amphibious capability for? And by the way, what do we need a Marine Corps for? We're now making the Army lighter and more maneuverable and more deployable.

All of those arguments were front and center during the Gulf War. And I don't know that any of that has been made public. But it was certainly on the table at the time.

WINKLER: Going back to a little earlier, one of the issues that I'm interested in, because of my interest in the Persian Gulf region, is the CinCCent...

MUSTIN: Oh, I just wanted to finish up. One of the reasons that this happened with Carlucci and Colin Powell was that Will Ball had no power base at all, so he was unable to weigh in. Both Webb and John Lehman would have weighed in, and I know that Lehman would have carried the day. Jim at least would have weighed in. But Will Ball told me, he said, "I just don't have any clout with these guys." So that's how the three-SecNav timing figured in.

WINKLER: Yes. Which leads to your retirement.

Going back earlier, there's this interesting situation. You have this ComMidEastForce, and then you have a Joint Task Force, Middle East, and this interesting arrangement in the Middle East where you have: CinCPac controls up to the Straits of Hormuz and then CinCCent. But you've got the carriers out in the.... It's very similar to what you had in Vietnam, it seems.

MUSTIN: The action when I was Op 06 involved Iran. As a matter of fact we were making a very pronounced but not well-advertised tilt towards Iraq. We were providing them with targeting information, because they were having a big war with Iran. The tanker war was on my watch, and involved a number of really interesting command relations issues between CinCCent—George Crist at the time; this was before Norm Schwarzkopf—and CinCPac, Ron Hays. As well as issues with the NATO allies, who I was trying to persuade to help us. The Brits did right away. The Germans had some constitutional restrictions; they could not. The French said hell no. Nobody else really had any useful forces. The Japanese offered to pay for some of the operations, but couldn't send their own forces because they were a self-defense force.

The big issue was what do we do with forces in the Gulf because of the line of demarcation in the Straits. I wanted to send carriers in and the battleship in, and protect them with Aegis ships, and turn over to CinCCent for operational command. And use Tomahawk strikes if required in the tanker war. In the meantime the mines were coming out and the tankers were being hit. Ron Hays, the aviator, CinCPac, was adamantly opposed to that. His public line was that operations in the confused waters of the Gulf were restrictive. I think the real agenda was letting his forces go to CinCCent. I was saying that we don't have any other game in town, because at the time the Saudis had not given us permission to use Saudi Arabia as a staging base. And that the only way to get U.S. aviation into the Gulf to deal with the tanker war was through the Navy. From what

I had seen with the operations in the Norwegian Sea, that meant the carriers. From outside the Gulf the carriers just didn't have the legs to do anything.

That was the idea, supported by CinCCent, George Crist. Opposed by CinCPac. Bill Crowe sided with CinCPac. So as a result the tanker war and the re-flagging became sort of an FFG-CG exercise, with no particular retaliation against anything other than specific Iranian naval forces that were involved in engagement. So we shot up a couple of fueling stations and sank a couple of PT boats, and that's about it. There were a lot of unknowns about the use of the Tomahawk at the time, but there weren't any unknowns about the use of carrier air. CinCPac did not want to put his forces in there because he was worried. I don't think he was so worried about the vulnerability of the carriers as he was reluctant to provide them to CinCCent. You'd probably have to check Ron Hays' oral history to find out what his reasons were. But whatever they were, the battleship and the carriers did not go in on my watch.

As soon as Colin Powell took over as the Chairman, he ordered the carrier and the battleships in, and in they went. The preponderance of the joint command at Schwarzkopf's headquarters being Army and Air Force, they took the preponderance of the action. The rest is history.

But the reason that the carriers and the battleship did not go in, in my view, was the transfer of them to another CinC, and not the vulnerability issue, although the vulnerability issue was the one that was used as the reason.

The whole business about supporting forces and supported CinCs is always a very bitterly contested issue in NATO and in the United States. The Navy position, which I had to uphold because that was the Navy position but I didn't agree with, was that when we go in to support a land commander, the operational command of the carriers will remain with the providing CinC. I said that's divided command and that's stupid. If you're going to provide the forces you ought to provide the forces. The Navy said, well we don't want to turn our carriers over to Army generals. None of that's changed.

The first guy that said we're going to do it the right way, in the Atlantic, was Lee Baggett when he was CinCLant. The issue was how are we going to support the Southern Command, the Army general down there, in his drug ops, because the boundaries were redrawn. The Navy position was, well, we'll support him with CinCLant forces which will remain under the OpCon of CinCLantFlt. Lee said that's a bunch of crap. We're going to just give it to him and he can operate it under his own component commanders. So that was the first chink in that armor. That was on my watch as Op 06. Lee strayed from the reservation. I told him privately, "I thought you were doing the right thing." But in formal dialogues I had to support the Navy position, which was against it.

WINKLER: The next question I was going to go to is in that area. You dealing with the druggies. At the time Nicaragua was a thorn in the side.

MUSTIN: Yes. Well, that was on my Second Fleet watch, Nicaragua.

WINKLER: That's right. Then you had Noriega.

MUSTIN: At that time—Panama and Nicaragua—that territory was under CinCLant's aegis. So I had to prepare the strike plans for Nicaragua. And they would have been done with Second Fleet forces under the CJTF 120 hat.

Goldwater-Nichols—the ink was hardly dry and there were a bunch of Air Force staffers on the joint staff, saying hey, we don't like your plan. Wes McDonald sent me up to the Pentagon to brief our strike plan. The Air Force had a competitive plan that involved a hundred aircraft. Mine was a single carrier air wing. So I said to the Chairman: Look, I'm not here to debate this plan with your staff. I'm here to present you with Admiral McDonald's plan to conduct the air strike. If you don't agree with Admiral McDonald then I think you've got to discuss it with him. But I'm not going to argue about it with your staff. I've explained what Admiral McDonald intends to do and why, and that's all I intend to do. The Chairman said that he liked my plan, and he approved it. That was not Bill Crowe. General Vessey. Once again, the real agenda, which was Navy vs. Air Force was never debated in public. But it was a valuable lesson for me and a good prep school for my Op-06 tour. Those kinds of things go on all the time.

WINKLER: Then Noriega.

MUSTIN: That was after I retired. There was a lot of leading up to that before I retired. Colin Powell had not taken over as Chairman when I retired. Bill Crowe was still the Chairman, and that was one of Colin's operations, as you remember.

WINKLER: If there are any other issues, we'll get together one more time to talk about the Mustin family legacy. But if there are some other issues on Op 06.... Is there anything else to touch on?

MUSTIN: Well, there are a zillion things. I think probably it would be the areas in which you're most interested that I'd be delighted to talk more about. I've given you sort of an overview of what was going on and what some of the issues were. There were plenty of others. Redrawing of the UCP lines. We covered briefly the zero-sum game and the transfer of authority to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. SecNav changes, which were hard on me personally.

WINKLER: I guess Admiral Kelso took charge before you left?

MUSTIN: Yes. Well, no. Carl Trost was still the CNO.

WINKLER: Okay. He was finishing up.

MUSTIN: At the time the submariners, I think had ten per cent of the officer corps and something like seventy per cent of the three- and four-star billets. So they had firm control over the Navy policies and programs. I had made some determinations when I

was Op 06 that the issue about whether ASW or AAW was a more pressing threat for the Navy is a big internal issue. Because in its simplest terms, if you say ASW is our highest priority area, then the budgeteers say, okay, we're going to solve all our ASW problems with our money and whatever is left over we'll provide to everybody else. Well, it became pretty apparent to me that ASW was a code word for submarine programs, which was not surprising since seventy per cent of the three- and four-star guys were submariners. So when I started to beat the drums for AAW, that did not endear me to the submarine community, which was a very powerful set of admirals. I've often said that if I had joined the submarine league I might have been CinCLantFlt.

(End of Side A, Tape II)

I made a couple of speeches when I was on active duty. I went up to the John F. Kennedy School and some other places. I made one out at a Naval Institute clambake in San Diego. The issue was: How ready are we for our strategy? My statement was that we are not ready at all to fight the battle of the Atlantic in the Atlantic. So therefore, spending a bunch of ASW money on these FFGs and new submarines is a waste of money, because we're too short of forces based on the testimonies of a series of SACLants. We've got to fight in the Norwegian Sea, and that's a carrier and AAW war and not an ASW war. On the other hand we're pretty damn capable of dealing with other people, like Iraq and Iran, but the problem is, they don't have any submarine forces to speak of. So if you want to focus on littoral warfare and dealing with Iraq and Iran, the ASW money which was wasteful in the NATO context is triply wasteful in the lesser included case, because there are no large, capable submarine forces. How much of the Navy's hard-earned money do you want to spend on shallow-water ASW when you're talking about a country that's got four submarines? On the other hand, all of these countries have large modern air forces.

Well, that was not a popular thing to say. I still believe that. Of course, that's turned out to be the way the moneys have changed since I retired. At first, Then the submariners started ginning up these arguments about, well, there are 250 submarines worldwide, etc. Does that mean that all those guys are going to gang up against us at one time? Anyway, my views did not endear me to Carl Trost and Bill Crowe, both of whom were submariners. Or Powell Carter, who was Crowe's right-hand man (phonetic), who was also a submariner. So I did some things that I knew were not going to be helpful to my upward mobility, but they seemed to make sense at the time. And the way the Navy's priorities have changed since then makes me feel that I was indeed ahead of my time, just as Bud Zumwalt and Worth Bagley had been.

WINKLER: When you realized that the CinCLant billet was taken up and that Schwarzkopf was the CinCCent, basically...

MUSTIN: Carl said he had no place for me to go. So it's time to leave.

WINKLER: Okay. Talk a little bit about your retirement?

MUSTIN: Sure.

WINKLER: Just a quick overview. I think in your narrative, what we'll do is talk about what you did, but are there any activities besides your corporate jobs that you were called back on to support, Navy studies or anything?

MUSTIN: Yes, I've done some work for the director of Naval research in the area of communications, and this network-centric warfare stuff. I had a fellowship at the Center for Naval Analyses for two years, where I worked on developing this gunnery improvement program, which led to guided projectiles and the liberalization of the targeting of Tomahawk.

When I was Op 06 I was also the senior military advisor to the United Nations. So I worked on a presidential commission. When Clinton first came into office he had this commission on: What should we do? We should do more in the area of military participation for the United Nations. I was asked to come and talk about that. I was the only military guy. I said I don't think we ought to do any more. There's no structure in the U.N. If you call the U.N. after 1600 on any given day you can't even report a typhoon. There's nobody on watch. There's no structure to command forces. The idea of taking U.S. troops and putting them under the command of some Saudi Arabian prince just doesn't make any military sense, and would be very difficult to explain to the parents if a young man or woman came home in a body bag. So I don't think we ought to do any more for the United Nations militarily until the organization of the United Nations is capable of handling it. Any military operations should either be U.S.-unilateral or under the purview of an existing military structure such as NATO.

And if we do anything I don't think we ought to put our forces under the command of people that are not qualified to command. They ought to stay under the command of U.S. people. And in particular, if we're going to provide forces to military operations, we ought to provide things that we have and other nations don't. Which means that we should provide them with air and naval power, and look to others to provide manpower. The Navy and the Air Force thought that was a great observation; the Army didn't like it at all. The Army wanted a piece of the action.

But all of my concerns came to pass in Somalia. Poor Jon Howe went down there and got hung out to dry, because he was the Secretary-General's representative. The Secretary-General has no authority over anything. He's a staff guy. A lot of people don't understand how the UN organization works. But it doesn't work. It is not an organization that's structured at all to command or supervise military operations in the field. Jeez, Jon got down there. He'd tell these Saudi guys, hey, I'd like you to do this, and the guy would just say: Aw, go to hell; I'm not going to do that. You don't have any authority. That was a pretty good lesson. My observation was that, if we're going to go and get more involved with the U.N. was that we ought to always do it either within a U.S. unilateral command structure or within a structure that already exists, like NATO.

What I think would be of value would be if you would think of some things that are of interest to Naval History. Because almost anything that you're thinking about during that period came under the aegis of Op 06 at one point or another.

One sea story that was of interest. One night I was at my daughter's having dinner, and I got a call from the Navy command center that the Stark had been hit by a missile and was on fire. So I left and went into the command center and stayed there all night. Started to figure out, okay, what do we know about this, and what do we don't know? It turned out that we didn't know a lot, but we did know a very few things. I had been inured to these early reports from the field in Vietnam that were always ninety per cent wrong. And I knew that according to initial action reports we had sunk the Japanese navy five times by the time we got to the battle of Leyte Gulf. So I was very explicit about: Here's what we know and here's what we don't know.

Early in the morning the CNO showed up and word came to me in the command center to go on in and brief the CNO on the Stark. I went in to his office. While I was in there SecNav's aide came in and said that SecNav wants to be briefed on the Stark. So the CNO and I got up and went in to see the SecNav. We got about half way through the briefing to the SecNav and an aide came in and said the SecDef wants to be briefed on the Stark. So now the SecNav, the CNO, and I go down to the Sec Def. Every time we do this the line gets longer. So now we're down there briefing the SecDef, and the Executive Assistant came in and said that a briefing was required for a joint session of Congress on the Stark. So now—Bill Crowe was out of town—Bob Herres, the vice chairman, and I, just the two of us, started briefing the Congress, which we did. We were very careful to say here's what we know and here's what we don't know.

I came back to my office and sent a steward over to my quarters to get a fresh uniform when the word came: You've got to go to the White House and brief the President. So Bob Herres and I went over there to brief President Reagan. This was about three o'clock in the afternoon after all this time. And of course we kept learning a little more as the time went on.

We get in the room with the President. I told him what we knew and what we didn't know. All of his principal advisors were there wringing their hands, about how are we going to cover this with the press? And what are we going to do about the inadequacies, not being able to protect our ships? How's this going to play? What kind of spin can we put on it? Except for President Reagan, who said, "I'm thinking about those poor young sailors who were killed in this." He said to me, "Admiral, do you think that you could arrange that when the sailors' bodies are returned I could be there to meet them and comfort the families to the degree that I can?"

I said, "Certainly sir, I will arrange that." I walked out of there and I thought, now there's a guy who stays focused on the problem. These other guys were all off on the periphery, the PR and the PAO. He didn't give a damn about that stuff. He figured they were going to handle it. He was going to do what he could to make the families feel

better about the loss of their husbands. I thought that was a pretty convincing display of the way I would like the President of the United States to react in a crisis situation.

WINKLER: I could picture the spin folks all saying, “This is a bad thing. We don’t want the President associated with these dead bodies.”

MUSTIN: Oh, yes. And, “Jeez, this is Iraq and we’ve given them all this information. The Hill’s going to find that out. What are they going to say when they do?” They were all off on the periphery. I’ve noticed in the last couple of days they’ve been playing these tapes about when Reagan was shot. I don’t know if you’ve been hearing those on the TV. Reagan gets shot and Haig gets up and says he’s in charge. Well, the first thing that Regan, the chief of staff, says, is, “Jeez, what are we going to do about gun control? We’d better have some strong positions, because people are going to raise that.” It had nothing to do with Reagan being shot, but that’s the kind of stuff that goes on. When President Reagan was in there all that same peripheral kind of stuff was being debated, but not in his mind.

WINKLER: Let’s close it for this evening. I’m going to come back probably for some additional items from the Op 06 tour. Then we’ll go and visit...tell me a little more about the Mustin family and whip out the old family tree, and we’ll get that on tape.

MUSTIN: All right.

17 April 2001

WINKLER: This is Dave Winkler and Captain Bill Peerenboom of the Naval Historical Foundation. This is April 17, 2001, and we’re here with Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, after concluding a series of interviews. You retired in 1989 after serving, I guess, about four decades or so?

MUSTIN: Yes, since 1950.

WINKLER: Could you reflect a little bit about how the Navy had changed over your tenure in service?

MUSTIN: Yes. I’ve been thinking about that since we started this series of interviews.

The context for the change was the simultaneous rise of the Soviet Union as a major maritime power from what had previously been a coastal defense force, and at the same time the decline in the size, although not in capability, of the United States Navy relative to that Soviet rise. So there was an enormous change in the balance of power at sea, that was not well advertised and not well understood in the United States.

Conversely, it was very well understood in the Soviet Union. The manifestation of that understanding was a carefully orchestrated political-military campaign, because the

Soviets recognized that while they were the dominant land power in Europe, in many respects they were not able to match the United States at sea globally, and that stymied further expansion outside of Europe. Further, in order to match the United States at sea, they would have to divert more funds from the restructuring of the Soviet economy and from the land and rocket forces than they were prepared to do. So the nub of their campaign was to neutralize the United States Navy, and NATO, diplomatically. That took a number of forms, including proposed arms-control agreements, and keep-out zones, and modern equivalents of the Washington Conference of 1922, all of them designed to put restrictions on the operations of U.S. Naval forces at sea, thereby neutralizing the U.S., while not spending more money on the Soviet Navy. A very carefully orchestrated and sophisticated campaign, not well understood by many people in the United States, and swallowed, generally, hook, line, and sinker, by the intelligentsia in the State Department, Ivy League colleges, and other places of that ilk. So that was the global context.

In the Navy, we went from 1000 ships when I was a junior officer down to about 400, and back up to 600, just about, when I retired. The changes in those ships and the Navy were significant. We went, for openers, to nuclear power. We changed from prop-driven to jet-driven aircraft. We saw the advent of anti-ship cruise missiles. We saw satellites go up. We saw digital computers and the digitization of the Navy. We saw, in the Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles, that the surface combatants could join aircraft carriers in power projection. We saw the end of the draft, and the enormous and turbulent changes that were involved with the handling of that. We saw Korea and Vietnam, which involved whole new ways of understanding armed conflict. We saw in general the increased sophistication of the Navy, which required the complete re-thinking of the Navy training establishment and structure. What was expected of a gunner's mate in 1955 is very different from what was expected of a gunner's mate in 1982. In 1982, he would have to be as much of an electronics technician as a mechanical engineer. So there were enormous changes in weaponry, the characteristics of the naval vessels, the kinds of skills required by both the officers and the enlisted.

We saw the introduction of women into the service and the issues surrounding the "gay rights" agenda. We saw terrible internal stresses in the country caused by the Vietnam War. In fact, we saw the Korean War become the first war that the United States had not won convincingly, and, as I said, it introduced a whole new way of thinking and conducting armed conflicts. The nuclear trigger provided a backdrop that, strategically and conceptually, we simply were not prepared to handle in the conduct of conventional war.

So all of these things, to me, indicate a very, very, interesting and unique time in Naval history. I used to say in speeches, that the changes that occurred in Naval matters during my brief time in the Navy were far, far greater than the aggregate of all the changes that had occurred in the preceding 200 years. So I feel very fortunate to have been a bystander to some of those major changes, and to be a footnote to history, as we discussed last time in this series.

WINKLER: As a follow-up to that question, what would you think are some of the constants over that period of time? Things that haven't changed in the Navy.

MUSTIN: The first constant is the sea, who remains a demanding mistress. The challenges of operating even the most modern vessels at sea are, in general, the same challenges that Prince Henry the Navigator and Christopher Columbus faced. So the need to understand and master the sea, which is the Navy's chosen medium of operation, is a constant that will never change.

The requirement that people in responsible positions at sea be leaders, is a constant. These days, in my view, the requirement for leadership is at a premium at least equal to that of World War II and the other wars, because the challenges are so significant for these young officers, who are facing problems that I never had to face. These challenges include the many issues regarding women on ships, the social experiments such as gays and lesbians, the whole environment of political correctness, and the "gotcha" relationships with the media.

Leadership is a constant. Mastery of the sea is a constant. The ability to prevail and to persevere is a constant. Arleigh Burke once said, and I believe it sums the problem up, that the Navy expects its successful officers in wartime to win battles, and in peacetime to win arguments. So the ability of senior people to win those battles and to win those arguments and prevail and accomplish the interests of the service is a constant. Therefore, the ability of the senior people in the Navy to be adroit and adept in the high corridors of power, not only in Washington, the Pentagon, the executive branch, and on the Hill, but in the executive corridors of our various alliances and adversarial countries worldwide, is a never wavering constant.

I'm sure there are more. There are technical constants. You have to be a good pilot if you want to be an aviator. You certainly ought to understand nuclear engineering if you want to be a nuclear submariner. You'd better understand the wind and current if you want to command a destroyer. But I'm not talking about things at that level. I'm talking about broader areas of constants.

PEERENBOOM: I think it would be interesting to hear your thoughts on the changes in the personalities of the sailors in that period of time. You talked about the officers having to know so much more now than they did when you and some, myself, had to deal with problems. I think back to the days when I was a damage control assistant on my first ship and the kind of sailor you ran into then, versus the kind of sailor you ran into twenty years later or twenty-five years later, and watching that change.

MUSTIN: Yeah. The requirement that the people in the Navy, officer and enlisted, be much more technically sophisticated and proficient has been proportional to the increase in complexity of the equipments that they're responsible for. There's a line in "The Caine Mutiny" where Herman Wouk says that "Ships were designed by geniuses to be run by idiots." The World War II and prior ships essentially fit that description. You could look

at a feed pump and if you didn't like the way it was running you hit it with a bigger hammer, and that solved the problem. No more. You can't do that with a microscopic circuit. So the requirements for technical education and proficiency are much higher in the digital Navy.

The one part of that issue that I'm not really up to speed on, and I don't think anybody else is, is how much our requirements have increased relative to the general base of knowledge in the civilian community. That is, when I was working on this project for the SecNav, on extending the littoral battle space, we went out and looked at a very complex new set of advanced computers that were about the size of a cigar box. One Marine was operating this thing. I said, "How long did it take you to learn how to operate that?"

He said, "About two weeks."

I was stunned. I said, "How in the world did you learn it so fast?"

He said, "I learned about how to do this when I was in high school." So what is not clear to me is how much our specific technical requirements are over and above the basic increase in the technical competence of the people that are coming into the Navy. I don't necessarily subscribe to the notion that these people are any smarter. I just think they know a lot more. Because they take things now in very junior grades in school—I can see with my own grandchildren—that we never took until we were in college.

But to see these young Marines and sailors adapt these things—you know, they're the PacMan-plus generation. The pace of mechanization and modernization and the sophistication of the way of life in the civilian community has increased at the same degree that the sophistication has increased in the military. Which is a long way of saying that I think the people are different now, the gear is different, but the difference is only in the area of education and general knowledge. I don't think their basic needs are any different. And therefore I don't think there are fundamental changes in the attitudes and knowledge that you need in order to be a sailor. The major change is in the area of the spouses--the working spouse has put stresses into Navy marriages that we didn't face on my watch, but the major stress of family separation remains front and center.

WINKLER: Okay. That might be a good place to break, and then we'll go ahead and start talking about the family tree here. Any other parting thoughts?

MUSTIN: Yes. The final thought that I have is that at the end of World War II the Navy was essentially a power-projection Navy. There was no more opposition at sea; because we had swept the seas of German and Japanese navies. We had found for the first time what carrier air could do. So we had a Navy that was designed essentially not to defeat an opposing fleet, but to inflict damage on an enemy ashore, because there was no opposing fleet. The means of doing this was the sole purview of the carrier air; that is beyond the 20 mile range of battleship guns. And that's what we did in Korea. And that's what we did in Vietnam.

But while we were concentrating on this power-projection Navy, a whole new navy rose up to threaten us—the Soviet Union. And so we had to change our direction in midstream to be a sea-control Navy. All of a sudden we couldn't just assume that we could go from the east coast or the west coast of the United States to Point B and launch air strikes. There was a navy out there that could make that very difficult. That was the Soviet Navy. And with our carriers the obvious high priority Soviet targets, the surface navy became very defensive oriented with a primary role to protect the carriers.

So with the same forces, since it takes literally decades to make major changes in the composition of the fleet, we had to change a whole set of priorities to go from power projection to fleet-on-fleet, or sea control, operations; which we did in the Zumwalt era. Then, near the end of my watch, the Soviet Union went away. So we had to go back from a sea control to a power projection navy. But our aircraft carriers were now so limited in numbers that we had to re-arm the surface navy with offensive weaponry in order to disperse and expand power projection.

So now this littoral warfare notion is a new buzzword for power projection. All of these things that people talk about, like operating in the Persian Gulf and everything, assume that you can get to the Persian Gulf without any problem. You're now figuring out what you have to do once you get there. So the Navy has gone from power projection, to sea control, back to power projection, and all of this had to be done with the same forces in very tight fiscal environments.

The Aegis fleet, for example, was built for sea control purposes, and now it's being used with Tomahawk missiles for power projection purposes and for theater ballistic missile defense against land-launched missiles. Now it is very difficult for the Navy to change the character of the fleet without building a bunch of new ships. It is a very expensive proposition, and emphasizes the need for people who, as Arleigh Burke said, win arguments. Because if you really want to do littoral warfare and all that entails—close cooperation with not only the Army and the Air Force, but with allied forces—you must make major changes to a sea-control Navy. And none of those changes is inexpensive. It's difficult to explain to people who have never served in the armed forces, which is increasingly the character of both the Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, why you have to take these brand new ships all of a sudden change them, expensively and with the loss of operating time while in conversion.

The idea that three times in 50 years we would have to deal with very significant changes in the basic role of the Navy with forces that were built and constructed for completely different roles is an idea that I would never have imagined when I raised my right hand and said, "I do."

WINKLER: Okay. (Pause)

Okay, we're sitting here looking at a humongous family tree. Admiral, do you want to start?

MUSTIN: Yes. The problem with walking through this enormous heritage is that both my mother's and my father's side have got a long and distinguished connection with the Navy. So I'm going to have to try to sort this out orally as best I can.

I'll start with my grandfather, Henry C. Mustin, who graduated from the Naval Academy in 1896, and was replaced as the all-time all-Navy quarterback on the football team by Roger Staubach in the 1960s. So he was quite an athlete. He was one of the first four-year four-letter men at the Naval Academy, and held a number of national records in the pole vault—12 feet, 6 inches.

He, in the Spanish-American War, captured a Spanish vessel. In those days none of the small ships had refrigerators, so the ships would tie up at night to islands, and the crew would go ashore and hunt food and cook their meals. He and a couple of guys off his small ship found this Spanish vessel. So they stuck knives in their teeth, swam ashore like an Errol Flynn movie and cut the mooring lines, captured the ship, and then he sent a message—by a message I mean a Western Union telegram, because we didn't have the Navy communications service—to the Chief of Naval Operations, saying that he'd captured this vessel and what should he do with it? The Chief of Naval Operations said: It's hereby a commissioned vessel in the United States Navy, and you're the captain. So that was his first command and he was commended for that action.

He became interested in naval aviation shortly after the Wright brothers flew, and at one time he held the world's record for over-water flight, which was from Philadelphia to Annapolis. The flight ended because he and Marshall Reid, his co-pilot, crashed into the Chesapeake Bay, and were rescued by a passing fisherman as they sat on the wings of their aircraft which floated on the night waters of the bay.

In about 1912 he wrote a letter to the CNO—he was a lieutenant commander—and he said: I think this aviation has got a great future; some day you'll be able to deliver mail with airplanes, even fly passengers, probably across the country and maybe even across the oceans. There will be a whole new industry associated with this. But right now there is no industry, and the only people that have airplanes are the people who can afford to build and buy them themselves. So what we need to do in the military is take the lead in bringing aviation to the attention of industry so that commercial aviation can grow and flourish. If you believe all that is true, in the Navy we should have a school to teach officers to fly, and we should provide them with some airplanes to do that. And if you believe all of that, I volunteer to be the head of that school.

These battleship admirals got this letter in OpNav and they said: Who the hell is this cloud-nine dreamer? He's running around causing us trouble here, and if we buy more airplanes, we'll have fewer dollars to buy more battleships. We've got to get him out of our hair. Some guy said, well, we've got this old abandoned naval station in a swamp down in Florida, built it during the Civil War and then closed it up a couple of years ago. What we'll do is we'll send him down there. That gets him about as far out of town as you can get, and he won't bother us any more.

So they gave him the North Carolina, assigned him as exec, but he was the skipper of the aviators, and he swung by Annapolis, where the aviation detachments, such as they were, were living in tents. Swept them all up and steamed down to Pensacola, and opened up that old Civil War station that had been closed up for a long time. That was the start of Pensacola.

While he was there the Mexican campaign occurred. The North Carolina and the aviation dets went down to the battle of Veracruz, where they became the first American aviators ever to receive ground fire. They were flying spotting missions for the battleship's guns over the city, and one of the aircraft took some bullets. That was the first time that any U.S. aviator of any service received ground fire.

Interestingly, when I was ComSecondFlt, my staff Marine gave me a book on the history of amphibious operations. One of the operations was the landing at Veracruz. At the time of that landing my mother's grandfather, my great-grandfather, Thomas Benton Howard, was CinCPacFlt, who provided the forces for this; my grandfather Mustin was in command of the aviation detachments; and my great-uncle, George Barnett, was the Commandant of the Marine Corps. And the only one of those ancestors mentioned in that history was George Barnett. The Marines didn't seem to consider that these other players were important.

Anyway, Henry Mustin was Naval Aviator Number 11. He has been referred to by many people as the father of naval aviation. He was the first person to conceive the idea of a catapult to launch aircraft from ships, and he personally conducted the first catapult launch from a ship underway from the North Carolina in Pensacola Bay in 1915. Shortly thereafter, he conceived the idea of a "flat top" ship to carry airplanes.

Prior to his time in aviation, of course there wasn't any aviation to be in. He had been in one of the battleships in the Great White Fleet, one of which also was commanded by Thomas Benton Howard. So he kissed his brand new bride goodbye at Hampton Roads and said, I'll see you in a couple of years, and my grandmother, in 1908, said she wasn't going to put up with that. She was going to join him on this world cruise. So she took the train to St. Louis and a stagecoach to San Francisco, where she caught a steamer for Sydney, Australia. She arrived in Sydney—she's nineteen years old—and she went to a hotel that she'd been told about, and said, "I'm Mrs. Mustin. My husband is serving in one of the battleships, and I'd like a room while he's here."

The clerk said, "Mrs. Mustin, the city is absolutely full because of the arrival of the American battleships. We just don't have any rooms. But you should not worry, because you and your husband can have a grand time, since we have the finest dining room in all of Sydney."

She said, "If you think I came 12,000 miles just to have dinner with my husband, you've got another thing coming." She said, in those days ladies didn't talk that way. She

said the clerk disappeared with a red face, and came out in a couple of minutes followed by the manager, who said, “We’ve got a room for you, Mrs. Mustin.”

She was telling me some of these stories at one point. She was negotiating with Twentieth Century Fox to write the story of some of these experiences. I said, “Who’s going to play you, Grandmom?”

She said, “I’m holding out for Marilyn Monroe.” She was a lovely lady, and great wit.

WINKLER: How long did she live?

MUSTIN: She lived ‘til she was in her late eighties. She died in 1976.

PEERENBOOM: And how had she met your grandfather?

MUSTIN: They met in Philadelphia. She was a wonderful lady. And incidentally, after my grandfather died in 1923, she later married one of his students from Pensacola, George Murray, who became the captain of the Enterprise at the Battle of Midway, and later retired as a four-star admiral. So she had a whole different Navy experience with him. I remember her saying one time to me, “I have been married to two lieutenant commanders, two commanders, two captains, a rear admiral, a vice admiral, and an admiral, but this is the first time I ever had a grandson who was selected for captain.” I thought that was quite something.

She was an accomplished linguist. She spoke Chinese and Japanese. Of course, the Enterprise was homeported at Pearl Harbor when Pearl Harbor was attacked, but luckily was at sea. And she was also a gray lady. So she had gone down to the hospital at Hickam to treat the wounded in the bombing on the 7th of December. She said she worked all day in these terrible scenes of disaster, and she said they didn’t have any idea whether the Enterprise had been sunk or where it was or what was going on. She said she went out to catch a break just at sunset, and she looked out over the horizon as the sun was setting in the west, and she saw the Enterprise coming up over the horizon, safe and untouched. When she told the story, it was very moving.

She also was a first cousin of the Duchess of Windsor, so she had a lot of fun with the Duchess and the Duke. During World War II, when my dad was in the Pacific—Navy families didn’t have a lot of money in those days, and my mother lived in what she called genteel poverty. She was almost in rags. Except the Duchess had the same size shoes as my mom, and the Duchess was always on the Ten Best-Dressed Women in the World list. Which meant that she could wear a pair of shoes and the matching handbag once, and when it showed up with her picture in Vogue that was it. So all during the war these packages would arrive from the Duchess, and they would contain a handbag and a pair of alligator shoes, or something like that. So my mother would wear these raggedy dresses with these really very expensive designer shoes and handbag.

But I've digressed a little bit. That covers my Grandfather Mustin, who was the first of his family to be in the Navy. My grandmother, in addition to being the first cousin of the Duchess of Windsor, my Grandmother Mustin was the sister-in-law of George Barnett, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and she was the great-granddaughter of Commodore Arthur Sinclair, who was voted a silver service by the Congress for victories over the British in the Battle of the Great Lakes in 1812.

Her grandfather, also named Arthur Sinclair, commanded one of the ships when Perry opened Japan. So she had a long, long list of distinguished Navy connections. One of the Arthur Sinclairs, my great-great-uncle, was the first lieutenant in one of the great sea stories of all time—Raphael Semmes' cruiser, the Alabama. He was a survivor of the battle between the Monitor and the Merrimack. So he was quite a distinguished guy. He later wrote a book about his time with Semmes in the Alabama.

That's about my Grandmother and Grandfather Mustin's side. Of course, George Murray was a four-star admiral, the captain of the Enterprise at the battle of Midway, my grandmother's second husband.

Oh, I wanted to say one other sea story about my Grandfather Mustin. After he finished his time at Pensacola, he was assigned as exec of a battleship. During a storm off Cape Hatteras two of the sailors were washed over the side, and he jumped over the side and managed to save one of the sailors. He was awarded a gold life saving medal for that, but in so doing, he strained his heart. This, in turn, led to his death in 1923 at the early age of 49. His death was referred to by Admiral Moffett as "an inestimable loss to Naval Aviation and to the Navy."

And we have a family legend that we couldn't really pin down now, that when he was a junior officer in London—the way my grandmother told the story—he was accosted at a diplomatic reception in honor of the King, by a diplomat from another country, who referred to the U.S. Navy as a bunch of pantywaists with no courage. In addition, the guy made very disparaging remarks about the flag; to the effect that he would spit on it. And so, in full regalia, with cocked hat and epaulets and everything, my grandfather punched this guy and knocked him cold. He was court-martialed and lost numbers. Then the court-martial was subsequently set aside by the President, Teddy Roosevelt, who wrote on his review of the case that he thought that Lieutenant Mustin had been "tempted beyond all reasonable expectation of restraint, and had I, T. Roosevelt, been in his position my actions would have been the same. He is hereby restored to his previous seniority."

So he was quite a very colorful character, and made major contributions to the Navy and to Naval aviation. He was the first aviation type commander, was a leading proponent of the creation of the Bureau of Aeronautics and served as the first Assistant Chief of the Bureau when it was established.

WINKLER: You mentioned he was the first Mustin to go into the Navy. Do you know what inspired him to join?

MUSTIN: I have no idea. I don't know.

WINKLER: What did his parents do?

MUSTIN: They were from Philadelphia. They were merchants. One of them ran a mill. They were well-respected members of the civilian community.

WINKLER: And your grandmother—I noticed there was that newspaper clipping that she was the first aviator in Philadelphia?

MUSTIN: We think she was the first woman in the United States to fly in an airplane. Marshall Reid's sister was married to my grandfather's brother. Marshall Reid and Glenn Curtiss were great friends, and Marshall Reid had one of the few airplanes in the country, in 1911. That was three years after the Wright brothers. So one Sunday afternoon he decided he'd take a bunch of his pals up for a flight. And he took my grandmother first. That was front-page news in the Philadelphia paper. He also took my grandfather later that day. That's the first time, we think, that my grandfather went up. Because he was quoted in the paper as saying that he was going to learn how to fly soon. It was quite an event, and fully covered in the paper as the "daring aeronaut," "aviatrix," described her flight, which was fifteen minutes long. So she was quite a lady.

A couple from Pensacola did a history when I was on active duty, in Op 06, of aviation in Pensacola, and they turned it into a play called "Seaplane." This was a very wealthy couple down there. They had the play produced and put on at the Kennedy Center, with a troupe of professional actors in it. The play was about the early days of Naval aviation. So they had actors playing all these people—"Putty" Read and Saufley and all those guys. And there was a couple playing my grandfather and grandmother. Lucy and I went to this play; I was in evening dress uniform. It was a big deal, and we were seated well up front. The CNO and the SecNav and a whole bunch of our friends were seated right around us. One of the lines in the play was, one of the characters said, "Well, we're going over to the Mustins for a cocktail party tonight. You know, the Mustins give the best parties in town." With that, all of our friends in the theater gave us a standing ovation. Which we thought was kind of neat. But the Mustins have a history of Naval aviation of which we're very proud, of course.

Incidentally, I'm sure you know that there's a second destroyer to be named, not only for my grandfather, but for my father and myself and my brother. In 1998 I wrote a letter to the SecNav and asked him to consider naming a second destroyer "Mustin," and he decided to do that. So that will be christened the 15th of December, this year. It's being built now in Pascagoula.

So that is a thumbnail sketch of the Mustin side.

WINKLER: Your grandfather, you said he died in 1923?

MUSTIN: 1923. An airfield at Philadelphia was named for him. And a destroyer was also named for him.

My father graduated from the Naval Academy in 1932. He was an all-American swimmer, captain of the swimming team, and stood very, very high in his class—I think 10th or 11th. He became one of the leading ordnance experts in the Navy. Designed the lead-computing sight, which was instrumental, according to Admiral Nimitz, in winning the air war in the Pacific. He fought all the way through the Pacific in cruisers and battleships, survived the sinking of the Atlanta, fought with the Marines on Guadalcanal for three months at the height of that battle. After the war he had various sea commands, mostly in cruisers and destroyers, got involved in the nuclear test business, ran the tests in the South Atlantic in which the Van Allen belt was discovered, and later became director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, which is now no longer in existence. He was the Director of J-3, the Operations Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the height of the Vietnam War. He had great contempt for McNamara. My dad was an officer who was loved and respected by people. I have people all the time coming up to me and telling stories about how they appreciated him, and what a leader he was, how professionally competent. When he was the commander of all Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Forces, he made a number of important tactical innovations.

I just finished reading his journal that he kept in the Atlanta, which was sunk in the Battle of Guadalcanal on 14 November 1942. It's fascinating to read his detailed descriptions of the tactics. He joins a large group of veterans who were very critical of Admiral Spruance for not following up after the carrier strike, and also critical of Admiral Ghormley in the conduct of the sea campaign incident to the Battle of Guadalcanal. In this journal, written by a lieutenant, lieutenant commander, the language is pretty pungent. He has detailed drawings of the formations they were in, and describes what they were trying to do. He describes the shot in the arm for everybody's morale when Admiral Halsey was announced as Ghormley's relief. He bitterly complains through the entire journal that Ghormley and Frank Jack Fletcher were doing everything they could to avoid engaging the Japanese navy, and so they allowed the Japanese navy at the time to amass these large forces that subsequently raised so much hell with the U.S. Navy. He believed at the time, and believed 'til he died, that if they had had a properly competent, aggressive series of commanders there in the early days, we would have never seen Savo Island, because they had enough carrier power at the time to keep the Japanese from bringing large surface forces into the region had the commanders chose to engage.

My dad had a very distinguished career, was early selected for every rank, and retired as a vice admiral when his left eye was put out in an accident in the swimming pool at the Pentagon athletic center in 1972.

WINKLER: He comes up in your career because he obviously was a mentor.

MUSTIN: Oh, yes.

WINKLER: How far along were you when he retired?

MUSTIN: I was a commander.

WINKLER: How long did he live after that?

MUSTIN: He died in 1999.

Now, on my mother's side, her father, James Proctor Morton, was one of the superintendents of the Naval Postgraduate School, and was with Admiral Dewey at the Battle of Manila Bay. In those days they got prize money in the Navy, and so he came back from the Battle of Manila Bay as a lieutenant commander, with \$1000 in prize money. His wife said, "Oh, wonderful. We'll put it into silver." So they bought \$1000 worth of silver in the early part of the century with this Manila Bay prize money, and had it all engraved, as being from Manila Bay prize money. We still have a number of pieces of that, which we cherish.

Her uncle, Douglas Howard, was a destroyer skipper in World War I. He was awarded the Navy Cross for sinking a submarine. He also was athletic director and coach of the football team at the Naval Academy, where he'd been a great football player, and he coached Navy to its only unscored-on season. A DE was named for him.

PEERENBOOM: Unscored on?

MUSTIN: Unscored on. They defeated Army 3-0.

Douglas Howard's father, Thomas Benton Howard, was my mother's grandfather. His father served under General Grant in the Civil War as a surgeon, and was killed when the Confederates blew up a bridge after the surrender at Appomattox. General Grant appointed one of the sons, Douglas, to West Point and the other, Thomas Benton, to Annapolis with the class of 1873.

Thomas Benton Howard was the captain of one of the ships, I think the Ohio, in the Great White Fleet. I have a picture of the captains taken in front of the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, and he's one of them. He became CinCPacFlt, as I said.

Here is a little rack-up of our direct family that attended the Naval Academy, on both father and mother sides. Thomas Benton Howard was Class of 1873; George Barnett, Commandant of the Marine Corps in World War I, 1881; James Proctor Morton, 1895; Henry Croskey Mustin, 1896; Abram Claude Howard, 1900; Douglas L. Howard, 1906; George D. Murray, 1911; Bushrod B. Howard, 1911; Charles P. Hill, 1927; Arthur Sinclair Hill, 1929; Lloyd Montague Mustin, my father, 1932; John M. Howard, 1933; Thomas Howard Morton, my mother's brother, who became a rear admiral, 1933; Joseph B. Howard, 1950; myself, Class of '55; my brother Tom, Class of 1962; and my son John, Class of 1990. We also have a large number of Claude cousins who are USNA graduates. So we've done our bit to keep that place in business.

WINKLER: Did we cover how your father and mother met?

MUSTIN: No. My mother's mother, my Grandmother Morton, was from Annapolis and lived in Annapolis in what is now the Lord Calvert Inn. It was then the Claude Apartments, built by her family back in the early part of the century, before the Civil War. So my mother lived in Annapolis. And the Navy was very small in those days. So my Grandmother Mustin knew my Grandmother Morton very well. So when my father became a midshipman the two mothers arranged an introduction, and that's how they met.

They were married as soon as he graduated. She was sixteen and he was twenty. They went off immediately to the flagship of the Asiatic fleet, the cruiser Augusta, which was commanded by Captain Chester Nimitz. My dad said, needless to say, it was a very well-commanded ship and did well in everything. Incidentally, he, at that time, made friends with a young family in the diplomatic service that was stationed there, the Lillys. James Lilly, one of the young boys, who's a former ambassador now to China, was taught to swim by my dad. He and I have had some fun discussing that over the years.

My dad said that he didn't really see Admiral Nimitz, except for a couple of meetings in Pearl Harbor during the war, until after the war was over when Admiral Nimitz was the CNO. He said that Admiral Nimitz had a meeting of all the officers, all the Naval officers, on duty in Washington at the time. There weren't that many officers in Washington in those days. But anyway, they were all in the room. He said that he, my dad, was seated way in the back with the commanders, because there were all these flag officers in front. He said Admiral Nimitz came in and, of course, they all stood up. He said, Admiral Nimitz stood up and said, "Well, I have some things I want to say to you, but before I do that, I look around the room and I see a lot of old friends and shipmates." My dad said he started going around the room naming people. He saw my dad back there, and he said, "Hi, Lloyd. How are you doing? How are Emily and the children?" My dad said there was no way that his aide could have prompted him on that. He just knew all the people that he had served with, and named them by name. My dad said it was the most amazing thing he ever saw. And he used that often as an example of a guy who really cares about people, who knows something about leadership, which was sorely needed in the Pacific Fleet after Pearl Harbor.

I'm kind of rambling around, here. I don't know how your poor subscriber is ever going to make any sense out of all this stuff. There's a zillion sea stories about all these distinguished people, the various arguments and fights. Everything seemed to work out all right in the end.

The Duchess of Windsor, my Grandmother Mustin's first cousin, was twice divorced when she married Edward: Her first husband was a Naval aviator named Win Spencer, who was a student of Henry Mustin at Pensacola. They met at my grandparents' house, Lieutenant Spencer and Miss Warfield. She went on from there.

This was a very different Navy and environment, because it sounds like everybody was all intertwined, and they were. The pre-World War II Navy was a very, very small operation. Everybody knew everybody.

WINKLER: Your mother's line goes back a ways.

MUSTIN: Yes. Well, as far back as we can get it, it goes back to Admiral Howard thanks to U.S. Grant, in the class of 1873. We can't find a Morton prior to James Proctor Morton who was in the Navy.

PEERENBOOM: How is it that your father chose not to go into aviation?

MUSTIN: He had bad eyes.

PEERENBOOM: The age-old thing.

MUSTIN: Yeah.

PEERENBOOM: Do you think he would have, had he not?

MUSTIN: I don't think that he ever considered it, because he knew what the physical requirements were, and he knew that he didn't meet them. But he certainly was well aware of the use of air power. A great tactician.

Let's see, Dave, can you think of anything else?

There's a hall in the Boston Navy Yard named for Admiral Murray, who, in addition to being the captain of the Enterprise at the Battle of Midway, was elected to receive the Japanese surrender in the Marianas, which he did. When he retired they settled in San Francisco. I asked my grandmother, "Why are you moving to San Francisco?"

She said, "Well, George says that all you do if you retire in Washington is bury your friends and classmates." I thought that was a very strange remark, but I don't think so anymore.

One of his great golfing pals was Dean Witter, who gave him some pretty astute financial advice. So, from a life, sort of, of poverty during the war, Admiral Murray managed to leave us all in not too bad shape.

WINKLER: There was an oral history done with your father, right? The Naval Institute?

MUSTIN: Yes. And it's voluminous. Right now, United Defense has arranged with the Naval Institute to do a book about the family. It will cover my grandfather, my father, myself and my brother. The family as it is involved in the new ship, the four honorees.

In the conduct of this, it turns out that the Naval Institute has got my dad's oral history, but they've never transcribed it. But they've got all these notes, so they're doing that now. And John Morton, who's my cousin, the son of Admiral Morton, my uncle, my mother's brother, is writing this book. But anyway, that history of my dad's is there. I don't think they did oral histories in my grandfather's day.

I wanted to say some words about my brother, who's the Class of '62. He went into destroyers. He went to the Postgraduate School and got an advanced degree in operations research. Volunteered for duty in Vietnam right after I had been there. He got there about a year or so after I did. So when I was CinCPac's flag lieutenant we used to make these monthly trips to Vietnam, and I kept telling Admiral Sharp: You ought to go down in the delta and see what these operations are like; my brother will give you a briefing. When I had been there, I was the second-senior officer south of Saigon. I was a lieutenant commander. I finally talked Admiral Sharp into going down there. We had been living in tents and an old motel that the French had left. When we got there, there was this enormous new headquarters building that my brother and the guys were in. We were met at the airfield by, jeez, a rear admiral, four captains, ten commanders, rank that you couldn't believe. And they weren't doing any better.

Anyway, my brother served with distinction there and won a Bronze Star with Combat "V". But in the middle of his tour he got a call from the Bureau of Personnel saying, hey, you're coming back on TAD to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to serve on his staff, for a period yet to be determined. My brother said, "You've got to be kidding. I've got combat operations going on here, I'm in the middle of a war."

The bureau said, "You weren't listening to me. I'm not asking what you think of this. I'm telling you to get on an airplane and get back here and report to the SecDef's office." Well, it turns out that a couple of years before, my brother had developed in his operations research thesis a mathematical model of how to interdict lines of communication with air warfare. Rolling Thunder was just being developed, which was the CinCPac campaign in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam; MACV ran the air war in South Vietnam. So McNamara's staff was deeply involved in setting this up, which is one of the reasons why it never worked very well, but in the Pentagon flails they had come across Tom's thesis, maybe because my dad was the J-3 so they wanted him to come back there and explain to them how he came up with all these mathematical models. Which he did, and said they were a bunch of jerks and history has certainly validated his observations.

Then he went back to Vietnam, and when his tour was over he was selected as a White House Fellow. So he went over to the White House. There he determined that he wanted to be a lawyer.

Before the White House he took command of an MSO USS Force, and he sailed the Force from Pearl Harbor to its home port in Guam. He said, when he arrived in Guam, there standing on the pier to meet him was the squadron commander, Lloyd Bucher, who'd been the skipper of the Pueblo. There were those of us in the Navy who

felt that Bucher had been a disgrace to the officer corps. I'm one of them and my brother was one of them. After that he just said, hey, I don't want to serve if that's the kind of guy I'm going to be involved with.

So he decided he'd transfer to the JAG Corps, and they said, no, he's too old, and the Navy lawyer's old boy network froze him out. So then I got a call from Dave Bagley, who was the Chief of Personnel. I, by this time, was a commander in OpNav, working for Dave's brother. Admiral Dave Bagley said to me, "What the hell are you doing with your brother?"

I said, "I'm not doing anything."

He said, "Well, he's getting out."

I said, "He applied for transfer to the JAG Corps."

He said, "Well, they don't want him." He said, "Your brother is the guy who has got the number 2 FRI, fitness report index, in his year group. That is, he is the second most highly thought-of guy in year group '62. He's a cinch for early selection and flag rank. And it's up to you to keep him in."

I said, "You're calling the wrong guy, Admiral Bagley." I didn't say, why don't you call my dad, who was also on active duty. But anyway, Tom resigned from the Navy when they turned him down. He went to Harvard Law School and became a very successful lawyer. He practiced on the West Coast for years, and retired as a partner from Latham and Watkins, which is a major firm on the west coast. So he had a very distinguished but somewhat abbreviated Navy career.

Neither of my two older sons, Lloyd or Tom, wanted to have anything to do with the Navy, because they were children of the Vietnam era. So we sent Lloyd off to Richmond, a private college, and the day he graduated—I was a CruDesGroup commander—he called me up and said, "Hey, how do I get in the Navy?"

I said, "Boy, if you'd have thought of this four years ago, it would have saved me hundreds of thousands of dollars." He entered the Navy and served in destroyers in Charleston. Then got out and remained in the Reserve, and two years ago he was elected the Naval Reserve officer of the year, which is quite an honor. He is a commander. He's married to a lovely young lady who is also a commander in the Reserve, a Seabee, Tracy. She was the first female battalion commander in the Seabees.

My youngest son, John, went to the Naval Academy and graduated in 1990, and served in an Aegis cruiser and a new construction Aegis destroyer. He recently resigned and is now in business in Boston, and in the Reserve as a lieutenant Commander. He had a skipper in his first ship who was a BuPers type who was selected out while in command, which is an indication of how unsat he was. He certainly poisoned the well for the young officers in that wardroom, and there was no way to recover from that. Even

though my son's skipper in the Donald Cook, the Aegis destroyer that he put in commission, was a wonderful guy, and they're good friends, it wasn't enough to overcome the really sour taste that this first CO had left. That, coupled with the general malaise affecting officers of all the services at about the ten year point pushed him out. So he's departed the Navy, remains in the Reserve.

And that's about it.

WINKLER: Well, I guess it's going to be up to the grandchildren now.

MUSTIN: Yeah, we've got nine of them, so they can take their pick.

PEERENBOOM: Have you ever summed up all the years involved?

MUSTIN: In the letter that I wrote to the SecNav asking him to consider a second destroyer

Mustin, I said there's been a Mustin on active duty in the Navy in every generation for the last hundred years. We think that that's a pretty unusual record. We've served through five wars, and my father and grandfather made very significant contributions.

Then he wrote back and said that he had decided to name an Aegis destroyer for all four of us. So my brother and I rode in on my grandfather's and father's coattails. And we're not complaining. I called up the SecNav's office after he had called me and told me of the ship name, talked to the officer who was in charge of the PAO and I said, "If the family has anything to say about this, we'd like to have three ladies sponsor this ship: my wife; my sister, who's my father's daughter; and my sister-in-law, who's my brother's wife. He called back within an hour and said the SecNav thinks that's a great idea. So those three ladies will break the champagne the 15th of December in Pascagoula.

WINKLER: That sounds like a good place to close.

MUSTIN: Okay.

WINKLER: Having gone all the way back, and you've taken us forward a little bit. What we're going to do here is a quick bibliography of some writings and articles written by or featuring the Vice Admiral here. Go ahead.

MUSTIN: Okay. I wrote some pretty detailed stuff about the maritime strategy. In the Naval War College Review of March and April, 1986, I wrote an article called "The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea." That was picked up, and I had a number of interviews with a guy named Eric Grove, who wrote a book called "The Battle for the Fjords," and mentioned a lot of that strategy and how it came about. That was published by the Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland.

WINKLER: When was that?

MUSTIN: That was 1991.

I wrote an article about the maritime strategy that appeared in the September, 1986, Naval Institute Proceedings. That was about how it had given us the framework to train—a number of the issues that we talked about.

I put a little article in here that turned out to be pretty prescient. The essence of some of the article was that you can only go so far with all these fancy electronic training devices and PacMan games. At some point you've got to really get down and do it in your own ship.

WINKLER: Were you Op 06 at the time? Or were you still at Second Fleet?

MUSTIN: I was at Second Fleet. It was just before I had gone to Op 06. In fact, in the little blurb at the end of the article—my nomination hadn't been approved by the Senate yet, so they said, don't say where you're going.

There's a discussion in the February 3, 1986, Newsweek about the state of play of the Reagan buildup. There's a section on what the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are doing, and I had a three-hour interview with the guy who wrote that. He boiled it down to about two sentences and in a vastly over-simplified and out of context series of quotes and made me sound like Mike Ditka. Then the day after it came out, I may have told you, I got a call from the U.S. ambassador saying, "What the hell are you doing? You're practically daring the Soviets to go to war. They're having special meetings of the Storting," which is the Norwegian Congress, "to talk over your remarks as they appeared in Newsweek." So I had to send over the entire transcript of the interview, which calmed down the Norwegians. Jim Watkin's guidance when I had been about to be ConSecondFleet rang loudly in my ears.

My last interview was with Sea Power magazine, in June of 1988. I discussed what I thought was the state of the Navy at the time. I just reviewed that tonight getting ready for this, and a lot of the thoughts in here, and the predictions about what will happen if you don't keep up the interest, have turned out to be true. It's a sort of "cover the waterfront" of the Navy of 1988, as I saw it.

Then in '78, we were having a terrible time because there were a bunch of guys on the Hill, led by a group of these three-piece-suited characters that have never heard a shot fired in anger, but who pronounce themselves as defense experts—one of them being William S. Lind, who was a bigshot staff aide and advisor for Taft. Anyway, the thrust of the debate at the time was, we don't need a surface Navy anymore because it's too vulnerable. So Admiral Doyle, Jim Doyle, Op 03 at the time, got hold of the Proceedings and said we ought to have a special issue for surface warfare. They said: All right; provide us what you're going to put in there. So Admiral Doyle sent for me; I was a captain in OpNav. He said, "Listen. We're going to put a couple of articles in the Naval Institute Proceedings, one by me and one by you, on why we ought to have a surface

Navy. But we've got to have these in two days," because—standard Pentagon—we've got a very tight deadline. So he said, "You can do that."

I said, "Well, I'll go get working on that 'why we need a surface Navy' article right away."

He said, "Well, of course, I meant to say that you've got to do two articles. You've got to do mine and yours."

So I said, "Yes, sir." So I went off and did that. They had an issue in March, 1978, and in it Admiral Doyle and I talked about the changes that we would need to undertake to go from a sea-control Navy to a power-projection Navy, and what the impact of various weapons would have on the way we did business in the surface Navy. It ended up with sort of a preview of what we thought the way that the capabilities of the surface Navy would evolve over the next twenty years. And it turned out to be amazingly prescient. So it's sort of an interesting article from that context.

WINKLER: Given that you had two days to write the article, I don't think this was that difficult a mission, because you knew...

MUSTIN: No, I had been making a lot of Congressional testimony, so I knew it. And I had been making speeches all over the country. So had he.

Then there's one that's in the International Security publication of Winter 1988-1989, Volume 13, Number 3. That's the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. This was a publication that was dealing with the issues of arms control. At the time this very clever and sophisticated Soviet campaign to neutralize the U.S. Navy by diplomatic instead of hardware methods was at its peak. And the Soviets were saying that they were going to derail the nuclear talks unless we decided to cancel the Tomahawk. I had gone up and made some speeches with Sam Huntington and talked to a bunch of people, and he asked me to write this article for International Security to lay out the reasons why, number one, we were playing right into the Soviets' hands if we gave them this; number two, how Navy nuclear weapons, and the Tomahawk in particular, did not fit within the overall envelope of the arms control discussions that were going on, and why the United States ought to not include Naval forces in those discussions.

That was touch and go, because the State Department wanted to give away the store in order to get the treaty. But we ended up prevailing. As I said, one of the constants is persistence. At the last minute we were able to keep naval nuclear weapons out. This also kept out the Tomahawk conventional weapon. The conventional weapon was in there because there was no way to distinguish between the two in the verification regime, so if you say you can't have nuclear Tomahawk, then you can't have conventional either. It turns out that the country is pretty lucky that we were able to keep Tomahawk out of the nuclear weapons treaty arena. Not only is my article in there, discussing the Navy

position on that, but there's a series of articles by other academicians about why we ought to cave in to the Soviets right away, and be good guys.

WINKLER: At that time, I think it was, what, '92, that we decided to remove all tactical nukes?

MUSTIN: No, I did that. That was on my watch as Op 06. We took them all off. I had been for that for a long time. The nuclear weapons were put in the ships essentially to save carrier aviation. You know, after World War II, if you didn't have a nuclear capability you weren't worth talking about. Massive retaliation was the game. But as time went on, that issue subsided. The rest of the nuclear weapons, in any scenario, got to be really shaky. My position was: Let's figure this out. We've got these nuclear depth charges in ships, destroyers. Now, the Soviets are going to nuke a carrier? And we're going to drop a depth charge on a submarine, and say take that, we're even? Well, they've got a lot more submarines than we've got carriers, so what the hell's going on here? And do we think that we're going to deter them from using a nuclear weapon on a carrier by carrying around a bunch of depth charges that we're going to drop on their 100-submarine force? Hell, no. So why are we doing it?

In addition to the illogic of the surface forces, the illogic of having a nuclear surface-to-air missile, which was also one that some people were pushing for.... It turned out, in my view, if you fired a nuclear Terrier or Tartar at a target, the biggest victims were any of your own airplanes who happened to be in the vicinity, because they're going to be blinded and all kinds of stuff. So that didn't make any sense.

PEERENBOOM: Plus it was very costly.

MUSTIN: Well, just technically and political-military, there was no deterrent value for those weapons. The other side of the coin was that they placed an enormous burden on the forces afloat. With the requirements for nuclear-weapons security, the inspections that went with this, the administrative detail, the management of the reliability programs, it was an absolute nightmare. I was first-hand aware of that, because I had been a weapons officer and had put up with all that ungodly crap. It was just awful. It was the epitome of everything that you would object to in the way of a burden on forces afloat. So I, with a great deal of glee, managed to get my position approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I signed the directive that took the nuclear weapons off the ships.

WINKLER: I guess it was the policy "We will neither confirm nor deny," because...

MUSTIN: That remained in effect.

WINKLER: That remained in effect, and that may have been what changed during the first Bush administration.

MUSTIN: Yeah. I've been called up by some guys doing books about that, and yes, I signed that directive. I was glad to do it. I had been campaigning for it. There was no

Navy tactical nuclear weapon that made any tactical sense, in my opinion. SubRoc wouldn't work, for a lot of reasons, mostly in the area of targeting. So the issues that had caused you to have Navy nuclear capability had long since been lost in the swirling sands of time. It was time to just get that awful burden off of forces afloat. So I was really campaigning for that when I was Op 06.

WINKLER: Did the tactical Terrier kind of have its genesis back in the days when we realized that the Soviet air threat could be overwhelming? In pre-Aegis days?

MUSTIN: Yes. It had its genesis in the fact that the spooks said that all of the Soviet long-range air-launched anti-surface weapons, AS-4 and -6, had nuclear capability. Then a bunch of guys did some studies about these weapons, and said, okay, if you shoot a Terrier out and hit one of these weapons coming in, it can have a barometric fuse in it. So the Terrier will go out and it will cut the weapon in half, which will then have it tumble and fall, and when it reaches its preset altitude it's going to go off, nuclear. So you've got to be able to guarantee that you're going to destroy the nuclear weapon, you're going to melt it. You can't do that with any conventional warhead that we have. This was at the time. And I'm sure all this stuff is in the public domain now. So therefore you need a nuclear weapon. So they had all kinds of proposals for the nuclear weapon, and people wanted to put money in these things. Well, that didn't make any sense at all.

It turned out that we had a lot of assumptions about the operation of naval surface forces in a given vicinity. The underlying assumption in every operation was that we had local air superiority. That meant that we had a lot of airplanes in the air at all times. In order to deal with the threat of Soviet tactics, those airplanes were out over an umbrella of hundreds of miles. The range of our surface-to-air missiles, which are long since obsolete, were measured in the twenty- to forty-mile range. What that meant was that if you took the assumption that we've got all these airplanes up or else we wouldn't be there, because that is air superiority, then the side who really is going to get hurt by a nuclear explosion in the upper air is going to be the side with the most airplanes in the vicinity, and by definition that's us. I had to go down and fight these battles not only in OSD and PA&E but in the Navy as well and everywhere else like the State Department. I was able to carry the day.

The Tomahawk was a verification issue. The people in OSD and the Army were really hot for the nuclear Tomahawk, because if the INF treaty went into effect, the intermediate nuclear weapons would come out of Europe and that would leave you back to massive retaliation, because there was no way to generate the necessary firepower to offset the numerical inferiorities vis-à-vis the Soviet army. So the U.S. Army supported us in the notion that we did not want the Tomahawk included in the intermediate nuclear weapons discussions. Because the Army wanted it for its nuclear capability. I didn't want it included because I didn't give a damn about the nuclear capability. What I wanted it for was the conventional capabilities. But because of the verification modalities, there was no way that you could verify that a Tomahawk shape was either conventional or nuke, unless you walked aboard with a meter and stood next to it, and even then it would be hard. So we were dead set against inclusion of Tomahawk, because the nuclear version

carried the conventional weapon on its back. A lot of people in the State Department and ACDA wanted to include them. The State Department took the position: Do anything to get a treaty. The same gang of guys who've got us hooked into this stupid ABM treaty that we've managed to stay in for all these years. A treaty with a country that no longer exists. But, you know, that's the State Department.

So that's some bibliography and why some of that stuff might be of interest to somebody. I've got a lot of others, but I pulled those out as ones that were sort of in keeping with the line of discussion that we've had.