NHF Announces Knox Prize for Naval History

Posted on April 16, 2013 by
Captain Dudley Knox NH 48459

Captain Dudley W. Knox, USN, during World War I. NHHC Image NH 48459

In the minutes of the 1948 annual meeting of the Naval Historical Foundation that detailed a post-World War II fundraising campaign led by NHF President Fleet Admiral Ernest King for a naval museum that would open in downtown Washington in May 1950, the secretary wrote:

No member of the Foundation, new or old, will need to be told that what has lighted and guided the campaign by all those named has been the flaming spirit of the Foundation’s original friend and sponsor, Commodore Dudley W. Knox. Surely none among us can be more fully entitled to the achievement of that purpose than he who has devoted so much time, thought, and strength to the establishment of a place where the Foundation’s treasures can be exhibited.

Sixty-five years later, the Navy and the NHF are still in debt for the work Knox accomplished. Thus the NHF is pleased to establish the Commodore Dudley W. Knox Lifetime Achievement Award recognizing an individual for a body of work in the field of U.S. naval history.

About Dudley W. Knox

The award is named for Commodore Dudley Wright Knox (21 June 1877 – 11 June 1960). A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and Naval War College, Knox had a distinguished career as a naval officer with service in the Spanish American War, Boxer Rebellion, Great White Fleet, and World War I. But it was his abilities as a historian, librarian, and archivist that earned him respect and admiration amongst his peers and later generations.

Transferred to the Retired List of the Navy on 20 October 1921, Knox served as Officer in Charge, Office of Naval Records and Library, and as Curator for the Navy Department. The publication of his clarion call Our Vanishing Naval History in the Naval Institute Proceedings in January 1926 led to the establishment of the Naval Historical Foundation. He would serve as secretary and then vice president of the organization for decades and was its sixth president at the time of his passing in 1960.

For a quarter of a century, his leadership inspired diligence, efficiency, and initiative while he guided, improved, and expanded the Navy’s archival and historical operations. His publications include The Eclipse of American Sea Power (1922),  A History of the United States Navy (1936), and multi-volume collections of documents on naval operations in The Quasi-War with France in 1798-1800, the first Barbary war and the second Barbary War.

The USS Knox (FF 1052) was named for him as was the headquarters building for the Naval History and Heritage Command.

It is the intent of the Naval Historical Foundation to annually honor an individual who has made “Knox-like” contributions to the field of naval history through a combination of scholarship and community building. On years when the McMullen Naval History Symposium is conducted at the U.S. Naval Academy, the NHF has an agreement with the History Department to present the award at that venue. In other years, the NHF will seek other venues to present the award.

Since there will be expenses involved with the administration of this prize, the NHF seeks contributions to endow the award. If you are interested in supporting this effort, please contact the NHF Director of Development Leslie Cook at lcook@navyhistory.org.

If you have a candidate you would like consideration for the 2013 inaugural prize, please visit the Knox Award page of the website and submit a nomination on-line. Elements of the submission will include the nominee’s name, his/her institutional affiliations, and an essay describing the nominee’s contributions to U.S. naval history. The nominating essay should include a description of nominee’s career in government, academia, and/or the private sector.  A discussion of nominee’s educational milestones and subsequent career and influence on naval historiography and others in the field should be highlighted. Coverage should include an assessment of the nominee’s service to the Navy, the historical profession, and the public at large.

The deadline for submissions for 2013 will be 15 July.

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Call for Papers – Naval and Maritime Power in Two World Wars: Contemporary Relevance and Historical Importance

Posted on April 15, 2013 by

11-12 April 2014
Greenwich Maritime Institute,
University of Greenwich

Global War Studies and the Greenwich Maritime Institute are pleased to announce an international conference on the naval and maritime history of the First and Second World Wars. On the centenary of the First World War, the conference seeks to promote an international and interdisciplinary dialogue among naval and maritime historians. Drawing upon the latest scholarship from a variety of disciplines, the conference aims to highlight a wide array of topics such as naval and maritime communications, logistics, international relations, regional studies, economic aspects, the role of ports and internal transport, the weather, morale, and grand strategy. Papers and panels addressing one or more of the above topics are welcome as well as any of the following subject areas. Additional First and Second World War themes pertaining to naval and maritime history are equally encouraged.

Naval Warfare / Martitime Strategies / Amphibious Operations / Air Power
Operational History / Intelligence / Command / Convoy Operations
Shipbuilding / Interwar History / Weapons Technology
Neutral States / Theaters of War / Industry / Civilians

Paper proposals must be submitted by 15 August 2013 and include an abstract and curriculum vitae. Panel proposals are welcome and should include a brief description of the panel’s theme.

Additional conference details and registration information will be available soon.

Submissions and inquiries should be addressed to:
Robert von Maier, Global War Studies <globalwarstudies@gmail.com>
Chris Bellamy, Greenwich Maritime Institute <C.D.Bellamy@greenwich.ac.uk>

The conference proceedings will be published as a special issue of Global War Studies.

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BOOK REVIEW – Fighting for MacArthur: The Navy and Marine Corps’ Desperate Defense of the Philippines

Posted on April 12, 2013 by

gordon-macarthur-philippinesBy John Gordon, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, (2011).

Reviewed by Captain Roger F. Jones, U.S. Navy (Retired)

This is a book well worth reading from several standpoints. First, the role of the Navy and Marine Corps in the defense of the Philippines in World War II, as compared to the Army, is not generally well known, and the author does an outstanding job describing how essential the Sea Services were in the courageous albeit doomed defense of Bataan and Corregidor, particularly in view of their limited armament, supplies and personnel.   Second, it documents how General MacArthur and his staff failed to integrate Admiral Hart and his forces into the defense of Manila Bay and Bataan, with significantly adverse consequences. While it is incontrovertible that the much larger and better armed Japanese armed forces would be able to conquer the Philippines at the onset of the war, the speed with which they accomplished this goal was in large part due to the Army’s lack of readiness and the inappropriate defense plans of MacArthur and his staff. Nevertheless, despite heavy losses, the heroic efforts of the Philippine and American military delayed the Japanese war machine long enough for the US to build up and deploy its military in the Pacific arena and go on the offensive. The most famous and decisive of these early actions was the battle of Midway, which took place just one month after the surrender of Corregidor.

Imperial Japan wasted no time attacking the Philippines following the surprise 7 December air strike on Pearl Harbor. Just four hours afterwards, Japanese aircraft launched from the carrier Ryujo, strafed and bombed USS Preston, a seaplane tender moored in southern Mindanao, destroying two PBYs moored close by. This was followed on 8 December by Japanese naval bombers and Zero fighters attacking Clark and Iba airfields, effectively destroying a very large part of the Army Air Force’s B-17 bombers and P-40 fighters on the ground, caught there due to a woeful state of unreadiness, conflicting orders, and confusion within MacArthur’s chain of command. The Japanese thus gained control of the skies at the beginning of the Philippines campaign, severely crippling U.S. efforts to defend against the invasion. Despite this blow, MacArthur stuck to his plans to defend the Luzon beaches against Japanese landings rather than fall back to defend Bataan and Corregidor. This flawed decision lead to another severe problem: food rations being lost or captured when Philippine and US Army troops fell back in disarray during attacks by the Japanese armed forces on land and in the air with far superior numbers and weaponry. Within two weeks, the largest Japanese invasion force of the war landed in Lingayan Gulf, only 100 miles north of Manila, and quickly established a major beachhead; two days later, the Japanese established a second beachhead on Lamon Bay, less than 75 miles east of Manila, completely compromising the MacArthur plan of defending the beaches. U.S. Navy forces were able to disrupt further Japanese landings along the southeastern coast of Bataan, but the enemy brought in additional troops, artillery, and tanks to begin a drive south that proved overwhelming. In early April, the retreat south became a rout, followed by the surrender of the US/Philippine forces on Bataan and the infamous “Bataan Death March.” By this time, all that remained of US resistance were the Marines, Sailors, and Soldiers on Corregidor. These courageous men put up a fierce resistance defending against the Japanese up to the surrender on May 6th.

This book is packed with references, including information the author obtained in a number of cases directly from interviews with individual survivors of this campaign. There are 18 photographs, 9 maps, and 3 tables, plus appendices listing the staff, naval vessels, and personnel assigned to the U.S. Asiatic Fleet at the beginning of the war, plus a description of the Japanese artillery units available for the bombardment of Corregidor. The maps will help the reader follow how the campaign developed and the photos enhance the atmosphere of early World War II. In addition, there are numerous footnotes which link the text to its sources, and furnish additional information. The bibliography is quite large and the index extensive. Gordon writes with great clarity and develops the story in an eminently readable style. This is a book that readers will find difficult to put down until they have finished it, despite knowing full well what the outcome will be. As an exceptionally well-crafted work of military history, this reviewer recommends it highly

Captain Jones is a frequent contributor to Naval History Book Reviews and was named a 2011 Naval Historical Foundation Volunteer of the Year.

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BOOK REVIEW – McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-69

Posted on April 12, 2013 by

drea-mcnamara-clifford-vietnam-secdefBy Edward J. Drea, Washington, D.C.:Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, (2011).

Reviewed by Dr. Richard P. Hallion

The historians within the Office of the Secretary of Defense have established an enviable reputation for meticulously researched and well-crafted books, particularly their series on the various Secretaries of Defense. Edward J. Drea’s impressive new volume in this series will add further luster to both the office and its author. Drea, a highly regarded historian of wide-ranging experience, is no stranger to those in the military history community, and he has drawn on a wide range of official and unofficial sources to brilliantly relate four crucial years in the Johnson era.

The central focal figure of Drea’s book is the enigmatic Robert Strange McNamara, Secretary of Defense from 1961-1968, his successor Clark Clifford (though well-treated) serving as a coda to the rest of the work. From his Preface onwards, Drea is unsparingly blunt examining McNamara and his acolytes, their motivations, their actions, the impact on the military and the war in Vietnam, and the McNamara legacy, noting that (iii):

He mismanaged the military services, leaving them under-funded, under-strength, and discredited in the eyes of the nation. He routinely disregarded military advice, particularly on strategic matters, leaving the United States weaker before the Soviet Union. He unilaterally implemented programs and disregarded their consequences, leaving the larger society poorer for it. Even now, McNamara remains a vilified man, and attempts to rehabilitate his reputation during the 1990s only served to reopen the raw emotions of the contentious Vietnam era.

All this constitutes red meat for McNamara’s legions of critics (not least of which are those who fought while under his tenure of Secretary). Despite this, Drea approached this history hoping to “derive a more balanced view of McNamara’s and by extension OSD’s, successes and failures” (iii). It is a task he takes on dutifully, recognizing McNamara’s outstanding early background, “surpassing intellectual gifts. . .an almost inexhaustible amount of energy,” and his unprecedented “mastery of the enormity and complexity of the Pentagon,” but nevertheless concluding “for all his luminous achievements, his choices that led to the Vietnam disaster will forever remain McNamara’s enduring legacy”(547).

Indeed, after one finishes this book, it is hard to see how McNamara’s reputation could possibly be worse, despite Drea’s scrupulously even-handed of treatment. Whether dealing with acquisition (example: the “do-everything” TFX [F-111] program that cost the Navy ten years of fighter development time), space policy, naval surface ship acquisition, relations with the Joint Staff, and his misguided faith in leadership via statistical analysis, McNamara blundered.

Nothing exemplified McNamara’s disastrous defense leadership more than Rolling Thunder, a misbegotten air campaign predicated on sending signals rather than achieving decisive effect. Drea presents a masterful “view from the top” of the micro-management, faulty assumptions, and political meddling that characterized this ill-fated operation, concluding:

The largely civilian direction of the air strategy failed the tests of both conception and execution….Lacking an integrated and coherent political-military strategic foundation the air campaign proceeded by fits and starts, sputtering most of the time (82).

Matters came to a head on Capitol Hill in the summer of 1967, when Pacific commander Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, 7th Air Force commander Lieutenant General William Momyer, and other military figures testified that McNamara’s bombing strategy was bankrupt. Though McNamara vigorously defended his record, Senators were unconvinced. “Throughout the adversarial questioning,” Drea writes, “McNamara resorted to evasion and obfuscation to ward off his critics,” adding (216-7):

McNamara obstinately insisted despite testimony by uniformed leaders to the contrary that no gulf existed between military and civilian officials over target selection. This was the McNamara of old – supremely confident, certain of his mastery of the facts. . . But three years of Vietnam had destroyed his credibility, discredited his policies, and shattered his aura of infallibility.

McNamara was done. Three months later, amid sleet and rain, he left office, his reputation in tatters, his policies discredited. Rolling Thunder outlasted him by just eight months until it, too (as Drea notes damningly) “ended as it had unfolded – troubled, contentious, and inconclusive” (232).

Drea’s book is remarkably free from error, a tribute to its editing. The author’s tendency to jump back-and-forth over time and topic can be jarring, but is probably unavoidable, given the complexity of the subject. It is an excellent companion to H. R. McMaster’s earlier Dereliction of Duty:  Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York:  HarperCollinsPublishers, 1998 ed.). Like that now-classic work, Drea’s book tells a sad, troubling, and cautionary tale, one to be taken to heart by those entrusted today with the defense of the nation.

Dr Hallion is Senior Adviser for Air and Space Issues, Directorate for Security, Counterintelligence and Special Programs Oversight, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

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Norman’s Corner: Pointing to General Genda

Posted on April 11, 2013 by
Captain Minoru Genda, IJN

Captain Minoru Genda, IJN

By Norman Polmar

(Editor’s note: This is the seventh in a series of blogs by Norman Polmar, author, analyst, and consultant specializing in the naval, aviation, and intelligence fields. Follow the full series here.)

While in high school I became interested in the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. As I read about the “date that will live in infamy,” I began to wonder about the six Japanese aircraft carriers that carried out the air strikes: Were they built specifically for the attack? Were they the entire Japanese carrier fleet? Were Japanese carriers involved in World War I? At Coolidge High School in Washington, D.C., I did a term paper entitled “Prelude… to Pearl Harbor”—and received an “A.”

My “research”—such that it was at the time—at the public library revealed no answers to those questions about aircraft carriers. Some information was found at the Navy Department  Library. But the “germ” was planted and I developed an interest in writing a history of aircraft carriers, not just Japanese, but a record of all of the world’s aircraft carriers.

By the early 1960s I had a contract with Random House to produce such a book—it would be my third. Through my work as assistant editor of Navy Times I began visiting London on a regular basis and established contact with several British naval historians, including Captain Donald Macintyre, a top-scoring anti-submarine expert in World War II, and Captain Eric Brown, who still holds the world’s records for the most types of aircraft flown and for the number of carrier landings made. Both men kindly agreed to help me with the aircraft carrier project.

I soon realized that I also needed a Japanese naval expert to help with the book. Masanori Ito, a leading Japanese Journalist, published his book The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1962. After reading the book (and reviewing it for Navy Times), I wrote to Ito, asking for his assistance. He promptly declined, saying that he was not a carrier expert. He urged me to contact General Minoru Genda, recently retired as head of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and elected to the House of Councilors (the upper house of Japan’s parliament).

Who was Genda? A leading Navy fighter pilot in the 1930s, Com­mander Genda arrived back in Japan in October 1940 after duty as assistant naval attaché in London. He was in Tokyo prior to becoming the air operations officer of the 1st Carrier Division. While in the capital city he by chance saw an American newsreel in which four U.S. aircraft carriers were steaming in formation. At the time Japanese carriers normally operated in two-ship formations (i.e., divisions) and four carriers had never steamed together. Commander Genda pondered what he had seen and concluded that several aircraft carriers could operate in a single formation and then could easily form their squadrons into one mass striking force in minimal time.

His proposal was accepted by the commander of the 1st Air Fleet—the main Japanese carrier force—and  became the formation used by the six carriers in the Pearl Harbor attack. Genda, as air operations officer for the 1st Air Fleet, was tasked in early February 1941 to develop the top-secret plan for the surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor. He held the air operations position for the main carrier force operations through the Battle of  Midway in June 1942. At  the end of the war he was a captain and in command of the fighter forces attempting to defend Japan.

Thus, I wrote to General Genda. He  had become a major general in the Japan Air Self-Defense Force in 1954 and the commander of the JASDF as a full general in 1959. He replied with alacrity. He would do all that he could to help with the book. Genda’s  help was invaluable. He read the drafts of each chapter about the Pacific War, providing valuable comments and details of operations (such as a copy of  the list that he kept on board the task force flagship Akagi as the six carriers reported to him how many aircraft of each type they launched in the Pearl Harbor attack).

Genda also provided new insights into Japanese carrier operations. It had been widely reported that after the two waves of aircraft that struck Pearl Harbor returned to their carriers there was a discussion (debate?) on the flagship over whether to launch another attack. Genda wrote to me:

There were no hot discussions on board the Akagi.  Commander Fuchida [who led the air attack] might [have] expressed his opinion about the further attacks….The only thing I know is “If  they come out [of Pearl Harbor] we will strike again,” Commander Fuchida said just after he landed on the deck. Anyhow, Admiral Nagumo [force commander] and Rear Admiral Kusaka (Chief of Staff 1st Air Fleet) made up their minds, “No Second Attack” long before we started the attack.

And, in June 1942, when Japanese carriers struck the U.S. base of Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian islands as a diversion for the Midway operation, according to Genda, “Japanese pilots were sent off without maps or information about the target. Photos taken on the first day’s attack were processed and used to advantage the following day.”

After dozens of letters and many hundreds of manuscript pages exchanged between us, we finally met in March 1969 when Genda visited the United States. He was invited to the United States in part to participate in the Naval Institute’s distinguished visitor program. (I had been assistant editor of the Naval Institute Proceedings from 1963 to 1967.)

During his visit Genda spoke at the Naval Academy to an audience of Naval Academy midshipmen and faculty, and area USNI members. When asked if the Japanese had possessed the atomic bomb, did he believe they would have used it against the United States, he replied, “I think so.” When in a later conversation I raised the subject to him, he responded, “Why wouldn’t we have?” (He also spoke at the Smithsonian Institution while in the Annapolis-Washington area.)

That week Genda and I had a lengthy, private session at his Annapolis hotel. His English was excellent, his views candid, and his personality overwhelming. During our discussion of the Battle of Midway (June 1942), we spoke of the failure of the Japanese to detect in a timely manner the three U.S. carriers that arrived in the area unbeknown to the Japanese. One of the Japanese search planes had developed engine trouble and had not been immediately replaced. It was in that plane’s search sector that the U.S. carriers were located.

When I asked Genda if another scout plane from the carriers or one of the accompanying cruisers or battleship should have quickly been launched to cover that sector, he responded, “Of course.” Not really thinking, I asked whose fault it was that a replacement plane was not immediately dispatched. Without hesitation, he pointed to his own chest and said: “Genda!”

Genda sent me a very kind letter when he received a copy of our book—Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, published in 1969. The title page listed me as author  “In collaboration with” General Minoru Genda, Captain Eric M. Brown, and Professor Robert M. Langdon of the Naval Academy.

We exchanged notes over the next few years, albeit with far less frequency than when we were working on the book. He retired from the upper house in 1986 and passed away three years later, the day before his 85th birthday.

Historian Clark G. Reynolds wrote of Genda in the April 1990 issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings:

Ever the outspoken critic of those whom he considered to be naïve pacifists, Genda had become a staunch advocate of the American nuclear shield over Japan. His intimate cooperation with the United States during his years as head of the Japanese air force had even earned him a U.S. Legion of Merit, awarded by President John F. Kennedy in 1962.

And, “Minoru Genda honored the enemy that had defeated him by helping to forge Japan into one of America’s staunchest allies and friends.”

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Naval Aviators Visit Cold War Gallery

Posted on April 5, 2013 by
CWG aviators 1

Retired naval aviators Captain Robert Feuilloy, FN, and Rear Admiral Steve Kunkle, USN, post in front of the glass mural outside the Ready Room Theater, which features a photo of them in VA 46 Ready Room aboard USS John F Kennedy in August 1976.

CWG aviators 2

Captain Mike Mears, USN (Ret) poses with the Ready Room Greenie Board he built for display in the Cold War Gallery.

 

On 3 April 2013, three retired naval aviators paid their first visit to the Cold War Gallery at the Washington Navy Yard, to view some of the Navy Museum’s newest exhibits. Of particular interest to them was the Ready Room Theater, a replica of an aircraft carrier squadron ready room. The three aviators, Rear Admiral Steve Kunkle, USN (Ret), Captain Mike Mears, USN (Ret), and Captain Robert Feuilloy, FN (Ret), were given a tour by Captain Ted Bronson, USN (Ret), whose personal collection inspired the design of the Ready Room Theater. All four retired officers served in VA-46, “The Clansmen,” whose awards, memorabilia, and artifacts line the inside bulkheads of the theater. The three visiting aviators have a special place in the design of the gallery. Kunkle and Feuilloy are featured in an enormous photo mounted on the glass front of the Ready Room Theater. Mears built the Greenie Board on display inside the Ready Room Theater. After watching the introductory video “The U.S. Navy and the Cold War,” all four retired Clansmen had a chance for a lengthy tour of the Gallery and its many exhibits.

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High School Student is Latest Addition to NHF Speakers Program

Posted on April 3, 2013 by

One of the services that the Naval Historical Foundation has provided to civic groups around the nation is a cadre of speakers who have naval history expertise developed through the study of naval history, or as a participant in historic events. Since 2000, the NHF has deployed dozens of individuals to address audiences from Maine to Washington state on a variety of topics ranging from the centennial of naval aviation to the bicentennial of the War of 1812. At a reception to be held on the USS Midway Museum in San Diego on April 7, we plan to welcome the newest member of our Speakers Program, high school student William Whittenbury.

william whittenburyBy William Whittenbury

Hello! My name is William Whittenbury. I live in Rancho Palos Verdes, California, and attend Palos Verdes Peninsula High School. I live with my mom and dad and my amazing parakeet, Abraham.

I’ve been interested in naval history since before I can remember. However, my naval history interest began in earnest when I was about four years old.  During an elementary school trip to the library, I was captivated by a beautifully illustrated volume about the hunt for the Bismarck in 1941. I was enthralled by the majesty of the massive warships that plied their trade in frigid Atlantic waters, surging about with menacing grace. After reading that book, I became battleship-obsessed (I still am). My newfound interest was heartily supported by all members of my family, none more so than my great uncle, who served on the USS Intrepid in 1944. I got my hands on whatever reading material I could find, and began to look into other areas of naval history. I became fascinated with sea warfare in the age of sail after watching the 1951 film Captain Horatio Hornblower R.N., which presented thrilling Napoleonic-era naval battles. Of course, I was interested in what our navy had accomplished during that time period, and I was delighted to discover the exploits of the USS Constitution and other American ships during the War of 1812. I found it particularly gratifying that our forces were regarded as amateur and unsophisticated at the war’s beginning, but that our “handful of fir-built frigates with a bit of striped bunting” soon had the English press in despair. The United States was a true underdog in this war. Many underestimate the importance of the events of 1812-1814, but our country might not survive today if not for the heroism of brave volunteers that risked their lives against the most powerful naval force in the world. The War of 1812 truly was a second war of independence.

My battleship interest continues to this day. My interests generally gravitate toward the obscure, so it stands to reason that my favorite battleships…were never built. Due to naval disarmament treaties following World War I and the general shift of focus to aircraft carriers in World War II, a great number of magnificent ships were planned for various navies, but were never built. I decided to try to consolidate all of the information I could find about these ships, so at age 10 I began making a slideshow of images of these vessels. It now contains over 500 slides. I also enjoy making 1:1200 scale models of the ships of the “Fleet that Never Sailed.”

My first speaking engagement came two years ago. My eighth grade American History teacher asked for students to volunteer to give lectures on subject material, so I gladly volunteered to teach The War of 1812. I thoroughly enjoyed the presentation and managed to finish exactly one second before the bell rang.

I’m also the president of the Muskwa Club, an organization dedicated to providing enriching activities and service opportunities outside of school. To this end, we decided to create a speaker series, where members could give presentations to the community to share knowledge and enhance speaking skills. Entitled Muskwa Amplified, our first two events have been big successes this year. I gave a presentation entitled “The War of 1812: Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Rise of the US Navy” at Muskwa Amplified I, and spoke about “The Fleet that Never Sailed: Cancelled Battleships of WWII and the Difference they might have Made” at Muskwa Amplifed II this past January. In both presentations, I wove humor into the subject matter to make it more interesting to the audience, and I was surprised by their positive reactions. Per the audience’s requests, I’m working on another such presentation, which will cover the major sea battles from the Second World War.

Besides naval history, I also speak about the vaquita, the world’s most endangered marine mammal. The Muskwa Club conducts a major effort to raise awareness of this tiny, defenseless porpoise, which numbers just 190 as of last year. I’ve spoken to Los Serenos de Point Vicente, the Los Angeles Chapter of the American Cetacean Society, and five classes about the plight of this critically endangered creature.

My family has been amazingly supportive. Both of my parents valiantly sat through the 500-slide edition of the Cancelled Battleships presentation (thanks, guys!) and have given me so many opportunities to learn more. I owe them a huge thanks for putting up with me as I dragged them to countless maritime museums, all four Iowa class battleships (some of them more than once,) the Constitution, Massachusetts, and numerous other historical ships. They’ve come to appreciate naval history as well, and both gave exemplary service helping to set up the Muskwa speaker series.

In the future, I plan to become a history professor and to build a space colony at L-5, a point in space where the Moon’s gravity and that of the Earth counterbalance.

Thanks for reading!

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Norman’s Corner: Disappointing Captain Beach

Posted on April 3, 2013 by
Beach USN 710690 L-File

Captain Edward Beach on the conning tower of the submarine TRITON (SSRN 586) in 1960. NHHC image USN 710690.

By Norman Polmar

(Editor’s note: This is the sixth in a series of blogs by Norman Polmar, author, analyst, and consultant specializing in the naval, aviation, and intelligence fields. Follow the full series here.)

As mentioned in previous blogs, in the early 1960s I was befriended by then-Captain F.J. (Fritz) Harlfinger and then-Commander Dominic Paolucci. At the time they were the head and deputy head, respectively, of the submarine warfare branch in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

They took the trouble to introduce me—a young journalist at the time—to most of the early skippers of nuclear-propelled submarines: Eugene P. Wilkinson, first C.O. of the pioneer Nautilus; William R. Anderson who commanded the Nautilus on history’s first trans-polar voyage; Richard B. Laning, first C.O. of the second A-sub, the Seawolf; James Calvert who commanded the Skate on her first two polar cruises; John H. Nicholson, who took the Sargo on her remarkable polar cruise; James B. Osborn, first skipper of the George Washington, the first Polaris submarine; Edward L. Beach, C.O. of the giant, two-reactor submarine Triton; and, indirectly, to B.F.P. Samborne, first C.O. of the Dreadnought, Britain’s first nuclear submarine. All helped me with my first book, Atomic Submarines (1963).

Subsequently, I developed a close relationship over the years with Dick Laning and Ned Beach. During the ensuing years both men helped me with subsequent books—especially the biography Rickover: Controversy and Genius that I wrote with Tom Allen—and several  articles. On (very) rare occasions I was able to help them with their research and writing projects.

Dick had served in aircraft carriers and submarines during World War II, receiving the Silver Star. After the war he commanded three diesel submarines, earned a master’s degree in biophysics, and, after nuclear power training, commanded the submarine Seawolf and, later, the Proteus, the first Polaris submarine tender.

Ned served in submarines throughout the war. He was executive officer to Commander George L. Street, who was awarded the Medal of Honor for the submarine Tirante’s first war patrol. Beach received the Navy Cross and two Silver Stars before taking command of a submarine as war in the Pacific was ending. After the war he commanded a new attack submarine; served as naval aide to General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; as naval aide to President Eisenhower; and commanded a fleet oiler before being given command of the USS Triton in 1959. At the time the Triton was the world’s largest submarine and under Beach’s command the submarine circumnavigated the world submerged.

Ned also was an award-winning novelist. His first book—Run Silent, Run Deep (1955)—quickly became a best-seller and a classic. The 1958 movie of the same name, starring Clark Gable and Burt Lancaster, was based on the novel. More books followed, including The Wreck of the Memphis (1966), about the cruiser that his father had commanded at the time of her loss.

We kept in contact. As late as the 1990s he provided considerable help for my book Cold War Submarines (2004), written in collaboration with K.J. Moore. During this period, Ned became an ardent supporter of the son of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel in his efforts to have his father restored to four-star rank, which he held on a temporary basis as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (at Pearl Harbor) on 7 December 1941.

During the controversy over giving Kimmel, deceased, four-star rank, I was involved on the “other side.” In a couple of talks that I gave about the Pearl Harbor attack and in press interviews, I expressed my opinion that the fleet was unprepared when the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor and that the blame fell largely on Admiral Kimmel’s shoulders.

Ned and I “crossed swords” following his December 1991 article in the Naval Institute Proceedings that defended Admiral Kimmel. In the March 1992 issue, Tom Allen and I took strong issue with Ned’s views. Further in support of the Kimmel efforts, Beach wrote Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and [General] Short at Pearl Harbor (1995). Air Force veteran and aviation historian John W. Lambert and I published the book Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor in 2003.

Throughout this period, Ned and I kept up a lively correspondence and continued our cordial chats whenever we met. At a Naval Submarine League conference, I asked Ned to sign one of his books for me.  He responded in the affirmative, and then added, “It will cost you.” When I expressed my surprise, he explained that he wanted me to come over to his home in Georgetown (D.C.) and listen to him make a case for Kimmel. Then, if I was in agreement with views, I would write an article or editorial supporting Kimmel’s posthumous promotion.

I readily agreed. Some time  later, I sat down with Ned and listened intently to him speak for about two hours, discussing Admiral Kimmel, the Japanese surprise attack, and the subsequent investigations of  the disaster. I interrupted him only for clarification of specific points. When he finished, after we drank some more tea, I responded. I attempted to reply point-by- point to his logical and well-presented treatise. It was with great regret that I found that I was not convinced by Ned’s arguments in support of Kimmel. I still believed that the overwhelming burden of  blame for the lack of preparedness by the fleet at Pearl Harbor rested with Kimmel.*

Late that afternoon we parted, still friends. Keeping in contact with one another, in a note dated 10 January 2002,  Ned wrote: “I further appreciate your willingness to go into this rather vexing and no longer very important matter with me.” Our subsequent contracts were few. On 1 December 2002, Ned passed away.  He was a true hero, an officer and gentlemen, a scholar, an exceptional author, and—I am very proud to claim—a friend.

*Kimmel served as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet and U.S. Pacific Fleet from February 1941 to December 1941 with the designated rank of full admiral. He reverted to his permanent rank of rear admiral upon being relieved of command ten days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  Despite efforts of his family and friends, and several official reviews, he has not been promoted posthumously to full admiral.

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Celebrating Women’s History Month at the Naval Historical Foundation

Posted on March 29, 2013 by
Hopper - Studeman

Captain Mike Studeman, Commanding Officer, Hopper Information Services Center, speaks at the Navy Museum event.

Responding to the Navy’s Women’s History Month theme of “Women Inspiring Innovation through Imagination: Celebrating Women in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics,” the Naval Historical Foundation participated in Women’s History Month by co-hosting an event with the Hopper Information Services Center, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), at the National Museum of the U.S. Navy on March 1, 2013. The event, organized by ONI for the command’s staff and their families, honored the contributions of the late Rear Admiral Grace Murray Hopper, a pioneer in the field of computer programing, who aptly utilized her advanced knowledge of mathematics and technology to create one of the first computer programing languages.

Grace Harper joined the Naval Reserves in 1943 as a member of the WAVES (Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service) with a strong interest in putting her Ph.D. in Mathematics from Yale University to work for her country, then in the middle of World War II. Lt. Hopper was one of more than 85,000 WAVES who worked in STEM fields, including air traffic controllers, cryptologists, drafters, meteorologists and translators. Commissioned as a lieutenant in 1944, she worked at the Bureau of Ordnance Computation Project at Harvard University. Nicknamed “Amazing Grace” by her colleagues, Dr. Harper retired as a Rear Admiral and is credited as the co-inventor of Common Business Oriented Language (COBOL), one of the first computer programming languages. She also is known for coining the word “bug” to describe computer malfunctions based on an actual moth that interfered with one of her computer projects. Following her death in 1992, USS Hopper (DDG 70) was commissioned as her namesake in 1997. The USS Hopper, an Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyer, was the second Navy warship to be named for a woman, and is still serving the Navy and defending our country today.

A strong supporter of women’s accomplishments and knowledge in STEM disciplines, the Naval History Foundation awarded its annual Captain Kenneth Coskey National History Day Prize in 2002, 2004 and 2009 to young historians who researched Dr. Hopper’s life and accomplishments. NHF supports STEM educational programs through its successful summer programs led by Foundation Education Coordinator Captain John Paulson, USN, (Ret.), a retired submariner and high-school physics teacher. Plans to export the Foundation’s STEM program to another Navy museum are in the works for this summer.

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BOOK REVIEW – The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King – The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea

Posted on March 26, 2013 by

borneman-admiralsBy Walter R. Borneman, Little, Brown and Company, New York, NY (2012).

Reviewed by Captain Scott Mobley, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Millions of men and women have served in the U.S. Navy since its founding more than two centuries ago, but only four attained five-star status. The circumstances of World War II propelled this quartet—William D. Leahy, Ernest J. King, Chester W. Nimitz, and William F. Halsey, Jr.—to the lofty rank of Fleet Admiral. While wartime exigency may explain the reasons and timing for their promotion, it does not explain why these men were singled out nor how they achieved such tremendous success leading the greatest naval force ever assembled. Walter R. Borneman sheds light on these questions in his new book, The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King—The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea.

Borneman traces the lives of his subjects from their boyhoods, through long and eventful naval careers, and into their final years. He deftly weaves these four biographic strands into a broad narrative that encompasses the historical events, trends, and controversies which shaped the navy, nation, and world between about 1900-1950. This emphasis on historical context is a strong point of the book.

The author divides his narrative into three sections. Part One, entitled “Sailors,” introduces the reader to the four protagonists, establishes the essential character of each, and describes their careers as junior officers. Part Two, “Ships,” begins with Leahy, King, Nimitz, and Halsey each stepping into the role of commanding officer afloat.  Borneman continues the saga by recounting the quartet’s rise to flag rank and follows their careers as senior naval leaders to the eve of World War II. Borneman devotes more than half the book to the third and final section, “Admirals,” which fully details the wartime activities of the four fleet admirals.

Four distinct, complex and colorful personalities emerge from Borneman’s prose. King was at once a mercurial egotist, a calculating careerist, an innovative administrator, and a brilliant strategist. Although Nimitz’s ability as a master strategist equaled King’s, the patient and thoughtful leadership style of this dedicated family man stood in marked contrast to that of his senior. Dynamic and pugnacious, “Bull” Halsey basked in the glow of public admiration, yet he privately suffered from nervous disorders that took him out of the fight at key moments.  Dismissive of any “standard protocol” that might impede action, Halsey also failed to heed important advice from his counselors—a reckless tendency that Borneman blames for the tragic loss of life suffered caused when the indomitable admiral let his fleet into typhoons during the fall/winter of 1944-45.

While Halsey reveled in publicity, Leahy actively avoided it. Such studied reticence often earns Leahy a mere mention in the footnotes of historical accounts, although he was the senior fleet admiral and the longest to serve on active duty.  Borneman redresses this oversight by placing Leahy front and center. Many readers will appreciate for the first time Leahy’s broad experience in the navy and as a diplomat, his mastery of organizational process and politics, and his wartime performance as a virtuoso of grand strategy. Pointing to the elder statesman’s simultaneous roles as presidential chief of staff, original chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and de facto National Security Advisor, Borneman convincingly argues that Leahy was truly the most influential, if least known, of the fleet admirals.

In his conclusion, Borneman attributes the success of Halsey, Nimitz, King and Leahy to a combination of superior leadership skills and strength of character. Central to Borneman’s argument is the Naval Academy experience, where four years of intense training, education and acculturation instilled in each man the “intangible elements” of leadership that propelled his rise to greatness. However, while giving USNA its due, the reader may add to Borneman’s assessment by gleaning from The Admirals other influences that shaped the lives and careers of the fleet admirals. These influences include: enhanced command opportunity for junior officers, new technologies that enabled officers to make professional contributions and build their service reputations, the Naval War College experience, and a service culture that encouraged strong mentorship and allowed young officers to learn from their mistakes.

Naval professionals and students of maritime and military history will enjoy The Admirals. The book’s short chapter lengths lend themselves to brief reading sessions that suit a busy shipboard environment. Judiciously placed maps provide useful visual references, and nine short appendices add interesting background detail. Both primary and secondary sources inform Borneman’s research. The bibliography includes all essential works of history and biography relevant to the book’s subject, supplemented by material from published memoirs and several reputable web sites. To this mix of evidence Borneman adds interesting details gleaned from diligent archival research at the Library of Congress, the Naval History and Heritage Command, the U.S. Naval Academy, the Naval War College, and other important collections.

Captain Mobley is working on his dissertation at the University of Wisconsin—Madison.

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BOOK REVIEW – The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty Year Conflict with Iran

Posted on March 26, 2013 by

crist-twilight-iranBy David Crist, Ph.D. Penquin Press, New York, NY (2012)

Reviewed by Stephen Phillips

The Cold War by definition gave birth to several proxy wars. Concern over the Soviet Union’s potential impact on the oil producing Middle East led the U.S. to support Shah of Iran. Though secular, the Shah became extremely oppressive and thus was deposed by the Islamic Revolution. As the regime’s benefactor, the U.S. received the same scorn marked by the capture of the American embassy in Tehran and 52 of its occupants being held for 444 days.

Thus began a complex, thirty year, small war between the United States and Iran. In Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-year Conflict with Iran, David Crist covers this conflict completely, delving into political intrigue, intelligence collection and special operations, and conventional battles at sea.

Crist’s reporting on political intrigue and the roots of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism at the beginning of this conflict remain salient today. The Carter Administration balanced the need to keep Iran as a U.S. ally, or at least lukewarm toward the Soviet Union, against the risk of aligning with the Shah. Decision makers today undoubtedly struggle with some of the same decisions, albeit with different players.

The 1980’s are the most interesting period of this conflict. Crist notes that The Reagan Administration worked the problem from all angles, enduring the Iran-sponsored terrorist attack on the Marine Beirut Barracks, inserting the Navy into the Iran-Iraq War by protecting reflagged tankers, conducting special operations at sea, and negotiating arms for hostages in the ill-fated Iran Contra Affair.

For naval historians it is important to note that Twilight War thoroughly describes the major events of the “Tanker War” such as the Iraqi Exocet attack on USS Stark, the USS Samuel B. Roberts mine strike, and the USS Vincennes shoot-down of Iran Air flight 655. As a result, it should be required reading for anyone studying the period. Still, it should serve as a companion to other works such as No Higher Honor by Bradley Penniston and Inside the Danger Zone by Harold Lee Wise when studying the period in depth.

The war with Iran continued as the U.S. invaded Iraq. Twilight War may be one of the first sources to report on Iranian Quds Force operating in Iraq, assisting cells that attack Americans with explosively formed penetrators – the conflict’s most lethal IEDs. The U.S. responded by setting up a task force that captured Iranian Quds Force operators as high value targets.

Through its pages, Crist provides enough detail to ensure Twilight War is valuable to any scholar of history, yet his narrative is not too deep or detailed so that the book remains an enjoyable read to a casual fan of nonfiction. It is clear that Iran will remain a focal point of U.S. national security policy. Anyone who reads Twilight War will be witted to the source of conflict, and an understanding of America’s complicated foe.

Stephen Phillips is a retired naval reservist. His is the author of The Recipient’s Son, a novel about the U.S. Naval Academy in the 1990s published by the Naval Institute Press.

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BOOK REVIEWS – A Dog Before A Soldier: Almost-lost Episodes in the U.S. Navy’s Civil War

Posted on March 26, 2013 by

veit-dog-before-a-soldier-civil-warBy Chuck Veit, Self-Published, United States (2010)

Reviewed by Nathan Albright

Chuck Veit, the President of the Naval & Marine Living History Association and founder of the U.S. Naval Landing Party, has managed an impressive feat in A Dog Before A Soldier. In this self-published collection of essays, Veit has written something that will be new to most readers in presenting solid historical treatments of largely obscure civil war engagements whose neglect springs from how the U.S. Navy has been traditionally overlooked in the historiography of the American Civil War.

Veit brings impressive credentials to his work as a pioneer in living history efforts that focus on the role of Sailors in historical reenacting, a field traditionally dominated by those who seek to portray soldiers. A number of these essays have previously appeared in the Naval History magazine, and hopefully the fact that this work was self-published will not discourage potential readers, as this work is well copy-edited with worthwhile historical essays.

Although this work is a collection of essays, the essays taken as a whole demonstrate the breadth and importance of the United States Navy to the Union war effort. This importance included such tasks as intelligence gathering, espionage and delivery of messages, providing logistical support and manpower for raids to deny areas and resources to the rebel effort, as well as providing supporting fire to aid in the defense of army posts and positions. One of these essays deals with a forgotten but significant incident where the Navy defended the honor of the United States against a rebellious Japanese daimyo in the waning days of the Tokugawa shogunate. Not all of these incidents were successes, but all of them demonstrate the vital role of the Navy in the Union War effort that has largely been neglected.

The last essay of the book ties up the various threads of the previous essays, arguing that the efforts of the US Navy were decisive in leading to victory. Though this particular essay is a bit more provocative than the others, the case drawn by the author is certainly reasonable in showing that at key parts of the Civil War that the efforts of the Navy were decisive (especially at New Orleans and Malvern Hill). The fact that the army could transmit news quickly over telegraphs (and tended to neglect to give proper credit to the Navy) whereas the Navy had to depend on slower dispatch boats, gave the Army a huge advantage when it came to writing their story and building their reputation.

Even though presently available naval sources like dispatches and logbooks can provide intriguing historical information of the First Battle of Shiloh, as well as the presence and vital importance of both black soldiers and gunboats in the brave and successful defense of Fort Butler, these sources have not been widely understood even among Civil War specialists. By providing this historical information in an easily readable form, Veit provides a service to those who are looking to better understand the largely forgotten role of the United States Navy in the American Civil War. Hopefully this role will not be forgotten for much longer.

Nathan Albright is an engineer in Portland, Oregon.

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BOOK REVIEW – Pass Me The Rice

Posted on March 26, 2013 by

kay-pass-me-rice-vietnamBy Robert G. Kay, Author House, Bloomington, IN (2011).

Reviewed by Charles H. Bogart

In 1966, the author, as a Navy Lt. (JG) with his marriage collapsing in divorce, volunteered for duty as a Naval Advisor in Vietnam to allow him to refocus his life and to help his promotional opportunities.  Robert Kay would complete two back to back tours of duty in Vietnam, seeing combat with both a Vietnamese Junk Group and a River Assault Group. His second tour would end early after he was wounded by a booby trap that resulted in the loss of a foot. After being discharged from the Navy, Kay returned to Vietnam and served there as a DOD civilian employee until April 1975. The book, however, only covers his naval service in Vietnam from 1966 – 1969.

During his two years in Vietnam, the author filled three different positions. His first assignment was as a Naval Advisor, first with Coastal Group 45 based at Kien An and then with Coastal Group 41 at Poulo Obi. Kay was then brought to Saigon to serve as a newsletter editor at Naval Advisory Group Headquarters.  At the end of his tour, Kay, assured he would be assigned to River Assault Group 24 based at Binh Loi, volunteers for a second tour of duty in Vietnam. The job River Assault Group 24 is to patrol the Saigon River from Binh Loi Bridge north to Lai Thieu Phu Cuong. While the book is 557 pages long, it still only manages to give a broad outline of Kay’s service in Vietnam.

The story the author tells is of weeks and months of boredom, punctuated by vicious short encounters with the enemy. During the course of Kay’s tale, we meet all kinds of Americans and Vietnamese. They range from warriors to those who only want safe billets. However, the 1968 TET Offensive that would swirl around the author in Saigon would prove that no place was safe. His account of the death of four news media persons during the Battle in Saigon shows a complete lack of situation awareness on their part.

The book, while not a day to day account of the author’s life in Vietnam, does give you a good insight into his day to day activities. Kay discusses, in graphic detail, not only his jobs with the U.S. Navy in Vietnam but also his rest and recreation among the native female population. It is obvious from his story of his life style in Vietnam that he fell in love with its people and culture and enjoyed its food and beverages.

The chapters on his assignment as Editor of the Naval Advisory Group newsletter are a very interesting read.  Kay, who had no experience as an editor, walks the reader through the steps he went through to eventually publish an award-winning newsletter. The thought process he went through is a classic case study of how to succeed when given a job for which you have no background:  Admit to yourself that you do not have the necessary skills and then seek support and guidance from those who do.

The chapters on his service with River Assault Group 24 bring one into the day to day activities of trying to stay alive and inflict maximum damage on the enemy. Kay reports on ambushes, death by friendly fire and accident, assaults upon enemy forces, sniper fire, and rough interrogations of enemy prisoners.  Center to this account is the ambush of a portion of the 9th NVA Regiment that leaves 150 of the enemy dead.

Despite its raunchy sex stories, the book has a lot going for it. Not only is it an enlightening tale about the U.S. Navy’s involvement in Vietnam, but it can serve as a leadership guide on how to accomplish a mission. Kay often finds himself separated by time and distance from his supervising headquarters.  Unable to reach out for guidance, he and his fellow officers and men are forced to improvise to complete a mission or provide creature comforts. This is a good adult read of the U.S. Navy providing direct political assistance to a foreign country that has great relevance for today’s Sailor.

Charles Bogart is a frequent contributor to Naval History Book Reviews and was named a 2011 Naval Historical Foundation Volunteer of the Year.

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BOOK REVIEW – Isaiah’s Eagles Rising: A Generation of Airmen (Second Edition)

Posted on March 26, 2013 by

nolan-isaiahs-eagles-risingBy Bernard Thomas Nolan, Xlibris Corporation, Bloomington, IN (2012).

Reviewed by Richard P. Hallion, Ph.D.

Privately published memoirs constitute a mixed-bag of literature, with many generally offering more opinion than substance. However, bomber pilot Bernard Thomas Nolan’s Isaiah’s Eagles Rising constitutes a very definite exception to this “rule.” It is at times a gripping account of one young American’s preparation for air war, and then his experience in combat.

Various airmen have recounted their own experiences in the strategic air war, beginning with Bert Stiles’ iconic Serenade to the Big Bird (written by its ill-fated pilot-author in the midst of the war and reissued by Schiffer in 2007). Historians have added informative and generally useful accounts, most notably Donald L. Miller’s Masters of the Air, Richard Davis’ Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, Tami Davis Biddle’s Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, and Robert Ehlers Jr.’s Targeting the Third Reich).

But for the cockpit perspective, Nolan is without peer. His book is surprisingly frank, his appraisals of himself and his colleagues sympathetic yet scrupulously honest, and his analysis of his—and their—role in the war nuanced and insightful. Like most youngsters who came of age in the interwar era, his interest in flight was honed by model-making, aviation-themed motion pictures, and the exploits of “speed merchants” such as Wiley Post, Roscoe Turner, and Al Williams, and, of course, the inspirational example of Charles Lindbergh. Readers desiring insights into aircrew selection and training will not be disappointed, for Nolan dwells extensively on his training and preparation for war.

Nolan’s accounts of combat are understated and occasionally chilling. His crew began their tour flying the Consolidated-Vultee B-24H Liberator, surviving a near-fatal flak burst on their nineteen mission just as they went “feet dry” on the Continent. The burst knocked out two engines on the same side. By then Nolan and his crew were experienced, hardened professionals, and so managed to jettison their bomb-load, limp across the North Sea, and remain aloft long enough to make an emergency landing at a British airfield. They then transitioned to the Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress, with which they finished their tour. As a pilot, Nolan thus had the opportunity to fly both of these legendary aircraft in combat. Of the two, there is no doubt of his preference.“ Comparing the two aircraft based on my own flight experience,” he writes (p.192), “I concluded that the B-17 was by far the better combat aircraft in the European arena.”

If 1943 had been the great year of trial for American strategic bombers—think Ploesti, Schweinfurt, and Regensburg—1944 was the year when strategic bombers savaged the Reich, disrupting production schedules, forcing redirection of German acquisition from offensive to defensive systems, and robbing the Hitler regime of oil and the means to transport it (and other crucial war materials) around the homeland and on to the various fighting fronts. At the beginning of the year, American fighter pilots had largely destroyed the Luftwaffe’s fighter forces, but enough remained that these, together with Germany’s dense antiaircraft defenses, ensured that American bomber formations were still imperiled, particularly as they struck deep into the Reich.

On their 24th mission, August 5, 1944, German fighters attacked his formation “like a pack of hungry wolves circling their prey,” one Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet rocket-powered fighter streaking by Norton’s bomber so fast that the crew “marveled at the speed” of the little tailless fighter. (p. 197). But in the end, they survived their tour, and after the war, Norton remained in the Air Force, retiring in 1965.  Afterwards, he became a senior program manager for NASA and SAIC. Meeting Nazi fighter ace Adolf Galland in the mid-1980s, Nolan “was struck by the notion that we were both still alive. How apparent it became to me that the hand of God ultimately guided by survival—obviously his as well.” (p.192).

Isaiah’s Eagles Rising is an enthralling book, and readers will finish it with a renewed appreciation for a time in air warfare when success was measured by the number of sorties required to destroy a target, rather than the number of targets destroyed per sortie. But most of all they will gain new respect for a generation of youngsters who came of age amid the flak-torn and fighter-filled skies of Western Europe.

Dr. Richard P. Hallion is a frequent contributor to Naval History Book Reviews.

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BOOK REVIEW – Normandy: A Graphic History of D-Day

Posted on March 26, 2013 by

vansant-normandy-graphic-historyWritten and Illustrated by Wayne Vansant. Zenith Press, Minneapolis, MN. (2012)

Reviewed by John R. Satterfield, DBA.

Scholars, writers, history buffs, movie producers and participants have minutely explored D-Day and the Normandy campaign. Thanks to thousands of books, articles and dramatic and documentary films, we are able to trace the activities and experiences of nearly all the troops, air and naval personnel involved in the invasion as well as their German adversaries, from initial planning to the assault itself to the campaign that unfolded after the invasion until the breakout nearly three months after June 6, 1944.

That makes Wayne Vansant’s hundred-page summary a bit unique. It is a graphic historical narrative, following the graphic novel format that gained currency in the late 1970s, with sequential illustrations and brief comments describing each art panel. Historians will deprecate the work as an adult comic book, and the description is accurate, but not completely fair. Vansant is indeed a comic book illustrator who served as the primary artist for Marvel Comics’ The ‘Nam series for five years. He is not, however, simply tossing off an expanded version of his earlier work. In fact, Normandy is the latest of several graphic military histories Vansant has completed, and more are in the works. Despite its brevity, the book clearly is well researched and organized.

Before writing this review, I decided to share the little volume with students in one of my college courses on military history. The reaction was favorable. The students were familiar with the graphic approach and had read and enjoyed graphic novels. This familiarity may create interest in Vansant’s work, a good thing since the brief summary it provides could lead young readers into much broader and more accomplished volumes on military history.

Obviously, the format is limited. Vansant encompasses the entire Normandy campaign in 103 pages. Each page contains three to six full-color illustration panels that look like the Sunday funnies, but the art is a step above simple comics. This means that much of the information in the narrative is conveyed visually. Many panels depict gory scenes, but the simple depictions are neither shockingly realistic nor disrespectfully cartoonish. The drawings reflect some care in selecting subjects that capture the eye and also convey thematic coherence. The real concern here is the captions that explain the meaning of the art and provide narrative continuity. Vansant does this with just 100 to 150 words per page, on average. That means he’s telling the Normandy story, including an introduction on the larger strategic context of the European Theater and planning for the invasion, airborne operations, amphibious landings, the German defense and subsequent stalemate on the Cotentin Peninsula through the breakout, in about 12,000 words, the length of a couple of scholarly articles. In addition, the book assumes that most of its readers know almost nothing about D-Day, so much of the narrative is explanatory as well as descriptive.

Vansant makes a credible effort to overcome these problems, but he must focus on an episodic approach that gives the book an overly anecdotal flavor. He illuminates general operational discussions with brief accounts of individual or small unit sacrifice or heroism. This technique is well-used, even cliché, but Vansant tries to repair the deficiency by avoiding many of the best-known stories and emphasizing less familiar events. To his credit, Vansant also pays a good deal of attention to British and Canadian forces, often ignored in many U.S. analyses that over-celebrate American D-Day achievements.

So, the overall effect is, for a knowledgeable reader, dissatisfying. There’s nothing new here for a serious student of the invasion. And, because he must gloss over so much, the inevitable mistakes stand out. For example, Vansant notes that more than 200,000 men set foot in Europe on D-Day, although the actual headcount was actually about 156,000 in 21st Army Group, with just over 83,000 British and Canadian troops in the British 2nd Army and about 73,000 GIs in the U.S. 1st Army, including more than 15,000 in the two airborne divisions who parachuted into the campaign. In addition, nearly 196,000 naval and merchant sailors manned more than 5,000 vessels in the Allied invasion fleet. By the end of July, about six weeks after D-Day, the Allies had landed more than 1.3 million men, held in check by fewer than 400,000 German troops until the advent of Operation Cobra on July 25, 1944, and the subsequent breakout and race through France.

Still, Vansant’s book may be a good alternative for young readers not ready for serious study of military history. It could have been more useful, however, with the addition of a select bibliography that leads its readers into more complex and complete studies.

Dr. Satterfield’s latest book is Saving Big Ben: The USS Franklin and Father Joseph T. O’Callahan, Naval Institute Press, (2011).

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