Ditty Bag: Japanese Navy Minister Flag

Ditty Bag: Collections of the Naval Historical Foundation An Artifact and Collections Blog Series

Imperial Japanese Navy Minister Flag

The Meiji Restoration saw an end to the Tokugawa shogunate rule of the Edo period in favor of imperial rule in Japan. The implementation of new political structures drastically changed the methods of military decisions and wartime preparation. The Navy Ministry was created in 1872 as a means of bureaucratic control over the navy during times of military conflict. The ministry was in charge of everything from budget management and ship construction to political relations and navy policy implementation. All affairs of the Navy Ministry were ultimately under the control of the Minister of the Navy.

Flag image taken inside the National Museum of the United States Navy (Photo by Matthew Eng/Released)

Flag image taken inside the National Museum of the United States Navy (Photo by Matthew Eng/Released)


The Navy Minister held much political power. Similar to the United States Secretary of the Navy, Imperial Japan’s Navy Minister controlled recruiting, vessel construction and repair, and all other affairs immediately related to the navy. He was both a member of the Cabinet and a direct report of the Emperor rather than the Prime Minister. The Navy Minister’s close relation with the Emperor is uniquely reflected on his flag of rank.

The Imperial Japanese Navy rank flags were initially based off of the national flag, the hinomaru or sun-disk flag. In 1897, new flags and command pennants were created to reflect the Rising Sun Flag with sixteen red rays of the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy. The Rising Sun Flag became the typical Japanese naval ensign, visible on almost every flag of rank and commissioning pennant. The Navy Minister’s flag is the only Flag of the Japanese Imperial Navy without the mark of the Rising Sun.

3The flag of the Navy Minister bears a crimson anchor on a field of white with two red, horizontal zig-zag stripes. Above the anchor is the mon of Japan, a stylized cherry blossom, the national flower of Japan. The placement of the anchor beneath the cherry blossom may be indicative of the Minister of the Navy’s direct contact with the Emperor, a likewise unique attribute of his rank.

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Lady Henry Moore donated the World War II-era flag to the Naval Historical Foundation in 1964 on behalf of her first husband, Admiral Theodore Stark Wilkinson, a veteran of both World Wars. Then Rear Admiral Wilkinson served as Director of Naval Intelligence during the early months of U.S. entry into WWII. By 1942, he reported as Commander Battleship Division TWO, Pacific Fleet and became Deputy Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force by January 1943. He was redesignated Commander THIRD Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet with rank of Vice Admiral in 1944 and retained that rank through the completion of World War II. Admiral Wilkinson would go on to serve temporary duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1945, concluding his naval career as a member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Join Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Due to the specifics of Admiral Wilkinson’s service record, the original owner of this flag most likely was one of three Ministers of the Navy of the Japanese Imperial Navy: Admiral Shigetarō Shimada, Admiral Naokuni Nomura, or Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai.

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This flag is indicative of both the shift in Japanese political structure from a shogunate into an empire as well as Imperial Japan’s quick advancement in naval technologies and bureaucracies. In the Naval Historical Foundation’s collection, it represents the valor and commitment of U.S. service men and women who sail around the globe for the purpose of protecting their family, friends, and country.

Citation:
Asada, Sadao (2006). From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States. US Naval Institute Press.

Jansen, Marius B. (2000). The Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University.

“Japanese Symbols”. Japan Visitor/Japan Tourist Info. Retrieved October 9, 2014.

Nussbaum, Louis-Frédéric and Käthe Roth. (2005). Japan encyclopedia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schencking, J. Charles (2005). Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, And The Emergence Of The Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868–1922. Stanford University Press.

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05d807eDitty Bag: Collections of the Naval Historical Foundation is a new artifact blog written by Emily Pearce, NHF Middendorf Curator. She will periodically write posts about various artifacts and accessioned items in the Naval Historical Foundation collection and their impact on naval history. You can view all of the collections highlighted in Ditty Bag on our Flickr page HERE. To contact Emily or to inquire about NHF collections, please email Emily Pearce at epearce@navyhistory.org.

For previous releases of Ditty Bag, Please go HERE.

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Ditty Bag: Vanguard Shoulder Boards

Ditty Bag: Collections of the Naval Historical Foundation An Artifact and Collections Blog Series

From Dock to Deck: Vanguard Shoulder Boards

Bernard Gershen, a Polish tailor, immigrated to the United States in 1903. Settling in New York City, the tailor stayed in southern Manhattan as he sought work in his trade. Gershen furthered his stitching profession by joining a firm located in South Street Seaport, New York. He frequently interacted with members of various shipping and military vessels. It was there that he gained a reputation for quality craftsmanship, specializing in sewing gold lace onto the jackets of ship captains and crewmembers.

South Street Seaport, NYC (LOC Image)

South Street Seaport, NYC (LOC Image)


Gershen quickly became the go-to tailor for seamen looking to repair their jacket’s gold lacing. After World War I ended, Gershen teamed up with local button merchant Sam Weisberg to form a new company. Weisberg contributed the metals and Gershen contributed the lace and stitching to create insignia and adornment for U.S. Navy sailors in the Brooklyn Navy Yard. The name of their new business, Vanguard, depicts someone on the forefront of new developments. Perhaps the most charming part of the company’s inception is the arbitrary method of its naming. In 1918, Gershen and Weisberg opened a dictionary and choose a word at random, choosing the word “Vanguard” as their new company name. “If they both knew what the word meant, that would be their company name,” noted current Vanguard president Bill Gershen, the grandson of Bernard Gershen. From its humble beginnings, Vanguard grew into one of the main insignia producers for all branches of the United States Military.

Vanguard Shoulder Boards, Rear Admiral (Lower Half). Photo by Emily Pearce.

Vanguard Shoulder Boards, Rear Admiral (Lower Half). Photo by Emily Pearce.


Vanguard Shoulder Boards, Rear Admiral (Lower Half). Photo by Emily Pearce.

Vanguard Shoulder Boards, Rear Admiral (Lower Half). Photo by Emily Pearce.


Pictured above are shoulder boards made by Vanguard that were in the NHF Collection. The shoulder boards are for a Rear Admiral (Lower Half) uniform. The craftsmanship is solid and well made. Mild wear and tear/fading exist on the front and back of the piece. You can see much of the quality lace work on the shoulder board, a defining quality of Vanguard products and Bernard Gershen’s legacy. The United-Carr Company of Cambridge, Massachusetts, made the brass snap buttons shown above. Other Vanguard shoulder boards used buttons by Scoville Waterbury, a company who has made brass buttons in the United States since 1812. The back of the shoulder boards have the signature Vanguard “V” and scroll lettering, which was typical in their manufacturing during the time period. Vanguard continues to make quality military insignia and accouterments for the U.S. Navy today.

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05d807eDitty Bag: Collections of the Naval Historical Foundation is a new artifact blog written by Emily Pearce, NHF Middendorf Curator. She will periodically write posts about various artifacts and accessioned items in the Naval Historical Foundation collection and their impact on naval history. You can view all of the collections highlighted in Ditty Bag on our Flickr page HERE. To contact Emily or to inquire about NHF collections, please email Emily Pearce at epearce@navyhistory.org.

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Defending the Flag at the Fourteenth Latitude: American Samoa, Fitafita, and the United States Navy

Image of Fitafita Guard courtesy American Samoa Historic Preservation Office (ASHPO)

Image of Fitafita Guard courtesy American Samoa Historic Preservation Office (ASHPO)



“I go along with somebody who says that when Samoa heard that the US government was at war with Japan, the call came around and they offered their hands to help.”
Tuala Sevaaetasi, Former Fitafita Guardsman

By Matthew T. Eng

The proud history of the American Samoan people traces back over 3,000 years, long before any islander saw their first naval vessel or merchant ship. The native population had a long held history of seafaring and pottery making along the archipelago, living undisturbed off the sea and land under the leadership of the Fa’amatai, the chiefly governing authority of the Samoan islands.

European contact with Samoan islanders came in the eighteenth century. The Dutch and French were the first to vie for a foothold in the tropical paradise. This eventually led to a series of violent backlashes between European explorers and Samoans. Tensions calmed in the nineteenth century with the introduction of Christian missionaries. This stability led to a growth in settlers and military personnel on the islands. Trade and education began to prosper. The United States soon came to know the islands well. American whalers hunting in the sperm whale hunting grounds stopped at the island chain for foodstuffs and provisions during the height of offshore whaling in the Pacific. Commodore Charles Wilkes and the United States Exploring Expedition stopped off in the Samoan Islands in 1839 to survey the region. Two vessels of the same expedition, USS Flying Fish and USS Peacock, were involved in a brief bombardment of Upolu in 1841 following the murder of an American sailor.

Samoan Dance, Charles Wilkes, Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842. Volume 3, 1845 (Image via Smithsonian)

Samoan Dance, Charles Wilkes, Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842. Volume 3, 1845 (Image via Smithsonian)

The island chain was not immune to the myriad international rivalries that would eventually carve out large swaths of territory in the name of empire near the beginning of the twentieth century. Disputes and disagreements between unified Germany and the United States eventually came to a head. Officials in Washington, eager for a slice of territory in the South Pacific to show the flag under the Mahanian-like notion of sea power, purchased the chain of islands known today as American Samoa in the 1899 Tripartite Convention with Germany. The eastern set of territories (Germany partitioned the western half of the island chain now the Independent State of Western Samoa) included five main islands and two coral atolls.

The island itself occupies a tiny piece of the South Pacific. As one naval officer pointed out in his assessment of American Samoa, the 290 mile-long island chain is easily fond by drawing a line on a map from Hawaii to New Zealand.

Naval Administration
The United States Navy began to manage the affairs of American Samoa in 1900. Commander Benjamin F. Tilley arrived at Pago Pago harbor to establish the territory’s new naval administration. A new naval station was established at the harbor, known as Naval Station Tutuila.

Under the direction of the U.S. Navy, Tilley took on the role of Governor of American Samoa. Other administrative posts within the “Island Government” were given to Navy officers and enlisted men. Governors were appointed directly by the President, and were directed to preside over all legislative, executive, and judicial matters on the islands. Military Governors like Tilley worked closely with the matai, Samoan tribal chiefs, to ensure the everyday niceties of the “Stars and Stripes” did not personally interfere with their own long-held rituals and traditions.

Commander Benjamin F. Tilley, USN

Commander Benjamin F. Tilley, USN

Commander Tilley, a career officer with combat experience during the Spanish-American War, created an island control with two central governing institutions, a judicial system and the Fitafita Guard. In the native Samoan language, the word fita translates to “courage.” Others within the indigenous population translate the term to “soldier.” When placed together, the casual observer of Samoan culture gets a good sense of the unit’s importance. According to Dr. Robert W. Franco, an expert on Samoan/Pacific affairs at Kapi’Olani Community College, the Fitafita guard was set up by the U.S. Navy to “enforce court decisions and generally maintain order.” Members of the Fitafita guard were placed in the naval reserve.

In the early years, the Navy handpicked the Fitafita Guard. Young natives and elites were attracted to the prospect of service. Others came to join the ranks of the Fitafita band for their love of music. The guard soon carved out their own military enclave in the South Pacific, serving both the U.S. Navy and their own people under a banner of mutual respect and admiration. The men of the Fitafita proudly served “with a full heart,” according to former Guardsman Tuala Sevaatasi. The Fitafita Guard had many of the same rights and responsibilities of regular enlisted personnel. Fitafita were given regular Navy pay as well as 20% overseas pay. They were not, however, permitted to serve outside of the home islands at sea, which made them more of an honor guard and ceremonial band than fighting unit. One source stated that some Fitafita guardsmen were given sea duty on an ocean-going tug during the beginning of the outfit’s operation.

The prestige of becoming a well-respected member of Samoan society drew many indigenous men to service, especially their musicians. The impressive seventeen-piece Fitafita band developed musical expertise, becoming a large influencer on the importance of blending Samoan and American culture together. Navy musicians from the United States were sent to Pago Pago to teach and train the Fitafita how to organize a band. They quickly caught on. Seen in several surviving photographs today, their military drill discipline resembled the world-renowned Marine Corps band. Many Fitafita were also highly proficient with the rifle, often besting competitive teams from visiting militaries. This short excerpt in Modern Samoa: It’s Changing Government and Changing Life discusses the impact and importance of the Samoan-born unit:

“These performed duties as seamen and bandsmen, and the example of their life has been a major shaping force upon the local native youth.” (Modern Samoa: It’s Government and Changing Life, 133)

The Fitafita uniform is a distinctive piece of U.S. Navy and Samoan history. Unlike those who served in the 1st Samoan Marine Battalion during the Second World War, the Fitafita uniform had features of both Samoan culture and common U.S. Navy enlisted personnel. Most Fitafita wore a uniform that consisted of a red cap, white skivvy shirt, red sash, and white lava lava (a type of long dress kilt) with blue chevrons. The Fitafita occasionally wore an alternate blue lava lava dress uniform with red chevrons. The stripes sewn on the bottom of the lava lava kilt denoted rank. Personnel did not wear shoes.

"One of the Navy's most unusual units is the Fita Fita Band, at U.S. Naval Station, Pago Pago, tutuila, American Samoa (All Hands Magazine, April 1949)

“One of the Navy’s most unusual units is the Fita Fita Band, at U.S. Naval Station, Pago Pago, tutuila, American Samoa (All Hands Magazine, April 1949)


Service in the Fitafita guard brought a welcome source of cash flow for family members. Fitafita service remained a unique avenue of employment for men in American Samoa throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Pago Pago became a center for economic activity in American Samoa, with the American naval base in Tutuila at its core. Wage labor opportunities also increased during these years, augmented by a rapid population growth. Island life improved, and a new generation of Samoans received valuable technological skillsets that would benefit them later in life.

More opportunities came to native Samoans as the threat of war loomed over the Pacific. The Imperial Japanese co-prosperity sphere directly threatened the island’s stability. The importance of American Samoa grew critical in the early 1940s. Navy leadership accelerated the rapid growth of industrialization felt in the 1920s and 1930s. Plans for expansion of Naval Station Tutuila began in late 1940. In the event of war, Pago Pago would become a forward facility for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. American Samoa and the Fitafita were ready.

World War II
The attack at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 put all islands in the area on full alert, including American Samoa. The sleepy naval station soon became a major base of operation. Tutuila was the only armed base in the South Pacific at the outset of hostilities. It was also deemed important for its strategic location near the important sea-lanes between Hawaii and New Zealand. Several ships were directly diverted to Pago Pago after the attack. Confrontation with the Japanese at Tutuila seemed eminent. One month after Pearl Harbor, a Japanese submarine surfaced off Fagasa and fired rounds onto the island. The submarine attempted to strike the valuable fuel tanks in the village of Utulei. Only a U.S. Navy radioman and Fitafita guardsman were injured in the attacks. It would be the last hostile shots fired at the island.

Fitafita in uniform, c. 1942

Fitafita in uniform, c. 1942

The naval buildup in Pago Pago continued to increase during the war. According to one eyewitness account during the war, ships increased from “three in December, 1941 to fifty-six in December, 1942.” By October 1942, there were nearly 15,000 American servicemen on Tutuila and nearby Upolo. The Fitafita became an essential part of home defense and were instructed to “take the enemy forces under fire” in the event that another Japanese incursion.

Other Samoans put to work for food production, a vital component in fueling the war effort against Japan. The continuous flow of sailors and Marines made the island’s rich natural resources a necessity. Many Samoans worked long and restless hours to fulfill the needs of the fleet.

Plans to invade Samoa by the Japanese tapered off by the end of 1942. The pivotal battle of Midway in June erased any hope for a concerted Japanese offensive in the region. The Fitafita continued to drill and perform their duties, always ready to defend their South Pacific hamlet. By 1944, the base at Pago Pago was downgraded back to a naval station. Activities remained quiet until the end of the war.

The importance of the islands as a base of military operations waned after 1945. The U.S. naval base in Samoa officially closed in 1951. The last naval transport, General R. L. Howe, left the island on 25 June carrying many of the disbanded Fitafita guard to Hawaii. The territory was transferred to the Department of the Interior that year, as it remains today.

Samoans looked for economic opportunities both on and off the island chain. Recognizing the rapid growth of wage-labor opportunities brought on by war, many migrated to Pago Pago, its territorial capital. Others went to Hawaii and mainland United States. Yet the heart and soul of the Samoan people remains in Tuitula. It was there that a small and elite group of Pacific Islanders proudly served in defense of American freedoms and ideals.

As of 23 March 2009, twelve American Samoans have given their lives in defense of the United States. Many more proudly risk their own lives in the U.S. Navy. Today, the Navy estimates that sailors of Asian and Pacific Islander heritage comprise approximately 6.5 percent of the active duty naval force. That number includes over 20,000 active duty sailors, 4,000 reservists, and 18,900 civilian employees.

Preserving a Legacy
The Naval Historical Foundation seeks to preserve the history and heritage of the Fitafita warriors for future generations to learn and enjoy.

The Fitafita Uniform at NMUSN

The Fitafita Uniform at NMUSN


The National Museum of the United States Navy (NMUSN) is now in possession of a WWII-era Fitafita guard uniform. The Naval Historical Foundation, working closely with NMUSN, is seeking funding from generous donors to display the uniform in their “Japan Advances” section of the “In Harms Way: The U.S. Navy in World War II” exhibit inside the museum. The uniform would be displayed in a five-sided Frank Case. The case would house a mannequin wearing the historic and rare uniform. The figure will have, in addition to the lava lava/loincloth, turban uniform parts, and white undershirt, a model 1903 Springfield rifle and cartridge belt. A graphic element on the back with interpretive text will accompany the model case.

We hope that the uniform and exhibit will help to preserve the unique cultural bond between American Samoa and the United States Navy.

For information regarding the Fitafita uniform case and donation opportunities, please contact the author at meng@navyhistory.org or by calling (202) 678-4333 ext. 6.

Bibliographic Information:
Collingham, Lizzie. Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food. New York: Penguin Books, 2011.
Enright, John. “Tutuila in WWII: In the Cross-hairs of History – Part 1.” Samoan News. Last modified March 15, 2011. Accessed January 22, 2015. www.samoanews.com/content/tutuila-wwii-cross-hairs-history—part-1.
Franco, Robert W. “Samoans, World War II, and Military Work.” Study done for the Center for Pacific Islander Studies, 1988.
Gray, J.A.C. Amerika Samoa: A History of American Samoa and Its United States Naval Administration. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1960.
Keesing, Felix Maxwell. Modern Samoa: It’s Government and Changing Life. Unwin Brothers: Originally Published in Great Britain, 1934.
Navy Office of Diversity and Inclusion Pubic Affairs. 2013 Asian American and Pacific Islander Heritage Month. Navy.Mil. Last modified April 29, 2013. Accessed January 23, 2015. www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=73735.
White, Geoffrey M. and Tuala Sevaaetasi. “The Fitafita Guard and Samoan Military Experience.” Remembering the Pacific War. Honolulu: Center for Pacific Islands Studies, School of Hawaiian, Asian & Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1991.

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Cracking Gibraltar: The Union Takes Fort Fisher (PART III)

Cracking Gibraltar is a blog series from the Naval Historical Foundation that will discuss the Army-Navy relationship involved in taking Fort Fisher, the last remaining Confederate stronghold in the Atlantic. READ PART I and PARTII.

Cracking Gibraltar

PART III: Cracking Gibraltar

Following the embarrassing show of force at Fort Fisher in December, General Grant and other wartime leaders wanted to make sure the next effort against the vital coastal fortification would be the last. General Butler’s replacement for the Expeditionary Corps was Major General Alfred H. Terry, a career man who saw action at Bull Run and Petersburg. Grant and Porter wanted an officer who was not afraid to fight. General Terry more than earned that reputation in January 1865. It is that reputation that helped him later in life battling Indians and Custer’s ego during the Great Sioux War.

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The New York Times (19 January 1865)

General Terry knew the profound importance of joint Army/Navy operations, having fought alongside Admiral Dahlgren’s forces at Charleston Harbor in 1863. General Grant wanted as little mistakes as possible so late in the war. He advised both expedition leaders to consult “freely” with one another in the days leading up to the attack. He hoped the open lines of communication between the two might right the wrongs of Porter and Butler’s toxic relationship. If they hoped to crack Gibraltar, they needed a plan as solid as its execution.

The total Union force heading back to Fort Fisher was comprised of 59 ships from Porter’s squadron and approximately 8,000 of Terry’s soldiers in four divisions.

Colonel Lamb and his Confederates guarding Fort Fisher were not at all surprised by the upcoming attack. As early as the evening of 12 January, the small number of soldiers guarding the garrison could see the mass of ships and transports near the beach to their north.

Terry landed his troops north of the Fort as planned on 13 January 1865. Behind the strength of Terry’s force was over six hundred of Porters guns pointed straight at Fort Fisher. If the Civil War is to be condensed into a numbers game, Fort Fisher ranks near the top for its show of force.

The Union Navy began to bombard Fort Fisher that day. The shelling acted as a screen for Terry, who began to offload and prepare to assault from the north. The paralleled firing position allowed for the close-in fire needed to shell the fort to not interfere with the landings. Army transports landed in two separate groups, with one landing several miles to the north in case the need came to repel any Confederate reinforcements from nearby Wilmington. To say that the execution was textbook might be an understatement.

Another day of shelling rocked the Fort on 14 January. The rigorous shelling lasted the entire day and inflicted some 300 Confederate casualties from inside the fort. With less than 2,000 Confederates inside before the battle began, Colonel Lamb was at a severe disadvantage. Most important, the barrage took out some of the heavy guns. Everything was set for an assault the following day.

Union vessels began shelling the fort once again around 9:00am on 15 January. Confederate General Hoke was able to get several hundred soldiers into the fort during the three-hour bombardment.

Porter sent a small contingent of sailors and marines on shore to aid in the assault. Unlike Terry’s forces, those who comprised the 1,600 man naval landing party had only cutlasses and revolvers to defend themselves with. The approximately 400 Marines going ashore had only rifles. Commander Kidder P. Breese was in overall command of the naval detachment. Breese was a close personal friend of Porter, who had been with him since the beginning of the war. It would take much more than cutlasses and revolvers to protect them as they organized into companies on the morning of 15 January. The Army originally planned for the naval landing party to attack in a series of waves, with the Marines providing covering fire.

Naval Charge at Fort Fisher (USNLP)

Naval Charge at Fort Fisher (USNLP)


Things did not go as planned for Commander Breese. The soldiers planned to attack simultaneously with the landing party were delayed, as they had to attack through the nearby woods. The sailors and Marines lumbered forward together in a mass of confusion and death towards the fort. Admiral Porter wrote about Commander Breese’s difficulties in his official report to Secretary Welles:

“Lieutenant-Commander Breese did all that he could to rally his men, and made two or three unsuccessful attempts to regain the parapet, but the marines hving failed in their duty to support the gallant officers and sailors who took the lead, he had to retire to a place of safety. He did not, however, leave the ground, but remained under the parapet in a rifle pit using a musket until night favored his escape [. . .] Nowhere in the annals of war have officers and sailors undertaken so desperate a service.”

Casualties mounted up as they moved across the open beach. The sailors barely made it to the fort before they had to turn back in panic. Only a handful made it to the outer palisades. Many injured were unfortunately left for dead. One source recorded nearly a fifth of the sailors and Marines that charged that early afternoon became casualties.

Capture of Fort Fisher by Union troops, by Kurz & Allison

Capture of Fort Fisher by Union troops, by Kurz & Allison

Colonel Lamb, seeing the intensity of attack, believed the landing party to be the central attack column. General Terry’s men soon charged at the fort with a ferocity and embattled courage rarely seen in combat. The artillery fire from the defenders was once again fierce and concentrated, this time on Terry’s men. Thanks to Porter’s rolling bombardment from the water, the advancing infantrymen had a protective blanket of cover during their rush. Terry and his men who made it to the fort began the arduous process of fighting through towards the heart of the base through the long parapet. By 9:00pm, Fort Fisher was in the hands of the United States.

The victory came at the loss of over one thousand killed or wounded. Southern casualties totaled half of that number, with nearly 1,500 taken prisoner.

The capture of Fort Fisher closed the South’s last major port. Although there are some who would note that other ports still open until the end of the war (a true statement), the “lifeline of the Confederacy” nonetheless came to a near screeching halt on 15 January. With little opportunity for blockade runners to come into the mid-Atlantic South to aid Lee’s Army, it only was a matter of time before the end. The engagement did not force an end of the war; it merely accelerated its end.

The New York Times ran on 19 January with a series of headlines covering the Union victory at Fort Fisher. The official report to the Secretary of War three days previous was equally positive. Note that both Porter and Terry wrote the report together – as equals:

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The battle would be the last great victory for the Union Navy during the Civil War. For joint operations, many scholars point to Fort Fisher as a critical benchmark for cooperation and a solid framework for future operations in U.S. military history. In all, Union forces captured 139 guns and the surrounding earthworks and fortifications.

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Cracking Gibraltar: The Union Takes Fort Fisher (PART II)

Cracking Gibraltar is a blog series from the Naval Historical Foundation that will discuss the Army-Navy relationship involved in taking Fort Fisher, the last remaining Confederate stronghold in the Atlantic. READ PART I.

Cracking Gibraltar

PART II: Butler’s “Singular and Interesting Disclosures”

Porter’s distaste for Butler was no secret. Political generals like Butler received regular harassment from career men like Porter. The disdain was clearly evident in Porter’s reports to both Grant and Welles in the weeks that followed the first attempt at Fort Fisher. He went so far as to suggest Butler quit the Army and return to civilian life. Admiral Porter often directed blame on others, when in reality some of the finger pointing should be directed his way.

Despite his own personal distrust in the man, General Grant wanted Butler’s official report published. Butler’s 3 January official report contrasted to Porter’s official correspondence with Gideon Welles. The New York Times published the report on 14 January with this apologetic headline:

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In his statement to General Grant, Butler swore that the naval bombardment did not damage the earthworks, even though his counterpart was “quite sanguine that he had silenced the guns” there. He cited historical precedent from the war about the Navy’s failure to silence the forts in New Orleans. Butler laid credibility to his argument based on the sole fact that he was there to witness both events. If it hadn’t worked before, why would anyone assume it would at Fort Fisher? Hindsight has a place in the annals of history:

“It is to be remarked that Admiral FARRAGUT even had never taken a fort, except by running by and cutting it off from all prospect of reinforcement, as Fort Jackson and Fort Morgan, and that no casemated fort had been silenced by a naval fire during the war; that if the Admiral would put his ships in the river the army could supply him across the beach, as we had proposed to do FARRAGUT at Fort St. Philip; that at least the blockade of Wilmington would be effectual even if we did not capture the fort.” (New York Times, January 14, 1865, 1)

general-butlerThe most damning information to Porter and the Navy was timing. According to Butler, the failure to take Fort Fisher was due in large part to the fleet’s sluggish movement to the rendezvous point off New Inlet prior to the attack. This troubled Butler, as he gave the Navy a “thirty six hours’ start” beginning on 14 December:

“We there waited for the navy, Friday, the 16th, Saturday, the 17th, and Sunday, the 18th, during which days we had the finest possible weather and the smoothest sea.” (New York Times, January 14, 1865, 1)

Towards the end of the report, he reiterated his feelings toward the delay:

“The loss of Friday, Saturday and Sunday, the 16th, 17th and 18th of December, was the immediate cause of the failure of the expedition. It is not my province even to suggest blame to the navy for their delay of four days at Beauford. I know none of the reasons which do or do not justify it. It is presumed they are sufficient.” (New York Times, January 14, 1865, 1)

Neither Butler nor Porter could let it go. Days after the successful capture of Fort Fisher, and over a week after the New York Times published Butler’s report, Porter wrote a final scathing response to Secretary Welles. “Though the late results have completely refuted the assertions of Generals Butler and Weitzel” he wrote, “I deem it true to the naval part of the expedition that General Butler’s report should receive some notice at my hands.” The report is a lengthy five pages long and filled with the same venomous accusations he made in late December. Porter wanted to be clear and concise as to why Butler was (still) the wrong man for the job. He proceeded to go line by line, pointing out the faults in each statement:

“General Butler states that Admiral Porter was quite sanguine that he had -silenced the guns of Fort Fisher [. . .] That is a deliberate misstatement. General Butler does not say who urged me, but I never saw him or his staff after the landing on the beach, nor did I ever have any conversation with him, or see him (except on the deck of his vessel as I passed by in the flagship) from the time I left Fortress Monroe until he left here after his failure. He showed himself by that remark just as ignorant about hydrography as the rebel General Whiting did when he built his fort where he supposed large ships could not get near enough to attack it.”

The End of Butler

grantGeneral Butler was relieved of his command of the Army of the James on 8 January 1865. That action was already in motion by end of 1864. General Grant wrote to Rear Admiral Porter from his headquarters at City Point on 30 December of his intentions to replace Butler with Major General Alfred H. Terry, a career officer both men could stand behind. Grant made every effort to convey the secrecy of the information he gave to Porter in light of the decision to promptly return back to Fort Fisher:

“I will endeavor to be back again with an increased force and without the former commander [. . .] There is not a soul here except my chief of staff, assistant adjutant-general, and myself knows of this intended renewal of our efforts against Wilmington [. . .] The commander of the expedition will probably be Major-General Terry. He will not know of it until he gets out to sea. He will go with sealed orders.” (Grant to Porter, ORN, Series I, Volume II, 394)

Butler went to Washington to answer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of War at his request. He once again insisted to the committee that Fort Fisher was heavily armed and guarded by Confederates, proving his decision to abort the mission was justified.

His efforts proved fruitless. His replacement effectively ended Butler’s military career less than one week later. General Butler went to New York after the embarrassing debacle down South until the end of the war. He retired from military life to once again pursue his political endeavors in Massachusetts. He went on to achieve the fame and success he so greatly desired during the war, serving as a member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives and the state’s 33rd governor. He died in 1893 in Washington, DC.

Coming Soon: Part III: Preparing for Attack

 

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The Battle of New Orleans: Commodore Patterson’s Gold Freedom Box

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The image above shows a gold freedom box presented to Commodore Daniel T. Patterson by the Common Council of New York City in July 1832 (NHF Accession #1960-043). Commodore Patterson was the senior American naval officer at the Battle of New Orleans, which reached its conclusion 200 years ago today.

Gold freedom boxes are extremely rare artifacts. Recipients received the box as a high honor on behalf of the city, and are subsequently bestowed the “Freedom of the City” in kind. Patterson received this prestigious gift for his actions during the New Orleans campaign during the War of 1812. According to a short biography included in NHHC’s Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Patterson began preparations months before Andrew Jackson defended the city. “The victory resulted as much from his foresight and preparations as from Jackson’s able fighting,” even earning the admiration of Jackson himself.

The boxes measures 4 ¼ inches long, 2 ¾ inches wide, and ¾ inches tall. The cover inscription reads:

“TO COMMODORE DANIEL T. PATTERSON.
FREEDOM of the city of NEW YORK
PRESENTED BY THE CORPORATION JULY 2nd. 1832″

Patterson died in 1839 in Washington, D.C. He is buried in Congressional Cemetery in the district.

Freedom Box on display in the Winterthur Museum, DE

Freedom Box on display in the Winterthur Museum, DE


The freedom box presented to Commodore Patterson is now on display at the Winterthur Museum in Delaware. The item was donated from the Foundation to the museum in 2005.

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Ditty Bag: Around the World on a Battleship

Ditty Bag: Collections of the Naval Historical Foundation
An Artifact and Collections Blog Series

Around the World on a Battleship 

DSC_6211The unique account of Around the World on A Battleship: A Narrative of the Cruise of 1908 depicts a rare perspective of life as a Navy sailor of the Great White Fleet during the early 1900’s. Lieutenant Burton W. Lambert crafted his 21-page book when he served as an enlisted sailor aboard USS Maine. His entries are charismatic and articulate, giving the narrative a literary quality and historic value. The book was generously donated to the Naval Historical Foundation by Lieutenant Lambert’s great, great nephew David Jakubuwski.

DSC_6217Lieutenant Lambert’s account is the only one of its kind. The book discusses his transition from a teenage journalist in Nebraska into a Navy sailor during the turn of the century. Lieutenant Lambert served as an enlisted sailor for sixteen years, attaining the rank of Chief Machinist Mate. He spent his remaining fourteen years as an officer, retiring with the rank of Lieutenant. His service aboard USS Maine including the historic global circumnavigation by the Great White Fleet. His account offers a glimpse into one of the United States Navy’s most important cruises unlike any other.

Around the World on A Battleship: A Narrative of the Cruise of 1908 will be donated to the Navy Library in the Washington Navy Yard in the name of donor David Jakubuwski.

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05d807eDitty Bag: Collections of the Naval Historical Foundation is a new artifact blog written by Emily Pearce, NHF Middendorf Curator. She will periodically write posts about various artifacts and accessioned items in the Naval Historical Foundation collection and their impact on naval history.

You can view all of the collections highlighted in Ditty Bag on our Flickr page HERE.

To contact Emily or to inquire about NHF collections, please email Emily Pearce at epearce@navyhistory.org.

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Cracking Gibraltar: The Union Takes Fort Fisher (PART I)

Cracking Gibraltar is a blog series from the Naval Historical Foundation that will discuss the Army-Navy relationship involved in taking Fort Fisher, the last remaining Confederate stronghold in the Atlantic.

Cracking Gibraltar

PART I: The Jonah of the Fleet

President Abraham Lincoln awoke on the morning of December 27th to disheartening news. Less than a week after General Sherman presented him with the city of Savannah, Georgia, Lincoln opened a Richmond newspaper and read about the Army-Navy blunder at Fort Fisher. News traveled fast, and with great effect. The Confederacy seemed somehow resilient in light of recent events. The war was at a critical stalemate in Virginia and much of the southern coastline was clutched in the palm of the Union Army. Yet this crudely made soil and sand fort stood up to the Federal gauntlet. General Ulysses S. Grant called the entire engagement was a “gross and culpable failure.” He was right.

The Expedition Leaving Chesapeake, by Alfred Waud (LOC Image:  LC-DIG-ppmsca-21456)

The Expedition Leaving Chesapeake, by Alfred Waud (LOC Image: LC-DIG-ppmsca-21456)


The offensive proved an embarrassing defeat – one of the worst suffered by the Union during the war. In reality, they beat themselves; the Confederacy was a shadow opponent. The results seemed out of the ordinary given the history of combined operation success in the western theater. Union forces failed to capture the South’s last remaining Atlantic port in a confusing spectacle of misinformation, missed signals, and poor management. Sixty ships and over 10,000 shells could not force the will of the Confederacy. The most unfortunate event during the holiday engagement was the fleet’s unsuccessful detonation of a disguised blockade runner (USS Louisiana) filled with explosives. Although General Grant and Gideon Welles doubted the offense would work, the attack strategy went forward on 23 December. Not unlike the entire attack itself, its explosion detonated without incident nearly a mile away from the fort. Soldiers at Fort Fisher got a fancy firework display as the kickoff to the attack.

Fort Fisher, N.C. Interior view of southeast end, showing site of main magazine (LOC Image:  LC-DIG-cwpb-03673)

Fort Fisher, N.C. Interior view of southeast end, showing site of main magazine (LOC Image: LC-DIG-cwpb-03673)


Given the overwhelming odds and firepower available, many sailors felt the main failure to capture the vital stronghold fell squarely on the Union Army. To them, the Army could not uphold their end of the bargain. Federal forces only had a handful of casualties to show for their efforts. Everyone in the North wanted an explanation.

Brady Portrait of General Butler (LOC Image: LC-BH82- 2988)

Brady Portrait of General Butler (LOC Image: LC-BH82- 2988)

Although Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter Porter felt the fort was all but abandoned and demolished from the bombardment, General Butler had a different feeling from the ground – or so one would assume. Butler did not attend the assault himself. Even so, both leaders failed to communicate with one another. This was especially embarrassing for Porter. The battle smacked against his official role as the commander of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. Porter was furious. He took to pen and paper with an eagerness and ferocity as matched his fighting spirit in the days following the attack.

On the same day President Lincoln read the disheartening news in the paper, Porter wrote to Secretary Welles from the flagship Malvern about the myriad misgivings of his Army counterpart. “My dispatch [. . .] will scarcely give you an idea of my disappointment at the conduct of the army authorities,” Porter wrote in the opening salvo of his telegram. He was more than certain that the accuracy of Union gunfire silenced the guns at fort Fisher. In reality, there were more Confederates inside the fort than originally believed by Porter, yet far less than Butler imagined. He conveyed the extreme level of Butler’s unprofessionalism and insubordination in a series of weighty passages:

“Had the army made a show of surrounding it (the forts), it would have been ours, but nothing of the kind was done. The men landed, reconnoitered, and hearing that the enemy were massing troops somewhere, the order was given to reembark”

“To show that the rebels have no force here, these men have been on shore two days without being molested [. . .] I can’t conceive what the army expected when they came here; it certainly did not need 7,000 to garrison Fort Fisher; it only required to garrison all these forts.”  (Porter to Welles, ORN, Series I, Volume II, 261-262)

Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter (LOC Image: LC-USZ62-113173)

Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter (LOC Image: LC-USZ62-113173)

Porter suggested that the makeup of the fort essentially “invited soldiers to walk in” and take possession. He ended the note with a few sharp concluding remarks and gave a positive outlook on a second follow-up engagement. He cited the discovery of the forts “weaknesses” from the December bombardment as a major factor in the future assault’s success. Despite the poor outcome initially, Porter believed a second chance under new Army leadership would be smoother. He threw support at General Winfield Scott Hancock, the hero of Gettysburg, as a possible candidate. Surely, he would not back down from the fight like Butler.

The Massachusetts Springfield Republican included several consolidated reports from Navy and government officials in their 2 January edition of the newspaper. Once again, blame pointed directly on Butler for the poor showing in North Carolina:

“In the fleet Gen. Butler is universally blamed, in vehement and emphatic terms,, for continual delays when the expedition was preparing, and for lack of enterprise when the action was in progress [. . .] a bold dash would have effected the capture of the place, almost without resistance.” (Springfield Republic, January 2, 1865, 2) 

The article ended with a small passage summarizing Confederate reports of the engagement. The section’s title clearly indicated the military and public feeling towards Butler and his disappointing show at Wilmington:

Butler the Jonah of the Fleet

Butler fought war like a politician. Porter saw battles with the same scope and breadth of his father. The latter was needed to take Fort Fisher. The upcoming engagement would not be an easy ride for the Union Army and Navy as Porter had suspected. They could not simply “walk right in” the fort. There would be casualties this time.

Coming Soon – Part II: Butler’s “Singular and Interesting Disclosures:” The Rivalry Continues

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“FLIVVERS – THE FIRST STEAM TURBINE DRIVEN DESTROYERS

By George Stewart

A “flivver” is an American slang term used in the early twentieth century to refer to any small car that gave a rough ride. These “flivvers” were primarily small, inexpensive and old. In the context of the United States Navy, “flivvers” refer to the two specific classes of destroyers that entered service in the early part of the 20th Century. Destroyers evolved from the need to defend a battle fleet from the newly developed, high-speed torpedo boats. Vessels were developed into what became known as torpedo boat destroyers, which was later shortened to destroyers.

The earliest US Navy ships classified as destroyers were the thirteen ships of the Bainbridge (DD 1- DD 13) class and the three ships of the Truxtun (DD 14 – DD 16) class. Both of these classes were referred to as Torpedo Boat Destroyers. These ships entered service between 1902 and 1903. Twin reciprocating steam engines developing approximately 8000 SHP propelled these classes. They could reach 28 to 29.6 knots, a very respectable speed for the day. Steam was supplied at 250 psi from four coal fired water tube boilers. Their major armament consisted of 18” torpedo tubes and 3” guns, backed by 6 pounders. The torpedoes were looked upon as their “Main Battery.”

The term “Flivvers” also applied to the Smith (DD 17) and the follow on Paulding (DD 22) classes. The five ships of the Smith Class were authorized in 1906 and entered service between 1909 and 1910, while the 21 ships of the Paulding Class entered service between 1910 and 1912. Both classes served throughout World War I, but they had relatively short service lives. All of the “flivvers” were decommissioned by 1920.

The “Flivvers” incorporated a number of significant advances in marine engineering. They were the first US Navy destroyer types to be powered by steam turbines. A major difference between the two classes was the boilers. The Smith class ships were the last destroyers with coal-fired boilers, while the Paulding class ships were the first with oil-fired boilers.

The five ships of the Smith Class were:

  • USS Smith (DD 17)
  • USS Lamson (DD 18)
  • USS Preston (DD 19)
  • USS Flusser (DD 20)
  • USS Reid (DD 21)

Smith and Lamson were built at Cramp Shipbuilding, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Preston was built at New York Shipbuilding, Camden, New Jersey, and Flusser and Reid at Bath Iron Works. The ships all entered service in late 1909 with the exception of Lamson, which was commissioned in February 1910. All five ships served on the East Coast with their shared homeport of Charleston, South Carolina. During the period between 1917 and 1919, all were assigned to convoy escort and patrol duties out of Brest, France. All Smith and Paulding class ships were decommissioned in 1919 shortly after the end of the war. This is likely due to the excess of destroyers that remained at the end of the war and the many technical advances made in the newer ship classes during the war.

The major ship characteristics were as follows:

  • Length – 294’
  • Beam – 26.5’
  • Draft – 10’ 7”
  • Deck – Raised forecastle
  • Full Load Displacement – 700 tons
  • Design Speed – 28 knots – Maximum Trial Speed – 30.41 knots
  • Armament – Five 3”/50 guns – Three 18” torpedo tubes (later upgraded to six in three dual mounts)
  • Crew – 89
  • Machinery – Triple screw, direct drive Parsons steam turbines – 10,000 SHP
  • Boilers – Four Mosher water tube boilers – Saturated steam – 240 psi
  • Fuel – Coal – 304 tons
  • Endurance – 2000 nautical miles @ 18 knots
  • Generators – Two 5 kW DC (Later upgraded to 10 kW). By comparison a modern destroyer has three ship service gas turbine AC generators, each with ratings as high as 3500 kW.

One peculiarity of the ships was the stack arrangement. They varied depending upon which shipyard the ships were built in. The two Cramp built boats (Smith and Lamson) had their two amidships funnels paired close together. The funnels on the New York boat (Preston) were equally spaced, and the Bath ships (Flusser and Reid) were in pairs fore and aft, as shown in the following photos. The funnels were raised in 1912, probably for the reasons shown in the photo of the USS Flusser underway.

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These ships would not have much luck meeting modern emissions standards. Ships had an open conning station on top of the pilot house, where watch standers would have to put up with a lot of smoke and water spray. You would also have to keep the lower portholes closed at high speed, or the crew would get wet.

The steam turbine was invented in Great Britain by Charles Parsons in 1884. The first marine installation was aboard the SS Turbinia, which was launched in 1894. By the early 1900s, turbines could be found aboard several large passenger vessels including the liners Mauretania and Lusitania, which entered transatlantic service in 1907. Both of these ships had quadruple screws driven directly by very large steam turbines with a total rating of 68,000 SHP at 190 RPM. The HP turbine rotors were 10’ in diameter and the LP turbine rotors were over 15’ in diameter.

Several very significant technical obstacles had to be overcome in order to make steam turbines viable for marine applications. The first and most significant was that turbines operate most efficiently at high RPM, while propellers must operate at much lower speeds in order to avoid cavitation. A compromise between efficient turbine and propeller speeds was required. The approach was to add stages to the turbine in order to make it operate more slowly so it could be connected directly to the propeller shaft that operated at higher than desirable speeds with a subsequent loss in propeller efficiency.

Additionally the turbine rotor diameters had to be quite large in order to develop the torque necessary to turn the propeller shafts. On sea trials, USS Smith operated the engines at 724 RPM. The first geared turbine installation aboard a US Navy destroyer was USS Wadsworth (DD 60), which entered service in 1915. Another significant problem was that the early turbine installations were very inefficient at low speeds. A variety of different cruising arrangements, many of which were quite complex, could be found aboard the World War I-era naval vessels. Some destroyer classes had small reciprocating steam engines geared to the propeller shafts for use under cruising conditions.

The next illustration shows the then revolutionary triple screw Parsons Turbine propulsion system for Flusser under construction on the floor at Bath Iron Works. The three shaft lines can be clearly seen. The turbines were arranged in five separate casings. The center shaft was driven by the High Pressure Turbine. The two Cruising and Low Pressure Turbines drove the port & starboard outboard shafts. The Low Pressure turbines exhausted outboard through the big ducts that you see to the main condensers. There were separate stages in each Low Pressure Turbine to go astern. The engines were all located in a single engine room, which was fitted with a skylight. The center shaft could not be reversed. The BIW people were justifiably very proud of this installation.

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Saturated steam at approximately 240 psi was supplied to the turbines by four coal fired water tube boilers manufactured by C.D. Mosher, New York. The boilers were unusually designed. They had two steam drums, one on each side of the boiler. Each steam drum was connected to a separate water drum by means of its own generating bank consisting of 1” tubes. This appears to have been the only application of Mosher type boilers on U.S. Navy destroyers of that era. In those days, each boiler was located in its own fire room. Combustion air was provided by individual forced draft blowers that discharged directly into the fire rooms, which were maintained under a positive pressure when the boilers were steaming and had to be entered by way of an air lock.

Mosher Boiler

Mosher Boiler


The Paulding Class destroyers were a modification of the Smith Class. There were 21 ships of the class with hull numbers from 22 through 42. The lead ship of the class, USS Paulding (DD 22), was commissioned in 1910. The last ship of the class, USS Jenkins (DD 42), was commissioned in 1912. The ships were built in five different shipyards:

  • Bath Iron Works – 5 ships – USS Paulding (DD 22), USS Drayton (DD 23), USS Trippe (DD33), USS Jouett (DD 41), USS Jenkins (DD 42)
  • Newport News Shipbuilding – 4 ships – USS Roe (DD 24), USS Terry (DD 25), USS Monaghan (DD 32), USS Fanning (DD 37)
  • Bethlehem Steel Fore River, Quincy, MA – 4 ships – USS Perkins (DD 26), USS Sterett (DD 27), USS Walke (DD 34), USS Henley (DD 39)
  • New York Shipbuilding – 4 ships – USS McCall (DD 28), USS Burrows (DD 29), USS Ammen (DD 35), USS Jarvis (DD 38)
  • Cramp, Philadelphia, PA – 4 ships – USS Warrington (DD 30), USS Mayrant (DD 31), USS Patterson (DD 36), USS Beale (DD 40)

The New York and Bath built ships had four stacks, while the Newport News, Quincy, and Cramp built ships had three, with the middle stack consisting of two uptakes trunked together. The newer class ships burned oil rather than coal and had 12,000 SHP vice the 10,000 SHP on the Smith Class, making them about one knot faster. Endurance was 3000 nm at 16 knots. There was some variation in the turbine arrangement between ships of the class. Most of the ships of the class had the same triple screw arrangement as the Smith class; however, five ships of the class had twin screws. DD 22-31 had Normand water tube boilers, while DD 32 through DD 42 had Normand boilers. Both of these boilers were of the “A” Type with a single steam drum and two water drums. All of the ships were decommissioned in 1919. However, twelve ships of the class were transferred to the Coast Guard for use in the Rum Patrol between 1924 and 1930. All ships of the class were scrapped in 1934-35 to comply with the London Naval Treaty. A photo of the Newport News built USS Terry (DD 25) underway follows. Note the three stack arrangement:

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A few historical items of interest concerning the Smith and Paulding Class destroyers include:

  • The USS Smith (DD 17) was placed in reserve after only 2 years of service and reactivated in 1915 as war became imminent. The reasons for the inactivation are not known, but it is highly probable that it was due to obsolescence because it was coal burning. It may have also been necessary in order to correct significant deficiencies in the original design after the ship entered service.
  • A significant number of the commanding officers of the Smith and Paulding classes went on to make flag rank during World War II. Some of the most prominent examples follow.
  • The commanding officer of USS Lamson (DD 18) between September 1912 and September 1913 was Lt Harold Stark. Stark served as the Chief of Naval Operations between 1939 and 1942. He later commanded the Paulding class destroyer USS Patterson (DD 36) in 1915.
  • The commanding officer of USS Flusser (DD 20) between August 1912 and September 1913 was Lt William Frederick (Bull) Halsey, who became famous during World War II. He later commanded the Paulding class destroyer USS Jarvis (DD 38).
  • Historical records indicate that USS Preston (DD 19) was utilized in 1913 by then Under Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt on an inspection tour of existing naval facilities on Frenchman’s Bay, Maine, with stops at Campobello Island and Bar Harbor. Apparently Lt Halsey, who was then acting as the commander of Torpedo Division 1, accompanied him on this trip. Some conflicts between historical sources exist as to which ships participated in this trip.
  • The commanding officer of the Paulding class destroyer USS Jarvis (DD 28) in 1911- 1913 was Lt Ernest J. King, the CNO from 1942 through 1945 during World War II.
  • The “Flivvers” were originally assigned to the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla. The commander of the flotilla during the period 1913 to 1915 was Admiral William S. Sims, who later served as Commander Naval Forces Europe during World War I and president of the US Naval War College after the war.

In summary, despite their relatively short service life, the “Flivvers” represented definite technical advances and they played very significant roles in the early development of US Navy destroyers.

                                                                 REFERENCES

  • NAVSOURCE
  • Dictionary of American Nava Fighting Ships (DANFS)
  • US Destroyers, an Illustrated Design History – Norman Friedman, 2004
  • Power of the Great Liners – Dennis Griffiths, 1990
  • Steam Boiler Construction, Hutton, 1916
  • E-Mail from Jonathan Eno, Bar Harbor, Maine –June 23, 2014
  • Steam Turbines – US Naval Institute, 1917

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BOOK REVIEW – The Path to War – U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Southeast Asia 1961 to 1965

Scan 3By Col George R. Hofmann Jr. USMC (Ret.), Government Printing Office, Washington DC (2014)

Reviewed by Charles Bogart

This book is part of Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series. As with all USMC histories, this book is both a history and a lesson learned publication. The title is a little misleading, as the author starts his story in 1954 when the USMC sent its first advisor teams to Southeast Asia. The heart of the book covers the years 1961 to 1965 as Marines deployed Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand.

The author takes care to incorporate Mao Tse-tung’s “Three-Phase Model for Protracted War.” Thus, as the USMC builds its presence in Southeast Asia, we are provided with a discussion of the Communist insurgent forces response to this situation within the content of Mao’s Three Phase Model. The author also discusses the political aspects of the war. It is clear that one of the problems facing the U. S. policy makers trying to contain the Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia was the lack of an overall military strategy. American leadership policy decisions are all made in response to an event and the ordered response operation is hampered by failure in civilian-military coordination.

In 1962, USMC forces assigned to Vietnam ceased being just advisors and began to engage in combat operations. The first USMC combat units to arrive in Vietnam were helicopter units assigned to transporting Republic of Vietnam troops conducting operational sweeps in enemy territory. This was a learning period for USMC helicopter pilots. What was before a theoretical problem was now for real. The learning curve for these Marines was brutal. Many technical improvisions developed during this time were later incorporated into USMC helicopter deployment doctrine. Among the challenges that were not considered before USMC helicopters had deployed to combat was the means to remove a wounded pilot from his seat for treatment while airborne?

The year 1962 also saw the first deployment of USMC combat ground forces to Southeast Asia. The Marines were not deployed to Vietnam, but to Cambodia. Within Vietnam, Marines undertook aerial transportation for Republic of Vietnam troops and provided technical support to the developing Republic of Vietnam’s own Marine Corps (RVMC). The book is not only a history of USMC in Vietnam, but also of the RVMC. We follow within these pages the development of RVMC from an adhoc force to an elite military unit. However, those Marines wounded and killed in better were the crews of the Marine helicopters flying in support of Republic of Vietnam troops conducting search missions to located enemy bases. These Marine helicopter crews soon began placing armor over critical engine components and arming themselves with crew served defensive weapons. In time, these defensive weapons became offensive weapons used to clear a landing zone. It is obvious that during 1962 the manual on how to deploy helicopters in battle was being developed by the Marines in Vietnam.

In February 1965, as Viet Cong attacks intensified, the first USMC ground forces arrived in Vietnam, the 1st Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion. Engineers and other support units soon followed. On 8 March 1965, the Marines of Battalion Landing Team 3/9 were landed at Da Hang. These Marines were the first of what would grow to a Marine Division with supporting air wing engaged in day to day combat in Vietnam.

I highly recommend this book to all interested in the development of helicopter combat tactics and how mission creep can change the best of plans. My only negative comment concerning this book is a lack of an index and a glossary of abbreviations used. I look forward to the other books in this series.

BUY AT THE GPO BOOKSTORE HERE

Charles H. Bogart is a frequent contributor to Naval History Book Reviews.

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BOOK REVIEW – A Century of Service: The U.S. Navy on Cape Henlopen, Lewes, Delaware: 1898-1996

Manthorpe_A Century of ServiceBy William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr, Cedar Tree Books, Ltd., Wilmington, DE (2014)

Reviewed By Michael F. Solecki

Protecting the entrance to the Delaware River and Bay has been of concern to its maritime communities since their early existence. Most of that protection was farther upstream at Forts Mott and Mifflin and Peapatch Island. But, it was not until the Spanish American War that the powers that be decided to protect the river at its entrance. Cape Henlopen, Delaware on the western bank and Cape May, New Jersey on the eastern bank form the gateposts of that entrance. Although this book gives some information about the Cape May side of the river, it describes in amazing detail the fascinating history of Cape Henlopen.

The late 1800s were a time of naval reform for the fledgling United States of America. Until that time, the U.S. did not have a high seas fleet to speak of. With war against Spain looming and vibrations of a world scale war coming from Europe, the U.S. decided that in order to protect their interests around the globe, a modern and sustainable navy was necessary. The 1880s and 1890s saw the formation of a naval reserve force, state naval militias, and a true “coast guard.” Post-Civil War America was becoming a global power. National defense by way of its harbors became a concern of the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, who began pushing harbor defense to the sitting congress and White House. The Philadelphia Navy Yard, commercial shipbuilding and the massive industrial base along Delaware was a primary national asset that needed protection. This was proven by German U-Boats during both of the world wars and the submarine service of the Soviet Union later on.

Once the gate posts were organized and equipped with signal stations and patrol boats, mining the entrance to the Bay began. By 1905, the Cape Henlopen facility received a Massie Spark Gap Transmitter and was named a Naval Wireless Station. From that point, the station technologically evolved through two world wars and the Cold War with the Warsaw Pact. The station provided not only anti-submarine services as part of the Navy Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) net it was at the forefront of naval surveillance, communications and navigational aids. Together with Cape May, the stations provided the main protective force of the harbors and assets of the Fourth Naval District.

Since its establishment, Cape Henlopen was manned by the United States Army in Fort Miles, a Coast Guard detachment from the Captain of the Port of Philadelphia and several Navy units and related military reserve units. The Public Health Service maintained a quarantine hospital and even state naval militias maintained a presence. The personnel became a welcome and integral part of the Lewes, Delaware community throughout its existence. As the Cold War began winding down in the 1980s, the naval facility became primarily a reserve training facility for the sailors living in the region. The reserve units of Cape Henlopen were activated and served in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s, the number of reserve personnel dwindled. The units were moved elsewhere and the facility closed in December 1995.

The State of Delaware has since reabsorbed the land and converted it into a state park and environmental center. Almost all of the buildings are gone and the antennas no longer decorate the beaches. The dunes are being allowed to reestablish to protect the area from nature instead of enemy ships and the town of Lewes has mostly become a sleepy hamlet. For the most part, the majority of the tourists do not realize the important services the area contributed to the security of the nation. I am more guilty than most. I was one of those “tourists” for fifty years, as I have been surfing the surrounding beaches from the mid-1960s through the present, not to mention the countless trips on the Cape May – Lewes Ferry. I actually taught beach ecology courses at the former Reserve Training Center, now an Environmental Center. Embarrassingly, as a Naval Historian and regional resident, I never knew its legacy.

This book tells it all and literally names names. It gives a comprehensive military history of the Cape from the beginning to the end. The detail is surprising and easily defines the amount of effort put into the research by the author. Authentic photographs and charts are used throughout to create a realistic mental picture and emphasize the military and communal importance throughout the station’s history. Unlike most other naval facilities this base was very mission specific and high-technology was its primary tool. Cape Henlopen was on the forefront of naval technological research and the author covers its evolution in detail. The author also personalizes it by including details of the close relationship between the local civilian community, the military personnel, their families and the base as a whole. By covering the whole spectrum he clearly defines the regional importance of its location. I recommend reading the book to anyone interested in the history of naval technology and/or the region; it is well written and maintains the reader’s attention.

BUY FROM CEDAR TREE BOOKS

Michael F. Solecki is an independent naval historian, U.S. Navy Destroyer (AAW & ASW) and NOAA (Atmospheric and Marine Physical Scientist) veteran of the Cold War and performs peer reviews for several publishers of U.S. and Japanese Naval History.

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BOOK REVIEW – Fighting the War at Sea: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology

Friedman_Great War at SeaBy Norman Friedman, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (2014)

Reviewed by Mark Lardas

The centennial of World War I has renewed focus on the conflict, including a slew of new books about the war. Norman Friedman’s Fighting the War at Sea: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology, examines the naval aspects of World War I.

Friedman attacks his subject comprehensively. He opens by examining the maritime war on a strategic level, presenting the grand maritime objectives of Britain, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, France, and the resources possessed by the major participants. He then reviews the fleets and the operational strategy of Britain and Germany, concluding with an examination of the battles.

He discusses the nature of the ships involved, starting with capital ships and working to inshore vessels, submarines, and anti-submarine vessels. He also surveys weapons and technology of World War I’s navies, which includes a chapter on mine warfare.

Some might think there is little new to learn about the naval aspects of World War I. Friedman shows that new information has been released since the fiftieth anniversary of the conflict. A great deal of material was declassified 75 years after its end. Ironically, some of its secrets held value during the Cold War, which ended a few years before the seventy-fifth anniversary.

The book presents new information. The initial maritime inaction is explained. Both sides had solid reasons for their actions, although underlying assumptions may have been flawed. Both sides believed the war would be short. The Germans were bedeviled by shortages of spares, ammunition, and scouts. Germany was Britain’s biggest trading partner; the Admiralty initially wished to avoid economic total war.

The reason for the propensity for British battle cruisers to explode at Jutland is revealed. Friedman shows this was due less to design flaws than from some captains ignoring safety procedures to increase rates of fire. He also provides evidence of the inadequate horizontal protection explanation offered by Beatty and Jellicoe afterwards was an excuse, used to cover up these failings.

Shortcomings of anti-submarine warfare during the First World War are well known, but Friedman highlights the handicaps submarines worked under. Inadequate targeting systems limited salvoes to single torpedoes. The chances of one torpedo hitting were further handicapped by the lack of plotting computers or tools to accurately determine the course of a target.

Most of all, Friedman offers readers an appreciation of the importance of factors often ignored in naval histories or war games. Logistics, personnel, and non-combat technologies (such as wireless communications) often determined victory. Friedman highlights these aspects superbly.

The book suffers a bit from being too focused on the British and German navies. The French Navy is mentioned in passing, and the United States Navy’s contributions are covered adequately. Italian, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian navies are almost totally neglected. Admittedly these were sideshows.

Fighting the Great War at Sea is a book anyone interested in the maritime aspects of the war will want to read. It provides a fresh and informative study of a critical aspect of the war. 

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Mark Lardas, an engineer, freelance writer, amateur historian and model-maker, lives in League City. His website is marklardas.com.

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BOOK REVIEW – The Admirals’ Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War

Ford and Rosenberg_Admirals AdvantageWritten by Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD (2014)

Reviewed by John R. Satterfield, DBA

This paperback reissue is the outgrowth of a series of operational intelligence (OPINTEL) “Lessons Learned” studies by Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reserve units conducted between 1994 and 2004. It also includes as well as a 1998 symposium on the same topic. The book is really a summary report about these activities. It reads more like a report than a narrative history, as it focuses almost entirely on the chronological evolution of organizational structures and functional operations. Readers looking for a general history comprised of anecdotes, individual achievements, and loads of interesting episodes about intelligence derring-do (rare in the Navy anyway) will not find that here.

The authors could not produce a popular history because they faced two significant limitations. First, the work served as the official report of a multi-year project supervised by six flag-rank Directors of Naval Intelligence. Such documents are not written to entertain. Secondly, much of the material that the book covers remains classified. Despite these issues, Ford and Rosenberg, both former Naval Reserve intelligence officers, present a substantive and interesting assessment of OPINTEL’s history and evolution from World War II to the advent of post-Cold War conflicts involving non-state pluralistic adversaries. Not surprisingly, the text is dry, with implicit or unwritten detail only intelligence professionals and serious scholars with some background in the field will genuinely benefit from. For this relatively narrow audience, however, The Admirals’ Advantage certainly is worth a look.

OPINTEL is “the art of providing near-real-time information concerning the location, activity and likely intentions of potential adversaries.” It is “directly concerned with the operating forces,” and intended for their near-term use to plan and conduct operations. Naval intelligence as conceived today is a twentieth century development that followed the introduction of shipboard radio communications. The Royal Navy utilized radio intercepts in World War I to anticipate German ship and submarine activities. The U.S. Navy followed the British lead in the years leading up to World War II, with both services relying on far more sophisticated analytical techniques.

The best-known event of the war involving both intelligence gathering and code breaking was the Battle of Midway. American analysts were able to predict that the island was the target of a Japanese fleet action six months after Pearl Harbor. This enabled U.S. carriers to ambush the Japanese and sink four aircraft carriers at the cost of one U.S. deck. Midway, coupled with the American invasion and victory at Guadalcanal later in 1942, put Japan on the strategic defensive until VJ Day.

U.S. emphasis on the “location, activity and likely intentions” of the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Kriegsmarine established OPINTEL at the central function of naval intelligence. Despite post-war force reductions, the Cold War quickly revitalized and institutionalized this approach. Threats from the Soviet Union generated significant efforts in several phases of the rivalry. The Soviets focused early on sea denial, and new missile technology created urgent OPINTEL requirements contributing to fleet defense for forward-deployed U.S. battle groups that would support any potential combat in Western Europe. The stakes were raised exponentially once the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons. Nuclear-powered submarines with the capability to launch nuclear missiles while submerged and the added threat of a growing blue-water Soviet naval presence required an even higher level of intelligence activity.

The U.S. Navy’s continuous monitoring of Soviet nuclear ballistic missile subs (SSBNs) became the service’s top strategic priority throughout much of the Cold War. Developing an all-source intelligence network involving undersea acoustic arrays and sensors on American aircraft, ships, and submarines enabled the U.S. to meet and contain this threat until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This comprehensive methodology and the application of constantly improving, complex technological resources and well-trained personnel were instrumental in avoiding potential disaster. Intelligence and operational units worked as cohesive teams. The best evidence of the effectiveness of their partnerships, almost completely unknown and rarely acknowledged by most Americans, was the absence of deliberate or accidental incidents that could have led to war and destruction beyond comprehension.

The Navy’s unique approach to intelligence was so successful that other services have adopted and adapted it for their own uses and established joint OPINTEL activities that have added continuous value through the years of relative chaos that followed. Even though serious long-term threats to naval assets are unlikely at the moment, OPINTEL has refocused its strengths on the now prevalent multifarious adversaries that function in unexpected ways around the globe, proving the effectiveness of a concept that has been in place and steadily evolving and progressing for nearly 75 years.

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Dr. Satterfield served as a naval reserve intelligence specialist and officer for more than 20 years.

 

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BOOK REVIEW – Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea, and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo

Cheevers_Act of WarBy Jack Cheevers. NAL Caliber, New York (2013)

Reviewed by John R. Satterfield, DBA

This excellent history, drawn from 11,000 pages of previously classified or unexamined documents as well as memoirs and other more contemporaneous accounts, is an omnibus review of the 1968 Pueblo incident.

This volume is the culmination of more than a decade of research by a former Los Angeles Times political reporter using much material unavailable to earlier works on the affair published soon after its conclusion. It summarizes the facts of the case and incorporates many more peripheral but significant activities gleaned from other sources that shaped the outcome and implications of the ship’s seizure. Other essential books that cover various aspects of the story are Ed Brandt’s The Last Voyage of USS Pueblo (1969), the captain’s account, Bucher: My Story (1970), Trevor Armbrister’s A Matter of Accountability (1970), and Mitchell Lerner’s The Pueblo Incident (2002). Cheevers includes these findings and adds many new insights from his relentless digging.

Cheevers’s analysis shows that nearly everyone involved, up to the highest levels of U.S. military and intelligence command, acted inadequately, with little planning for contingencies. This conclusion is no real surprise, but Cheever discloses extensive background on the military activity immediately after the ship’s capture and the months of diplomatic maneuvering that reinforce his overarching judgment. Early on, the Navy took a page from Stephen Decatur and considered sending a destroyer with carrier air cover into Wonson Harbor to recapture Pueblo and a Marine raid onshore to rescue the crew. It was clearly a hare-brained scheme destined to fail if actually carried out.

Intelligence capabilities are far more sophisticated today. Vessels like Pueblo, operating just outside territorial waters, are long since obsolete. At the time, however, coastal surveillance conducted by ships or aircraft were a necessary part of intelligence gathering. High-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, like the A-12 and SR-71, capable of Mach 2 and Mach 3 airspeeds, respectively, were too few in number and in too high demand to cover North Korea, not considered a global threat back then. Still, command authority ignored the real risk attached to Pueblo’s mission despite repeated Soviet attacks on U.S. snooper flights close to USSR territory near the Sea of Japan. The U.S. apparently also underestimated North Korea’s capacity for outrageous actions, even after several terrorist raids against South Korea and the attempted assassination of the South’s president just days before Pueblo’s hijacking.

The overriding aspect of the incident, so resonant in memory, was the fact that Pueblo surrendered without firing a shot, making it the first U.S. Navy ship to be taken by a foreign power in peacetime since the capture of USS Chesapeake in 1807.

Moreover, Pueblo was no ordinary ship. It carried a vast inventory of classified papers, studies, codebooks, and surveillance equipment. The NSA later described these as the worst security breach in U.S. history. Because he failed to fight his ship, the captain, CDR Lloyd “Pete” Bucher, faced a court of inquiry and a court martial recommendation, which was quickly squelched by the Secretary of the Navy. Cheever argues forcefully, however, that the Navy placed Bucher and his crew in an untenable situation with no options if anything went wrong. To back up his claim, Cheevers found the only surviving copy of a White House study headed by former Undersecretary of State George Ball which found fault with the “planning, organization, and direction” of the entire operation by command authority.

The Pueblo crew’s courage was never in doubt, despite nearly a year of horrendous and continued abuse, torture, and starvation. They all signed confessions. Anyone subjected to such treatment would. To their credit, the 82 sailors consistently resisted their captors, most famously displaying middle fingers, explained as “Hawaiian good luck signs,” in many North Korean publicity photos and acted with deliberate insubordination that could have led to their executions.

Pueblo itself reflected the Navy’s shoestring level of support for activities unrelated to the Vietnam War. The ship was a small World War II-era Army freighter converted into an electronic and signals intelligence gathering vessel. Despite entreaties from Bucher, document destruction systems could not handle the volume of classified documents in an emergency, and the crew was inexperienced or inadequately trained. Pueblo was effectively defenseless; except for small arms, its only crew-served weapons were two .50-caliber machine guns, useless against the guns, cannons and torpedoes on the North Korean sub chaser and patrol boats that waylaid AGER-2, not to mention MiG fighters carrying missiles. Armament was absent because the Navy thought it might provoke a response. Bucher had clear responsibility to resist seizure, but doing so would have killed many if not all of those on board, in addition to the one sailor killed by cannon fire that forced Bucher to heave to. Even if the ship were sunk, North Korea could recover much of Pueblo’s classified information and equipment because sea depth was just 30 fathoms.

Pueblo’s seizure led to calls for retaliation nationwide, but President Lyndon B. Johnson had few real options for action. Within days, the Tet Offensive would disrupt the Vietnam War, shredding public support for the conflict and forcing Johnson’s withdrawal from the 1968 presidential election. Johnson quickly implemented diplomatic actions that kept the lid on South Korea, incensed by the North’s assassination attempt, and led to the crew’s release, two days before Christmas in 1968. American negotiators finally broke the impasse by agreeing to an apology that the U.S. renounced before signing it, a process Cheever documents in detail from contemporary memos and personal accounts.

Bucher and his crew returned to the U.S. as heroes, but the incident scarred many of them. Bucher, with no prospect of promotion, retired in 1973. He died in 2004 at the age of 76. Most of his shipmates left the service, many with crippling health issues after their time in captivity. North Korea today displays Pueblo as a Cold War trophy on the Taedong River in Pyongyang. The little ship remains in naval service, the second-oldest commissioned vessel in the U.S. Navy after USS Constitution, and will remain so until it is returned.

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Dr. Satterfield teaches military history and served as a naval intelligence officer. Unfortunately, he is old enough vividly to remember the Pueblo incident.

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Yale Professor Awarded Hattendorf Prize

 NEW HAVEN, Conn. (Nov. 20, 2014) U.S. Naval War College (NWC) president Rear Adm. P. Gardner Howe III and NWC professor John B. Hattendorf present Yale University professor Paul M. Kennedy the Hattendorf Prize for Distinguished Original Research in Maritime History, Nov. 20, at Yale. First awarded in 2011, the prize is made to an individual who has made world-class achievement in original research, contributing to a deeper historical understanding of the broad context and interrelationships involved in the roles, contributions, limitations and uses of the sea services in history. (Courtesy photo)


NEW HAVEN, Conn. (Nov. 20, 2014) U.S. Naval War College (NWC) president Rear Adm. P. Gardner Howe III and NWC professor John B. Hattendorf present Yale University professor Paul M. Kennedy the Hattendorf Prize for Distinguished Original Research in Maritime History, Nov. 20, at Yale. First awarded in 2011, the prize is made to an individual who has made world-class achievement in original research, contributing to a deeper historical understanding of the broad context and interrelationships involved in the roles, contributions, limitations and uses of the sea services in history. (Courtesy photo)


From Naval War College Museum
Dec. 4, 2014

NEW HAVEN, Conn. – Paul M. Kennedy, the J. Richardson Dilworth professor of history at Yale University, was presented the Hattendorf Prize for Distinguished Original Research in Maritime History by U.S. Naval War College (NWC) president Rear Adm. P. Gardner Howe III, Nov. 20, at Yale.

The ceremony, attended by NWC professor John B. Hattendorf, for whom the prize is named, took place during Kennedy’s military history class in Luce Hall Auditorium, where Hattendorf provided a guest lecture on “Sea Power since 1945.”

In presenting the award, Howe recognized Kennedy for his innovative and wide-ranging approach to the writing of naval history, inspiring scholars to examine the importance of sea power and shaping the course of international history.

“This impressive body of historical scholarship has influenced the work not only of other historians, but a much wider audience,” said Howe. “By breaking down barriers to interdisciplinary study, by integrating a wide range of knowledge, and by making a contribution to policy discussions, your works have themselves become prizes for us to read.”

Kennedy has written compelling narratives that show the interrelationship of sea power and land power, technological innovation and naval warfare, economic wherewithal and naval strength, and grand strategy and high politics.

Howe emphasized that the award honors both Kennedy and his work, expressing appreciation for distinguished academic research, insight and writing that contributes to a deeper understanding of the influence of sea power and the rise and fall of great powers.

The Hattendorf Prize is made to an individual who has made world-class achievement in original research, contributing to a deeper historical understanding of the broad context and interrelationships involved in the roles, contributions, limitations and uses of the sea services in history.

Among the many achievements of Kennedy are his studies on the British Royal Navy and the role of navies in the rise and fall of great powers, earning him an international reputation and following.

He is the second Hattendorf Prize Laureate.

First awarded in 2011, the prize is made possible through the generosity of the NWC Foundation. It is awarded at two- or three-year intervals, providing a $10,000 cash prize with a citation and bronze medal.

Edited and posted by Daniel S. Marciniak

 

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